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Context of 'January 16, 2004: Gen. Karpinski is Informed of Abu Ghraib Prison Photos'

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Shortly after the US invasion of Afghanistan (see October 19, 2001), the CIA takes control of an abandoned brick factory, and turns it into a training facility and secret prison. The facility, code-named the “Salt Pit,” is a 10-acre facility just north of Kabul. It is used to train Afghan counterterrorism forces and to house prisoners. The agency intends the Salt Pit to be a “host-nation facility,” manned and operated entirely by Afghans, in part so that CIA officials cannot be held accountable for the actions taken by the Afghan guards and interrogators. Similar methodologies are used in secret CIA prisons in other countries. However, the CIA pays the entire cost of maintaining the facility. It vets the guards who work there, and decides which prisoners will be kept in the facility, including some senior al-Qaeda operatives who will eventually be transferred to other facilities such as Guantanamo. Sometime before March 2005, the CIA will transfer its operations to another facility, and the Salt Pit will be demolished. [ABC News, 11/18/2005]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

At the request of CIA Director George Tenet, the White House orders the FBI to hand Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, a captured al-Qaeda operative being held in Afghanistan (see December 19, 2001), over to the CIA. One day before the transfer, a CIA officer enters al-Libi’s cell, interrupting an interrogation being conducted by FBI agent Russel Fincher, and tells al-Libi: “You’re going to Cairo, you know. Before you get there I’m going to find your mother and I’m going to f_ck her.” Soon after, al-Libi is flown to Egypt. [Newsweek, 6/21/2004; Washington Post, 6/27/2004; Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 121] The CIA officer will later be identified as “Albert,” a former FBI translator. [Mayer, 2008, pp. 106] Presumably, this is the same former FBI translator named “Albert” who will later threaten al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri with a gun and drill during interrogations (see Between December 28, 2002 and January 1, 2003 and Late December 2002 or Early January 2003). [Associated Press, 9/7/2010] Vincent Cannistraro, former head of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, will later say: “He’s carried off to Egypt, who torture him. And we know that he’s going to be tortured. Anyone who’s worked on Egypt, has worked on other countries in the Middle East, knows that. Egyptians torture him, and he provides a lot of information.” [PBS Frontline, 6/20/2006]
Provides Mix of Valid, False Information - It is unclear whether al-Libi is interrogated solely by Egyptian officials, or by a combination of Egyptian and CIA interrogators. Al-Libi is subjected to a series of increasingly harsh techniques, including at least one, waterboarding, that is considered torture (see Mid-March 2002). Reputedly, he is finally broken after being waterboarded and then forced to stand naked in a cold cell overnight where he is repeatedly doused with cold water by his captors. Al-Libi is said to provide his Egyptian interrogators with valuable intelligence about an alleged plot to blow up the US Embassy in Yemen with a truck bomb, and the location of Abu Zubaida, who will be captured in March 2002 (see Mid-May 2002 and After). However, in order to avoid harsh treatment he will also provide false information to the Egyptians, alleging that Iraq trained al-Qaeda members in bomb making and poisons and gases. Officials will later determine that al-Libi has no knowledge of such training or weapons, and fabricates the statements out of fear and a desire to avoid further torture. Sources will later confirm that al-Libi did not try to deliberately mislead his captors; rather, he told them what he thought they wanted to hear. [ABC News, 11/18/2005; New York Times, 12/9/2005]
Using Allegations in White House Statements - Both President Bush (see October 7, 2002) and Secretary of State Colin Powell (see February 5, 2003) will include these allegations in major speeches.
Shifting Responsibility for Interrogations to CIA from FBI - The FBI has thus far taken the lead in interrogations of terrorist suspects, because its agents are the ones with most experience. The CIA’s apparent success with al-Libi contributes to the shift of interrogations from the bureau to the CIA. [Washington Post, 6/27/2004] Such methods as making death threats, advocated by the CIA, are opposed by the FBI, which is used to limiting its questioning techniques so the results from interrogations can be used in court. [Washington Post, 6/27/2004] “We don’t believe in coercion,” a senior FBI official says. [Guardian, 9/13/2004]

Entity Tags: “Albert”, Russell Fincher, George J. Tenet, Vincent Cannistraro, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline, War in Afghanistan

Mohammed Omar Abdul-Rahman.Mohammed Omar Abdul-Rahman. [Source: Public domain]In 2007, NBC News will report that the CIA uses aggressive interrogation techniques on at least 13 high-ranking al-Qaeda detainees between 2002 and 2004. These techniques are first used on Abu Zubaida, captured in March 2002 (see March 28, 2002), and some of the techniques are discontinued in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal around the middle of 2004 (see April 28, 2004), which is also around the time the CIA’s Inspector General issues a secret report suggesting many of these techniques could be a violation of an international treaty against torture (see May 7, 2004). Euphemistically called “enhanced interrogation,” these techniques include:
bullet Sleep deprivation.
bullet Exposure to extreme heat and cold.
bullet Confined quarters.
bullet Psychological and physical abuse.
bullet The use of psychotropic drugs.
bullet Waterboarding. However, waterboarding is allegedly only used on about four of the detainees (see May 2002-2003).
All 13 of these detainees will later be transferred to Guantanamo prison to stand trial before a military tribunal there (see September 2-3, 2006). (Two others similarly transferred - Abu Faraj al-Libbi and Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi - are captured after the Abu Ghraib scandal and thus are not subjected to as many interrogation techniques.) [MSNBC, 9/13/2007] However, there are other “ghost detainees” not officially acknowledged as captured by the US government (see June 7, 2007). Some, like Hassan Ghul, Abdul Rahim al-Sharqawi, and Mohammed Omar Abdul-Rahman, are held in the same secret prison as most of the “official” high-ranking detainees later transferred to Guantanamo, so it would seem likely that aggressive techniques have been used on many of them as well. In 2007, President Bush will sign an executive order allowing the CIA to use most of these aggressive techniques again (see July 2007).

Entity Tags: Mohamad Farik Amin, Majid Khan, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, Khallad bin Attash, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Mohammed Omar Abdul-Rahman, Hambali, Abdul Rahim al-Sharqawi, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, Hassan Ghul, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Central Intelligence Agency, Abu Zubaida, Gouled Hassan Dourad

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline

A group of militants thought to be linked to Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Hezb-e-Islami organisation are captured in Pakistan. One man arrested is Gul Rahman, who will later freeze to death at a CIA-controlled prison in Afghanistan (see November 20, 2002). Another is Ghairat Baheer, a doctor and Hekmatyar’s son-in-law. Hekmatyar was a CIA ally during the Soviet-Afghan war (see (1986)), but is now linked to al-Qaeda. According to Baheer, Rahman had driven from Peshawar, Pakistan, in the northwest frontier to Islamabad for a medical checkup. He is staying with Baheer, an old friend, when US agents and Pakistani security forces storm the house and take both men, two guards, and a cook into custody. [Associated Press, 3/28/2010]

Entity Tags: Gul Rahman, Ghairat Baheer

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Two detainees, Gul Rahman and Ghairat Baheer, are transferred from Pakistan to the CIA-controlled Salt Pit black site in Afghanistan. Baheer will say that he was separated from Rahman about a week after they were captured (see October 29, 2002) and they were both moved to the prison, so presumably they are transferred there together. [Associated Press, 3/28/2010] Rahman will later die at the prison (see November 20, 2002).

Entity Tags: Gul Rahman, Ghairat Baheer, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Gul Rahman.Gul Rahman. [Source: From Family via CBS News]Gul Rahman, an Afghani recently detained in Pakistan (see October 29, 2002) and now held at the CIA-controlled Salt Pit black site in Afghanistan (see Shortly After October 29, 2002), is uncooperative with his captors. At one point he throws a latrine bucket at his guards, and he also threatens to kill them. These actions provoke harsher treatment. His hands are shackled over his head, he is roughed up, and will be doused with water, leading to his death (see November 20, 2002). [Associated Press, 3/28/2010]

Entity Tags: Gul Rahman, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Shortly after his arrest in the United Arab Emirates in early October 2002 (see Early October 2002), al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri is taken to an unknown location and tortured. He is waterboarded, which is a technique simulating drowning that is widely regarded as torture. He is only one of about three high-ranking detainees waterboarded, according to media reports (see May 2002-2003). [Associated Press, 12/11/2007] Much will later be written about the torture and interrogation of other top al-Qaeda leaders such as Abu Zubaida, but next to nothing is publicly known about what happens to al-Nashiri in the months after his arrest. However, in late 2007 it will be reported that at least some of his interrogations were videotaped by the CIA (see Spring-Late 2002) and his waterboarding was videotaped. [Washington Post, 12/18/2007] But these videotapes will later be destroyed in controversial circumstances (see November 2005). The waterboarding likely takes place in Thailand, because the videotape of al-Nashiri’s torture will be destroyed there in 2005 (see November 2005). [Newsweek, 6/28/2008]

Entity Tags: Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline

An Afghan detainee dies of hypothermia while being brutalized by CIA interrogators at a secret prison north of Kabul code-named the “Salt Pit” (see After October 2001). The detainee, whose name is Gul Rahman, is considered uncooperative (see November 2002). [Washington Post, 3/3/2005; ABC News, 11/18/2005; Associated Press, 3/28/2010] He had originally been arrested in Pakistan, and then brought to Afghanistan. [Washington Post, 9/19/2009] An inexperienced junior CIA case officer named Matthew Zirbel, who is in charge of the Salt Pit, orders Rahman to be stripped semi-naked, chained to the concrete floor, and left overnight without blankets. [Washington Post, 3/3/2005; ABC News, 11/18/2005; Mahoney and Johnson, 10/9/2009, pp. 29 pdf file] The incident will later be confirmed by four government officials. Afghan guards paid by the CIA and working under agency supervision take Rahman to an abandoned warehouse, drag him around on the concrete floor, causing bruising and lacerations, before chaining him in his cell. When night falls, the temperature plummets. Rahman is found in the morning, frozen to death. A CIA medic quickly autopsies him and states that “hypothermia” is the cause of death, and guards bury the body in an unmarked, unacknowledged cemetery used by Afghan forces. The man’s family is not notified, and his remains are never returned for a proper burial. The man is not listed on any registry of captives, not even as a so-called “ghost detainee.” One government official says simply, “He just disappeared from the face of the earth.” Zirbel will later be promoted. [Washington Post, 3/3/2005; ABC News, 11/18/2005] Zirbel’s supervisor, the CIA chief of station in Afghanistan known only as Paul P., will go on to play a role in incidents of detainee abuse in Iraq, although details about this are unknown. [Washington Post, 9/19/2009; Harper's, 3/28/2010] Colleagues later describe Zirbel as “bright… eager, [and] full of energy,” and say that he was placed in charge of the facility because “there were not enough senior-level volunteers,” according to one senior intelligence officer. “It’s not a job just anyone would want. More senior people said, ‘I don’t want to do that.’ There was a real notable absence of high-ranking people” in Afghanistan. Moreover, the officer will add: “[T]he CIA did not have a deep cadre of people who knew how to run prisons. It was a new discipline. There’s a lot of room to get in trouble.” The CIA will brief the chairmen and vice chairmen of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees on the death, but at least one official will say the briefing is incomplete. Senator John D. Rockefeller (D-WV), the ranking minority member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, will ask the committee chairman, Pat Roberts (R-KS), to investigate Rahman’s death, but Roberts will refuse. No one is sure if Rahman had any real connection to al-Qaeda or the Taliban. “He was probably associated with people who were associated with al-Qaeda,” one US government official will say. [Washington Post, 3/3/2005; ABC News, 11/18/2005]

Entity Tags: House Intelligence Committee, Matthew Zirbel, “Paul P.”, Pat Roberts, Central Intelligence Agency, John D. Rockefeller, Gul Rahman, Senate Intelligence Committee

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The CIA’s Deputy Director for Operations, James Pavitt, informs the agency’s inspector general, John Helgerson, that the CIA Counterterrorist Center has established a program to detain and interrogate terrorists at foreign sites. At the same time, Pavitt also informs Helgerson that he has just learned of an apparently controversial incident and sent a team to investigate it. It appears that the incident triggered the notification to the inspector general about the program. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 1 pdf file] The incident is the killing of detainee Gul Rahman at the Salt Pit prison in Afghanistan (see After October 2001 and November 20, 2002). [Associated Press, 3/28/2010] The detention and interrogation program has been in operation since March at the latest, as high-value detainee Abu Zubaida was arrested and then taken to a CIA black site at that time (see March 28, 2002 and April - June 2002). However, it is unclear whether Helgerson was aware of the program prior to being informed by Pavitt.

