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Mohammed Mansour Jabarah.Mohammed Mansour Jabarah. [Source: CBC]A number of governments are given warnings suggesting an upcoming attack on nightclubs on the island of Bali, Indonesia, but this does not prevent the bombing of two nightclubs in Bali in October 2002 (see October 12, 2002). Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, an al-Qaeda operative with Canadian citizenship, attended a meeting held in January 2002 in southern Thailand led by Hambali, an al-Qaeda leader who also heads the al-Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Hambali announces a new plan to target nightclubs and restaurants in Southeast Asia. A second meeting held shortly thereafter also attended by Jabarah (but not Hambali) narrowed the target to nightclubs in Bali. Jabarah was arrested in Oman in April 2002 and deported to Canada. By August, he is in the US and is interrogated by US agents, and he reveals this attack plan. He also reveals code phrases, such as the use of “white meat” to refer to US targets. As a result, the FBI completes an intelligence report on his interrogation on August 21, and passes a warning to all Southeast Asian governments immediately thereafter. A leading counterterrorism expert will later say, “There is absolutely no question [Australia] would have received [the report] under our intelligence-sharing agreement with the US, [Britain], and Canada.” [Age (Melbourne), 1/23/2003; Sydney Morning Herald, 10/10/2003] A US intelligence report in early September will list six likely targets, including two nightclubs in Bali (see Early September 2002).

Entity Tags: Jemaah Islamiyah, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hambali, Mohammed Mansour Jabarah

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

In Asadabad, Afghanistan, US troops arrest Haji Rohullah Wakil, a local leader, together with 11 of his associates. They are flown by helicopter to Bagram air base. [New York Times, 8/28/2002] One of Wakil’s associates, Abdul Qayyum, will later tell the Associated Press of his experience at Bagram. Qayyum stays at the base for two months and five days, during which time he says he is systematically deprived of sleep, forced to stand for long periods of time and humiliated by female US soldiers. All the time, he is forbidden to talk to his fellow detainees. He is held in a large hall with about 100 other prisoners divided by wire mesh into several cages or cells, each containing 10 people. The lights are always on, washing is allowed for only five minutes a week, and a bucket is provided for use as a toilet. When a military spokesperson is later asked to comment on Rahman’s account, the spokesperson says it sounds only partially true (see January 22, 2002). [Associated Press, 3/14/2003]

Entity Tags: Haji Rohullah Wakil, Abdul Qayyum

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, War in Afghanistan

Patsy Spier, an American teacher wounded in the attack. Her husband Rick Spier was killed.Patsy Spier, an American teacher wounded in the attack. Her husband Rick Spier was killed. [Source: US Department of Justice]A group of US teachers traveling in the Indonesian province of Papua (also known as Irian Jaya) are ambushed on a jungle road. Two American teachers and one Indonesian teacher are killed, and eight American teachers are injured. The ambush takes place on a road owned by the company Freeport-McMoRan, which owns an extremely lucrative gold and copper mine nearby. The road is tightly controlled by the Indonesian military, the TNI, and a military check point is only 500 yards away. The TNI quickly blames the killings on the Free Papua Movement (OPM), a separatist group in the province. But a preliminary Indonesian police investigation finds that “there is a strong possibility” the ambush was carried out by members of the Indonesian military. Other classified reports presented to Congress by the CIA and FBI suggest the TNI was behind the ambush. [Washington Post, 6/22/2003] The weeks later, a US intelligence report suggests that senior Indonesian military officials discussed an operation against Freeport shortly before the ambush (see Mid-September 2002). [Washington Post, 11/3/2002] Matthew P. Daley, deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, later says: “The preponderance of evidence indicates to us that members of the Indonesian army were responsible for the murders in Papua. The question of what level and for what motive did these murders take place is of deep interest to the United States.” At the time, over 2,000 security personnel were guarding the Freeport mine, and this has been a lucrative business for the TNI. However, Freeport had made recent comments in the local media that they were planning on cutting the security forces. The Washington Post will report in 2003 that the FBI is investigating the possibility that the ambush was designed to make Freeport increase its payments to the TNI. The Post will additionally report US officials also believe that “elements of the military may have wanted to frame the [OPM] in the hope of prompting the State Department to add the group to the department’s terrorist list. If the separatists were listed as a terrorist group, it would almost guarantee an increase in US counterterrorism aid to the Indonesian military.” [Washington Post, 6/22/2003] In 2006, the New York Times will report that, despite all the evidence, “Bush administration officials [have] consistently sought to absolve the Indonesian military of any link to the killings.” In November 2005, the US officially restores ties to the TNI despite the unresolved nature of the killings. The ties had been cut for 12 years due to widespread human rights abuses by the TNI. Also in 2006, Anthonius Wamang, the main suspect in the killings who was recently arrested, will confess that he did shoot at the teachers, but so did three men in Indonesian military uniforms. Furthermore, he says he was given his bullets by a senior Indonesian soldier. Wamang is said to belong to the OPM, but a human rights group connects him to the TNI. [New York Times, 1/14/2006] After the Bali bombings less than two months later (see October 12, 2002), the Asia Times will point to the Papua ambush to suggest that elements in the TNI could have had a role in the Bali bombings as well. [Asia Times, 11/7/2002]

