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Context of '(9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Counterterrorism ‘Tsar’ Clarke Is Told Some Hijackers Have Al-Qaeda Connections'

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Mohand Alshehri, apparently in Afghanistan.Mohand Alshehri, apparently in Afghanistan. [Source: As Sahab]Some of the “muscle hijackers” transit London when traveling between Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and the US (see April 11-June 28, 2001 and April 23-June 29, 2001):
bullet Satam al Suqami and Waleed Alshehri leave Dubai on April 22, change planes in London, and arrive in Orlando the next day.
bullet Majed Moqed and Ahmed Alghamdi fly from Dubai via London to Washington on May 2.
bullet Hamza Alghamdi, Ahmed Alnami, and Mohand Alshehri pass through London on their way from Dubai to Miami on May 28.
bullet Ahmed Alhaznawi and Wail Alshehri travel from Dubai to Miami via London on June 8.
bullet Fayez Ahmed Banihammad and Saeed Alghamdi transit London en route from Dubai to Orlando on June 27. (US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division 7/31/2006, pp. 42-50 pdf file)
There are also some reports that some of the hijackers spend more time in Britain (see January-June 2001 and June 2001). Ahmed Alghamdi is later said to have been on a British watch list and the Sunday Herald will say that he should have been “instantly ‘red-flagged’ by British intelligence” as he passed through Britain. Alghamdi was linked by the FBI to Raed Hijazi, an associate of Osama bin Laden in prison in Jordan for plotting a bombing campaign there, so the British may have watchlisted him based on information from the US. Two other hijackers that may have been on the British watch list are Satam al Suqami and Hamza Alghamdi, who were investigated by US customs together with Ahmed Alghamdi. If Ahmed Alghamdi was watchlisted based on US information, the names of the other two hijackers may have been passed to the British along with his name. Al Suqami and Ahmed Alghamdi are connected to both Hijazi and one of his associates, Nabil al-Marabh, and are reported to be under investigation, starting between autumn 2000 and spring 2001, by US customs and the FBI (see September 2000, Spring 2001 and September 11, 2001). A British intelligence source will say: “There is no way that MI5 and MI6 should have missed these guys. Britain has a history of having Islamic extremists in the country. We should have been watching them.” (MacKay 9/30/2001) Alghamdi appears to have been questioned about bin Laden after arriving in the US from London, but he is not stopped from entering the country (see May 2, 2001). According to The Times, the identities of some of the men are in question: “Officials hope that the inquiries in Britain will disclose the true identities of the suicide team. Some are known to have arrived in Britain using false passports and fake identities that they kept for the hijack. There are serious question marks over the identities of at least four of the visitors to Britain.” (McGrory and Kennedy 9/26/2001)

CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia.CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. [Source: GlobeXplorer]A fire lasting several hours leads to the forced evacuation of the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. (Reuters 8/8/2001) The fire is discovered on August 7 at around 5:45 p.m., in the northeast section of the agency’s older headquarters building, and more than 60 firefighters are involved in putting it out. It was reportedly caused by a workman at the top of an elevator shaft dropping a welder, which ignited wood at the bottom of the shaft. Both the older headquarters building and the agency’s new headquarters building nearby are evacuated. Following this fire, A. B. “Buzzy” Krongard—the executive director of the CIA since March this year—is dismayed to find that plans for an evacuation of the headquarters are patchy, and that some of the fire alarms do not work. In the ensuing month he therefore initiates regular fire drills and equips key agency officials with tiny walkie-talkies, meaning communication will still be possible should cell phones ever go out. Krongard declares that evacuating safely is to be more important than storing classified material, and has the agency’s computer network reprogrammed so an evacuation warning could be flashed on all computer screens. Journalist and author Ronald Kessler will describe the August 7 fire as being “fortuitous,” as little over a month later, on the morning of September 11, CIA Director George Tenet will order the evacuation of the headquarters building due to fears that it might be targeted (see (9:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). On that day, Tenet and other top officials will reconvene at an alternate location on the CIA campus, “[f]ollowing procedures laid out by Krongard after the fire.” (Central Intelligence Agency 3/16/2001; Associated Press 8/7/2001; Weil 8/8/2001; Kessler 2003, pp. 222-223)

An image from a Dulles Airport surveillance video.An image from a Dulles Airport surveillance video. [Source: FBI]Security cameras at Washington’s Dulles International Airport capture the alleged hijackers of Flight 77 checking in at the airport and passing through a security screening checkpoint. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/19/2001; 9/11 Commission 4/6/2004 pdf file) A surveillance camera located above the British Airways ticket counter points toward the American Airlines ticket counter, and therefore records alleged hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Salem Alhazmi when they check in at the airport (see 7:29 a.m. September 11, 2001). (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/25/2001) Another surveillance camera located by the British Airways ticket counter also points toward the American Airlines ticket counter, and records alleged hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Majed Moqed when they check in (see 7:15 a.m. September 11, 2001). (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/19/2001; Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/19/2001) All five of the alleged hijackers of Flight 77 are recorded on video as they go through a security checkpoint at the airport (see 7:18 a.m. September 11, 2001, (Shortly Before 7:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001, and 7:36 a.m. September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 3; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 27) Dulles Airport is the only one of the three airports used by the hijackers this morning that has videotaping equipment in use at its security checkpoints. Consequently, William Johnstone, a member of the 9/11 Commission staff, will later note, “the most specific information that exists about the processing of the 9/11 hijackers is information about American Airlines Flight 77,” which will take off from Dulles Airport this morning (see (8:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 1/27/2004) In 2004, news organizations will receive a copy of a surveillance video apparently showing the alleged hijackers passing through a security checkpoint at Dulles Airport before boarding Flight 77. The Associated Press will describe the video as “grainy” and report that details are “difficult to distinguish.” It will note that “[n]o knives or other sharp objects are visible” on the video. (Associated Press 7/22/2004)

Khalid Almihdhar and Majed Moqed passing through a security checkpoint at Dulles Airport.Khalid Almihdhar and Majed Moqed passing through a security checkpoint at Dulles Airport. [Source: FBI]Khalid Almihdhar and Majed Moqed, two of the men who will allegedly hijack Flight 77, go through a security screening checkpoint at Washington’s Dulles International Airport. They are screened at the west checkpoint in the airport’s main terminal. Screening passengers is the responsibility of United Airlines, but it contracts the work to Argenbright Security.
Hijackers Set Off the Metal Detector Alarms - After entering the checkpoint, Almihdhar and Moqed place their carry-on bags on the X-ray machine belt and then pass through the first walk-through metal detector. Both men set off the alarm. They are therefore directed to go through a second metal detector. Almihdhar passes through this without any problems but Moqed again sets off the alarm. This leads to him being screened by a security officer with a handheld metal detector wand. No problems are found and so he is allowed to proceed on his way. None of the men’s carry-on bags are inspected by checkpoint personnel. As Moqed is leaving the checkpoint area, he appears to intentionally look down at the floor as he passes a security camera, thereby preventing the camera from capturing a close-up of his face. The other three Flight 77 hijackers will go through the west checkpoint 17 or 18 minutes later (see (Shortly Before 7:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 7:36 a.m. September 11, 2001). (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/19/2001; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 3; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 27)
Screeners Will Recall No Suspicious Activity - Immediately after today’s terrorist attacks, the FAA’s Washington Civil Aviation Security Field Office will investigate the security screening at Dulles Airport. It will interview 43 of the 44 screeners who were on duty today, and these employees will all report having encountered no suspicious activity and nothing out of the ordinary this morning. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 3; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 93) However, lawyer Ron Motley, whose firm will represent some families of victims of today’s attacks, will later criticize the screeners at Dulles Airport, commenting, “Even after setting off these alarms, the airlines and security screeners failed to examine the hijackers’ baggage, as required by federal regulations and industry-mandated standards, or discover the weapons [the hijackers] would use in their attack.” (Associated Press 7/22/2004)

Hani Hanjour passing through a security checkpoint at Dulles Airport.Hani Hanjour passing through a security checkpoint at Dulles Airport. [Source: FBI]Hani Hanjour, one of the men who will allegedly hijack Flight 77, passes through a security screening checkpoint at Washington’s Dulles International Airport without incident. He is screened at the west checkpoint in the airport’s main terminal. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 3; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 27) He has two carry-on bags with him: a small black suitcase and a black bag with a shoulder strap. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/19/2001) After entering the checkpoint, he places them on the X-ray belt and walks through the metal detector. He sets off no alarms and so, after picking up his bags, proceeds on his way. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 3; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 27) His carry-on bags are not physically inspected at the checkpoint. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/19/2001) Two of the other Flight 77 hijackers passed through the west checkpoint 17 minutes ago (see 7:18 a.m. September 11, 2001) and two more will go through it a minute later (see 7:36 a.m. September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 3; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 27) The FAA’s Washington Civil Aviation Security Field Office will investigate the security screening at Dulles Airport today, and the screeners who were on duty will report having encountered no suspicious activity and nothing out of the ordinary this morning. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 3; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 93)

Salem (white shirt) and Nawaf Alhazmi (dark shirt) passing through security at Dulles Airport.Salem (white shirt) and Nawaf Alhazmi (dark shirt) passing through security at Dulles Airport. [Source: FBI]Brothers Nawaf Alhazmi and Salem Alhazmi, two of the men who will allegedly hijack Flight 77, go through a security screening checkpoint at Washington’s Dulles International Airport. They are screened at the west checkpoint in the airport’s main terminal. Both men have one carry-on bag. After entering the checkpoint, Salem Alhazmi walks through a metal detector without setting off the alarm and so is allowed to continue on his way. However, Nawaf Alhazmi sets off the alarm when he passes through it and so he has to walk through a second metal detector. He again sets off the alarm. He is therefore hand-wanded by a member of staff and has his carry-on bag swiped by an explosive trace detector. These checks apparently find no problems and so he is allowed to proceed on his way. Salem Alhazmi’s bag is not physically inspected while the two men are at the checkpoint, nor are the contents of Nawaf Alhazmi’s bag. Security camera footage will later reveal that Nawaf Alhazmi has an unidentified item clipped to the rim of the back pocket of his pants. One of the other Flight 77 hijackers passed through the west checkpoint a minute ago (see 7:35 a.m. September 11, 2001) and two more passed through it 17 minutes before that (see 7:18 a.m. September 11, 2001). The FAA’s Washington Civil Aviation Security Field Office will investigate the security screening at Dulles Airport today and the screeners who were on duty will recall having encountered no suspicious activity and nothing out of the ordinary this morning. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/19/2001; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 3; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 27-28)