Entity Tags: Office of the Inspector General (CIA), James Pavitt, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, John Helgerson

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The CIA’s office of the inspector general begins an investigation of the killing of detainee Gul Rahman at the agency’s Salt Pit black site in Afghanistan (see November 20, 2002). The investigation begins after the agency’s inspector general, John Helgerson, is notified of the incident by management (see Shortly After November 20, 2002). It is unclear whether the inspector general issues a separate report on this incident or whether his office’s conclusions about it are contained in a general report on the effectiveness of the CIA’s detention and interrogation program (see May 7, 2004). Whatever the case, the inspector general’s conclusions focus on two agency officials, an officer named Matthew Zirbel, who caused Rahman’s death, and his boss, the CIA’s station chief in Afghanistan, known only as Paul P. The investigation finds that Zirbel displayed poor judgement in leaving Rahman to die, but that he made repeated requests for guidance that were largely ignored. [Associated Press, 3/28/2010]

Entity Tags: Office of the Inspector General (CIA), “Paul P.”, Central Intelligence Agency, Matthew Zirbel

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

CIA interrogators use stress positions that will later be described as “potentially injurious” on detained al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. Al-Nashiri is required to kneel on the floor and lean back, and on one occasion he does this a CIA officer reportedly pushes him backwards. On another occasion, an unnamed person has to intervene after somebody else expresses concern that al-Nashiri’s arms might be dislocated from his shoulders. At this time the interrogators are attempting to put al-Nashiri into a standing stress position; he is reportedly lifted off the floor by his arms while they are bound behind his back with a belt. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 43 pdf file] The timing of these events is unknown, although other similar abuse of al-Nashiri takes place around December 2002 (see Late December 2002 or Early January 2003 and Between December 28, 2002 and January 1, 2003). At this time al-Nashiri is apparently being held at a CIA base in Poland. [Associated Press, 9/7/2010]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

CIA employees who have been applying “enhanced interrogation techniques” to al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri decide that he is now “compliant.” The techniques, including waterboarding, have been used on al-Nashiri for around a month (see (November 2002)). At this point, the agency regards him to be ready to be “debriefed”—a CIA term for part of an interrogation conducted by a more knowledgeable officer who does not use the enhanced techniques, or not to such an extent. Following this decision, the Counterterrorist Center at CIA headquarters sends out a senior operations officer to question al-Nashiri. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 36, 41 pdf file] This officer will later become known to the public as “Albert.” [Associated Press, 9/7/2010] Al-Nashiri is currently being held at CIA black site in Poland (see December 5, 2002).

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, “Albert”, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Counterterrorist Center

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

A CIA official known as a “debriefer” attempts to intimidate al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri with a handgun and a power drill. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 42 pdf file] The official, who will later become known as “Albert,” had come to interrogate al-Nashiri at an agency black site in Poland after al-Nashiri had been tortured (see (November 2002)), but recently decided that al-Nashiri was still withholding information (see Mid-December 2002). [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 42 pdf file; Mayer, 2008, pp. 225; Associated Press, 9/7/2010] Albert gets approval for the plan to use the gun from his supervisor, known only as “Mike,” although Mike does not clear the plan with CIA headquarters. [Associated Press, 9/7/2010] Albert takes an unloaded semi-automatic handgun into al-Nashiri’s cell. He racks it once or twice, simulating the loading of a bullet into the chamber, close to al-Nashiri’s ear. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 42 pdf file] After again receiving consent from Mike, around the same day Albert takes a power drill into the cell. While al-Nashiri is naked and hooded, he revs the drill to frighten al-Nashiri, but does not touch him with it. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 42 pdf file; Associated Press, 9/7/2010] This abuse will be reported to CIA headquarters (see January 2003), but the Justice Department will decline to prosecute Albert (see September 11, 2003), and the result of the CIA inspector general’s investigation of the matter is unknown (see October 29, 2003).

Entity Tags: “Albert”, Central Intelligence Agency, “Mike”, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

A CIA officer who is interrogating al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri threatens to harm al-Nashiri’s mother and family. The officer tells al-Nashiri that if he does not talk, “We could get your mother in here,” and, “We can bring your family in here.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 42 pdf file] At this time al-Nashiri is apparently being held at a CIA base in Poland. The officer will later become known as “Albert.” [Associated Press, 9/7/2010] Albert, who also threatens al-Nashiri with a gun and power drill around the same time (see Between December 28, 2002 and January 1, 2003), apparently wants al-Nashiri to infer, for what the CIA’s inspector general will call “psychological reasons,” that he may not be a US official. Instead, al-Nashiri is to believe that he comes from an Arabic country. Al-Nashiri would infer this because of Albert’s Arab accent. According to the inspector general, this is because it is “widely believed in Middle East circles” that interrogation by officials of this Arabic country involves “sexually abusing female relatives in front of the detainee.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 42-43 pdf file] The name of the Arabic country is not known, although Albert is of Egyptian descent. [Associated Press, 9/7/2010] Albert will admit not identifying himself as a US official to al-Nashiri, but say that he neither claimed to be an official of this Arabic country nor threatened his family. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 42-43 pdf file]

Entity Tags: “Albert”, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Two or more CIA officers who have arrived for temporary duty at an agency black site in Poland where al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri is being held discover that unauthorized interrogation techniques have been used against him. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 42 pdf file; Associated Press, 9/7/2010] These techniques include the use of a handgun and power drill to frighten al-Nashiri (see Between December 28, 2002 and January 1, 2003). They were applied by an officer later referred to as “Albert,” with the approval of his supervisor, “Mike.” The newly arrived officers report the use of the techniques to CIA headquarters, which informs the agency’s inspector general. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 42 pdf file; Associated Press, 9/7/2010]

Entity Tags: “Mike”, “Albert”, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

A CIA officer known only as “Albert” who threatened detained al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri with a gun and drill (see Between December 28, 2002 and January 1, 2003) is recalled to the US. The recall follows the reporting of the incidents at an agency black site in Poland to CIA headquarters by officers newly arrived at the black site (see January 2003). In addition, the agency’s inspector general has just learned of them (see January 2003). [Washington Post, 8/23/2009] Albert will later be reprimanded for his actions (see (After October 29, 2003)).

Entity Tags: “Albert”, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

CIA officials ask for reauthorization of the controversial harsh interrogation methods (see April 2002 and After and August 1, 2002) that had been withdrawn (see December 2003-June 2004) after the revelation of abuse and torture at Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison (see November 5, 2003). The CIA has captured a new al-Qaeda suspect in Asia, and top agency officials ask the National Security Council Principals Committee—Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, CIA Director George Tenet, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Attorney General John Ashcroft—for permission to use extreme methods of interrogation against the new detainee. Rice, who chairs the Principals Committee, says: “This is your baby. Go do it.” [ABC News, 4/9/2008] The name of the new suspect captured in Asia is not mentioned, but Hambali is captured in Thailand in August 2003 (see August 12, 2003), and he is the only prominent al-Qaeda figure arrested that summer. He is considered one of al-Qaeda’s most important leaders. There are some reports that he is one of only about four prisoners directly waterboarded by the US (see Shortly After August 12, 2003).

Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, George J. Tenet, John Ashcroft, Hambali, National Security Council, Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline

Abdul Wali turns himself in to a US base in Asadabad, Afghanistan [CBS News, 6/18/2004] at the request of the Afghan governor of Kunar province. Wali allegedly participated in rocket attacks against the base, which is located in northeast Afghanistan close to the border with Pakistan. During the next two days, according to an indictment, he is “brutally assault[ed]” by David A. Passaro, a private contractor, employed by the CIA, [Guardian, 6/23/2004] who uses “his hands and feet and a large flashlight.” On June 21, Wali dies in detention. The CIA refers the case to the Justice Department in November 2003. Passaro will be indicted with charges of assault in June 2004. [CBS News, 6/18/2004]

Entity Tags: David A. Passaro, Abdul Wali

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, War in Afghanistan

Officials at the CIA station in Baghdad ask agency managers at headquarters for information and training on detainee interrogations, but receive little in response. After the station agrees to interrogate the most important detainees in order to gain information about the growing insurgency, it asks headquarters for training for its officers, so that they can perform the interrogations correctly. It also requests written guidelines in July. However, headquarters does nothing and this refusal to act leads to heated arguments between Baghdad station and headquarters. For example, in one videoconference in the fall the deputy station chief begins yelling at headquarters staffers, demanding that they provide the written guidelines. The response of the agency’s Near East division chief is to tell Baghdad station boss Gerry Meyer (see May 18, 2006) that his deputy is becoming “too strident.” No guidelines will arrive before the Abu Ghraib scandal breaks (see April 28, 2004). Neither does headquarters send a lawyer to the Baghdad station for some time. Initially, the station gets its legal advice on an informal basis from CIA or military lawyers who happen to be passing through Baghdad. No agency lawyer is stationed in Baghdad until January 2004. [Risen, 2006, pp. 144-145]

Entity Tags: CIA Baghdad Station, Gerry Meyer, Near East Division (CIA), Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Iraq under US Occupation

Geoffrey Miller.Geoffrey Miller. [Source: US Army]Major General Geoffrey Miller, who oversees the prison at Guantanamo (see November 4, 2002), flies to Iraq for a 10-day consulting trip (see August 18, 2003). He is part of a team “experienced in strategic interrogation… to review current Iraqi theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence” and to review the arrangements at the US military prisons in Iraq. [Washington Post, 5/9/2004; New Yorker, 5/17/2004; Washington Post, 8/24/2004; Savage, 2007, pp. 190] The team consists of 17 interrogation experts from Guantanamo Bay, and includes officials from the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). [Washington Post, 6/12/2004]
Attempt to Increase Flow of 'Actionable Intelligence' - The Pentagon’s decision to dispatch the team on this mission was influenced by the military’s growing concern that the failure of coalition forces to quell resistance against the occupation was linked to a dearth in “actionable intelligence” (see August 2003). [New Yorker, 5/24/2004] Miller has therefore come to help Brigadier General Barabara Fast improve the results of her interrogation operations. More to the point, he is supposed to introduce her to the techniques being used at Guantanamo. [New Yorker, 6/21/2004; Signal Newspaper, 7/4/2004] Officials are hoping detainees will provide intelligence on weapons of mass destruction and Saddam Hussein, who is still on the loose. [Washington Post, 5/16/2004]
'Gitmoizing' Abu Ghraib - “[Miller] came up there and told me he was going to ‘Gitmoize’ the detention operation,” Brigadier General Janis L. Karpinski, later recalls. [Washington Post, 5/9/2004] Miller will later deny he used the word “Gitmoize.” [Washington Post, 5/12/2004] During Miller’s visit, a Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) is established in order to centralize the intelligence operations at the prison. Captain Carolyn A. Wood is made officer in charge (OIC) of the Interrogation Coordination Element (ICE), within the JIDC. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] Before returning to Washington, Miller leaves a list of acceptable interrogation techniques—based on what has been used in Guatanamo—posted on a wall in Abu Ghraib, which says that long term isolation, sleep disruption, “environmental manipulation,” and “stress positions” can be used to facilitate interrogations, but only with the approval of Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez on a case-by-case basis. [Washington Post, 5/21/2004] The use of dogs is also included, even though the technique was banned at Guantanamo eight months before by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (see January 15, 2003). [Washington Post, 7/19/2004; US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] Karpinski later recalls, “He said they are like dogs and if you allow them to believe at any point that they are more than a dog then you’ve lost control of them.” [BBC, 6/15/2004] Miller’s visit to Iraq heralds some significant changes, which include, first, the introduction of more coercive interrogation tactics; second, the taking control of parts of the Abu Ghraib facility by military intelligence; and third, the use of MPs in the intelligence collection process. During his visit, Miller discusses interrogation techniques with military intelligence chief Colonel Thomas M. Pappas. [New York Times, 5/13/2004]
'Snowballing' Effect of Chaos, Brutality - “The operation was snowballing,” Samuel Provance, a US military intelligence officer, will later recall, describing the situation at Abu Ghraib after Miller’s visit. “There were more and more interrogations. The chain of command was putting a lot of resources into the facility.” And Karpinski will later say that she was being shut out of the process at about this time. “They continued to move me farther and farther away from it.” [Washington Post, 5/20/2004] Major General Anthony Taguba (see March 9, 2004) will later determine that Miller’s visit helped bring about the complete breakdown of discipline at the prison: “Interrogators actively requested,” at Miller’s behest, “that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogations of witnesses.” In essence, Miller tells guards to “soften up” prisoners so they will not be able to resist their inquisitors. Miller will later deny any responsibility for the Abu Ghraib torture program (see May 4, 2004). [Savage, 2007, pp. 190]

Entity Tags: Barbara G. Fast, Antonio M. Taguba, Carolyn A. Wood, Samuel Provance, Janis L. Karpinski, Thomas M. Pappas, Geoffrey D. Miller

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The Justice Department’s criminal division decides not to prosecute a CIA officer, known only as “Albert,” who intimidated al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri with a handgun and power drill during interrogations. The use of the gun and drill took place around late 2002 (see Between December 28, 2002 and January 1, 2003), but was not authorised by CIA headquarters. As there will be no prosecution, the department returns the matter to the CIA. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 42 pdf file; Associated Press, 9/7/2010] The CIA’s inspector general will issue a report on the incidents the next month, but its conclusion is unknown (see October 29, 2003).

Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Criminal Division (DoJ), “Albert”

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The CIA’s inspector general, John Helgerson, issues a report on the use of a handgun and power drill to intimidate al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri during an interrogation. A CIA officer known only as “Albert” threatened al-Nashiri with the gun and drill at a CIA black site in Poland around late 2002 (see Between December 28, 2002 and January 1, 2003). [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 42 pdf file; Associated Press, 9/7/2010] The incidents have already been referred to the Justice Department, which has declined to prosecute (see September 11, 2003). What conclusions Helgerson comes to in the report are unknown. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 42 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Office of the Inspector General (CIA), Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, “Albert”, John Helgerson, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

A CIA officer known only as “Albert” is reprimanded by the agency for threatening detained al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri with a gun and drill. The incidents took place at a CIA black site in Poland in December 2002 or January 2003 (see Between December 28, 2002 and January 1, 2003) and Albert’s actions were approved by his supervisor, “Mike,” who is also reprimanded. [Associated Press, 9/7/2010] The timing of the reprimand is unknown, although it may follow the completion of a report into the matter by the CIA’s inspector general (see October 29, 2003). Both Mike and Albert leave the agency, although Albert will later be rehired as a contractor (see 2003 and Before 2008).

Entity Tags: “Albert”, Central Intelligence Agency, “Mike”

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Sabrina Harman giving the thumbs up over Manadel al-Jamadi’s dead body.Sabrina Harman giving the thumbs up over Manadel al-Jamadi’s dead body. [Source: Public domain]Detainee Manadel al-Jamadi, is brought to Abu Ghraib prison by US Navy SEAL Team 7. The Iraqi, captured during a joint Task Force 121/CIA mission, is suspected of having been involved in an attack against the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] Members of the Navy SEAL team punch and choke Al-Jamadi and stick their fingers in his eyes. A SEAL lieutenant is involved in the abuse. [Associated Press, 1/11/2005] Al-Jamadi resists his arrest, and one SEAL Team member hits him on the head with the butt of a rifle. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] MP Spc. Dennis E. Stevanus is on duty when two CIA representatives bring the man to the Hard Site. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] Spc. Jason A. Kenner, an MP at Abu Ghraib, will later say the detainee was “in good health” when he was brought in. [Guardian, 5/20/2004] According to Kenner’s later account, the detainee’s head is covered with an empty sandbag. MPs are then ordered to take him to a shower room, and told not to remove the hood, according to Kenner. [Guardian, 5/20/2004] The detainee is then interrogated by CIA and military intelligence personnel. Less than an hour later, the detainee will be found dead (see (7:00 a.m.) November 4, 2003). [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Dennis E. Stevanus, Jason A. Kenner, Manadel al-Jamadi, International Committee of the Red Cross

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Charles Graner giving the thumbs up over Manadel al-Jamadi’s dead body on November 4, 2003.Charles Graner giving the thumbs up over Manadel al-Jamadi’s dead body on November 4, 2003. [Source: Public domain]Spc. Dennis E. Stevanus is summoned to the shower stall of the Hard Site in Abu Ghraib. When he arrives he discovers that detainee Manadel al-Jamadi, interrogated by the CIA less than an hour before (see Between 4:30 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. November 4, 2003), is dead. Jamadi’s body is still shackled to the stall. When the hood is removed, he is found to have severe head wounds. (It is unclear whether these wounds were present when the prisoner was taken in, or whether they were inflicted during the interrogation.) [Los Angeles Times, 5/18/2004; US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] Stevanus calls a medic and notifies his superiors. Lt. Col. Steven Jordan arrives at the site at around 7:15 a.m. He finds several MPs and medics in the shower stall. The deceased prisoner is still handcuffed with his hands behind his back, lying on the floor face down. When the body is uncuffed and turned over, Jordan notices a small spot of blood on the floor where his head has lain. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file Sources: Jason A. Kenner] There is also extensive bruising on the body. [Guardian, 5/20/2004 Sources: Jason A. Kenner] Jordan alerts Col. Thomas M. Pappas. A CIA supervisor is also notified. He arrives and requests that the Hard Site hold the body until the next day. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] According to ABC News, Spc. Jason A. Kenner sees the body packed in ice while a “battle” rages between CIA and military intelligence interrogators over who should dispose of the corpse. [Guardian, 5/20/2004] The body is then put in a body bag, packed in ice, and stored in the shower area. [New Yorker, 5/10/2004; US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file Sources: Ivan L. Frederick II] Photographs are later released of MP Spcs. Charles Graner and Sabrina Harman posing next to the dead body wrapped in cellophane and packed in ice, giving a “thumbs up.” [New Yorker, 5/10/2004] According to MP Spc. Bruce Brown, an MP with the 372nd, they spray “air freshener to cover the scent.” [Los Angeles Times, 5/18/2004] The Criminal Investigation Division (CID) is also alerted. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Thomas M. Pappas, Sabrina Harman, Manadel al-Jamadi, Steven L. Jordan, Dennis E. Stevanus, Bruce Brown, Charles Graner, Criminal Investigation Division, Jason A. Kenner

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Major General Marshal Donald Ryder files a report on the prison system in Iraq, as requested by Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez earlier in the fall (see Late January 2004). He concludes that there are potential systemic human rights, training, and manpower issues that need immediate attention at Abu Ghraib. But he also says that he found “no military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices.” [US Department of the Army, 3/9/2004] Ryder suggests that the problem may stem from methods used in Afghanistan where MPs have worked with intelligence operatives to “set favorable conditions for subsequent interviews.” He recommends that military police no longer participate in military intelligence supervised interrogations. Guidelines need to be drawn up that “define the role of military police soldiers… clearly separating the actions of the guards from those of the military intelligence personnel,” he says. [New Yorker, 5/10/2004; New Yorker, 5/17/2004] An investigation by Gen. Antonio M. Taguba completed next year (see March 9, 2004) will come to the same conclusion. “I concur fully with MG Ryder’s conclusion regarding the effect of AR 190-8. Military Police, though adept at passive collection of intelligence within a facility, should not participate in military intelligence supervised interrogation sessions. Moreover, Military Police should not be involved with setting ‘favorable conditions’ [emphasis by Taguba] for subsequent interviews. These actions… clearly run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility.” [US Department of the Army, 3/9/2004] Ryder does not appear to report on actual instances of prisoner abuse and downplays the gravity of the situation, saying it has not yet reached a crisis point. [New Yorker, 5/10/2004; New Yorker, 5/17/2004] Ryder’s report also notes that a great number of people being held in the Iraq prison system appear to be innocent of any crime. It notes that some Iraqis have been held for several months for nothing more than expressing displeasure or ill will towards US troops (see February 2004).

Entity Tags: Antonio M. Taguba, Ricardo S. Sanchez, Donald J. Ryder

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Thomas Pappas.Thomas Pappas. [Source: US Army]The office of Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez formally puts Col. Thomas M. Pappas of 205th Military Intelligence Brigade in charge of cell blocks 1A and 1B in the Abu Ghraib prison. As Gen. Antonio Taguba will note in his February 26, 2004 (see February 26, 2004) report, the order “effectively made an MI Officer, rather than an MP officer, responsible for the MP units conducting detainee operations at that facility. This is not doctrinally sound due to the different missions and agenda assigned to each of these respective specialties.” [New York Times, 5/12/2004; Washington Post, 5/16/2004; New Yorker, 5/17/2004; Newsweek, 5/24/2004] Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba will also note: “[T]he intelligence value of detainees held at… Guantanamo is different than that of the detainees/internees held at Abu Ghraib and other detention facilities in Iraq…. There are a large number of Iraqi criminals held at Abu Ghraib. These are not believed to be international terrorists or members of al-Qaeda.” The report will say also that the order was in conflict with existing military regulations and suggests that Sanchez’s recommendation had influenced the conditions at Abu Ghraib.

Entity Tags: Ricardo S. Sanchez, Antonio M. Taguba, Thomas M. Pappas

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Iraqi Major General Abed Hamed Mowhoush is questioned by “other governmental agency officials” (In military parlance, this means the CIA) and possibly beaten. [Human Rights Watch, 6/2004]

Entity Tags: Abed Hamed Mowhoush

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Abed Hamed Mowhoush.Abed Hamed Mowhoush. [Source: New York Times]At the Al Qaim detention facility northwest of Baghdad, Iraqi Major General Abed Hamed Mowhoush is interrogated by two officers of the 66th Military Intelligence Company. They force him head-first into a sleeping bag and question him as they roll him back and forth. One of the soldiers, Chief Warrant Officer Lewis Welshofer, sits on the Iraqi general’s chest and covers his mouth. [Human Rights Watch, 6/2004] The prisoner dies of asphyxia due to smothering and chest compression. [Denver Post, 5/18/2004] Later in the day, US military officials issue a statement saying that a prisoner has died of natural causes during questioning. “Mowhoush said he didn’t feel well and subsequently lost consciousness,” the statement reads. “The soldier questioning him found no pulse, then conducted CPR and called for medical authorities. According to the on-site surgeon, it appeared Mowhouse died of natural causes.” [Denver Post, 5/18/2004; New York Times, 5/22/2004] But the autopsy report will say there is “evidence of blunt force trauma to the chest and legs.” [Human Rights Watch, 6/2004] The incident is investigated and a report is issued in early 2004 (see Late January 2004).

Entity Tags: Lewis Welshofer, Abed Hamed Mowhoush

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

At Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, MPs hide prisoners from a Red Cross delegation by shifting them around the complex. These prisoners, or “ghost detainees,” are a group of detainees that have been imprisoned without names, charges, or other documentation. According to Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba’s February 26 report (see February 26, 2004), a number of jails operated by the 800th Military Police Brigade “routinely held” such prisoners “without accounting for them, knowing their identities, or even the reason for their detention.” Taguba will note that the practice is a “violation of international law.” [US Department of the Army, 3/9/2004; Los Angeles Times, 5/5/2004; Washington Post, 5/9/2004; Washington Post, 5/11/2004, pp. A01]

Entity Tags: Antonio M. Taguba

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Joseph Darby.Joseph Darby. [Source: Richard Lambert / US Army]Spc. Joseph Darby, a 24-year-old member of the 372nd MP Company at Abu Ghraib, slips an envelope under the door of the Army’s Criminal Investigations Division. The envelope contains an anonymous note and a CD with roughly one thousand photographs of abuses that took place at the prison, mostly between October and December of the previous year. [Knight Ridder, 5/10/2004; New Yorker, 5/24/2004] Darby was collecting photographs from his tour in Iraq and received them inter alia from Spc. Charles Graner. “It was just wrong,” Darby later declares. “I knew I had to do something.” He talked about it with Graner who allegedly replied: “The Christian in me says it’s wrong, but the corrections officer in me says, ‘I love to make a grown man piss himself.’” [Washington Post, 5/22/2004]

Entity Tags: Joseph Darby, Charles Graner

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Bantz Craddock.Bantz Craddock. [Source: US European Command]On January 15, 2004, Lieutenant General Bantz Craddock, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s senior military assistant, and Vice-Admiral Timothy Keating, director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are e-mailed a summary of the Abu Ghraib abuses depicted on a CD-ROM recently given to an army investigative unit two days before (see January 13, 2004). The summary says that about ten soldiers are shown in the pictures and are involved in acts including: “Having male detainees pose nude while female guards pointed at their genitals; having female detainees exposing themselves to the guards; having detainees perform indecent acts with each other; and guards physically assaulting detainees by beating and dragging them with choker chains.” On January 20, Central Command sends another e-mail to Keating, Craddock, and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the top US Army commander in Iraq. It confirms the detainee abuse took place, is well-documented with photos, and says that “currently [we] have 4 confessions implicating perhaps 10 soldiers.” General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will later acknowledge in testimony that around this time, information about the abuse and the photographs had been given “to me and the Secretary [Rumsfeld] up through the chain of command.… And the general nature of the photos, about nudity, some mock sexual acts and other abuse, was described.” [New Yorker, 6/17/2007]

Entity Tags: Ricardo S. Sanchez, Richard B. Myers, Bantz J. Craddock, Timothy Keating, Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Gen. Janis Karpinski is informed of the abuses depicted in the photographs turned in by Spc. Joseph Darby a few days before (see January 13, 2004). She is an hour and a half away from Baghdad engaged in some kind of “security mission.” The Criminal Investigation Division (CID) commander informs her by e-mail “almost as if he thought of me as an after-fact or an afterthought,” she later says. [Signal Newspaper, 7/4/2004]