Entity Tags: Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Free Papua Movement, Freeport-McMoRan, Bush administration (43), Anthonius Wamang, Matthew P. Daley

Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks, Complete 911 Timeline

Al Haramain logo.Al Haramain logo. [Source: Reuters / Corbis]In June 2002, al-Qaeda operative Omar al-Faruq was captured by the US and interrogated with techniques described as close to torture (see June 5, 2002). On September 9, 2002, he reportedly breaks down and immediately begins spilling secrets in great detail. He confesses that he is al-Qaeda’s senior representative in Southeast Asia. He says that al-Qaeda leaders Abu Zubaida and Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi had ordered him to “plan large-scale attacks against US interests in Indonesia, Malaysia, [the] Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Cambodia.” In particular, he had a plan to launch truck bomb attacks on US embassies in Southeast Asia around the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. The US issues a code orange alert, and the attacks never happen. He also says that much of the money for al-Qaeda’s operations in the region comes from the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, a charity closely linked to the Saudi government. Al-Faruq’s confessions are immediately leaked to Time magazine, which publishes a story about them on September 15. US investigators tell Time that Al Haramain is a “significant” source of funding for al-Qaeda linked groups in the region and they also say they are investigating possible links between al-Qaeda and top al-Haramain officials in Saudi Arabia. [Time, 9/15/2002] However, Al Haramain offices are not shut down in Southeast Asia or elsewhere. Early the next month, a car bomb and a backpack bomb hit two discotheques in Bali, Indonesia, killing over 200 people (see October 12, 2002). The London Times reports later in the month that $74,000 was sent to Abu Bakar Bashir, the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, al-Qaeda’s main affiliate in the region. The money was spent to buy the explosives for the bombing from the Indonesian military. Furthermore, Jemaah Islamiyah was mainly funded by money from Al Haramain. [London Times, 10/20/2002] However, Al Haramain still is not shut down. In late 2003, it is announced that the charity’s Indonesian branch is shutting down, but in fact it secretly changes locations and stays open. All Al Haramain branches worldwide will finally be shut down in 2004 (see March 2002-September 2004). [Burr and Collins, 2006, pp. 38-41]

Entity Tags: Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Omar al-Faruq, Abu Bakar Bashir, Abu Zubaida, Jemaah Islamiyah

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

US officials claim that approximately 2,700 known or suspected al-Qaeda operatives have been captured around the world in the year since 9/11. [New York Times, 9/10/2002] However, what this means exactly is unclear. It is estimated that there were only about 1,000 al-Qaeda operatives at the time of 9/11, although many more people passed through al-Qaeda training camps (see Just Before September 11, 2001). Furthermore, a later investigation will suggest that only one or two dozen of the many hundreds of prisoners sent to Guantanamo prison have any significant al-Qaeda links (see June 21, 2004).

Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, US intelligence

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Bush giving his speech in front of the Statue of Liberty.Bush giving his speech in front of the Statue of Liberty. [Source: September 11 News (.com)]The Bush administration’s public relations team decides to kick off its push for a war with Iraq, and its drive to the midterm elections, with President Bush’s speech commemorating the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. After much deliberation, Ellis Island in New York Harbor is chosen as the setting for Bush’s speech; the Ellis site won out over nearby Governors Island because the senior public relations officials want the Statue of Liberty as a backdrop. “We had made a decision that this would be a compelling story either place,” White House communications director Dan Bartlett will later recall. “We sent a team out to go and look and they said, ‘This is a better shot,’ and we said okay.” Leading that team is Scott Sforza, the former ABC producer who will later oversee the May 2003 “Mission Accomplished” event (see May 1, 2003 and April 30, 2008). [Rich, 2006, pp. 57-58] (Deputy press secretary Scott McClellan will later write of Sforza, “Reagan’s team had perfected this art of stagecraft, and the man in charge for Bush, deputy communications director Scott Sforza, took it to new heights.” [McClellan, 2008, pp. 82] Sforza is joined by former Fox News producer Gary Jenkins and former NBC cameraman Bob De Servi. They use three barges laden with stadium lights to illuminate the Statue of Liberty for the shoot. Former Reagan administration public relations chief Michael Deaver will later observe that the Bush team is far better at this kind of marketing presentation than the Reagan, Bush I, or Clinton public relations teams ever were. “[T]hey’ve taken it to an art form,” Deaver will say. The speech is designed to push Congress towards authorizing the war before the midterm elections (see January 19, 2002 and October 10, 2002), when, as author Frank Rich will later write, “the pressure on congressmen facing re-election to prove their war-waging machismo would be at its nastiest. Any weak sisters could expect a thrashing much like that Republicans inflicted on Democrats who had failed to vote for the ‘use of force’ resolution sought by the first President Bush after the Persian Gulf War in 1991” (see January 9-13, 1991). A senior administration official says, “In the end it will be difficult for someone to vote against it.” [Rich, 2006, pp. 57-58] In other preparatory moves for the speech, the government raises the National Threat Level from yellow to orange (see September 10, 2002), and announces the death or capture of some 2,700 al-Qaeda operatives since 9/11 (see September 10, 2002). The administration will also attempt to significantly revise its account of events on 9/11 itself (see September 11, 2002).

Entity Tags: Frank Rich, Dan Bartlett, Bob De Servi, Michael Deaver, Scott Sforza, Gary Jenkins, Bush administration (43), George W. Bush

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Domestic Propaganda, 2004 Elections

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s (KSM’s) children, who were captured in a September 2002 raid on a house KSM used (see September 11, 2002), are allegedly tortured following their capture. A statement that they are tortured is made in a submission to a Guantanamo Bay hearing to determine the status of a detainee called Majid Khan. The submission is made by Khan’s father, based on information from another of his sons. It reads: “The Pakistani guards told my son that the boys were kept in a separate area upstairs and were denied food and water by other guards. They were also mentally tortured by having ants or other creatures put on their legs to scare them and get them to say where their father was hiding.” [US department of Defense, 4/15/2007 pdf file] Human Rights Watch, based on eyewitness accounts, says that KSM’s children are held in an adult detention center (see June 7, 2007), and KSM also says that his children are abused in US custody (see March 10-April 15, 2007). [US Department of Defense, 3/10/2007 pdf file; Reuters, 6/7/2007]

Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Majid Khan, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