American Airlines Flight 11 pushes back from the gate at Boston’s Logan Airport. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 2) There are discrepancies over which gate it leaves from. Most early reports state that it pushes out from Gate 26 in Terminal B of the airport. (Howe and Brelis 9/12/2001; Lawrence, Warmbir, and Sweeney 9/13/2001; Alderson et al. 9/16/2001; Maraniss 9/16/2001; Bernstein 2002, pp. 179; Der Spiegel 2002, pp. 36) However, one unnamed Logan Airport employee will say it leaves from Gate 32, also in Terminal B. (Kurkjian and Lewis 9/11/2001) The transcript of radio communications with the flight confirms it left from Gate 32, and the 9/11 Commission also later states this. (New York Times 10/16/2001; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 451) The reason for the discrepancy in these reports is unclear. Flight 11, a Boeing 767 with a capacity of 158 passengers, is about half full on this day, with 81 passengers on board (including the five hijackers), along with the two pilots and nine flight attendants. (9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 6) It will take off at 7:59 (see (7:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 4)

Daniel Lewin.Daniel Lewin. [Source: Akamai]Daniel Lewin, a 31-year-old Internet entrepreneur who is a passenger on Flight 11, has his throat slashed by hijacker Satam Al Suqami while the plane is being hijacked, thereby becoming the first person to be killed in the 9/11 attacks. (Maltz 11/11/2011; Raskin 2013, pp. 202-203; Leopold 9/11/2013) Lewin was traveling to California to sign a deal he hoped would save his company, which is struggling as a result of the dot-com collapse. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/18/2001; Zuckoff 2019, pp. 39) He is in seat 9B in the business class section of the plane, behind hijackers Mohamed Atta and Abdulaziz Alomari, and directly in front of Al Suqami. (9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 8; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division 7/31/2006)
Assault Will Be Described by Flight Attendants - Details of the events that lead to Lewin’s death will be revealed in phone calls made by two of the flight attendants on Flight 11 to people on the ground. Betty Ong will speak to employees at the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North Carolina, and at 8:19 a.m., presumably referring to Lewin, tell them, “Somebody’s stabbed in business class” (see 8:19 a.m. September 11, 2001). (American Airlines 9/11/2001; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 8) She will subsequently report that Lewin might be dead, saying she has been “informed by other flight attendants that a passenger by the name of Daniel Lewin may have been fatally wounded.” She will say the passenger who was killed was “possibly” in seat 9B (see 8:33 a.m. September 11, 2001). (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/12/2001; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 12) Meanwhile, Amy Sweeney will talk to personnel at the American Airlines flight services office at Logan International Airport in Boston in a series of calls beginning at 8:25 a.m. and, presumably referring to the attack on Lewin, report that “a passenger in row 9… had their throat cut by a passenger in seat 10B,” which is Al Suqami’s seat (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001, 8:29 a.m. September 11, 2001, and (8:32 a.m.-8:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 6; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 10-11) She will say the injured passenger “is bleeding severely” and “is not going to make it.” (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001)
Claim Will Be Made that Lewin Was Shot - Some evidence will indicate that Lewin was shot, rather than having his throat slashed, by Al Suqami (see 8:44 a.m. September 11, 2001, 9:20 a.m. September 11, 2001, and 5:13 p.m. September 11, 2001). (Federal Aviation Administration 9/2001; United Press International 3/6/2002; General Accounting Office 8/30/2002) However, FAA and FBI officials will later say a report of a gun on Flight 11 was a mistake, and the 9/11 Commission will conclude that a shooting on Flight 11 was unlikely to have occurred. (Eggen 3/2/2002; 9/11 Commission 2003; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 452-453)
Lewin Would Have Tried to Stop the Hijackers - Lewin is presumably attacked by Al Suqami at around 8:14 a.m. or shortly after, since this is when the hijacking of Flight 11 begins, according to the 9/11 Commission Report (see 8:14 a.m. September 11, 2001). It is unclear whether he has his throat slashed while attempting to stop the terrorists. The 9/11 Commission Report will tentatively suggest that he “may have made an attempt to stop the hijackers in front of him, not realizing that another was sitting behind him.” (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 4-5) However, numerous friends and family members of Lewin who are interviewed by author Molly Knight Raskin for a book about the entrepreneur will say they are sure he died while trying to stop the hijackers. They will state that “there was no way Lewin could have sat idly by and watched terrorists hurt flight attendants and attempt to hijack the plane.” “I know he’d have fought like a lion,” Brad Rephen, who knew Lewin as a teenager, will say.
Lewin Is 'Pure Strength' - Their belief that Lewin would have tried to stop the hijackers is due in part to his physical strength. (Maltz 11/11/2011; Raskin 2013, pp. 218-219) He is “muscular and agile,” and “pure strength from head to toe,” according to Raskin. As a teenager, he regularly attended a gym and trained so hard “that his physical strength multiplied,” friends of his will say. By the age of 16, he was able to bench-press more than 300 pounds. (Raskin 2013, pp. 30-31; Raskin 9/2013) He won the title of “Mr. Teenage Israel” in a coveted bodybuilding competition. (Leibovitz 9/11/2013) Rephen will find it difficult to believe a hijacker could have taken him down with just a knife. “I’m pretty sure that if [the hijackers] had knives, [Lewin] would have taken them,” he will say. (Maltz 11/11/2011)
Lewin Had Training in Counterterrorism - The ability of Lewin to take on the hijackers and his willingness to do so are presumably greater due to his military experience. He moved with his family from Denver, Colorado, to Israel when he was 14 and, when he was 18, joined the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). He spent almost four years in the IDF, eventually rising to the rank of captain, and served in the Sayeret Matkal—the IDF’s most elite counterterrorism unit. (Chicago Tribune 9/17/2001; Maltz 11/11/2011; Raskin 2013, pp. 4) The Sayeret Matkal is “perhaps the most effective counterterrorism force in the world,” according to Vanity Fair, and, according to Raskin, its members have “almost unmatched counterterrorism skills.” (Cohen 12/2001; Raskin 2013, pp. 38)
Lewin Committed Himself to Defeating Terrorism - Furthermore, Lewin knows conversational Arabic and, Raskin will note, this would have enabled him to pick up on any verbal cues of the planned hijacking, if the terrorists had given any. (Raskin 9/2013) Ironically, while he was in the IDF, Lewin became committed to eliminating terrorism. “Danny had a very clear view that the way to address terrorism was not to sit idly by and let innocent people be killed, but to actively go out and cut the head off the stick,” one of his brothers will say. (Raskin 2013, pp. 37-38)
Lewin Is a Highly Successful Businessman - Lewin is a particularly talented and successful person. After returning to the US from Israel in 1996, while he was a graduate student at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) he co-invented a way for the Internet to handle Web congestion, thereby making it run faster. (Raskin 9/2013; Zuckoff 2019, pp. 38; High 3/25/2019) This led him to co-found the high-tech firm Akamai in 1998. The company, of which he is chief technology officer, now has around 1,500 employees. (Mualem, Arbeli, and Shamir 9/13/2001; Greenberg 9/5/2008; Raskin 2013, pp. 200) It has had great success. By the age of 30, Lewin’s net worth was $285.9 million and Lewin was, for a time, a paper billionaire. (Raskin 2013, pp. 195; Raskin 9/2013; Leopold 9/11/2013) In April 2001, Forbes magazine placed him at number 72 in its annual list of “100 Highest Rollers,” made up of the highest earners working in information technology. Three months later, Enterprise Systems magazine included him in the top 10 of its list of leaders in technology. (Willis 4/2/2001; Enterprise Systems 7/2001; Raskin 2013, pp. 195) Akamai was even employed recently by the White House to provide cybersecurity for its Internet infrastructure (see July 2001). (Clarke and Knake 2010, pp. 112; High 3/25/2019)

Vanessa Minter.Vanessa Minter. [Source: Capitol Broadcasting Company]Betty Ong, a flight attendant on Flight 11, calls the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North Carolina, to report the emergency on her plane. Ong makes the call using an Airfone. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 5; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division 7/31/2006) Flight attendants know the reservations 800 number that she calls because they often call it to help passengers with reservations questions. Calls made to the number are routed to the first available phone station at one of several facilities, including the office in Cary. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 72-74; 9/11 Commission 11/19/2003 pdf file; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 8)
Ong Tells Agent, 'We're Being Hijacked' - The call is answered by Vanessa Minter, a reservation agent. The first thing Ong says is, “I think we’re being hijacked.” (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/12/2001, pp. 38-41; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 453) Minter will later reflect: “There was something in her voice that said: ‘Okay, this isn’t funny. This isn’t a joke. This is real.’” (WRAL 9/9/2011)
Resolution Agent Joins Call - Minter asks Ong to hold for a moment. She then phones the American Airlines international resolution desk, which is on the other side of the building. Winston Sadler, the resolution agent, answers, and Minter tells him she has a woman on the phone who is calling from an American Airlines flight that is being hijacked. Minter says she cannot find the “emergency button” on her phone, and Sadler notices that she seems panicked. He offers to take over the call, and so Minter transfers it to him. The phone system allows Sadler to be connected to Minter’s line while Minter remains on it.
Alarm Sent Out to Notify Supervisor - Realizing the seriousness of the situation, Sadler pushes the emergency button on his phone, which initiates a tape recording of Ong’s call and also sends out an alarm that notifies Nydia Gonzalez, a supervisor at the reservations office, to pick up the call. Gonzalez will join the call from Ong a short time later (see 8:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). Sadler will tell the FBI that as soon as he joins Ong’s call, he is convinced it is a genuine phone call from an airplane, because he is used to hearing the background noise that occurs in calls from airplane telephones, and he can hear such noise during Ong’s call. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/12/2001, pp. 38-41; Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/12/2001, pp. 42-44; 9/11 Commission 11/19/2003 pdf file; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 453)
Only First Four Minutes of Call Recorded - Ong’s call will last over 25 minutes, ending at around 8:44 a.m. or 8:45 a.m. (see (8:43 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and in it Ong will relay crucial information about what is happening on her plane. (9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 8; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division 7/31/2006) However, only the first four minutes of the call are recorded. This is because the recently installed recording system at the reservations office has a default time limit. The recording system it replaced did not have such a time limit. (9/11 Commission 11/19/2003 pdf file; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 8)