Entity Tags: Janis L. Karpinski, Criminal Investigation Division

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez orders a high level administrative investigation into the 800th Military Police Brigade apart from the criminal investigation that was announced three days earlier (see January 16, 2004). He appoints Major General Antonio M. Taguba to conduct the inquiry and limits the scope of the investigation to the conduct of the military police brigade. Taguba’s report will be filed on February 26 (see February 26, 2004). [US Department of the Army, 3/9/2004; Sydney Morning Herald, 5/4/2004; New York Times, 5/10/2004] As preparations for investigation are underway, investigators reportedly give the MPs at Abu Ghraib “a week’s notice before inspecting their possessions.” [ [Sources: Several unnamed soldiers] Whether it is an attempt to sabotage the investigation, or a matter of clumsiness on the part of the military leadership or the CID, the result may well be that evidence of abuse is deliberately destroyed. “That shows you how lax they are about discipline. ‘We are going to look for contraband in here, so hint, hint, get rid of the stuff,’ that’s the way things work in the Guard,” MP Ramone Leal will say. [Reuters, 5/6/2004]

Entity Tags: Ramone Leal, Ricardo S. Sanchez, Antonio M. Taguba

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba begins investigating abuses at Abu Ghraib prison. He is limited to investigating the 800th MP (military police) unit, as the abuse photographs mainly involve them. However, he suspects that superiors are to blame as well. He will later comment, “From what I knew, troops just don’t take it upon themselves to initiate what they did without any form of knowledge of the higher-ups.… These MP troops were not that creative. Somebody was giving them guidance, but I was legally prevented from further investigation into higher authority. I was limited to a box.” [New Yorker, 6/17/2007]

Entity Tags: Donald J. Ryder, Ricardo S. Sanchez

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

In February 2004, a confidential report by the International Committee of the Red Cross says that “military intelligence officers told [us] that in their estimate between 70 percent and 90 percent of the persons deprived of their liberty in Iraq had been arrested by mistake.” Half or more of all prisoners in Iraq are held at Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad. This report echoes the conclusions of an unpublished US Army report by Maj. Gen. Donald Ryder given to Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the top US commander in Iraq, on November 5, 2003 (see November 5, 2003). Ryder, the US Army’s provost marshal, reported that some Iraqis had been held for several months for nothing more than expressing “displeasure or ill will” towards US troops. And it said the process for deciding which arrested Iraqis posed security risks and which should be released violated the military’s own policies. It also complains that the continuing influx of new prisoners detained despite little evidence against them threatens to strain the prison system. Senior officers claim that Brig. Gen. Barbara Fast, the top Army intelligence officer in Iraq, often ruled last against the release of prisoners, even vetoing the recommendations of a military police commander and military intelligence officers. [New York Times, 5/30/2004] Similarly, Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, who investigates abuses at Abu Ghraib prison around this time (see February 26, 2004), will later say very few prisoners there were affiliated with any terrorist group. Taguba saw classified documents revealing that there were only “one or two” suspected al-Qaeda prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Most of the detainees were not even connected to the Iraqi insurgency. [New Yorker, 6/17/2007] Despite this evidence, Pentagon spokesperson Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt will later claim, “If they were innocent, they wouldn’t be at Abu Ghraib.… The number that were released because they were innocent? That number… is zero. Persons are held at Abu Ghraib because they are determined to be security threats, imminent security threats here in [Iraq].” [New York Times, 5/30/2004]

Entity Tags: Donald J. Ryder, Barbara G. Fast, International Committee of the Red Cross, Mark Kimmitt, Ricardo S. Sanchez

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Antonio M. Taguba.Antonio M. Taguba. [Source: US Army]Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba files a 53-page classified report which finds that between October and December of 2003, members of the 372nd Military Police Company and US intelligence community engaged in numerous incidents of “sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses” against prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad. As evidence, he cites “detailed witness statements and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence.” The photographs—which are later leaked to the press (see Mid-April 2004), causing an enormous international public outcry—are not included in the report. [US Department of the Army, 3/9/2004; New Yorker, 5/10/2004; New Yorker, 5/17/2004] Taguba also takes issue with the November 5 (see November 5, 2003) Ryder report which concluded that the military police units had not intentionally used inappropriate confinement practices. “Contrary to the findings of MG [Maj. Gen.] Ryder’s report, I find that personnel assigned to the 372nd MP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed to change facility procedures to ‘set the conditions’ for MI interrogations.” Army intelligence officers, CIA agents, and private contractors “actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses.” [US Department of the Army, 3/9/2004; New Yorker, 5/10/2004] He presents his report to his commander on March 3 (see March 3, 2004).

Entity Tags: Antonio M. Taguba

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Major General Antonio M. Taguba out-briefs the findings of his investigation to General David McKiernan. [Slate, 5/5/2004; New York Times, 5/10/2004]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Antonio M. Taguba, Peter Pace, David D. McKiernan

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba submits the final version of his report (see February 26, 2004) on the investigation into prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib by MPs. He concludes that military intelligence personnel played a part in the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. But due to the fact that his investigation was limited to the conduct of MPs (see January 19, 2004), he did not investigate military intelligence conduct. Another investigation (see August 25, 2004), however, is launched that will examine military intelligence’s role in the abuses. It will be conducted by Maj. Gen. George R. Fay, the Army’s deputy chief of staff for intelligence. But the scope of this investigation is also limited from the outset, for two reasons. First, as a two-star general, he cannot hold any officer of his own rank or higher accountable. Second, Fay is appointed by Lt. Col. Ricardo S. Sanchez and therfore the scope of investigation is limited to the people under Sanchez’s command. [Newsweek, 6/7/2004] Additionally, Fay may be less inclined to report negatively on military intelligence personnel, since his superior, Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, head of Army Intelligence, has already stated that the abuse at Abu Ghraib was committed by “a group of undisciplined military police” who were acting on their own, and not upon instructions from military intelligence officers. [Truthout (.org), 5/14/2004]

Entity Tags: George R. Fay, Ricardo S. Sanchez, Antonio M. Taguba, Keith Alexander

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba presents his report (see February 26, 2004) on prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib to his commanders. [Truthout (.org), 5/14/2004] The report is “very closely held” among the Army’s senior leadership and the report is only accessible to top officials on a secure computer network. Congress is not informed of the report or its findings. [Baltimore Sun, 5/6/2004] It is classified as “Secret / No Foreign Dissemination.” Neither the vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Gen. Peter Pace, nor the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld will later say they know why the report was classified when asked at a Pentagon press briefing on May 4. Such a classification may be in violation of US law. Section 1.7 of Executive Order 12958 reads: “In no case shall information be classified in order to… conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error [or to] prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency….” [Secrecy News, 5/5/2004]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Antonio M. Taguba, US Congress, Peter Pace

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The Pentagon announces Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller is to be replaced by Brig. Gen. Jay W. Hood as commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo. Miller will become deputy commander for detainee operations in Iraq, including Abu Ghraib prison. [US Department of Defense, 3/22/2004] He will assume his new function on April 15. [Washington Post, 5/9/2004] In late April, abuses committed at Abu Ghraib will become a public scandal (see April 28, 2004). Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba had conducted a US Army investigation into the abuses in January 2004 (see February 26, 2004). In the course of that investigation, Taguba concluded that Miller was partly responsible for the abuses because Miller had visited Abu Ghraib and successfully pushed for more aggressive interrogation techniques there. However, due to a limited mandate, Taguba could not formally investigate Miller’s role. Ironically, after the scandal breaks, Miller will be in the role of helping to clean up the problems in the prison that he helped create. [New Yorker, 6/17/2007]

Entity Tags: Jay W. Hood, Antonio M. Taguba, Geoffrey D. Miller

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

David Hackworth.David Hackworth. [Source: Public domain via Flickr]Staff Sgt. Ivan Frederick’s uncle William Lawson sends an e-mail about the abuses and their documentation to the website of retired Col. David Hackworth, stating: “We have contacted the Red Cross, Congress both parties [sic], Bill O’Reilly [a Fox News Channel host] and many others. Nobody wants to touch this.” Within minutes, an associate of Hackworth calls him over the phone. Hackworth, who is described by the New York Times as “a muckraker who was always willing to take on the military establishment,” then puts Lawson in touch with the producers of the CBS news program “60 Minutes II,” who will eventually air the story on Abu Ghraib. Lawson’s efforts to publicize the abuses are motivated by his fear, and that of his brother-in-law, Frederick’s father, that Frederick will take the fall for what they believe involves higher ranking officers and officials. Seventeen members of Congress, however, ignored Lawson’s plea before he contacted Hackworth. “The Army had the opportunity for this not to come out…, but the Army decided to prosecute those six GI’s because they thought me and my family were a bunch of poor, dirt people who could not do anything about it. But unfortunately, that was not the case.” [New York Times, 5/8/2004]

Entity Tags: US Congress, David Hackworth, Ivan L. Frederick II, International Committee of the Red Cross, Bill O’Reilly

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

A deranged Abu Ghraib detainee wanders the halls covered in human feces on December 12, 2003. MP Ivan Frederick stands behind him with a stick.A deranged Abu Ghraib detainee wanders the halls covered in human feces on December 12, 2003. MP Ivan Frederick stands behind him with a stick. [Source: Public domain]The Abu Ghraib prison photos are leaked to CBS. The network informs the Pentagon that it will broadcast a story on the prison abuses and include the photos. But the network delays broadcasting the story at the request of Gen. Richard Myers. [Guardian, 4/30/2004; CBS News, 5/6/2004; Los Angeles Times, 5/6/2004; CNS News, 5/7/2004]

Entity Tags: Richard B. Myers

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Lynndie England dragging a prisoner nicknamed Gus on October 24, 2003.Lynndie England dragging a prisoner nicknamed Gus on October 24, 2003. [Source: Public domain]CBS’s “60 Minutes II” airs the Abu Ghraib prison photos (see March 23, 2004) having learned that the New Yorker is about to publish a piece on abuses at Abu Ghraib. Bush reportedly first learns about these photos from the television report. [CBS News, 5/6/2004; Los Angeles Times, 5/6/2004; Baltimore Sun, 5/6/2004; St. Petersburg Times, 5/9/2004] Most of the photos show prisoners being forced to engage in humiliating sexual acts. For example in one photo a hooded naked man is forced to masturbate as a grinning female MP, Lynndie England, looks on, giving a thumbs-up. Another photo shows two naked hooded men, one standing, while the other is kneeling in front of him, simulating oral sex. The Bush administration will portray these forced acts of humiliation as the immature pranks of low ranking soldiers. But others will argue that the acts were ordered from above with the intent to exploit Arab culture’s conservative views with regard to sex and homosexuality (see 2002-March 2003). [New Yorker, 5/10/2004; New Yorker, 5/17/2004] A different picture shows a hooded-man with his arms spread and wires dangling from his fingers, toes, and penis. He was apparently told that if he fell off the box he would be electricuted. The tactic is known as the “The Vietnam,” an “arcane torture method known only to veterans of the interrogation trade” that had been first used by Brazilians in the 1970s. [Seattle Times, 5/14/2004; Newsweek, 5/24/2004 Sources: Darius Rejali] Another picture is of Manadel al-Jamadi who was killed after being “stressed” too much (see (7:00 a.m.) November 4, 2003). [New Yorker, 5/10/2004; New Yorker, 5/17/2004] “A generation from now,” one observer notes, “historians may look back to April 28, 2004, as the day the United States lost the war in Iraq.” [Washington Monthly, 11/2004]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Lynndie England, Manadel al-Jamadi, Bush administration (43), CBS News

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline

Seymour Hersh.Seymour Hersh. [Source: Daily Californian / Skyler Reid]The New Yorker magazine publishes an in-depth article by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh on the Abu Ghraib abuses, as well as excerpts of the Taguba report (see February 26, 2004). The article includes some of the graphic photos of the abuses that were turned in by Spc. Joseph Darby (see January 13, 2004) in January. [New Yorker, 5/10/2004] Soon thereafter, subordinates of Undersecretary for Policy Douglas Feith send out an “urgent” e-mail around the Pentagon warning officials not to read the Taguba report and not to mention the report to anybody including family members, even though major parts of it are now part of the public record. Newsweek later quotes a military lawyer as saying, that Feith has turned his office into a “ministry of fear.” [Newsweek, 6/7/2004]

Entity Tags: Joseph Darby, New Yorker, Douglas Feith, Seymour Hersh

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

General John Abizaid, head of US Central Command (Centcom) threatens Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba over Taguba’s hard-hitting report on the Abu Ghraib prison abuses (see February 26, 2004). Riding with Abizaid in the back of a car in Kuwait a few weeks after Taguba’s report was leaked to the public, Taguba will later claim that Abizaid turned to him and quietly said, “You and your report will be investigated.” Taguba will later recall, “I wasn’t angry about what he said but disappointed that he would say that to me. I’d been in the Army thirty-two years by then, and it was the first time that I thought I was in the Mafia.” [New Yorker, 6/17/2007]