US officials hold a secret meeting with Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri and strongly urge her to allow the US to rendition Abu Bakar Bashir out of the country. Bashir is a radical Islamist imam alleged to be the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), al-Qaeda’s main Southeast Asian affiliate. US ambassador to Indonesia Ralph Boyce, National Security Council official Karen Brooks, and a CIA official meet with Megawati at her home in Jakarta. The interpreter is an American named Fred Burks, who will later reveal details of the meeting during an Indonesian trial. Burks claims the CIA official tells Megawati that Bashir was responsible for a series of Christmas Eve bombings in Indonesia in 2000 and asks to rendition him. Megawati had allowed the US to rendition two suspects earlier in the year, Omar al-Faruq and Muhammad Saad Iqbal Madni (see June 5, 2002 and Early January-January 9, 2002). But neither of them are Indonesian citizens, whereas Bashir is. Megawati rejects the request, saying Bashir is too popular to simply disappear without repercussions. (Megawati’s Vice President Hamzah Haz describes himself as “very close” to Bashir, and shortly after this meeting he says publicly, “If you want to arrest Abu Bakar Bashir, you will have to deal with me first” (see July 23, 2001-October 20, 2004).) Burks claims that Megawati says: “I can’t render somebody like him. People will find out.” Boyce will later claim that the US did press forcefully for Indonesia to arrest Bashir because the CIA had just learned from interrogating al-Faruq that Bashir was the head of a terrorist network that was about to attack Indonesia. However, he will deny the US wanted to rendition him. Boyce will later call the meeting the centerpiece of a month-long series of meetings with Indonesian officials in an attempt to prevent a terrorist attack in Indonesia. [BBC, 1/3/2005; Boston Globe, 3/2/2005] However, the Bali bombings take place one month later, killing over 200 (see October 12, 2002). In 2005, Bashir will be acquitted of charges that he was involved in any terrorist acts and set free after serving a year in prison on minor charges (see March 3, 2005).

Entity Tags: Megawati Sukarnoputri, Fred Burks, Central Intelligence Agency, Abu Bakar Bashir, Hamzah Haz, Karen Brooks, Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni, Omar al-Faruq, Jemaah Islamiyah, Ralph Boyce

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Several high-level Bush administration lawyers arrive in Guantanamo. The group includes White House counsel Alberto Gonzales; Vice President Cheney’s chief of staff David Addington, who had helped the Justice Department craft its “torture memo” (see August 1, 2002); CIA legal counsel John Rizzo, who had asked the Justice Department for details about how interrogation methods could be implemented (see June 22, 2004); and the Pentagon’s general counsel, William J. Haynes. They are at Guantanamo to discuss the case of suspected “20th hijacker” Mohamed al-Khatani (see August 8, 2002-January 15, 2003).
Pressure from Washington - The commander of the Guantanamo facility, Major General Michael Dunlavey, will recall: “They wanted to know what we were doing to get to this guy, and Addington was interested in how we were managing it… They brought ideas with them which had been given from sources in DC. They came down to observe and talk.” Dunlavey will say that he was pressured by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld himself to expedite the interrogation and use extraordinary means to squeeze information from the suspect. “I’ve got a short fuse on this to get it up the chain,” Dunlavey recalls. “I was on a timeline. This guy may have been the key to the survival of the US.” Asked how high up the pressure was from, Dunlavey will say, “It must have been all the way to the White House.” Rumsfeld is “directly and regularly involved” in all the discussions of interrogations.
'Do Whatever Needed to Be Done' - Staff judge advocate Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver will recall that Addington is “definitely the guy in charge,” taking control of the discussions. Gonzales is quiet. Haynes, a close friend and colleague of Addington’s, seems most interested in how the military commissions would function to try and convict detainees. The lawyers meet with intelligence officials and themselves witness several interrogations. Beaver will recall that the message from Addington and his group is “Do whatever needed to be done.” In essence, the Guantanamo interrogators and commanders are given a green light from the administration’s top lawyers, representing President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Rumsfeld, and the CIA. [Vanity Fair, 5/2008]

Entity Tags: William J. Haynes, US Department of Justice, Mohamed al-Khatani, Michael E. Dunlavey, David S. Addington, Diane E. Beaver, Central Intelligence Agency, Alberto R. Gonzales, Bush administration (43), Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, John Rizzo, George W. Bush