Betty Ong.Betty Ong. [Source: The Eagle-Tribune]Betty Ong, a flight attendant on Flight 11, begins relaying information about the trouble on her plane to employees at the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North Carolina. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 5) Ong has just called the reservations office to report the hijacking of Flight 11, and is on the line with two employees there: Vanessa Minter and Winston Sadler (see 8:18 a.m. September 11, 2001). (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/12/2001, pp. 38-41; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 453)
Ong Describes Hijacking but Gives Wrong Flight Number - Ong tells Minter and Sadler: “The cockpit’s not answering, somebody’s stabbed in business class, and I think there’s Mace, that we can’t breathe.… I think we’re getting hijacked.” Sadler asks Ong what flight she is on and Ong replies, incorrectly, “Flight 12.” She says her plane just left Boston and is supposed to go to Los Angeles, and the pilots are not answering the phone in the cockpit. She says she is in the jump seat, 3R, which is at the back of the plane, behind the coach section. (American Airlines 9/11/2001, pp. 3-6; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 6, 8) However, Amy Sweeney, another flight attendant who makes a call from Flight 11, is in the next-to-last row of passenger seats in the coach section of the plane, and she will say that Ong is sitting next to her (see (8:32 a.m.-8:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (Sheehy 2/15/2004; Sheehy 6/20/2004; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 11)
Ong Says Two Flight Attendants Stabbed - Sadler asks Ong her name and she replies: “My name is Betty Ong. I’m number three [flight attendant] on Flight 11.” She says the number one flight attendant and the number five flight attendant have been stabbed. (American Airlines 9/11/2001, pp. 3-6) These two attendants are Barbara Arestegui and Karen Martin. (9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 6) Ong says, “Nobody knows who stabbed who and we can’t even get up to business class right now, ‘cause nobody can breathe.” She also says: “We can’t get into the cockpit. The door won’t open.” (American Airlines 9/11/2001, pp. 3-6) Sadler takes notes of the call, using his computer “scratch pad.” (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/12/2001, pp. 42-44) He notifies Ong of this, saying, “I’m taking it down, all the information.” He tells Ong, “We’re also, you know, of course, recording this.” (American Airlines 9/11/2001, pp. 3-6)
Ong Receiving Details of Hijacking from Colleague - During the entire conversation, Sadler will later recall, Ong seems to be talking to someone in the background and receiving information from them. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/12/2001, pp. 42-44) This person is presumably Sara Low, another of the flight attendants, who was assigned to the front of the plane and so would have witnessed the hijacking when it happened. (Associated Press 3/5/2009; Zambito 3/6/2009; Keith 9/11/2011) Ong will keep repeating herself during the call, Minter will recall, such as repeatedly mentioning the stabbings on her plane. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/12/2001, pp. 38-41) Nydia Gonzalez, a supervisor at the reservations office, has been alerted to the call and will soon join it (see 8:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 11/19/2003 pdf file; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 453)

Nydia Gonzalez.Nydia Gonzalez. [Source: 9/11 Commission]Nydia Gonzalez, a supervisor at the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North Carolina, joins a phone call between two employees at her office and Betty Ong, a flight attendant on the hijacked Flight 11. (9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 8-9) Ong called the reservations office at 8:18 a.m. to report the hijacking (see 8:18 a.m. September 11, 2001), and has since then been talking to two employees there: Vanessa Minter and Winston Sadler. Sadler pushed the emergency button on his phone to alert personnel in the operations area of the reservations office, so that one of them could pick up the call from Ong. A colleague of Gonzalez’s initially picked up the call, but Gonzalez quickly takes over from them. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/12/2001, pp. 38-41; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 453; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division 7/31/2006) Gonzalez, Minter, and Sadler are in different areas of the reservations office, but all three of them are able to monitor Ong’s call. (9/11 Commission 11/19/2003 pdf file)
Supervisor Told of Stabbings on Flight 11 - The first thing Gonzalez says when she joins the call is: “This is operations. What flight number are we talking about?” Ong earlier told Minter and Sadler, incorrectly, that she was on “Flight 12,” not Flight 11 (see 8:19 a.m. September 11, 2001). Sadler therefore tells Gonzalez, “Flight 12.” Ong quickly corrects him, saying: “We’re on Flight 11 right now. This is Flight 11.… Boston to Los Angeles.” She also repeats information she previously gave to Minter and Sadler, saying, “Our number one [flight attendant] has been stabbed and our [number] five [flight attendant] has been stabbed.” (American Airlines 9/11/2001, pp. 3-6)
Supervisor Notifies Airline's Operations Center - Gonzalez is an operations specialist, and her responsibilities include monitoring any emergency situations with American Airlines flights and forwarding information to the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center in Fort Worth, Texas. (9/11 Commission 1/27/2004 pdf file; Spencer 2008, pp. 17) She immediately realizes the seriousness of the situation on Flight 11 and therefore, while remaining connected to Ong’s call, phones the SOC on a separate line to notify it of the problem (see (8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 11/19/2003 pdf file; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 9) Gonzalez will later recall that she finds Ong to be “calm, professional, and in control throughout the call.” (9/11 Commission 1/27/2004 pdf file) She will also say that during the time she is monitoring Ong’s call, she does not hear much commotion in the background. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/12/2001, pp. 69-71)

Madeline ‘Amy’ Sweeney.Madeline ‘Amy’ Sweeney. [Source: Nashua Telegraph / Getty Images]Madeline “Amy” Sweeney, a flight attendant on Flight 11, makes two unsuccessful attempts at calling the American Airlines flight services office at Logan International Airport in Boston. (9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 9-10; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division 7/31/2006) Flight 11 took off from Logan Airport at 7:59 a.m. (see (7:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (Kifner 9/13/2001) The American Airlines flight services office at the airport manages the scheduling and operation of flight attendants. Attendants go there to check in for duty and fill in their pre-flight paperwork, among other things. The office’s phone number is well known to the American Airlines flight attendants who operate out of Logan Airport. (9/11 Commission 1/25/2004 pdf file; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 9) Sweeney first tries phoning the flight services office at 8:22 a.m., but the call fails to connect. Her second attempted call, two minutes later, also fails to connect. (9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 9-10; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division 7/31/2006) Sweeney tries making the calls from a passenger seat in the next-to-last row of the coach section of the plane. She makes the attempted calls on an Airfone, using a calling card given to her by Sara Low, another of the plane’s flight attendants. (Sheehy 2/15/2004; Sheehy 6/20/2004; Keith 9/11/2011) Sweeney will finally reach the American Airlines flight services office on her third attempt to do so, at 8:25 a.m., and alert its staff to what is happening on her plane (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001). (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 57-58; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 10)

Amy Sweeney, a flight attendant on Flight 11, finally reaches the American Airlines flight services office at Logan International Airport in Boston, and tells the employee who answers the call about the trouble on her plane. Sweeney’s two previous attempts at calling the flight services office failed to connect (see 8:22 a.m.-8:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). But her third attempted call is answered by Evelyn Nunez, a passenger service agent for American Airlines. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 57-58; 9/11 Commission 2004, pp. 4; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 9-10)
Sweeney Says Two Attendants Stabbed, One Passenger Had Throat Cut - Sweeney talks fast during the call. She says she is an American Airlines flight attendant, but does not give her name. Nunez will later tell the FBI that Sweeney says that “Flight 12 at Gate 32 had two flight attendants stabbed.” (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 57-58) (Although Sweeney is on Flight 11, not Flight 12, Flight 11 departed from Gate 32 at Logan Airport (see 7:40 a.m. September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 7) ) Sweeney says a passenger seated in row 9 of the plane had their throat cut by a passenger in seat 10B. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 57-58) This would be a reference to passenger Daniel Lewin being attacked by hijacker Satam Al Suqami (see (8:14 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (Guttman 7/22/2004; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 5) Sweeney also says there is a bomb on the plane. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 57-58)
Sweeney Given Details of Hijacking by Another Flight Attendant - Sweeney makes this call from the next-to-last row of passenger seats in the coach section of her plane, using an Airfone. (Sheehy 2/15/2004; Sheehy 6/20/2004) She gets her information about the trouble on Flight 11 from Sara Low, another of the flight attendants, who was assigned to the front of the plane and so would have witnessed the hijacking when it happened. (Dwinell 12/15/2008; Associated Press 3/5/2009) But after 1 minute and 47 seconds, the call is cut off. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 6; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division 7/31/2006)
Flight Services Manager Overhears Call - Michael Woodward, an American Airlines flight services manager at Logan Airport, hears Nunez talking on the phone to Sweeney. Nunez is talking in a “rather loud” voice, Woodward will recall, and keeps saying to Sweeney: “What, what, what?… Who’s hurt?… What?” When Woodward asks what is wrong, Nunez says she has received an odd phone call, in which the caller said someone was hurt on Flight 12. “She indicated that someone had been hurt, stabbed,” Woodward will recall. Woodward will tell the 9/11 Commission that he mistakenly thinks the incident the caller described “was air rage, because there was a lot of that type of thing going on at the time.” He thinks that “maybe there was a disturbance in the terminal.” Woodward will subsequently head to a departure gate to see if anything is wrong there (see (8:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 1/25/2004 pdf file)
Agent Determines Name of Hijacker - Nunez immediately calls flight operations for American Airlines to determine the status of Flight 12, the plane Sweeney said she was on. Nunez learns that it was in fact Flight 11 that recently left Logan Airport. She then runs a computer check to find the name of the passenger Sweeney identified, who was in seat 10B on Flight 11. Nunez determines that the passenger was Al Suqami. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 57-58) Sweeney will call the American Airlines flight services office again at 8:29 a.m. and 8:32 a.m. (see 8:29 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (8:32 a.m.-8:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 6; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division 7/31/2006)

