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Context of 'Between February 2001 and February 2003: Oil Consultant Begins Interviewing For Successors to Hussein'

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Falah Aljibury, an Iraqi-born oil industry consultant with strong ties to OPEC and western oil industries, interviews potential successors to Saddam Hussein on behalf of the Bush administration. One of the candidates that he will consider is Gen. Nizar Khazrahi, who is under house arrest in Denmark awaiting trial for war crimes. (Palast 3/17/2005; Palast 3/21/2005; Palast 4/2005, pp. 74-76)

In a paper titled, “The Road to Economic Prosperity for a Post-Saddam Iraq,” which is a part of the study, “A Future of a Post-Saddam Iraq: A Blueprint for American Involvement,” authors Ariel Cohen and Gerald P. O’Driscoll argue for the implementation of neoliberal reforms including the privatization of Iraq’s major industries. The document says that poverty in Iraq is a result of Saddam Hussein’s mismanagement, namely Saddam’s decision to nationalize certain industries; Iraq’s war with Iran; the invasion of Kuwait; and Saddam’s refusal to comply with the requirements for the suspension of UN sanctions. The paper’s proposal for jumpstarting Iraq’s economy focuses on privatization of Iraq’s industries and several other neoliberal reforms. To complement this, the authors recommend using the “media and the educational system to explain the benefits of privatization and the changes to come in order to ensure broad public support.” The costs of reconstruction, they suggest, could be paid for with funds generated from the sale of Iraq’s oil. “Iraq’s vast oil reserves are more than ample to provide the funds needed to rebuild and boost economic growth,” the report says. (Beaumont 11/3/2002; Cohen and O'Driscoll 3/5/2003) But in order to generate this amount, Cohen and Driscoll write, the post-Saddam government would probably have to reconsider its membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). “Following the demise of Saddam Hussein, it is unlikely that the Saudi kingdom would transfer a fraction of its production quota under the [OPEC] regime to Iraq to compensate for those lost profits and facilitate its rebuilding,” the authors note. “Iraq will need to ensure cash flow for reconstruction regardless of OPEC supply limitations. Combined with the potential privatization of the oil industry, such measures could provide incentive for Iraq to leave the OPEC cartel down the road, which would have long term, positive implications for global oil supply.… An Iraq outside of OPEC would find available from its oil trade an ample cash flow for the country’s rehabilitation.” (Cohen and O'Driscoll 3/5/2003) Cohen will later admit in an interview after the invasion of Iraq that his interest in Iraq withdrawing from OPEC was to destabilize Saudi Arabia (see Early 2005).


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