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Context of 'Fall 2002-January 2003: US State Departments and Former Oil Executives Plan Iraq’s Post-Invasion Oil Industry'

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“Within weeks” of taking office, the Bush administration begins planning for a post-Saddam Iraqi government. The State Department convenes a series of secret discussions attended by prominent Iraqi expatriates, many with ties to US industries, to plan for a post-Saddam Iraq. The meetings are held in the home of Falah Aljibury, an adviser to OPEC, Goldman Sachs, and Amerada Hess’s oil trading arm. He also served as Ronald Reagan’s backchannel to Saddam Hussein during the 1980s. According to Aljibury, the discussion group, led by Pamela Quanrud, an NSC economics expert, quickly evolves into an “oil group.” The plan they develop is said to represent the views of the oil industry and the State Department. According to the plan, Saddam Hussein would be replaced by some former Baathist general, while the rest of the government would continue to function as before. One of the candidates that is considered to head post-Saddam Iraq is Gen. Nizar Khazrahi (see Between February 2001 and February 2003), who is under house arrest in Denmark awaiting trial for war crimes. “The petroleum industry, the chemical industry, the banking industry—they’d hoped that Iraq would go for a revolution like in the past and government was shut down for two or three days,” Aljibury will later tell reporter Greg Palast. “You have martial law… and say Iraq is being liberated and everybody stay where they are… Everything as is.” (Palast 3/17/2005; Palast 3/21/2005; Palast 4/2005, pp. 74-76)

The Bush administration picks Philip Carroll, a former CEO of Royal Dutch/Shell’s US division, to advise post-Saddam Iraq’s oil ministry. (Palast 4/2005, pp. 74-76) He is formally appointed in January 2003 along with Gary Vogler of ExxonMobil, three employees of the US Department of Energy, and an employee of the Australian government. In the months before the invasion, they are sent to Kuwait where they “begin planning for the restructuring of the ministry of oil to improve its efficiency and effectiveness [and] begin thinking through Iraq’s strategy options for significantly increasing its production capacity,” Carroll later explains. (Muttitt 2005)

Philip Carroll, the chief adviser to the new Iraqi government’s oil ministry, tells the Washington Post that Iraq might end its membership in OPEC. “[Iraqis] have from time to time, because of compelling national interest, elected to opt out of the quota system and pursue their own path…. [The new Iraqi government] may elect to do that same thing.” But Carroll later tells investigative reporter Greg Palast that he personally would not have supported privatization. “Nobody in their right mind would have thought of doing that,” he later explains. (Goodman 5/17/2003, pp. E01)

Philip Carroll, the chief adviser to the new Iraqi government’s oil ministry, and Gary Vogler, another adviser, resign and are replaced by Rob McKee, a former vice president of ConocoPhillips, and Terry Adams of BP Oil. (Muttitt 2005; Palast 4/2005, pp. 75)

US State Department spokesman Philip J. Crowley calls the treatment of alleged whistleblower Bradley Manning “ridiculous and counterproductive and stupid.” The remarks are made at a talk at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology about how new media are impacting foreign policy, during a question-and-answer session. Crowley is asked about what he thinks about WikiLeaks and the US “torturing a prisoner in a military brig.” After criticising the conditions of Manning’s detention, Crowley adds, “None the less Bradley Manning is in the right place,” and goes on to say that in Washington’s view, “there is sometimes a need for secrets… for diplomatic progress to be made.” When the remarks become news, Crowley will issue a clarification: “What I said was my personal opinion. It does not reflect an official [US government] policy position. I defer to the Department of Defense regarding the treatment of Bradley Manning.” (BBC 3/12/2011)


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