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

Shortly after the Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002), the Washington Post will report: “US intelligence officials said they intercepted communications in late September [2002] signaling a strike on a Western tourist site. Bali was mentioned in the US intelligence report…” [Washington Post, 10/15/2002] In response to the Post story, the State Department will issue a statement saying they did share this information with the Australian government. The statement admits their warning discussed tourists as potential targets, but says the warning did no specify an attack on Bali on the weekend that it took place. No government urgently warns tourists to stay away from likely targets in Bali before the bombings. Australian Prime Minister John Howard will later admit that Australia received this warning, but he will claim his intelligence agency analyzed it and decided no upgrade in alert status or any special warning was warranted. [Age (Melbourne), 10/17/2002]

Entity Tags: John Howard, US Department of State, US intelligence

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

High-ranking al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri is captured in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Al-Nashiri is believed to have played a role in the 1998 African embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998), attended a 9/11 planning summit in Malaysia in 2000 (see January 5-8, 2000), was one of the masterminds of the 2000 USS Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000), and planned the 2002 bombing of the French oil tanker Limburg (see October 6, 2002). Said to be chief of al-Qaeda’s operations in the Persian Gulf region, he is taking flight lessons in the remote UAE region of Umm Al-Qaiwain when he is arrested by local authorities and then turned over to the CIA. An unknown number of other al-Qaeda suspects are arrested with him, but apparently they are considered less important and are not handed to the CIA as well. Most reports indicate he is arrested on November 8, 2002, about two weeks before the first media leaks about his arrest. [New York Times, 12/23/2002] However, US News and World Report will later claim that he was arrested even earlier, early in October 2002. “Al-Nashiri soon broke; he even let officials listen in as he called his associates.” This leads to intelligence on Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, a top al-Qaeda operative, and the US assassinates him with a missile strike on November 3, 2002, after trailing him for about two weeks (see November 3, 2002). [US News and World Report, 6/2/2003] Al-Nashiri will remain in secret CIA prisons until 2006 and then will be transfered to the Guantanamo Bay prison (see September 2-3, 2006).

Entity Tags: Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Central Intelligence Agency, Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline

Ralph Boyce meeting with Megawati Sukarnoputri in September 2004.Ralph Boyce meeting with Megawati Sukarnoputri in September 2004. [Source: Reuters / Corbis]Ralph Boyce, the US ambassador to Indonesia, warns Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri and her top advisers that a group linked to al-Qaeda is planning an attack in Indonesia. The warning does not specify when and where an attack might occur, but it is the latest of several warnings based on the interrogations of al-Qaeda operative Omar al-Faruq and Mohammed Mansour Jabarah (see June 5, 2002 and August 21, 2002). Boyce gives Megawati until October 24 to take action. He says that if Indonesia does not take action by then, the US is going to order all but the most essential US diplomats out of the country as a public warning that Indonesia is a safe haven for terrorists. An unnamed US official will later tell the New York Times: “We told them: ‘Wrap it up. Block it. Demonstrate that you are serious about eliminating the threat against us.’” Boyce publicly warns that the US is considering withdrawing non-essential personnel just hours before two bombs explode in Bali on October 12 (see October 12, 2002). As part of an effort to convince Megawati of the threat, the US allows Indonesian intelligence and police officials to interview al-Faruq, who is in US custody and being held in a secret location. Their interrogation of al-Faruq is still taking place when the Bali bombings occur. [Australian Financial Review, 10/14/2002; New York Times, 10/16/2002]