Entity Tags: John P. Abizaid, Antonio M. Taguba

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

White House spokesman Scott McClellan says President Bush still has not seen or been briefed on the Taguba report (see February 26, 2004). [US Department of Defense, 5/12/2004]

Entity Tags: Scott McClellan

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Speaking about the Abu Ghraib scandal (see April 28, 2004), President Bush promises a “full investigation.” In an interview with Al Arabiya, he says: “It’s important for people to understand that in a democracy, there will be a full investigation. In other words, we want to know the truth. In our country, when there’s an allegation of abuse… there will be a full investigation, and justice will be delivered.… It’s very important for people and your listeners to understand that in our country, when an issue is brought to our attention on this magnitude, we act. And we act in a way in which leaders are willing to discuss it with the media.… In other words, people want to know the truth. That stands in contrast to dictatorships. A dictator wouldn’t be answering questions about this. A dictator wouldn’t be saying that the system will be investigated and the world will see the results of the investigation.” [White House, 5/5/2004] In April 2009, after significant revelations of Bush torture policies have hit the press (see April 16, 2009 and April 21, 2009), Atlantic columnist Andrew Sullivan will write: “Bush personally authorized every technique revealed at Abu Ghraib. He refused to act upon the International Committee of the Red Cross’s report that found that he had personally authorized the torture of prisoners, in violation of the Geneva Conventions and the UN Convention on Torture and domestic law against cruel and inhuman treatment. A refusal to investigate and prosecute Red Cross allegations of torture is itself a violation of the Geneva Accords.” [Atlantic Monthly, 4/27/2009]

Entity Tags: Andrew Sullivan, George W. Bush

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, author of a hard-hitting report on Abu Ghraib prison abuse, is summoned to meet Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld for the first time. Rumsfeld is scheduled to testify about Abu Ghraib before Congress the next day (see May 7, 2004). Also attending the meeting is Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Richard Myers, Army chief of staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker, Rumsfeld’s senior military assistant Lt. Gen. Bantz Craddock, and others. According to Taguba, when he walks in, Rumsfeld declares in a mocking voice, “Here… comes… that famous General Taguba—of the Taguba report!” Asked if there was torture at Abu Ghraib, Taguba recalls, “I described a naked detainee lying on the wet floor, handcuffed, with an interrogator shoving things up his rectum, and said, ‘That’s not abuse. That’s torture.’ There was quiet.” Rumsfeld asks who leaked Taguba’s report to the public, but Taguba says he doesn’t know. Rumsfeld then complains that he has not seen a copy of his report or the Abu Ghraib abuse photographs and yet he has to testify to Congress tomorrow. Taguba is incredulous, because he sent over a dozen copies of his report to the Pentagon and Central Command headquarters, and had just spent several weeks briefing senior military leaders about it. He also was aware that Rumsfeld, Myers, Craddock, and others were notified about the abuse and the photographs back in January, before Taguba even began his investigation (see January 15-20, 2004). Taguba will later suspect that the military leaders were trying to remain ignorant of the scandal to avoid responsibility and accountability. For instance, when Taguba urged one lieutenant general to look at the photographs, he got the reply, “[I] don’t want to get involved by looking, because what do you do with that information, once you know what they show?” Taguba will later complain of the meeting, “I thought they wanted to know. I assumed they wanted to know. I was ignorant of the setting.” [New Yorker, 6/17/2007]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Antonio M. Taguba, Bantz J. Craddock, Peter J. Schoomaker, Richard B. Myers, Stephen A. Cambone, Paul Wolfowitz

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Rumsfeld under oath, testifying about Abu Ghraib.Rumsfeld under oath, testifying about Abu Ghraib. [Source: HBO]In public testimony under oath before the Senate and the House Armed Services Committees, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld claims he had no early knowledge of the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse. He says, “It breaks our hearts that in fact someone didn’t say, ‘Wait, look, this is terrible. We need to do something.’ I wish we had known more, sooner, and been able to tell you more sooner, but we didn’t.” He claims that when reports about the hard-hitting Taguba report on Abu Ghraib (see February 26, 2004) first appeared publicly just days before his testimony, “it was not yet in the Pentagon, to my knowledge.” Regarding the shocking Abu Ghraib photos, seen by millions on the television program 60 Minutes on April 28 (see April 28, 2004), Rumsfeld claims, “I say no one in the Pentagon had seen them.” He adds that “I didn’t see them until last night at 7:30.” Asked when he’d first heard of them, he replies, “There were rumors of photographs in a criminal prosecution chain back sometime after January 13th… I don’t remember precisely when, but sometime in that period of January, February, March.… The legal part of it was proceeding along fine. What wasn’t proceeding along fine is the fact that the President didn’t know, and you didn’t know, and I didn’t know. And, as a result, somebody just sent a secret report to the press, and there they are.” But General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will later acknowledge in testimony that just days after the photos were given to US Army investigators on January 13, information had been given “to me and the Secretary [Rumsfeld] up through the chain of command.… And the general nature of the photos, about nudity, some mock sexual acts and other abuse, was described” (see January 15-20, 2004). Major General Antonio M. Taguba, author of the Taguba report, will later claim that he was appalled by Rumfeld’s testimony. “The photographs were available to him—if he wanted to see them.… He’s trying to acquit himself, and a lot of people are lying to protect themselves.” Congressman Kendrick Meek (D-FL) will later comment, “There was no way Rumsfeld didn’t know what was going on. He’s a guy who wants to know everything, and what he was giving us was hard to believe.” [New Yorker, 6/17/2007]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Kendrick Meek, Antonio M. Taguba, Richard B. Myers

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Some time after Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s testimony to Congress, where he claimed he knew virtually nothing about the Abu Ghraib incidents (see May 7, 2004), former Defense Policy Board member Kenneth Adelman confronts Rumsfeld. As Adelman will recall: “I said to Rumsfeld, ‘Well, the way you handled Abu Ghraib I thought was abysmal.’ He says, ‘What do you mean?’ I say, ‘It broke in January of—what was that, ‘04? Yeah, ‘04. And you didn’t do jack sh_t till it was revealed in the spring.’ He says, ‘That’s totally unfair. I didn’t have the information.’ I said, ‘What information did you have? You had the information that we had done these—and there were photos. You knew about the photos, didn’t you?’ He says, ‘I didn’t see the photos. I couldn’t get those photos. A lot of stuff happens around here. I don’t follow every story.’ I say, ‘Excuse me, but I thought in one of the testimonies you said you told the president about Abu Ghraib in January. And if it was big enough to tell the president, wasn’t it big enough to do something about?’ He says, ‘Well, I couldn’t get the photos.’ I say, ‘You’re secretary of defense. Somebody in the building who works for you has photos, and for five months you can’t get photos—hello?’” [Vanity Fair, 2/2009]

Entity Tags: Kenneth Adelman, Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

When the Taguba report (see March 9, 2004), which together with all its 106 annexes includes 6,000 pages, is delivered by the Pentagon to the Senate Armed Services Committee, some 2,000 pages are missing, withheld by the Defense Department. Pentagon spokesman Larry DiRita calls this an “oversight.” [Associated Press, 5/24/2004] Nevertheless, the missing pages contain key documents, internal Army memos and e-mails, sworn statements by soldiers, officers, contractors, and prisoners. It also includes the final section of Taguba’s interview with Col. Thomas M. Pappas. [Newsweek, 6/7/2004] The missing annexes of the Taguba report hold evidence that the abuse was not conducted solely by a few MPs acting on their own, but instead at the instigation and with the involvement of military intelligence personnel.

Entity Tags: US Congress, Larry Di Rita, Thomas M. Pappas

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba is a young officer rising through the ranks of the US Army with unusual speed. But after his hard-hitting report on the Abu Ghraib abuses (see February 26, 2004), he claims that Gen. John Abizaid, head of US Central Command, threatens to have him investigated (see May 2004). Taguba had been scheduled to rotate to the Third Army’s headquarters in Georgia in June of 2004, but instead he is ordered to work at the Pentagon. A retired four-star Army general later tells Taguba that he had been sent to the job in the Pentagon so that he could “be watched.” Taguba later claims that in January of 2006, General Richard Cody, the Army’s Vice-Chief of Staff. calls him and bluntly tells him without any explanation, “I need you to retire by January of 2007.” Taguba does retire in January 2007, after thirty-four years of active service.. He will later complain, “They always shoot the messenger. To be accused of being overzealous and disloyal—that cuts deep into me. I was being ostracized for doing what I was asked to do.” [New Yorker, 6/17/2007]

Entity Tags: Antonio M. Taguba, Richard Cody

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Officials at the CIA refer a case in which a detainee named Gul Rahman apparently froze to death at the Salt Pit prison in Afghanistan (see November 20, 2002) to the Justice Department for examination. [Washington Post, 9/19/2009] The full name of the CIA officer who caused the detainee to die is not known, although his last name is Zirbel. [Mahoney and Johnson, 10/9/2009, pp. 29 pdf file] The case is reviewed with an eye to prosecution by the US Attorneys Office for the Eastern District of Virginia, where one of the office’s top prosecutors works on it. [Washington Post, 9/19/2009] This is apparently one of eight such referrals around this time. [New York Times, 10/23/2005] According to the New York Times, the Justice Department will be “reviewing its jurisdiction” in the case in May 2005. [New York Times, 5/22/2004] The department will decide not to prosecute in October 2005 (see Mid-October 2005), but will re-examine the case in 2009 (see August 24, 2009).

Entity Tags: Gul Rahman, Matthew Zirbel, Central Intelligence Agency, US Department of Justice

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

James Schlesinger.James Schlesinger. [Source: HBO]The four-member Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations completes its final report on its investigations into the prisoner abuses that are known to have taken place in US-run detention centers throughout Iraq and Afghanistan. The investigative panel, which includes James R. Schlesinger, Harold Brown, Tillie K. Fowler, and Gen. Charles A. Horner, finds that a failure of leadership, leading all the way to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, contributed to the abuse of prisoners. Like the Fay report (see August 25, 2004), to be released the following day, and the February 2004 Taguba report (see March 9, 2004), the Schlesinger report concludes that a lack of oversight and supervision allowed incidents, such as that which occurred at Abu Ghraib, to occur. Unlike preceding investigations, the Schlesinger Panel takes issue with the notion that abuses resulted from the actions of a few bad apples and were not widespread, charging that there is “both institutional and personal responsibility at higher levels.” The panel however does not name names. Notwithstanding their criticisms of the secretary, all four members say that Rumsfeld’s mistakes were comparably less significant than those made by uniformed officers. The panel, appointed by the secretary himself, recommends against removing Rumsfeld from office. [New York Times, 8/25/2004] In sum, the panel finds:
bullet Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and his aides failed to anticipate significant militant resistance to the US invasion and did not respond quickly enough to it when its strength became apparent. [New York Times, 8/25/2004]
bullet The Department of Defense created confusion when it issued, retracted, and then re-issued its policy on interrogation methods. [New York Times, 8/25/2004]
bullet The failure to adequately staff Abu Ghraib contributed to the poor conditions and abuses that took place at the prison. The ratio of military police to prisoners at the facility was 75 to one. [New York Times, 8/25/2004]
bullet Responsibility for the abuses that took place at Abu Ghraib go beyond the handful of MPs present in the photographs. “We found a string of failures that go well beyond an isolated cellblock in Iraq,” panelist Tillie K. Fowler explains during a Pentagon press conference. “We found fundamental failures throughout all levels of command, from the soldiers on the ground to the Central Command and to the Pentagon. These failures of leadership helped to set the conditions which allowed for the abusive practice to take place.” [US Department of Defense, 8/24/2004; New York Times, 8/25/2004]
bullet Rumsfeld’s decision (see December 2, 2002) on December 2, 2002 to authorize 16 pre-approved additional interrogation procedures for use at the Guantanamo facility; his subsequent decision (see January 15, 2003) to rescind that authority, and the final April 16, 2003 decision (see April 16, 2003) providing a final list of approved techniques was “an element contributing to uncertainties in the field as to which techniques were authorized.” The methods on the list eventually “migrated to Afghanistan and Iraq where they were neither limited nor safeguarded.” [New York Times, 8/25/2004]
bullet The panel seemingly concludes that the interrogation methods approved for use in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo are lawful, fully agreeing that the Third Geneva Convention does not apply to detainees considered enemy combatants. The panel does not question whether the military was justified in classifying the detainees, or “terrorists,” as such. “The Panel accepts the proposition that these terrorists are not combatants entitled to the protections of Geneva Convention III. Furthermore, the Panel accepts the conclusion the Geneva Convention IV and the provisions of domestic criminal law are not sufficiently robust and adequate to provide for the appropriate detention of captured terrorists.” [US Congress, 9/9/2004, pp. 83 pdf file]
bullet The panel says that Gen. Ricardo Sanchez’s decision to classify some prisoners in Iraq as enemy combatants was “understandable,” even though Combined Joint Task Force 7 “understood there was no authorization to suspend application of the Geneva Conventions… .” [US Congress, 9/9/2004, pp. 83 pdf file]
bullet Abuses at Abu Ghraib involved both MPs and military intelligence personnel. “We now know these abuses occurred at the hands of both military police and military intelligence personnel,” the report says. “The pictured abuses, unacceptable even in wartime, were not part of authorized interrogations nor were they even directed at intelligence targets. They represent deviant behavior and a failure of military leadership and discipline. However, we do know that some of the egregious abuses at Abu Ghraib which were not photographed did occur during interrogation sessions and that abuses during interrogation sessions occurred elsewhere.… We concur with the Jones/Fay investigation’s (see August 25, 2004) conclusion that military intelligence personnel share responsibility for the abuses at Abu Ghraib with the military police soldiers cited in the Taguba investigation.” [New York Times, 8/25/2004]
bullet In Guantanamo, roughly one-third of all abuses were interrogation related. [New York Times, 8/25/2004]
bullet Contradicting the conclusions of the Red Cross report (see May 7, 2004), the Schlesinger report demonstrates that abuses were widespread. “Abuses of varying severity occurred at differing locations under differing circumstances and context,” the report’s authors write. “They were widespread and, though inflicted on only a small percentage of those detained… .” [New York Times, 8/25/2004]
bullet The abusive practices were not sanctioned by the military’s interrogation policy. “No approved procedures called for or allowed the kinds of abuse that in fact occurred. There is no evidence of a policy of abuse promulgated by senior officials or military authorities.” [New York Times, 8/25/2004]
bullet The panelists believe the abuses occurring during the night shift in Cell Block 1 of Abu Ghraib “would have been avoided with proper training, leadership and oversight.” [New York Times, 8/25/2004] Critics will say the report is a “whitewash,” noting that the panel cannot be considered independent given that it was appointed by Rumsfeld himself. Months before the panel completed its work, panelist Tillie Fowler said Rumsfeld should not be blamed for the abuses. “The secretary is an honest, decent, honorable man, who’d never condone this type of activity,” she said referring to the abuse at Abu Ghraib. “This was not a tone set by the secretary.” [New York Times, 6/6/2004]