Michael Woodward, an American Airlines flight services manager at Logan International Airport in Boston, goes with a colleague to the American Airlines gate area at Logan Airport in response to a call from a flight attendant on Flight 11, but finds the area quiet and sees that all of his airline’s morning flights, including Flight 11, have already left the airport. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 5-6; 9/11 Commission 1/25/2004 pdf file; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 10)
Manager and Colleague Head to Departure Gate - Amy Sweeney, a flight attendant on Flight 11, called the American Airlines flight services office at Logan Airport at 8:25 a.m. and told Evelyn Nunez, a passenger service agent, about the trouble on her plane (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001). Nunez passed on the details of the call to Woodward. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 57-58; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 10) She told Woodward that the plane on which the trouble occurred was at Gate 32 at the airport. Woodward therefore heads to the departure gate with Elizabeth Williams, a colleague of his, to see if the plane is still there. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 5-6) Williams will later recall that Woodward tells her that “they needed to go to Gate 32 because two flight attendants had been stabbed.” (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/13/2001, pp. 3-4) Sweeney incorrectly told Nunez that she was on Flight 12, not Flight 11. However, Flight 11 did indeed depart from Gate 32 at Logan Airport (see 7:40 a.m. September 11, 2001). (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 57-58; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 7)
Manager and Colleague Realize They Have Been Given Incorrect Information - Woodward will say that when he and Williams reach Gate 32, they find that all of American Airlines’ morning flights have already left Logan Airport. (9/11 Commission 1/25/2004 pdf file; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 10) However, Williams will contradict this, telling the FBI that when she and Woodward reach the departure gate, they find “an empty airplane” there. Williams uses the gate-side computer to search for information on the flight time of the plane at Gate 32, while Woodward phones Nunez. Williams and Woodward then conclude that they must have received incorrect information. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/13/2001, pp. 3-4)
Manager Realizes Flight 12 Is a Plane from Los Angeles - Woodward realizes that Flight 12—the plane Sweeney said she was on—is a flight from the West Coast that has not yet left for Boston. He says to Williams: “Wait a minute: Flight 12 comes in at night. It hasn’t even left Los Angeles yet.” Woodward will tell the 9/11 Commission that he is currently thinking about how “sometimes the [American Airlines] operations center will call when there is a problem on a flight, and tell them to meet it when the aircraft lands.” Presumably he means that he is wondering if the call Nunez received from Sweeney was actually made by someone at the airline’s operations center, who was referring to a flight that is heading to Boston. Woodward and Williams check out the gate area and then, finding nothing wrong there, walk back to their office, which takes them about two minutes. Woodward will talk to Sweeney when she calls the flight services office again at 8:32 a.m. (see (8:32 a.m.-8:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 1/25/2004 pdf file; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 10-11)

James Sayer.James Sayer. [Source: Boston Globe]Amy Sweeney, a flight attendant on Flight 11, reaches the American Airlines flight services office at Logan International Airport in Boston for the second time, and describes the trouble on her plane to an employee there. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 7-8; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 6; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division 7/31/2006) Sweeney called the flight services office at 8:25 a.m. and told Evelyn Nunez, a passenger service agent, about the trouble on Flight 11, but the call was cut off after less than two minutes (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001). (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 57-58; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 10; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division 7/31/2006) Sweeney now calls the flight services office again. Nunez is busy making a phone call, so Sweeney’s call is answered by James Sayer, a staff assistant.
Sweeney Describes Stabbings on Flight 11 - Sayer takes notes while he is talking to Sweeney. He will later describe to the FBI what she tells him. Sweeney apparently does not give her name during the call. Sayer will recall that “[o]n the telephone was [a] female flight attendant on… Flight 11, calling from the air, who stated that two flight attendants were stabbed and a man in business class had been stabbed in the throat.” (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 7-8) Sweeney would be referring to flight attendants Barbara Arestegui and Karen Martin, and passenger Daniel Lewin (see (8:14 a.m.) September 11, 2001), who were attacked by the hijackers. (ABC News 7/18/2002; Guttman 7/22/2004) Sweeney says that a “doctor and nurse on board the plane [are] caring for the injured man,” Sayer will recall. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 7-8) Michael Woodward, a manager in the flight services office who talks with Sweeney in a subsequent call (see (8:32 a.m.-8:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001), will also tell the FBI that Sweeney says a doctor and nurse are caring for a passenger who has been stabbed. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 5-6) However, Betty Ong, another flight attendant on Flight 11, is currently talking over the phone to employees at the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in North Carolina (see 8:19 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 8:21 a.m. September 11, 2001), and she will say there are no doctors on the plane (see 8:36 a.m.-8:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). (American Airlines 9/11/2001, pp. 7-19; 9/11 Commission 1/27/2004 pdf file)
Hijackers Have a Bomb and Are in the Cockpit - Sweeney tells Sayer that the individuals who took over her plane “had Mace and pepper spray,” and she can “detect an odor in the cabin.” She says that “two people had gone in the cockpit and they said they had a bomb.” Apparently describing the bomb, Sweeney says she “observed two boxes connected with red and yellow wire.”
Sweeney Gives Incorrect Information about Plane's Location and Hijackers' Seat Numbers - Sweeney says Flight 11 is currently in the air over New York City, Sayer will recall. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 7-8) However, Flight 11 recently turned south over Albany, which is about 150 miles north of New York (see (8:26 a.m.-8:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and so is still a long way from the city. (Federal Aviation Administration 9/17/2001 pdf file; National Transportation Safety Board 2/19/2002 pdf file) Sweeney also indicates that she thinks there are only three hijackers on Flight 11, telling Sayer that the hijackers were in seats 9C, 9G, and 10B. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 7-8) However, apart from seat 10B, these seat numbers are different to those registered in the hijackers’ names. The five hijackers on Flight 11 had been in seats 2A, 2B, 8D, 8G, and 10B, according to the 9/11 Commission Report. (BBC 9/21/2001; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 2)
Call Is Disconnected, but Sweeney Phones Again - Sweeney’s call is cut off after 43 seconds. (US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division 7/31/2006) Sayer will answer the phone when Sweeney contacts the flight services office again at 8:32 a.m., but he will pass the call on to Woodward. It is unclear whether all the information that Sayer describes to the FBI, about the problems on Flight 11, is given to him by Sweeney in the current call, or if she provides some of it to him in the 8:32 a.m. call. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 7-8; 9/11 Commission 1/25/2004 pdf file; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 11)

Michael Woodward.Michael Woodward. [Source: Discovery Channel]Amy Sweeney, a flight attendant on Flight 11, reaches the American Airlines flight services office at Logan International Airport in Boston for the third time, and, in a phone call lasting 12 or 13 minutes, gives details of the trouble on her plane to a manager there. (9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 11; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division 7/31/2006) Sweeney has already called the flight services office two times and provided employees there with details of the hijacking of Flight 11, but both calls were cut off after a short time (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 8:29 a.m. September 11, 2001).
Manager Takes Over Answering Call - At 8:32 a.m., Sweeney reaches the office for the third time. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 6; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division 7/31/2006) The call is answered by James Sayer, a staff assistant. But Sayer tells Michael Woodward, an American Airlines flight services manager at Logan Airport, that the caller is Sweeney, and Woodward then takes over the call. Woodward is friends with Sweeney and has known her personally for 10 years. Furthermore, Woodward will tell the 9/11 Commission, Sayer is not trained to handle emergency calls. Woodward asks Sweeney, “Amy, sweetie, what’s going on?” She replies, “Listen to me very, very carefully.” Realizing that Sweeney is going to give him important information, Woodward immediately begins taking notes.
Sweeney Provides Details of Hijacking - Woodward will tell the 9/11 Commission that, in a matter-of-fact and official manner, Sweeney then describes to him the trouble on her plane. She says she is sitting in the back of the aircraft next to Betty Ong, another flight attendant, and the two of them are trying to relay as much information as they can to people on the ground. She says her plane has been hijacked, a man in first class had his throat slashed, and two flight attendants—Karen Martin and Barbara Arestegui—have been stabbed. Sweeney says that Martin isn’t doing very well and is on oxygen, but Arestegui is less seriously injured and seems to be alright. She says the hijackers have gained entry into the cockpit, though she doesn’t say how they did this, and there is a bomb in the cockpit. She makes no comments about the condition of the pilots, but says the flight attendants are unable to contact the cockpit. Later in the conversation, she says she doesn’t think the original pilot is in control of the plane, because they are flying “all over the place.” (9/11 Commission 1/25/2004 pdf file; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 11-12)
Sweeney Gives Seat Numbers of Hijackers - Sweeney apparently believes there are only three hijackers on Flight 11. She tells Woodward that the people who hijacked her plane were in seats 9D, 9G, and 10B. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 5-6; 9/11 Commission 1/25/2004 pdf file; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 14) However, apart from seat 10B, these are different seats to those assigned to the hijackers on the tickets they purchased. (Lichtblau 9/20/2001; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 2) Sweeney tells Woodward that the hijackers are of Middle Eastern descent. She says one of them spoke excellent English and another spoke very little English. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/13/2001, pp. 1-2; 9/11 Commission 1/25/2004 pdf file)
Doctor or Nurse Requested - Woodward will say, when he is first questioned by the FBI about Sweeney’s call, that Sweeney tells him that a doctor and nurse are caring for the passenger who had his throat slashed. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 5-6) But Ong, who is on the phone with employees at the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in North Carolina (see 8:19 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 8:21 a.m. September 11, 2001), says there are no doctors on Flight 11 (see 8:36 a.m.-8:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). (American Airlines 9/11/2001, pp. 7-19; 9/11 Commission 1/27/2004 pdf file) However, in a second interview with the FBI and in his interview with the 9/11 Commission, Woodward will say only that a doctor or nurse has been paged.
Woodward Gives Contradictory Accounts of Type of Phone Used - Woodward hears no noise in the background during his conversation with Sweeney. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/13/2001, pp. 1-2; 9/11 Commission 1/25/2004 pdf file) The information Sweeney provides about the hijacking has been given to her by Sara Low, a flight attendant who was assigned to the front of Flight 11 and so would have witnessed the hijacking when it happened. (Dwinell 12/15/2008; Associated Press 3/5/2009) In interviews with the FBI, Woodward will say that Sweeney makes the call using an Airfone, or that he is unsure whether she uses an Airfone or a cell phone. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 5-6; Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/13/2001, pp. 1-2) But he will tell the 9/11 Commission that she makes the call on a cell phone. (9/11 Commission 1/25/2004 pdf file) However, the FBI will state that Sweeney is using an Airfone. (9/11 Commission 2004, pp. 4; Sheehy 6/20/2004; Keith 9/11/2011) There is no tape machine in the flight services office, and so her call is not recorded. (9/11 Commission 1/25/2004 pdf file; Sheehy 6/20/2004)
Airline Contacted about Call - At 8:40 a.m., one of Woodward’s colleagues in the flight services office calls the American Airlines System Operations Control center in Fort Worth, Texas, and passes on to it the information that Sweeney is providing to Woodward (see 8:40 a.m.-8:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). Sweeney’s call ends after 12 or 13 minutes (see (8:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 11, 14; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division 7/31/2006)