Entity Tags: Ralph Boyce, Megawati Sukarnoputri

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

An explosion lights up the sky on the island of Bali, Indonesia.An explosion lights up the sky on the island of Bali, Indonesia. [Source: Agence France-Presse]A car bomb detonates in front of a discotheque at Kuta Beach, on the Indonesian resort island of Bali, starting a fire that rages through a dozen buildings. A backpack-mounted device carried by a suicide bomber explodes in another Kuta Beach discotheque. 202 people are killed and 209 are injured. Eighty-eight of those killed are Australian, while most of the rest are Indonesian. A much smaller device explodes outside the US consulate in nearby Denpasar, causing only minor damage and no casualties. No group claims responsibility, but Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), al-Qaeda’s main affiliate in Southeast Asia, is believed to be behind the bombings. [New York Times, 10/13/2002; New York Times, 10/14/2002; BBC, 2/19/2003] Hambali, a key leader in both al-Qaeda and JI, is said to have been involved. He will be arrested in 2003 and taken into US custody (see August 12, 2003). [Chicago Tribune, 12/7/2003] Three alleged JI operatives, Ali Gufron (a.k.a. Mukhlas), Imam Samudra, and Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, will be arrested in Indonesia and sentenced to death in 2003 for their roles in the Bali bombings. Ali Imron, brother to both Gufron and Amrozi, will be sentenced to life in prison. [New York Times, 9/19/2003; New York Times, 10/3/2003] JI operatives Dulmatin, Azhari Husin, and Noordin Mohammed Top also are said to have major roles in the bombings. Husin will be killed in a police shootout in 2005, while Dulmatin and Top remain at large (see October 6, 2005 and After). It will later turn out that the US was given a “stunningly explicit and specific” advanced warning that Hambali and JI were planning to attack nightclubs in Bali (see August 21, 2002).

Entity Tags: Ali Gufron, Azhari Husin, Dulmatin, Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, Imam Samudra, Ali Imron, Hambali, Noordin Mohammed Top, Jemaah Islamiyah

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

The Washington Post reports that a former Indonesian military official has confessed to assembling the main bomb that blew up a nightclub in Bali, Indonesia, several days earlier (see October 12, 2002). According to an unnamed Indonesian security official, former Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Dedy Masrukhin says he regrets the loss of life, but will not disclose who ordered him to make the bomb. He was discharged from the military in September 2001 for involvement in a drug case. He received explosives training in the US while he was still in the military. However, less than 24 hours later, an Indonesian military spokesman acknowledges Masrukhin was intensively interrogated but denies that he confessed. [Jakarta Post, 10/16/2002; Washington Post, 10/16/2002] Several days later, the Jakarta Post, an English language newspaper in Indonesia, reports that their sources say “the police received orders to release [Masrukhin] although suspicions of his link to the Bali blasts remain strong.” [Jakarta Post, 10/21/2002] Interestingly, the London Times reports that the explosives used in the bombings were bought from the Indonesian military (see September-October 2002). [London Times, 10/20/2002]

Entity Tags: Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Dedy Masrukhin

Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks, Complete 911 Timeline

London imam Abu Qatada is arrested at a house in South London by Scotland Yard and MI5 officials. Intelligence agencies in eight countries, including Italy, France, and Germany, have claimed that Qatada has extensive al-Qaeda links, and he is believed to be a member of al-Qaeda’s fatwa (religious) committee (see June 1996-1997). Using anti-terrorist laws passed in December 2001, he is held at the Belmarsh high security prison without charge. He “disappeared” hours before the new laws went into effect (see Early December 2001). Several days before his arrest, Qatada came out of hiding to release a new document justifying the 9/11 attacks. He posted a ten-page document on the Internet entitled “The Legal Vision for the September 11 Events.” In it, he outlined the “moral” case for the attacks and praised Osama bin Laden for challenging the US. [London Times, 10/25/2002] Another radical London imam, Sheik Omar Bakri Mohamed, tells the press that Abu Qatada was arrested after family members visited his house and one of them used a cell phone that was apparently traced by the authorities. [New York Times, 10/26/2002] Qatada worked as an MI5 informant beginning in 1996 (see June 1996-February 1997).

Entity Tags: Abu Qatada, UK Security Service (MI5), Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

The US and the United Nations officially declare Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) to be a terrorist organization. JI is considered to be al-Qaeda’s main affiliate in Southeast Asia. Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Indonesia, and other nations support the UN declaration. The Indonesian government had previously maintained that JI did not even exist, but immediately changed its position on JI after the Bali bombings earlier in the month (see October 12, 2002). However, even though the Indonesian government supports the UN declaration, it does not actually declare JI an illegal organization within Indonesia. [New York Times, 10/24/2002; Associated Press, 10/31/2002] It will take until 2008 for an Indonesian court to officially declare JI an illegal organization (see April 21, 2008). The key breakthrough to identifying the bombers takes place on November 2, 2002. The first suspect, an alleged JI operative named Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, is arrested on November 5. [BBC, 12/3/2002] Indonesia officially declares JI the prime suspect in the bombings on November 16. [Jakarta Post, 1/3/2003]