Entity Tags: James R. Schlesinger, International Committee of the Red Cross, Harold Brown, Charles A. Horner, George R. Fay, Donald Rumsfeld, Tillie K. Fowler

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

George Fay.George Fay. [Source: US Army]Generals George Fay and Anthony R. Jones release a final report describing the findings of their combined investigation of the abuses committed by US soldiers against detainees being held at Abu Ghraib. The investigation was initially ordered by Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, commander of CJTF-7, who charged Fay with determining whether the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade “requested, encouraged, condoned, or solicited Military Police (MP) personnel to abuse detainees and whether MI [military intelligence] personnel comported with established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations.” Lt. Gen. Anthony R. Jones joined the investigation in June and was instructed to determine if “organizations or personnel higher” than the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade chain of command were involved in the Abu Ghraib abuses. [US Department of the Army, 3/9/2004] The report provides detailed descriptions of 44 separate incidents of abuse perpetrated by US soldiers against Abu Ghraib detainees beginning in September 2003. The abuses described include acts of sodomy, beatings, nudity, lengthy isolation, and the use of unmuzzled dogs aimed at making detainees urinate and defecate in fear. “The abuses spanned from direct physical assault, such as delivering head blows rendering detainees unconscious, to sexual posing and forced participation in group masturbation,” the authors say in the report. “At the extremes were the death of a detainee… an alleged rape committed by a US translator and observed by a female soldier, and the alleged sexual assault of an unknown female.” [Washington Post, 8/26/2005] Parts of the report are classified because, according to Army officials, they include references to secret policy memos. But when these classified sections are leaked to the New York Times by a senior Pentagon official, they do not appear to contain any sensitive material about interrogation methods or details of official memos. Instead, the secret passages demonstrate how interrogation practices from Afghanistan and Guantanamo were introduced to Abu Ghraib and how Sanchez played a major part in that process. [New York Times, 8/27/2004] Though the report lays most of the blame on MPs and a small group of military intelligence, civilian, and CIA interrogators, it does recommend disciplinary action for Col. Thomas M. Pappas and Lt. Col. Steven L. Jordan. “The primary causes are misconduct (ranging from inhumane to sadistic) by a small group of morally corrupt soldiers and civilians, a lack of discipline on the part of the leaders and soldiers of the 205 MI BDE [Military Intelligence Brigade] and a failure or lack of leadership by multiple echelons within CJTF-7.” Lt. Gen. Sanchez, the commander of Combined Joined Task Force (CJTF) 7, though mildly criticized, is still praised in the report as having performed “above expectations.” [US Department of the Army, 3/9/2004; Washington Post, 8/26/2005] Jones portrays the abuse as being only coincidentally linked to interrogations. “Most, though not all, of the violent or sexual abuses occurred separately from scheduled interrogations and did not focus on persons held for intelligence purposes.” Gen. Fay on the other hand writes that the majority of the victims of abuse were military intelligence holds, and thus held for intelligence purposes. In addition, he concludes that “confusion and misunderstanding between MPs and MI [military intelligence]” also contributed to acts of abuse. Military intelligence personnel ordered MPs to implement the tactic of “sleep adjustment.” “The MPs used their own judgment as to how to keep them awake. Those techniques included taking the detainees out of their cells, stripping them, and giving them cold showers. Cpt. [Carolyn A.] Wood stated she did not know this was going on and thought the detainees were being kept awake by the MPs banging on the cell doors, yelling, and playing loud music.” [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file]
Conclusions -
bullet Nearly 50 people were involved in the 44 incidents of abuse listed in the report: 27 military intelligence soldiers, 10 military police officers, four civilian contractors, and a number of other intelligence and medical personnel who failed to report the abuse. [Washington Post, 8/26/2005; Washington Post, 8/26/2005] Military intelligence soldiers were found to have requested or encouraged 16 of the 44 incidents. [Washington Post, 8/26/2005; Washington Post, 8/26/2005]
bullet The incidents of abuse included torture. “Torture sometimes is used to define something in order to get information,” Fay tells reporters. “There were very few instances where in fact you could say that was torture. It’s a harsh word, and in some instances, unfortunately, I think it was appropriate here. There were a few instances when torture was being used.” [Washington Post, 8/26/2005]
bullet Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez and his staff “contributed indirectly to the questionable activities regarding alleged detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib” and failed “to ensure proper staff oversight of detention and interrogation operations.” [US Department of the Army, 3/9/2004; Washington Post, 8/26/2005] For example, Sanchez endorsed the use of stress positions, nudity, and military working dogs (see October 12, 2003), even though they had not been approved by Rumsfeld. [Washington Post, 8/26/2005] In spite of this, the executive summary of the report asserts that “the CJTF-7 Commander and staff performed above expectations… .” [US Department of the Army, 3/9/2004; Washington Post, 8/26/2005]
bullet Senior officers in Iraq failed to provide “clear, consistent guidance” for handling detainees. [US Department of the Army, 3/9/2004; Washington Post, 8/26/2005]
bullet There is no evidence that policy or instructions provided by senior US authorities sanctioned the types of abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib. [Washington Post, 8/26/2005; Washington Post, 8/26/2005]
bullet CIA officials in the prison hid “ghost detainees” from human rights groups in violation of international law. [Washington Post, 8/26/2005]

Entity Tags: Steven L. Jordan, Ricardo S. Sanchez, George R. Fay, Anthony R. Jones, Thomas M. Pappas, Carolyn A. Wood

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The CIA’s Executive Director Kyle “Dusty” Foggo reviews the case of the killing of Afghan detainee Gul Rahman at the Salt Pit black site in 2002 (see November 20, 2002). However, he takes no action against the two officers involved in the death, one named Matthew Zirbel, who had Rahman doused with water and left with little clothing in the cold, and one known as Paul P., Zirbel’s boss who failed to provide him with the proper guidance. [Associated Press, 3/28/2010] The timing of the review is unknown, but it must occur after Foggo becomes executive director in November 2004. [New York Times, 8/12/2009; Associated Press, 3/28/2010]

Entity Tags: Matthew Zirbel, Gul Rahman, “Paul P.”, Kyle Dustin “Dusty” Foggo

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The Justice Department decides not to prosecute in most cases where detainees were abused and killed by the CIA. The cases, of which there are apparently eight, had been referred to the department by the CIA’s inspector general (see (August 2004)) and were investigated primarily by the US Attorneys Office for the Eastern District of Virginia, although officials at department headquarters in Washington are also involved in the decision not to prosecute. Although some of the cases are still technically under review at this time, the department indicates it does not intend to bring charges. [New York Times, 10/23/2005] The cases include:
bullet The death of Iraqi prisoner Manadel al-Jamadi in CIA custody in November 2003 (see Between 4:30 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. November 4, 2003 and (7:00 a.m.) November 4, 2003);
bullet The asphyxiation of Major General Abed Hamed Mowhoush in Iraq, also in November 2003 (see November 24 or 25, 2003 and November 26, 2003). This incident involved the military, as well as at least one CIA contractor; [New York Times, 10/23/2005]
bullet The intimidation of al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri by a CIA officer named “Albert” using a gun and drill (see September 11, 2003).
bullet The death of detainee Gul Rahman, who froze to death at the Salt Pit prison in Afghanistan (see November 20, 2002). The case was examined by prosecutors, but, in the end, a recommendation not to prosecute the officer who caused the detainee to die is made. [Washington Post, 9/19/2009] The officer’s first name is not known, although his last name is Zirbel. [Mahoney and Johnson, 10/9/2009, pp. 29 pdf file] The decision is made because prosecutors conclude that the prison was outside the reach of US law; although the CIA funded it and vetted its Afghan guards, it was technically an Afghan prison. In addition, it is unclear whether Rahman, who was captured in Pakistan and then taken to Afghanistan, would have died from injuries sustained during his capture, rather than by freezing. Although hypothermia was listed as the cause of death in the autopsy, the body was not available to investigators. According to the Washington Post, “questions remain whether hypothermia was used as a cover story in part to protect people who had beaten the captive.” However, according to a “senior official who took part in the review,” the decision not to prosecute in this case is not initially that clear, and an indictment is considered. However, the prosecutors decide not to press charges against Zirbel and a memo explaining this decision is drafted. An official involved in the review will later say there is “absolutely no pressure” from the Justice Department’s management to decide not to prosecute. However, a later report by the Post will indicate there may be a split among prosecutors over the decision, and that a political appointee, US Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia Paul McNulty, assesses the case. McNulty will be nominated for the position of deputy attorney general around this time (see October 21, 2005). [Washington Post, 9/19/2009]
However, one CIA employee, a contractor named David Passaro, has been charged with detainee abuse (see June 18-21, 2003). [New York Times, 10/23/2005] The department will begin a second review of some or all of these cases in 2009 (see August 24, 2009).

Entity Tags: Matthew Zirbel, Paul J. McNulty, Gul Rahman, Central Intelligence Agency, Abed Hamed Mowhoush, Manadel al-Jamadi, US Department of Justice

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The White House announces that President Bush will nominate Paul McNulty to be the next deputy attorney general. McNulty is currently the US Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, which the Washington Post will describe as the “central legal front in the Bush administration’s anti-terrorism strategy.” He was involved in the prosecutions of “American Taliban” John Walker Lindh and Zacarias Moussaoui, sometimes referred to as a candidate for the “20th hijacker” on 9/11. McNulty’s nomination comes after the previous nominee, Timothy E. Flanigan, withdrew his name from consideration at the start of the month due to opposition in the Senate. McNulty will keep his current job and serve as acting deputy attorney general until confirmed by the Senate. [Washington Post, 10/22/2005] McNulty recently took a decision not to prosecute CIA officers who abused and killed detainees in some cases referred to his office by the agency’s inspector general (see (August 2004) and Mid-October 2005).