Michael Woodward, a manager at the American Airlines flight services office at Logan International Airport in Boston, instructs a colleague to find out the details of three hijackers on Flight 11, based on their seat numbers, but it is unclear whether his colleague is then able to identify the hijackers. (ABC News 7/18/2002; Sheehy 2/15/2004) Since 8:32 a.m., Woodward has been on the phone with Amy Sweeney, a flight attendant on Flight 11, who has been describing to him the trouble on her plane (see (8:32 a.m.-8:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 11) During the call, she says that the men who hijacked her plane were in seats 9D, 9G, and 10B. (9/11 Commission 1/25/2004 pdf file) According to the New York Observer, Woodward then orders a colleague “to punch up those seat locations on the computer.” (Sheehy 2/15/2004) This enables airline personnel “to pull up [the hijackers’] names, phone numbers, addresses—and even credit card numbers—on the reservations computer,” according to ABC News. ABC News will add, “One of the names that came up was Mohamed Atta,” the name of the lead hijacker. (ABC News 7/18/2002) However, apart from 10B—the number of the seat belonging to Satam Al Suqami—the seat numbers provided by Sweeney are different to the numbers of the seats assigned to the hijackers. The five hijackers on Flight 11 were in seats 2A, 2B, 8D, 8G, and 10B, according to the 9/11 Commission Report. Atta was in seat 8D—not one of the seats mentioned by Sweeney. (Lichtblau 9/20/2001; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 2) It is therefore unclear whether American Airlines is able to determine the identities of any of the hijackers, other than, presumably, Al Suqami, at this time. Evelyn Nunez, a passenger service agent at the American Airlines flight services office, was provided with the seat number of Al Suqami, but none of the other hijackers, when she talked with Sweeney in an earlier call, at 8:25 a.m. (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001). By running a computer check, she was able to determine Al Suqami’s identity from this number. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 57-58) Nancy Wyatt, another employee in the flight services office, will pass on the three hijackers’ seat numbers provided by Sweeney to the American Airlines System Operations Control center in Fort Worth, Texas, when she calls it at 8:40 a.m. (see 8:40 a.m.-8:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). (American Airlines 9/11/2001, pp. 34-41; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 14)

Flight attendants Karen Martin and Barbara Arestegui.Flight attendants Karen Martin and Barbara Arestegui. [Source: Family photos]Betty Ong, a flight attendant on the hijacked Flight 11, tells American Airlines employees on the ground that there are no doctors on her plane who could help the injured crew members, and this information leads an airline manager to decide that he wants Flight 11 to land at the next available airport. (American Airlines 9/11/2001, pp. 7-19; Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 49-51; 9/11 Commission 1/27/2004 pdf file) Ong is on the phone with employees at the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in North Carolina (see 8:18 a.m. September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 8) She previously told them that the “number one” flight attendant on her plane—Karen Martin—and the “number five” flight attendant—Barbara Arestegui—had been stabbed (see 8:19 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 8:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). (American Airlines 9/11/2001, pp. 3-6)
Ong Confirms that Stabbed Flight Attendant Is on Oxygen - Nydia Gonzalez, one of the reservations office employees talking to Ong, asks, “So the number one flight attendant—the one that was stabbed—she’s on oxygen right now?” (American Airlines 9/11/2001, pp. 7-19) Ong says that other crew members have been “able to administer oxygen” to Martin and that Martin is “able to breathe,” Gonzalez will later recall. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/12/2001, pp. 69-71; 9/11 Commission 1/27/2004 pdf file) Gonzalez then asks, “And the number five: that was a superficial wound, you were saying?” (American Airlines 9/11/2001, pp. 7-19) Ong says the number five flight attendant’s injury is less serious. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/12/2001, pp. 69-71)
Ong Says There Is No Doctor on Flight 11 - While she is on the phone with Ong, Gonzalez has been relaying the information Ong provides to Craig Marquis, the manager on duty at the American Airlines System Operations Control center in Texas, on another phone line (see (8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 11/19/2003 pdf file; Spencer 2008, pp. 17-18) Marquis now requests that Gonzalez ask Ong a question. He says to Gonzalez: “Who’s helping them? Is there a doctor on board?” Gonzalez passes on Marquis’s question, asking Ong, “Is there a doctor on board, Betty, that’s assisting you guys?” (American Airlines 9/11/2001, pp. 7-19) Ong indicates that there isn’t a doctor on Flight 11. (9/11 Commission 1/27/2004 pdf file)
Marquis Wants Flight 11 to Land - Marquis will tell the FBI that because there is “no doctor on board Flight 11 to help the injured,” he wants “the aircraft to land at the next available airport.” Because of “the medical emergencies and the violence” on the plane, Marquis will say, he intends “for medical personnel and law enforcement to meet the aircraft as soon as it landed.” (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 49-51)

Nancy Wyatt, a manager at the American Airlines flight services office at Logan International Airport in Boston, talks on the phone with an employee at the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center, and passes on to them information that is being provided by a flight attendant on the hijacked Flight 11, but the SOC employee advises Wyatt to keep quiet about the hijacking. (American Airlines 9/11/2001, pp. 34-41; 9/11 Commission 2004, pp. 4; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 14; et al. 9/7/2011, pp. 14 pdf file) Amy Sweeney, a flight attendant on Flight 11, called the flight services office at 8:32 a.m., and has since then been providing details of the trouble on her plane to Michael Woodward, an American Airlines flight services manager at Logan Airport (see (8:32 a.m.-8:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 11)
Wyatt Passes on Details of Call in Real Time - Wyatt, who, like Woodward, is an American Airlines flight services manager, calls the American Airlines SOC in Fort Worth, Texas, at 8:40 a.m. Her call is answered by Ray Howland. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/15/2001, pp. 2-4; 9/11 Commission 2004, pp. 4; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 14) During the call, Wyatt is able to pass on information to Howland in real time, because she is standing next to Woodward and so is hearing his side of the conversation with Sweeney, and she is also able to read the notes he is taking, based on what Sweeney tells him. (9/11 Commission 1/25/2004 pdf file)
Wyatt Unclear about Name of Flight Attendant - Wyatt is unclear about the identity of the flight attendant Woodward is talking to. At the start of the call with Howland, she says, “We’ve got the flight attendants on the line here.” A couple of minutes later, she says, “We’ve got… Betty Ong, the purser, on the line.” (American Airlines 9/11/2001, pp. 34-41) However, Ong is currently on the phone with the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in North Carolina (see 8:18 a.m. September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 8) Finally, another couple of minutes later and after checking with Woodward, Wyatt tells Howland, “Amy Sweeney is on the phone.”
Wyatt Passes on Hijackers' Seat Numbers - Based on Sweeney’s information, Wyatt says that Flight 11 “is in a rapid descent.” She tells Howland that the hijackers were in seats 9D, 9G, and 10B, and she says one of them “speaks no English.” She also reports, several minutes into the call, that the hijackers are “in the cockpit.” Wyatt tells Howland that two flight attendants, Karen Martin and Barbara Arestegui, have been stabbed. (American Airlines 9/11/2001, pp. 34-41) Referring to passenger Daniel Lewin, who was attacked by one of the hijackers (see (8:14 a.m.) September 11, 2001), she says: “There is severe bleeding. There is a slashed throat.” She subsequently says, “There is a passenger also injured.” (American Airlines 9/11/2001, pp. 34-41; Nickisch 9/8/2011)
Airline Wants Information Withheld from Plane's Crew - During the call, Howland tells Wyatt that the SOC wants some information to be withheld from Sweeney and the other crew members on Flight 11. After Wyatt says the flight attendants on Flight 11 “are concerned” because they “don’t know what’s going on in the cockpit,” Howland replies that the SOC is “trying to get in contact with the cockpit,” but then says, “We don’t really want to tell [Sweeney] that.” Wyatt confirms: “Okay, don’t. Okay, okay. Got it.” And when Wyatt later asks: “Do we know where that plane is going to right now?” Howland replies: “We don’t know.… [I]t looks like it’s going to JFK” International Airport in New York, but he then says: “I mean, we don’t really want to give a whole lot of information to that flight. Okay?” Wyatt confirms: “Okay, we’re not. We’re not giving them that information to that flight.”
Airline Employees Told to Keep Quiet about Hijacking - Wyatt and Howland also want American Airlines employees on the ground to keep quiet about the hijacking. At about 8:46 a.m., while she is still on the phone with Howland, Wyatt says to a colleague of hers: “Evelyn, don’t mention this to anyone. Me, you, Beth. Just the five of us. Okay?” (American Airlines 9/11/2001, pp. 34-41) (“Evelyn” and “Beth” are Evelyn Nunez and Elizabeth Williams, two American Airlines employees at Logan Airport. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/11/2001, pp. 57-58; Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/13/2001, pp. 3-4; 9/11 Commission 1/25/2004 pdf file) ) Near the end of her call with Howland, Wyatt asks, “What do you want us to do as far as just keeping our mouths shut and not… ?” Howland answers simply, “That’s basically it.” (American Airlines 9/11/2001, pp. 34-41) Wyatt notifies Howland when the call from Sweeney gets disconnected, at around 8:45 a.m. (see (8:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 14) Her call with Howland ends at 8:48 a.m. (9/11 Commission 2004, pp. 4)