Entity Tags: United States, Jemaah Islamiyah, Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, United Nations

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Six of Indonesia’s main newspapers, including the Jakarta Post, Jawa Pos, and Bali Pos, suggest that several high-ranking Indonesian government figures could be suspects in the Bali bombings that took place earlier in the month (see October 12, 2002). These newspapers note that Gen. Djaja Suparman and former Jakarta police chief Nugroho Jayusman had flown to Bali just before the bombings. Army chief of staff Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu was also reportedly in Bali at the time of the bombings. [Jakarta Post, 1/3/2003; Pacific Media Watch, 3/31/2003] Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, head of the Indonesian military, admits to the movements, but claims that Suparman was on vacation, while Riyacudu was in Bali for “health reasons.” An Indonesian human-rights activist says, “General Suparman is one of the generals who was behind the extremist jihad groups. He set up militias composed of gangsters and religious fanatics to counter student demonstrations in 1998. One of these militias, Pram Swarkasa, became the embryo of Laskar Jihad.” Laskar Jihad collaborated with the Indonesian military to kill thousands of Christians in the Indonesian province of Maluku in previous years (see January 1999-July 2001); al-Qaeda and its Southeast Asian affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah provided assistance (see Late 2000-Mid-2001). [Asia Times, 11/7/2002] Wimar Witoelar, spokesman for the previous Indonesian president, Abdurrahman Wahid, also says around this time, “The plot is probably hatched by hardline military rogues. This is certainly an excuse for a military takeover unless it is pre-empted.” Suparman threatens to sue for libel, as does Sutarto, who is accused by the Washington Post around the same time for tacitly approving the killing of a group of US citizens in Indonesia less than two months before the Bali bombings (see Mid-September 2002). But the lawsuits apparently never occur, and an Indonesian press council apparently never rules if the newspapers were irresponsible for making the allegations. None of the government figures are ever charged or officially named as suspects in the bombings. [Jakarta Post, 11/9/2002; Pacific Media Watch, 3/31/2003; Reporters without Borders, 6/3/2004]

Entity Tags: Laskar Jihad, Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Nugroho Jayusman, Wimar Witoelar, Djaja Suparman, Ryamizard Ryacudu

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Jamil al-Banna and Bisher al-Rawi have been helping the British intelligence agency MI5 communicate with al-Qaeda linked imam Abu Qatada. Al-Rawi had a formal informant relationship but was fired (see Late September 2001-Summer 2002), while al-Banna has been only helping a little on a casual basis (see Summer-Early November 2002). They are planning to travel together to Gambia for business purposes. On October 31, the day before they are to leave, al-Banna is visited by MI5 agents and British police. According to an MI5 memo later given to his lawyers, they attempt to formally recruit him as an informant. They tell him that he could “start a new life with a new identity” and acquire British citizenship (he is a long-time British resident). He turns down the offer. The agents tell him that he can travel to Gambia without a problem and return to Britain when they are done. MI5 records confirm that they are given permission to travel. [Washington Post, 4/2/2006; Observer, 7/29/2007] Al-Banna and al-Rawi leave for their trip the next day (see November 1-7, 2002).