Entity Tags: Paul J. McNulty, US Department of Justice

Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties

According to Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, author of the most probing investigation into Abu Ghraib abuses (see February 26, 2004), many photographs and videos of the abuses have yet to surface publicly. While making his report, Taguba saw “a video of a male American soldier in uniform sodomizing a female detainee.” This video has not even been mentioned in any court proceedings. [New Yorker, 6/17/2007] Journalist Seymour Hersh, who first broke the Abu Ghraib abuse story, also claims that still unreleased photos show “other, more sexual abuse than we knew, sodomy of women prisons by American soldiers, a father and his son forced to do acts together. There was more stuff [than] was made public.” [Raw Story, 6/17/2007] The US Army’s Criminal Investigation Division (CID) continues to hold such photos and videos and declines to release them, citing ongoing criminal investigations and their “extremely sensitive nature.” [New Yorker, 6/17/2007]

Entity Tags: Seymour Hersh, Antonio M. Taguba, Criminal Investigation Division

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

John Durham.John Durham. [Source: Bob Child / Associated Press]After the Justice Department and CIA Inspector General conclude there should be a criminal probe into the destruction of videotapes showing interrogations of two detainees, Abu Zubaida and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (see January 2, 2008), Attorney General Michael Mukasey appoints John Durham, a federal prosecutor from Connecticut, to oversee the case. The investigation would usually be handled by the prosecutor’s office in the Eastern District of Virginia, but that office is recused to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interests. Durham will not act as an independent special prosecutor like Patrick Fitzgerald in the Valerie Plame Wilson case, but will report to the Deputy Attorney General. [Salon, 1/2/2008] Durham made his name as a prosecutor in a difficult organized crime case in Boston. [New York Times, 1/13/2008] House Judiciary Committee Chairman John Conyers (D-MI) criticizes the appointment, saying, “it is disappointing that the Attorney General has stepped outside the Justice Department’s own regulations and declined to appoint a more independent special counsel in this matter… The Justice Department’s record over the past seven years of sweeping the administration’s misconduct under the rug has left the American public with little confidence in the administration’s ability to investigate itself. Nothing less than a special counsel with a full investigative mandate will meet the tests of independence, transparency and completeness.” [Salon, 1/2/2008]

Entity Tags: Michael Mukasey, US Department of Justice, John Conyers, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Abu Zubaida, John Durham

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline

Physicians for Human Rights logo.Physicians for Human Rights logo. [Source: Newsguide (.us)]Retired Army Major General Antonio Taguba, who led the probe into prisoner torture and abuse at Baghdad’s Abu Ghraib prison (see March 9, 2004), accuses the Bush administration of committing “war crimes,” and calls for Bush officials to be held accountable. Taguba’s remarks are part of a wide-ranging report on US torture by the human rights organization Physicians for Human Rights (PHR). The report, released today, finds that US personnel tortured and abused detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay, using beatings, electrical shocks, sexual humiliation, sleep deprivation, isolation, being hung from ceilings, and other practices. One prisoner was forced to drink urine. “After years of disclosures by government investigations, media accounts, and reports from human rights organizations, there is no longer any doubt as to whether the current administration has committed war crimes,” Taguba wrote in the report. “The only question that remains to be answered is whether those who ordered the use of torture will be held to account.” PHR calls the report the most complete medical and psychological examination of former detainees to date. The report focuses on statements from, and medical examinations of, 11 detainees held for long periods of time in various US-run prisons and facilities before being released without charges. The report, titled “Broken Laws, Broken Lives,” concurs with an investigation of Guantanamo conducted by investigative reporters for McClatchy News. PHR president Leonard Rubenstein says there was a direct connection between the Pentagon’s authorizations of extreme interrogation methods and the abuses his organization documented. “The result was a horrific stew of pain, degradation, and… suffering,” he says. [Physicians for Human Rights, 6/2008; McClatchy News, 6/18/2008]

Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), Antonio M. Taguba, Physicians for Human Rights, Leonard Rubenstein

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Newsweek reports that the Justice Department’s criminal investigation into the CIA’s destruction of video of the torture of al-Qaeda leaders Abu Zubaida and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri is continuing, but proceeding slowly. Federal prosecutor John Durham has recently filed a federal court affidavit that states he is examining whether anyone “obstructed justice, made false statements, or acted in contempt of court or Congress in connection with the destruction of the videotapes.” He is specifically attempting to determine if the destruction violated any judge’s order. But progress is slow, and the investigation is likely to take six months or more, which means any criminal charges will probably come after the November 2008 presidential elections. Two sources close to former intelligence officials who are potential key witnesses in the case say these officials have not been summoned to give grand jury testimony. One of them has not even been questioned by the FBI yet. [Newsweek, 6/28/2008] Attorney General Michael Mukasey appointed Durham to head the investigation in January 2008 (see January 2, 2008).

Entity Tags: John Durham, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Central Intelligence Agency, US Department of Justice, Abu Zubaida

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline

The CIA rehires a former officer who previously threatened al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri with a gun and drill during interrogations (see Between December 28, 2002 and January 1, 2003 and Late December 2002 or Early January 2003). The officer, a former FBI translator known as “Albert,” is to train other CIA officers at a facility in northern Virginia to handle different scenarios they might face in the field. He continues with the training until 2008 at the latest. However, according to an anonymous US official, he will still be working as an intelligence contractor in 2010. Albert’s rehiring will be revealed by the Associated Press in September 2010. According to the Associated Press, human rights critics say Albert’s return as a contractor raises questions about how the intelligence community deals with those who used unauthorized interrogation methods. “The notion that an individual involved in one of the more notorious episodes of the CIA’s interrogation program is still employed directly or indirectly by the US government is scandalous,” Ben Wizner, an attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union, will comment. [Associated Press, 9/7/2010]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, American Civil Liberties Union, “Albert”, Ben Wizner

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Retired Major General Anthony Taguba, who headed an intensive military investigation into the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison (see March 9, 2004), is one of the most prominent supporters of the call to investigate the Bush administration’s interrogation, detention, and torture policies. Taguba joins 18 human rights organizations, former State Department officials, former law enforcement officers, and former military leaders in asking President Obama to create a non-partisan commission to investigate those abuses. Even though prosecuting former Bush officials might be difficult, Taguba says, a commission would provide some measure of accountability for the practices Taguba calls “misguided,” “illegal,” “despicable and questionable.” Taguba wants the commission to study the Bush administration’s claims that torture provides good intelligence, which he disputes. He particularly wants the commission to investigate administration officials’ claims that the administration’s policies were legal. Taguba says he supports “a structured commission with some form of authority with clear objectives and a follow-on action plan. I’m not looking for anything that is prosecutorial in nature, unless a suspected violation of relevant laws occurred, which should be referred to the Department of Justice.… In my opinion, our military prosecuted those who were involved in torture or unlawful interrogation. And I think our military has come to terms with that. We are an institution that prides itself on taking corrective action immediately, admitting to it, and holding ourselves accountable. And we have done that. But I am not so sure that our civilian authorities in government have done that for themselves.” Speaking about the Bush Justice Department’s findings that torture and indefinite detentions are legal (see Late September 2001, November 11-13, 2001, December 28, 2001, January 9, 2002, August 1, 2002, and August 1, 2002), Taguba says: “This notion that a lot of constitutional legal experts—lawyers with great intellect, well educated—came up with such despicable and questionable legal findings that were contrary to the definition of defending the Constitution? And then they framed this as if the executive branch had the authority to extend beyond the constitution to establish a policy of torture and illegal detention?… Some of those that were tortured were innocent. How do we come to terms with those that were cruelly mistreated and were innocent, never charged, were illegally detained, and never compensated for their suffering? This is not a political issue, but a moral and ethical dilemma which has far-reaching implications.” [Salon, 2/21/2009]

Entity Tags: Antonio M. Taguba

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Court documents filed by the government show that the CIA destroyed 12 videotapes specifically depicting two detainees being tortured by interrogators. Though the CIA has previously admitted to destroying 92 videotapes (see March 2, 2009), this is the first time it has admitted that some of the tapes showed detainees being tortured. The agency does not use the word “torture,” but instead uses the phrase “enhanced interrogation techniques.” According to the heavily redacted classified document: “There are 92 videotapes, 12 of which include EIT [enhanced interrogation techniques] applications. An OGC [Office of General Counsel] attorney reviewed the videotapes” and the CIA’s “OIG [Office of Inspector General} reviewed the videotapes in May 2003.” The document, along with others, are filed pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit begun by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). The ACLU has asked that the CIA be found in contempt for destroying the videotapes, a motion that is still pending. The videotapes were destroyed to prevent disclosure of evidence showing that CIA interrogators actively tortured detainees, using waterboarding and other methods. The destruction is under investigation by acting US Attorney John Durham (see January 2, 2008). The two detainees depicted in the videotapes are Abu Zubaida and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, both of whom were waterboarded by the CIA (see March 2002, April - June 2002, and (November 2002)). The document describing the destroyed videotapes says “interrogators administered the waterboard to Al-Nashiri.” The videotapes are believed to have been made at the CIA’s secret detention center in Thailand. The CIA has promised to release more information about the videotapes by March 20. However, according to acting US Attorney Lev Dassin, “to date, the CIA is not aware of any transcripts of the destroyed videotapes.” An unredacted version of the inventory of the destroyed videotapes will only be made available for the ACLU to view behind closed doors in court: “This inventory identifies the tapes and includes any descriptions that were written on the spine of the tapes.” Much of the information sought by the ACLU will remain classified, Dassin says. ACLU attorney Amrit Singh says the “government is needlessly withholding information about these tapes from the public, despite the fact that the CIA’s use of torture—including waterboarding—is no secret. This new information only underscores the need for full and immediate disclosure of the CIA’s illegal interrogation methods. The time has come for the CIA to be held accountable for flouting the rule of law.” Author and reporter Jane Mayer believes the tapes were destroyed at least in part because Democratic members of Congress briefed on the tapes began inquiring whether the interrogations of Zubaida and al-Nashiri were legal. [Public Record, 3/6/2009]

Entity Tags: John Durham, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Abu Zubaida, Central Intelligence Agency, American Civil Liberties Union, Lev Dassin, Amrit Singh, Jane Mayer

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

John Durham, a special counsel appointed by former Attorney General Michael Mukasey to investigate the destruction of video tapes made by the CIA of detainees’ interrogations (see January 2, 2008), summons CIA officers from overseas to testify before a grand jury. “Three legal sources familiar with the case” also say that Durham wants testimony from agency lawyers who gave advice relating to the November 2005 decision by Jose Rodriguez, then chief of the CIA’s clandestine service, to destroy the tapes (see Before November 2005 and November 2005). Newsweek will say this comes as a surprise to the CIA, whose officials have “plenty to worry about.” Previously, some lawyers on the case had thought Durham intended to wind down the probe without recommending any charges be brought. However, his recent activity has made them unsure. Newsweek will speculate that Durham “might simply be tying up loose ends.” Alternatively, he may be fixing to have charges brought. [Newsweek, 5/2/2009]

Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency, John Durham

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline

Mary Patrice Brown.Mary Patrice Brown. [Source: Allgov (.com)]The Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) recommends reversing a Bush-era policy and reopening nearly a dozen prisoner abuse investigations, mostly in Iraq and Afghanistan. The decision could potentially expose CIA employees and contractors to prosecution for crimes involving brutalizing and torturing prisoners in US custody, particularly as some detainees died in custody and others were physically and mentally abused. The OPR makes the recommendation in early August, but the information is not reported in the media until later in the month. The decision comes as the Justice Department is ready to disclose new information on prisoner abuse from a 2004 report by the CIA’s inspector general that has never before been released (see May 7, 2004). The Bush-era Justice Department chose not to pursue investigations into any of the allegations, deciding that none of them warranted further inquiry. However, Attorney General Eric Holder reconsidered that decision after he saw the allegations and the accompanying evidence, much of which is contained in the 2004 CIA report. The OPR gives Holder additional leverage to reopen the investigations. The OPR report is primarily authored by the office’s new chief, Mary Patrice Brown, a federal prosecutor picked to replace the office’s former head, H. Marshall Jarrett, who is working elsewhere in the Justice Department. One case under review is that of Iraqi citizen Manadel al-Jamadi, who died in 2003 at Abu Ghraib prison (see Between 4:30 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. November 4, 2003) after being captured by a team of Navy SEALs. Prosecutors believe he received his fatal injuries from his captors, but lawyers for the SEALs deny the charge. During President Bush’s tenure, the Justice Department responded to inquiries about the incidents from Democratic lawmakers with little more than summaries of the numbers of cases under scrutiny, and provided virtually no details about individual cases or explanations as to why the department chose not to prosecute. [New York Times, 8/24/2009]

Entity Tags: H. Marshall Jarrett, Central Intelligence Agency, Eric Holder, US Department of Justice, Manadel al-Jamadi, Mary Patrice Brown, Office of Professional Responsibility