Dianne Snyder.Dianne Snyder. [Source: Family photo]Amy Sweeney, a flight attendant on Flight 11, tells an American Airlines manager at Logan International Airport in Boston that the passengers in the coach section of her plane believe there is simply a routine medical emergency at the front of their plane. (ABC News 7/18/2002; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 6) Sweeney, who is sitting at the back of the coach section of Flight 11, phoned the American Airlines flight services office at Logan Airport at 8:32 a.m. Since then, she has been describing the trouble on her plane to Michael Woodward, an American Airlines flight services manager (see (8:32 a.m.-8:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (Sheehy 2/15/2004; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 11) Sweeney now tells Woodward that the passengers in the coach section are calm, and under the impression that there is a routine medical emergency in the first class section of the plane. Presumably this means they are unaware that their plane has been hijacked. Sweeney says three flight attendants—Jeffrey Collman, Sara Low, and Dianne Snyder—are attending to duties, such as getting medical supplies, while she and Betty Ong are reporting events over the phone. (ABC News 7/18/2002; 9/11 Commission 1/25/2004 pdf file; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 14) (Ong is another flight attendant, who is sitting next to Sweeney and is talking on the phone with the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in North Carolina (see 8:19 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 8:21 a.m. September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 8, 11) )

Amy Sweeney, a flight attendant on Flight 11, gives updates over the phone to Michael Woodward, an American Airlines flight services manager at Logan International Airport in Boston, as her plane approaches the World Trade Center, and then, after she reports that the plane is flying “very, very low,” the line goes dead. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/13/2001, pp. 1-2; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 6-7) Sweeney has been on the phone with the American Airlines flight services office at Logan Airport since 8:32 a.m., describing to Woodward the trouble on her plane (see (8:32 a.m.-8:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 11)
Sweeney Says Plane Is 'in a Rapid Descent' - She now tells Woodward: “Something is wrong. We are in a rapid descent.” She says her plane is flying “all over the place.” (9/11 Commission 1/25/2004 pdf file; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 14) Around this time, Woodward tells Nancy Wyatt, another employee in the flight services office, that Sweeney has “started screaming that there’s something wrong with the airplane.” He adds: “In other words… [the original pilot is] not flying the airplane. They’re not flying the airplane.” (American Airlines 9/11/2001, pp. 34-41)
Sweeney Says Plane Is Flying 'Very Low' - Woodward asks Sweeney to look out of the window to see if she can determine where her plane is. (9/11 Commission 1/25/2004 pdf file; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 14) In an interview with the FBI a couple of days later, Woodward will say that Sweeney tells him: “I see water. I see buildings. We’re very, very low. Oh my God.” (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/13/2001, pp. 1-2) In 2004, he will give a slightly different account, telling the 9/11 Commission that Sweeney says: “We are flying low. We are flying very, very low. We are flying way too low.” Seconds later she says, “Oh my God, we are way too low.” (9/11 Commission 1/25/2004 pdf file; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 14) Sweeney says “Oh my God” after taking “a very slow, deep breath,” Woodward will tell ABC News. She says these final words “[v]ery slowly, very calmly, very quietly. It wasn’t in panic,” Woodward will say.
Call Suddenly Cut Off - Woodward then hears what he will describe as “very, very loud static on the other end” of the line. (ABC News 7/18/2002) After a short time, the line goes dead. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/13/2001, pp. 1-2) Woodward looks up from the phone and tells everyone else in the office that the line has died. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/13/2001, pp. 3-4) Wyatt is on the phone with Ray Howland, an employee at the American Airlines System Operations Control center in Fort Worth, Texas, and has been passing on to him the information that Sweeney was providing to Woodward (see 8:40 a.m.-8:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). She now informs Howland, “Okay, we just lost connection” with Sweeney. (American Airlines 9/11/2001, pp. 34-41; et al. 9/7/2011, pp. 14 pdf file)
Flight Services Office Personnel Learn of Crash at WTC - Shortly after Sweeney’s call is cut off, Woodward’s operational manager, Craig Kopetz, will enter the flight services office and say that a plane has just crashed into the WTC. Woodward will not initially connect this news with the crisis he has been dealing with. (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/13/2001, pp. 1-2; ABC News 7/18/2002) Those in the flight services office will then go to their command center. “Approximately 15 minutes later,” according to Elizabeth Williams, one of Woodward’s colleagues, the group will realize that “Flight 11 was the same flight which crashed into the WTC.” (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/13/2001, pp. 3-4) The call between Sweeney and Woodward lasts “approximately 12 minutes” and ends at around 8:44 a.m., according to the 9/11 Commission. (9/11 Commission 2004, pp. 4; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 11, 14) But according to a summary of phone calls from the hijacked flights presented at the 2006 trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, the call began at 8:32 a.m. and 39 seconds, and lasts 13 minutes and 13 seconds, meaning it ends at 8:45 a.m. and 52 seconds. (US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division 7/31/2006) Flight 11 crashes into the WTC less than a minute later, at 8:46 a.m. (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 7)

CIA Director George Tenet has just learned of the first attack on the WTC while having breakfast with former Senator David Boren (D-OK) at the St. Regis Hotel in Washington, DC. He later says, “It was obvious to us both that I had to leave immediately.” Along with Tim Ward, the head of his security detail, he gets into his car and, with lights flashing, hurries back to the CIA headquarters in Langley. Tenet later recalls that in these first minutes after the attack, “All the random dots we had been looking at started to fit into a pattern.… [M]y head was exploding with connections. I immediately thought about the ‘Bojinka’ plot to blow up twelve US airliners over the Pacific and a subsequent plan to fly a small airplane into CIA headquarters, which was broken up in 1994.” During his journey, he calls John Moseman, his chief of staff, and instructs him to assemble the senior CIA staff and key people from the Counterterrorist Center in the conference room next to his office. However, Tenet claims, it is difficult for him to get calls through on the secure phone, meaning he is “Essentially… in a communications blackout between the St. Regis and Langley, the longest twelve minutes of my life.” He only learns that a second plane hit the World Trade Center when he arrives at CIA headquarters. Tenet enters the conference room at around 9:15 a.m. By that time, he says, “I don’t think there was a person in the room who had the least doubt that we were in the middle of a full-scale assault orchestrated by al-Qaeda.” (Tenet 2007, pp. 161-163)

By 9:50 a.m., CIA Director George Tenet is in his office on the seventh floor of the agency’s Langley headquarters. He later describes: “[E]veryone was wondering, what next? Reports came in of several airplanes that were not responding to communications from the ground and perhaps heading toward Washington. Several [Counterterrorist Center] officers reminded us that al-Qaeda members had once discussed flying an airplane into CIA headquarters, the top floor of which we were presently occupying.” Tenet himself later recalls that, in the minutes after he’d learned of the first attack, he’d “thought about the ‘Bojinka’ plot to blow up twelve US airliners over the Pacific and a subsequent plan to fly a small airplane into CIA headquarters” (see (8:55 a.m.-9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (Woodward 2002, pp. 7-8; Tenet 2007, pp. 162 and 164) According to CIA contractor Billy Waugh, people at the headquarters are aware that Flight 93 is currently unaccounted for, and it is “a widespread assumption within the building that this flight [is] headed straight for us in the CIA headquarters” (see (Before 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (Waugh and Keown 2004, pp. 293-294) Tenet asks Mike Hohlfelder, the chief of his security detail, for his recommendation, and is advised, “Let’s evacuate.” Though he later claims he was “reluctant” about this, Tenet tells his senior leadership: “We have to save our people. We have to evacuate the building.” Therefore, at about 10 a.m., the word goes out for a large number of the CIA’s thousands of employees to go home. Initially, the senior leadership team moves from Tenet’s seventh-floor conference room to another room on the first floor, but it then exits the headquarters building and heads across the campus to the CIA’s printing plant, where a crude operational capability has been set up. However, due to the objections of CIA counterterrorism chief Cofer Black, those in the Counterterrorist Center and the Global Response Center are allowed to stay in place in the headquarters (see (10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Tenet and his staff will leave the printing plant and return to the headquarters at around 1 p.m., by which time they will consider the danger to be over. (Woodward 2002, pp. 8-9; Tenet 2007, pp. 164-165 and 168) The CIA headquarters evacuation is aided by the fact that a fire had occurred there just over a month earlier. Consequently, new evacuation procedures had been laid out, which Tenet follows on this day (see August 7-September 10, 2001). (Kessler 2003, pp. 222-223)

Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke is told in private by Dale Watson, the head of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division: “We got the passenger manifests from the airlines. We recognize some names, Dick. They’re al-Qaeda.” Clarke asks, “How the f_ck did they get on board then?” Watson replies: “Hey, don’t shoot the messenger, friend. CIA forgot to tell us about them.” As they are talking about this, they see the first WTC tower collapse on television. (Clarke 2004, pp. 13-14) Some hijacker names, including Mohamed Atta’s, were identified on a reservations computer over an hour earlier (see (Shortly After 8:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001).

