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Context of 'Spring 2002: CIA Afghanistan Intelligence Gathering Plan Flounders for Lack of Funding'

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The Central Intelligence Agency authors a classified report acknowledging that Iraq is still using chemical weapons as an “integral part” of its military strategy and that it is a “regular and recurring tactic.” (Sciolino 2/13/2003)

Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni.Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni. [Source: Public domain]The CIA sends a request to Indonesia to arrest suspected 24-year old al-Qaeda operative Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni and extradite him to Egypt. The CIA found his name in al-Qaeda documents obtained in Afghanistan. The agency believes that Iqbal, a Pakistani, worked with Richard Reid (see December 22, 2001), the Briton charged with attempting to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami on December 22 with explosives in his shoes. A few days later, the Egyptian government sends Jakarta a formal request to extradite Madni in connection with terrorism, providing Indonesian authorities with a convenient cover for complying with the CIA request. On January 9, Iqbal is detained in Jakarta by Indonesia’s State Intelligence Agency at the insistence of the CIA. He is flown to Egypt two days later (see January 11, 2002). (Chandrasekaran and Finn 3/11/2002)

The CIA develops an innovative plan to gain intelligence about al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The CIA would spend $80 million to create a new Afghan intelligence service in the new Afghan government. It would be staffed by Afghans but in reality would be “a wholly owned subsidiary of the CIA” with the orders being given by CIA officers. It would be much easier for Afghan operatives to slip into Pakistan and gain information about al-Qaeda operations than it would be for Americans to do so. But the plan is disrupted by the Bush administration’s focus on Iraq. Funding for the new service is repeatedly delayed and key personnel are redeployed to Iraq. (Risen 2006, pp. 169-170)

A Central Intelligence Agency assessment conducted before Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s visit to Washington in late September 2006 warns that Karzai’s government is increasingly weak and unpopular, and is failing to exert authority and security beyond Kabul. (Rohde and Risen 11/5/2006)


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