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Attorney General Eric Holder announces he has appointed a federal prosecutor from Connecticut, John Durham, as a special prosecutor to investigate whether CIA interrogators broke any federal laws. [US Department of Justice, 8/24/2009; Washington Post, 8/25/2009]
Decision Stems from CIA IG Report - The investigation is preliminary in nature, and will decide whether a full investigation is warranted. Holder bases his decision in part on a just-released 2004 report on torture by the CIA’s inspector general (see August 24, 2009) and a Justice Department recommendation that there should be an investigation of about a dozen cases of possible abuse and torture from Iraq and Afghanistan (see First Half of August 2009). According to the conclusion of the CIA report: “The enhanced interrogation techniques used by the agency under the CTC [Counterterrorist Center] program are inconsistent with the public policy positions that the United States has taken regarding human rights. Unauthorized, improvised, inhumane, and undocumented detention and interrogation techniques were used.” [New York Times, 8/24/2009; MSNBC, 8/25/2009] The review is also prompted by a report by the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) into memoranda drafted by the department’s Office of Legal Counsel related to “enhanced interrogation techniques.” The OPR report recommends the department re-examine previous decisions not to prosecute in some cases related to the interrogation of certain detainees. The aim of the preliminary review is to find whether federal offenses were committed in some detainee interrogations. [US Department of Justice, 8/24/2009] According to the Washington Post, the review will focus on “a very small number of cases,” including one in which a CIA officer named Zirbel caused Afghan prisoner Gul Rahman to freeze to death at the Salt Pit prison in Afghanistan (see November 20, 2002) and the intimidation of al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri by a CIA officer named “Albert” using a handgun and drill (see Between December 28, 2002 and January 1, 2003). These cases and the others were previously referred by the CIA inspector general to the Justice Department for examination, but the department decided not to prosecute (see (August 2004) and Mid-October 2005). [Washington Post, 9/19/2009; Associated Press, 9/7/2010]
Durham a Veteran Prosecutor - Durham has been investigating the CIA’s destruction of videotapes of interrogations that may have documented instances of torture (see January 2, 2008). Although Durham has a low public profile, he is a veteran of numerous high-level prosecutions, including cases against Boston-area organized crime figures, corrupt FBI agents, and former Governor John Rowland (R-CT). Durham is considered apolitical, and has worked closely with the Justice Department under both Democratic and Republican administrations. Connecticut defense lawyer Hugh Keefe calls him “the go-to guy for Justice whenever they get a hot case.” Former Connecticut prosecutor Mark Califano calls Durham’s approach to investigations “clinical,” and says he has “very rarely” concluded a case without bringing criminal charges. “He likes to make cases when there is evidence there,” Califano says. “You’ve got to balance whether that kind of information exists.… You can’t move forward if you don’t have the evidence.” [US Department of Justice, 8/24/2009; MSNBC, 8/25/2009; Washington Post, 8/25/2009] Boston prosecutors and defense attorneys have characterized Durham as “honest” and “tenacious.” Warren Bamford, who heads Boston’s FBI office, said Durham “kind of has blinders on in the sense that he doesn’t worry about the politics and all the other stuff that might be swirling around, and I think that’s really what makes him so successful.” [Boston Globe, 1/7/2008] In a statement, Holder says, “Mr. Durham, who is a career prosecutor with the Department of Justice and who has assembled a strong investigative team of experienced professionals, will recommend to me whether there is sufficient predication for a full investigation into whether the law was violated in connection with the interrogation of certain detainees.” [Think Progress, 8/24/2009]
Senator: Durham a 'First-Rate' Choice - Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) is enthusiastic about the choice of Durham. He says he has worked with Durham before, while Whitehouse was US Attorney for Rhode Island, and calls the prosecutor “very professional” and “a first-rate choice,” adding that Durham has “a very good grounding in this because he has been doing the investigation into the destruction of the torture tapes.” [MSNBC, 8/25/2009]
No Acknowledged 'Break' with White House - Holder notes that he will be criticized for undermining the CIA, and may be going against abjurations by President Obama to “move forward” instead of focusing on past transgressions, but says the facts left him little choice. “As attorney general, my duty is to examine the facts and to follow the law,” he says in a statement. “Given all of the information currently available, it is clear to me that this review is the only responsible course of action for me to take.… I have concluded that the information known to me warrants opening a preliminary review into whether federal laws were violated in connection with the interrogation of specific detainees at overseas locations.” White House officials say Holder’s decision does not mark a break between the White House and the Justice Department on their policies toward interrogations. Deputy press secretary Bill Burton tells reporters that “ultimately, the decisions on who is investigated and who is prosecuted are up to the attorney general.… The president thinks that Eric Holder, who he appointed as a very independent attorney general, should make those decisions.” [New York Times, 8/24/2009; Washington Post, 8/24/2009; MSNBC, 8/25/2009] Justice Department spokespersons refuse to say who will, and who will not, be investigated. [TPM Muckraker, 8/25/2009]

Entity Tags: Mark Califano, John Durham, Warren Bamford, Office of Professional Responsibility, Office of Legal Counsel (DOJ), Hugh Keefe, Obama administration, Eric Holder, Barack Obama, Bush administration (43), Matthew Zirbel, Central Intelligence Agency, “Albert”, Bill Burton, US Department of Justice, Sheldon Whitehouse

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The response by media and public officials to the announcement of a preliminary investigation by the Justice Department into whether crimes were committed in the course of a small number of detention and interrogation cases by the CIA (see August 24, 2009) is mixed. The investigation is headed by special prosecutor John Durham. Reporter Michael Isikoff says that it will be “difficult to bring cases against agency operatives when you have the [former] attorney general of the United States [John Ashcroft] saying repetitive use of waterboarding is okay with him. He has no problem with it. The Justice Department has no problem with it—which is why some people say if we’re not going to have criminal investigations at the very top, the leadership that authorized these programs, at least have full disclosure so the American public can know the full story of what happened.” Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) criticizes the potential focus on interrogators and says the inquiry should focus on former Bush administration officials and Justice Department lawyers; he says the investigation could echo the Abu Ghraib investigation, where “lower ranking troops who committed abuses were hung out to dry.” Representative Peter Hoekstra (R-MI), the ranking Republican on the House Intelligence Committee, says the Justice Department inquiry risks disrupting current counterterrorism operations, and claims that abuse charges have already been “exhaustively reviewed.” [New York Times, 8/24/2009; MSNBC, 8/25/2009]
Lack of Accountability? - Joanne Mariner, the terrorism and counterterrorism program director at Human Rights Watch, says: “It’s heartening that the attorney general has opened a preliminary investigation of these crimes, but it’s crucial that its scope include senior officials who authorized torture. Lower-level CIA operatives—even if using so-called ‘unauthorized’ techniques—may still have relied on the letter or the spirit of high-level authorizations.” Human Rights Watch warns that if the investigation focuses solely on so-called “rogue” interrogators who acted without official authorization, but fails to investigate senior officials with responsibility for the interrogation program, it will lack credibility. The organization writes, “Such an approach would validate the Bush-era Justice Department memoranda that authorized torture.” It calls the US’s record on accountability for detainee abuse “abysmal.” [Human Rights Watch, 8/24/2009]
Focusing on 'Low-Level Operatives'? - The American Civil Liberties Union’s Jameel Jaffer later says that Durham’s investigation seems to be far too narrow in scope, focusing solely on CIA interrogators and ignoring Bush administration officials who authorized torture and other abusive actions. [TPM Muckraker, 8/31/2009] This position is echoed by the Center for Constitutional Rights, which states: “Responsibility for the torture program cannot be laid at the feet of a few low-level operatives. Some agents in the field may have gone further than the limits so ghoulishly laid out by the lawyers who twisted the law to create legal cover for the program, but it is the lawyers and the officials who oversaw and approved the program who must be investigated.” The center demands the appointment of “an independent special prosecutor with a full mandate to investigate those responsible for torture and war crimes, especially the high ranking officials who designed, justified, and orchestrated the torture program.” Another organization, Physicians for Human Rights, says that it “urges the administration to pursue any investigation up the chain of command to those officials who authorized and supervised the use of illegal techniques.” [TPM Muckraker, 8/24/2009] Several Democrats, including Senators Russ Feingold (D-WI) and Judiciary Committee chair Patrick Leahy (D-VT), and two members of the House Judiciary Committee, Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) and John Conyers (D-MI), issue statements urging the investigation to go beyond looking into the actions of CIA interrogators, and investigate the officials who authorized those actions. [TPM Muckraker, 8/24/2009]

Entity Tags: Eric Holder, Ron Wyden, Russell D. Feingold, US Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency, Bush administration (43), Peter Hoekstra, Center for Constitutional Rights, Patrick J. Leahy, Michael Isikoff, Jameel Jaffer, Jerrold Nadler, Joanne Mariner, John Conyers, John Ashcroft, Obama administration, John Durham

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales defends Attorney General Eric Holder’s decision to investigate allegations of prisoner abuse by the CIA (see August 24, 2009). Referring to Holder’s decision going against the apparent wishes of President Obama, Gonzales says, “As chief prosecutor of the United States, he should make the decision on his own, based on the facts, then inform the White House.” The attorney general has a “great deal of discretion” in such matters, he says. Gonzales also says that since Bush administration lawyers clearly defined what interrogation techniques were legal, the interrogators who went beyond those defined boundaries should be investigated. “We worked very hard to establish ground rules and parameters about how to deal with terrorists,” he says. “And if people go beyond that, I think it is legitimate to question and examine that conduct to ensure people are held accountable for their actions, even if it’s action in prosecuting the war on terror.” Holder, Gonzales says, is only concerned about the “one percent of actors” who went beyond the guidelines of Justice Department lawyers, and is not conducting a witch hunt. The other 99 percent “are heroes and and should be treated like heroes for the most part, not criminals,” he says. [Washington Times, 9/1/2009] Two days later, Gonzales backs down from his position. He tells a Washington Times reporter, “Contrary to press reporting and based on the information that’s available to me, I don’t support the investigation by the department because this is a matter that has already been reviewed thoroughly and because I believe that another investigation is going to harm our intelligence gathering capabilities, and that’s a concern that’s shared by career intelligence officials, and so for those reasons I respectfully disagree with the decision.” [Washington Times, 9/3/2009]

Entity Tags: Alberto R. Gonzales, Eric Holder, Bush administration (43), Central Intelligence Agency, Barack Obama

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Law professor Benjamin Davis calls on former Bush administration officials to step forward and cooperate with the Justice Department investigation into torture, being led by prosecutor John Durham (see August 24, 2009). Davis makes his call after attending a debate called “After Guantanamo” at Case Western Reserve Law School. During that debate, he writes, “members of the former administration regaled the audience with stories about the mistakes made and the arrogance demonstrated by persons with whom they had worked on the issues of detention, interrogation, and military commissions.” Davis writes that “it would seem preferable for the former administration members to tell their stories to the federal prosecutor rather than to audiences at conferences.” He calls the stories “appalling,” citing incidents of “arrogant disdain for military lawyers” displayed by senior Bush officials, widespread ignorance of military law, “and the general indifference of those tasked with developing detention, interrogation, and military commission policy in the prior administration.” Davis calls on the former adminstration officials to go farther than they did at Case Western: “Names were not named in the conference, but names should be named to John Durham. He is permitted to ‘follow the facts wherever they lead,’ but if those lawyers, other civilians, and uniformed types who know where the dogs are buried refrain from coming forward, they will make the task more arduous than it needs to be. Everyone who has a story is a witness in piecing together what really went on. Every lawyer has also sworn an oath to be an officer of the court and is under an ethical duty to refrain from abetting crimes. Help John Durham find the facts.” He concludes by asking: “[B]eyond legal or ethical obligations, the real question is of what these architects of detention, interrogation, and military commission policy are made of. Are they made of the stuff that led Specialist Darby [Joseph Darby—see January 13, 2004] to clearly see what was wrong with detainee treatment in Abu Ghraib, thus prompting him to provide military investigators with the incriminating photos? Or are these persons made of the stuff of cowards that hope this will all go away if they do not say anything to anyone—posturing in public and cowering in private?” [Jurist, 9/18/2009]

Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), Benjamin Davis, Joseph Darby, US Department of Justice, John Durham

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The House Judiciary Committee accidently reveals the surname of the covert CIA officer who caused the death of Afghan detainee Gul Rahman in November 2002. The officer, whose last name is now known to be Zirbel, had Rahman doused with water then left him with few clothes in the cold. Rahman was later found dead (see November 20, 2002). The surname is uncovered in a footnote to a document drafted by lawyers acting for Jay Bybee, who is accused of improper conduct over his drafting of memos that effectively authorised the CIA to torture prisoners, which the committee posts at its website. Although sections of the document are redacted, it appears censors failed to remove Zirbel’s name in this one instance. After the document is highlighted in the press in late March, the name will be redacted in the version of it posted at the committee’s website, but will survive elsewhere on the Internet. [Mahoney and Johnson, 10/9/2009 pdf file; Harper's, 3/28/2010; New Yorker, 3/31/2010]

Entity Tags: House Judiciary Committee, Matthew Zirbel

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The Associated Press publishes an article by Adam Goldman and Kathy Gannon revealing the name of the Afghan detainee who died at the CIA-controlled Salt Pit prison near Kabul in November 2002 (see November 20, 2002). The prisoner is named as Gul Rahman, and further details about his capture and death are also revealed for the first time. [Associated Press, 3/28/2010]

Entity Tags: Adam Goldman, Kathy Gannon, Gul Rahman

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

New Yorker reporter Jane Mayer writes that CIA officer Matthew Zirbel, who caused Afghan detainee Gul Rahman to freeze to death in November 2002 (see November 20, 2002), is still employed by the agency. [New Yorker, 3/31/2010; Associated Press, 2/9/2011] The comment is made in a post about Rahman’s death and the aftermath. [New Yorker, 3/31/2010]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Jane Mayer, Matthew Zirbel

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

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