Counterterrorist Center logo.Counterterrorist Center logo. [Source: CIA]At around 10 a.m., following reports that several aircraft were not responding to communications and could be heading toward Washington, CIA Director George Tenet orders the evacuation of the CIA headquarters building in Langley, Virginia (see (9:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, Cofer Black, the director of the Counterterrorist Center (CTC), is unhappy about this and tells Tenet, “Sir, we’re going to have to exempt CTC from this because we need to have our people working the computers.” The CTC, according to the Los Angeles Times, is “the nerve center for the CIA’s effort to disrupt and deter terrorist groups and their state sponsors.” About 200 employees are currently working in it. Eight of them are in the Global Response Center on the sixth floor of the building, monitoring the latest intelligence on terrorism throughout the world. The rest are in a windowless facility low down in the building. When Tenet points out that the Global Response Center staff will be at risk, Black responds, “They have the key function to play in a crisis like this. This is exactly why we have the Global Response Center.” When Tenet points out, “They could die,” Black replies, “Well, sir, then they’re just going to have to die.” After pausing, Tenet agrees, “You’re absolutely right.” Tenet later says, “Now that we were under attack, the Counterterrorist Center, with its vast data banks and sophisticated communications systems, was more vital than ever. Even as we were discussing going or staying, CTC was sending out a global alert to our stations around the world, ordering them to go to their liaison services and agents to collect every shred of information they could lay their hands on.” (Drogin 10/12/2001; Woodward 2002, pp. 8-9; Tenet 2007, pp. 164-165)

Charles Allen.Charles Allen. [Source: Chertoff Group]The CIA sets up a secure line to the White House, but because the line is kept constantly connected to the White House, the CIA will be unable to receive the latest information about the terrorist attacks from the National Security Agency (NSA) over it. (Coll 2018, pp. 32) At around 10:00 a.m., personnel at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, were ordered to evacuate. Consequently, the agency’s senior leaders left the headquarters building and headed across the campus to the CIA printing plant, where they could continue their operations (see (9:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (Tenet 2007, pp. 164; Whittle 2014, pp. 236) When CIA Director George Tenet and other senior officials reach the printing plant, a technician sets up a secure terminal equipment (STE) line to the White House for them to use. Tenet then talks to Stephen Hadley, the deputy national security adviser, who is at the White House. During their conversation, Hadley insists that Tenet keep the STE line open to the White House continuously. However, this hinders the ability of the NSA to communicate with the CIA. NSA Director Michael Hayden wants to send the CIA preliminary evidence that al-Qaeda is responsible for the attacks on the US. (Coll 2018, pp. 32) Presumably this includes details of a phone conversation between one of Osama bin Laden’s operatives in Afghanistan and someone in the Republic of Georgia that was intercepted at 9:53 a.m., in which the operative said he had “heard good news” and another target was still to come (see 9:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). (Roberts 9/4/2002) But because the STE line is occupied, Charles Allen, assistant director of central intelligence for collection, who is with Tenet at the printing plant, is unable to securely receive the latest intercept reports from the NSA about who might be responsible for the attacks. He consequently has to send an NSA liaison officer to the headquarters building to collect these reports from a secure fax machine there. (Coll 2018, pp. 32)

Robert White, the FAA liaison at the Counterterrorist Center (CTC) at CIA headquarters, refuses to provide the CIA with passenger lists for the four planes that were hijacked this morning. Richard Blee, chief of Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, wants copies of the passenger lists for the hijacked planes. He, along with Alec Station’s analysts at the CTC, are now certain al-Qaeda was behind the attacks on the United States, but they need proof of this before they can pass on their assessment to the White House. White has the capability to access airline passenger manifests, and so Blee asks him to access the FAA’s computers and share the manifests for the hijacked planes with him. White, however, refuses. He maintains that “[t]hese were American airliners filled with American citizens and under the law the CIA could not access private information about US persons.” Blee is frantic when he is told this. He therefore asks FBI agents deployed to Alec Station to see if they can get the information he requires through their channels. (9/11 Commission 10/8/2003 pdf file; Coll 2018, pp. 33) The FBI agents will subsequently obtain the passenger manifests and pass them on to the CIA (see (1:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). (Summers and Swan 8/12/2011; McLaughlin, Pistole, and Taylor 9/12/2016; Coll 2018, pp. 35)

At some unspecified time, apparently relatively soon after Flight 93 crashed, Vice President Dick Cheney calls CIA Director George Tenet and asks him if he is anticipating any further attacks. Tenet replies, “No. My judgment is that they’re done for the day.” Tenet will later explain his reasoning behind this judgment: “There was a lull in the action, and to me that was telling.… I had no data to go on. But the pattern of spectacular multiple attacks within a very tight attack window was consistent with what we knew of al-Qaeda’s modus operandi based on the East African embassy attacks and others. Events happened within a strict timeline, and then they were done.” Yet at 10 a.m., Tenet had wanted the CIA headquarters evacuated, following reports that several airplanes were not responding to communications and were perhaps heading toward Washington. A large number of the CIA’s workforce had therefore been sent home (see (9:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (Tenet 2007, pp. 164 and 167) And according to recordings of the operations floor at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) later obtained by Vanity Fair magazine, “inside NEADS there was no sense that the attack was over with the crash of United 93; instead, the alarms go on and on. False reports of hijackings, and real responses, continue well into the afternoon” (see 10:15 a.m. and After September 11, 2001). (Bronner 8/1/2006) Tenet and his staff will return to the CIA headquarters building at around 1 p.m. after having earlier evacuated to the CIA’s printing plant nearby. By that time, Tenet will say, “The danger was over for the day, in our estimation.” (Tenet 2007, pp. 168)

Mike Morell, President Bush’s CIA briefer, speaks to Cofer Black, the director of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, who can provide him with little more information about the attacks on the US than is generally known. Morell, who is with the president on Air Force One, has just spoken to Bush, who asked him to call CIA Director George Tenet and tell him to inform the president immediately when the CIA has any definitive information about the perpetrators of today’s attacks (see (10:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Morell now sits down in the staff section of the plane, picks up the phone by his seat, and calls Tenet’s office at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. However, the headquarters is currently being evacuated (see (9:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and so Tenet and his staff are in the process of relocating to a secure site. The secretary who answers Morell’s call says Tenet is unavailable and Morell instead has to talk to Black, the nearest senior official, after the secretary passes the phone to him. During their conversation, Black tells Morell what the CIA currently knows about the attacks on the US, which, Morell will later comment, “was little beyond what the rest of the world knew.” Morell then passes on the president’s request to be informed right away as soon as the CIA has information about who is responsible for the attacks and asks Black to share the request with Tenet. As he hangs up the phone, however, Morell is doubtful that his message will be passed on. “I was not confident [Tenet] would get the word, given the evacuation and given everything that would be asked of Black over the next few hours,” he will recall. (Morell 9/2006 pdf file; Morell and Harlow 2015, pp. 52-53) Tenet will inform Bush, for the first time, that the CIA has linked al-Qaeda to the attacks during a video teleconference at around 3:15 p.m. this afternoon (see (3:15 p.m.) September 11, 2001). (Woodward 2002, pp. 26-27; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 326)

Robert Bonner, the head of Customs and Border Protection, later testifies, “We ran passenger manifests through the system used by Customs—two were hits on our watch list of August 2001.” (This is presumably a reference to hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, watch-listed on August 23, 2001.) “And by looking at the Arab names and their seat locations, ticket purchases and other passenger information, it didn’t take a lot to do a rudimentary link analysis. Customs officers were able to ID 19 probable hijackers within 45 minutes. I saw the sheet by 11 a.m. And that analysis did indeed correctly identify the terrorists.” (Sheehy 2/15/2004) However, Bonner appears to be at least somewhat incorrect: for two days after the attacks (see September 13, 2001-September 14, 2001), the FBI believes there are only 18 hijackers, and the original list contains some erroneous Arab-sounding names on the flight manifests, such as Adnan Bukhari and Ameer Bukhari. (CNN 9/13/2001) Some hijacker names, including Mohamed Atta’s, were identified on a reservations computer around 8:30 a.m. (see (Shortly After 8:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and Richard Clarke was told some of the names were al-Qaeda around 10:00 a.m. (see (9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001)

One day after 9/11, the New York Times will report that FBI agents in Florida investigating the hijackers quickly “descended on flight schools, neighborhoods and restaurants in pursuit of leads.” At one flight school, “students said investigators were there within hours of Tuesday’s attacks.” (Canedy and Sanger 9/13/2001) Also on September 12, the Times will report, “Authorities said they had also identified accomplices in several cities who had helped plan and execute Tuesday’s attacks. Officials said they knew who these people were and important biographical details about many of them. They prepared biographies of each identified member of the hijack teams, and began tracing the recent movements of the men.” (Johnston and Risen 9/13/2001) In September 2002, 9/11 victim’s relative Kristen Breitweiser, testifying before the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, will cite these news reports and will ask, “How did the FBI know exactly where to go only a few hours after the attacks? How did they know which neighborhoods, which flight schools and which restaurants to investigate so soon in the case?… How are complete biographies of the terrorists, and their accomplices, created in such short time? Did our intelligence agencies already have open files on these men? Were they already investigating them? Could the attacks of September 11th been prevented?” (US Congress 9/18/2002) In at least some cases, it appears that US intelligence did quickly access existing files on the hijackers. The Washington Post reports, “In the hours after Tuesday’s bombings, investigators searched their files on [Satam] Al Suqami and [Ahmed] Alghamdi, noted the pair’s ties to [Nabil] al-Marabh and launched a hunt for him.” A top Customs official claims that by checking flight manifests and comparing them with other information such as watch lists, he is able to determine the names of all 19 hijackers by 11:00 a.m.(see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (Mintz and Lengel 9/21/2001)

The FBI arrives at Washington’s Dulles International Airport and begins its investigation of the hijacking of Flight 77, which departed from the airport this morning. (9/11 Commission 9/29/2003 pdf file; Goldberg et al. 2007, pp. 161) Flight 77 took off from Dulles Airport at 8:20 a.m. (see (8:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and crashed into the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 8, 10) The FBI’s Washington Field Office (WFO) was reportedly notified of the hijacking of Flight 77 at around 9:20 a.m. (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (US Department of Health and Human Services 7/2002, pp. C-45 pdf file) Dulles Airport has now been locked down, preventing people from entering or leaving it, and the terminals have been evacuated (see (Between 9:38 a.m. and 11:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 10/16/2003 pdf file; Trento and Trento 2006, pp. 36; Priska Neely 10/21/2010)
Fifty FBI Agents Arrive at Dulles Airport - The FBI is responsible for investigating the hijacking of Flight 77, and so Special Agent in Charge Arthur Eberhart has sent a team of 50 agents to the airport to look into it and provide additional security to prevent another hijacking. (US Department of Health and Human Services 7/2002, pp. A-23, C-45 pdf file) However, the agents only arrive there at around 12:40 p.m., according to a 9/11 Commission memorandum. (9/11 Commission 9/29/2003 pdf file) The first thing they do there is seize the security tape at the main terminal’s west checkpoint, according to Ed Nelson, a security manager at the airport. (Trento and Trento 2006, pp. 36) They also interview ticket agents, security personnel, baggage and food handlers, and other personnel, and collect evidence. (Eberhart 1/15/2002; Goldberg et al. 2007, pp. 161) They order the confiscation of the 52 computer hard drives that record all electronic television and security information at the airport. The hard drives contain all of the video recorded by the airport’s surveillance cameras and all records of electronic badges used to gain access to secure areas. (Trento and Trento 2006, pp. 34)
Agents Assess the Passengers on Grounded Planes - Airport officials have received no guidance regarding how passengers on planes that have been grounded in response to the terrorist attacks this morning should be processed. But the FBI agents at the airport now take the lead in reviewing the passengers who have deboarded from planes. (9/11 Commission 9/29/2003 pdf file) The FBI will set up a command post and a substantial operation at Dulles Airport to carry out its investigation of the hijacking of Flight 77. Van Harp, head of the WFO, will assume responsibility for its response at the airport. (Harp 12/12/2001)

Susan Trento.Susan Trento. [Source: DC Bureau]FBI agents are able to identify the alleged hijackers of Flight 77 surprisingly quickly on video recorded this morning by security cameras at Washington’s Dulles International Airport, from where Flight 77 took off. (Trento and Trento 2006, pp. 36-37; Priska Neely 10/21/2010) FBI agents arrived at Dulles Airport at around 12:40 p.m. (see (12:40 p.m.) September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 9/29/2003 pdf file) The first thing they did there was seize the security video of the west checkpoint in the airport’s main terminal. (Trento and Trento 2006, pp. 36) The five alleged hijackers passed through this checkpoint on their way to boarding Flight 77 (see 7:18 a.m. September 11, 2001, 7:35 a.m. September 11, 2001, and 7:36 a.m. September 11, 2001) and were captured on video as they did so (see 7:15 a.m.-7:36 a.m. September 11, 2001). (Federal Bureau of Investigation 9/19/2001; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 3)
FBI 'Knew Who the Hijackers Were' - FBI agents now bring Ed Nelson, the supervisor in charge of the west checkpoint, the video recorded at the checkpoint this morning for him to examine. As he watches it with them, he is surprised that they already seem to know who the Flight 77 hijackers were and what they looked like. The agents “went right to the first hijacker on the tape and identified him,” Nelson will later recall. “They would go ‘roll’ and ‘stop it,’ and showed me each of the hijackers,” he will say. He will remark that both of the metal detectors at the checkpoint were open around the time the hijackers were screened and “lots of traffic was moving through.” In light of this, he will say, “picking people out [on a video recording] is hard.” And yet the agents “knew who the hijackers were out of hundreds of people going through the checkpoints.” When an interviewer asks him, “How would they know?” since the “FBI claimed they had no idea who these hijackers were,” Nelson will reply: “Oh, exactly. Yeah, it boggles my mind.” He will comment: “I wanted to know how they had that kind of information. So fast. It didn’t make sense to me.” (Trento and Trento 2006, pp. 36-37; Priska Neely 10/21/2010)
FBI Knew Who the Hijackers Were 'the Day Before,' Journalist Will Suggest - US Customs reportedly provided the FBI with the passenger lists and the names of the probable hijackers for the four hijacked flights within 45 minutes of the terrorist attacks this morning (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 1/26/2004) Whether this helped the FBI agents at Dulles Airport to identify the hijackers on the security video is unclear. Investigative journalist Susan Trento will comment on their ability to recognize the hijackers so quickly, stating, “What it says to me is… if they knew [the hijackers] that morning, they knew who they were the day before and they should have been able to catch them before they got to the airport.” (Priska Neely 10/21/2010)

CIA Director George Tenet is given copies of the passenger manifests for the four planes that were hijacked this morning. (Summers and Swan 8/12/2011) Tenet is currently in the CIA’s printing plant, where a makeshift operational facility has been set up, after evacuating from the agency’s headquarters building this morning (see (9:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (Tenet 2007, pp. 164, 167) Earlier today, Richard Blee, chief of Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, asked the FAA liaison at the Counterterrorist Center (CTC) at CIA headquarters to let him see the manifests for the hijacked planes, but the liaison refused. Blee therefore asked FBI agents deployed to Alec Station to see if they could get the manifests through their channels (see After 10:03 a.m. September 11, 2001).
FBI Has Sent the Passenger Lists to the CTC - The FBI has now sent copies of the manifests to these agents. (Coll 2018, pp. 33, 35) It apparently obtained them from the US Customs Service. Robert Bonner, commissioner-designate of US Customs, will later state, “Within 45 minutes of the attacks, Customs forwarded the passenger lists with the names of the victims and 19 probable hijackers to the FBI and the intelligence community” (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 1/26/2004)
Analyst Passes the Lists to Tenet - An analyst from the CTC races across to the printing plant with the manifests. He hands them to Tenet and points out that the manifest for Flight 77 shows two known al-Qaeda members were on this plane. “Some of these guys on one of the planes are the ones we’ve been looking for in the last few weeks,” he says, pointing at the names Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi. Tenet looks at the manifest for Flight 77 and exclaims: “There it is. Confirmation. Oh, Jesus…” This is “the first time we had absolute proof of what I had been virtually certain of from the moment I heard about the attacks: we were in the middle of an al-Qaeda plot,” he will comment. (Tenet 2007, pp. 167; Summers and Swan 2011; Summers and Swan 8/12/2011)
Counterterrorism Chief Will Claim the Manifests Were Obtained Much Earlier - The exact time when Tenet receives the passenger manifests is unclear. The FBI agents at the CTC received them “by about 1:00 p.m.,” according to journalist and author Steve Coll. (Coll 2018, pp. 35) Authors Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan will write that Tenet is given them “[s]oon after 1:00 p.m.” (Summers and Swan 2011; Summers and Swan 8/12/2011) CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin will recall that an analyst bursts into the temporary office at the printing plant with a copy of the manifest for Flight 77 “[w]ithin about two and a half to three hours after the last plane hit.” (McLaughlin 9/11/2016; McLaughlin, Pistole, and Taylor 9/12/2016) But White House counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke will claim that he was told the FBI had received the manifests from the airlines significantly earlier, at around 9:59 a.m. (see (9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (Clarke 2004, pp. 13-14)

Around 2:30 a.m., the FBI arrives at Huffman Aviation flight school in Venice, Florida, inquiring about suspected hijackers Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi, who attended the school (see July 6-December 19, 2000). Huffman Aviation has around 200 students, about half of them foreigners. The FBI takes away all its records on former students, including photocopies of Atta and Alshehhi’s passports, as well as two computers. (Moore 9/12/2001; Canedy and Sanger 9/13/2001; US Congress 3/19/2002) Students at another Florida flight school say the FBI arrived at their school within hours of the attacks (see September 11, 2001).

None of the manifests for the hijacked flights have ever been released, except for this partially obscured page which appears in Terry McDermott’s 2005 book, Perfect Soldiers. McDermott has not explained how or where he got this document. Names of the five hijackers are highlighted.None of the manifests for the hijacked flights have ever been released, except for this partially obscured page which appears in Terry McDermott’s 2005 book, Perfect Soldiers. McDermott has not explained how or where he got this document. Names of the five hijackers are highlighted. [Source: Terry McDermott]On September 13, the FBI says there were 18 hijackers, and releases their names. Hani Hanjour’s name is not on the list. (CNN 9/13/2001) On the morning of the next day, CNN announces on the air that “CNN managed to grab a list of the names of the 18 suspected hijackers that is supposed to be officially released by justice sometime later today.” An announcer reads the list, which actually contains 19 names. It is the same list as the day before, except for one new name: Mosear Caned. (Note that the name is a very rough phonetic spelling from a CNN transcript.) (CNN 9/14/2001) Later in the day, the list is revised. Caned is gone and is replaced by Hani Hanjour. It is never explained who Caned is, how he got on the list, or even how his name is correctly spelled. No name even remotely similar to his appears on any of the released manifests of the hijacked 9/11 flights. (CNN 9/14/2001; Barakat 9/14/2001) A few days later, it is reported that Hanjour’s “name was not on the American Airlines manifest for [Flight 77] because he may not have had a ticket.” (Washington Post 9/16/2001)

When the recording of flight attendant Betty Ong is played in public before the 9/11 Commission in January 2004, family members demand that the FBI honor the family members’ rights under the Victims Assistance Act to hear any and all phone calls made from the hijacked airplanes. So, on this date, about 130 victims’ relatives gather in Princeton, New Jersey, and hear previously unavailable calls. But the Justice Department only plays what it decided are “relevant” calls. However, attendees are ordered not to disclose what they hear lest it compromise the prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui. (Hirschkorn 5/28/2004; Berland 6/5/2004; Sheehy 6/20/2004) Some family members nonetheless later discuss what they have heard. Witnesses describe one recording of two American Airlines managers who are told details of flight attendant Amy Sweeney’s call from Flight 11 shortly after the first hijacking has begun. Rather than report news of a possible hijacking to other government agencies so they can learn what to do in case there is a crisis, the managers say things like, “don’t spread this around. Keep it close,” and “Keep it quiet” (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001) (Sheehy 6/20/2004)


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