Entity Tags: Bisher al-Rawi, UK Security Service (MI5), Jamil al-Banna

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Bisher al-Rawi, Jamil al-Banna, and Abdullah El-Janoudi are scheduled to fly from London to Gambia on November 1, 2002. They are going to help al-Rawi’s brother start a peanut factory there. Al-Rawi had worked as an informant for the British intelligence agency MI5, helping them communicate with imam Abu Qatada, but he was fired several months earlier (see Late September 2001-Summer 2002 and Summer 2002). Al-Banna had also been informally helping MI5 with Abu Qatada, but the day before their trip he had turned down an offer to formally work as an MI5 informant (see Summer-Early November 2002 and October 31, 2002). El-Janoudi is a friend and a British citizen, while the other two men are long-time British residents. At Gatwick Airport in London, the three men are detained by security agents. For four days, they are questioned by police about their luggage and their ties to Abu Qatada. In particular, they are interested in a device al-Rawi has. But on closer inspection, it turns out to be a modified store-bought battery charger. Their houses are also searched for evidence. Finally they are cleared and let go. While they are being held, MI5 contacts the CIA and warns that the three men are about to go to Gambia. MI5 calls al-Rawi an “Iraqi extremist” linked to Abu Qatada and says the battery charger is a timing device for a bomb, even though MI5 already knows this is not true. They fail to mention that al-Rawi and al-Banna have been working as MI5 informants. By the time the three men can get another flight to Gambia, seven days have passed. The Washington Post will later note that this “has led to [later] speculation by the men’s attorneys and families that the delay gave the CIA time to position operatives in Gambia.” [Washington Post, 4/2/2006; Observer, 7/29/2007] The CIA, believing the false information sent by MI5, will detain the three men as soon as they arrive in Gambia on November 8 (see November 8, 2002-December 7, 2002).

Entity Tags: UK Security Service (MI5), Abu Qatada, Central Intelligence Agency, Bisher al-Rawi, Abdullah El-Janoudi, Jamil al-Banna

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline

On November 2, 2002, only three weeks after the 2002 Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002), the Australian and Indonesian teams investigating the attacks say they have finished their initial forensic analysis of the bomb site. One forensic team member says, “We have all we need to nail these bad guys down.” [New York Times, 11/2/2002; Jakarta Post, 1/3/2003] That same day, investigators get their first big break when they discover the vehicle identification number of the chassis of the van used by some of the bombers. [BBC, 12/3/2002] The first arrest of an officially suspected bomber, Amrozi, takes place on November 5. He had bought the van. He immediately confesses to taking part in the bombings. Other arrests, including the arrest of an alleged mastermind of the bombings, Imam Samudra, follow in the next weeks and months. [Jakarta Post, 1/3/2003] Most Balinese are Hindu, and on November 15, the island holds a large public Hindu ritual purifying the bomb sites. The next day, bulldozers begin dumping the debris into the ocean, and they dump all the bomb site wreckage into the ocean over the next several days. [Jakarta Post, 11/17/2002; New York Times, 5/4/2003] Robert S. Finnegan, editor for the English-language Jakarta Post newspaper, will later sarcastically comment on how quickly the investigators finished their on-site work: “Astounding work, as it must have set a world record for crime scene forensic analysis.” He will also note, “Given the scope of the bombing and the sheer size of the primary and secondary blast areas - where traces from a plethora of different explosive compounds were swabbed from - this was a feat that escaped even the vaunted investigators working the World Trade Center [9/11] crime scene in New York, who spent nearly a year literally sifting by hand for evidence at the site.” [Jakarta Post, 1/3/2003]

Entity Tags: Imam Samudra, Robert S. Finnegan, Amrozi bin Nurhasyim

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Wahab al-Rawi.Wahab al-Rawi. [Source: Public domain]Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil al-Banna, both long-time British residents, and Abdullah El-Janoudi, a British citizen, fly from London to Gambia. They are planning to help al-Rawi’s brother, Wahab al-Rawi, set up a mobile peanut oil processing company. But before they left, they were detained for several days by police. Meanwhile, the British intelligence agency MI5 sent the CIA false information about them, for instance alleging that al-Rawi was traveling with a timing device for a bomb, even though MI5 had already inspected it and determined it was simply a battery charger (see November 1-7, 2002). MI5 asks the CIA to detain and question them when they arrive in Gambia. Wahab al-Rawi is already in Gambia, and when he and a friend arrive to greet the three men, all five of them are detained by Gambian agents. [Washington Post, 4/2/2006; Observer, 7/29/2007] But the men are moved to hidden locations and safe houses around the capital. Technically, they are held by the NIA, the Gambian intelligence agency, but CIA agents act as if they are in charge. They are intensively interrogated for many days, and one American using the alias Lee leads the questioning. Al-Rawi and al-Banna had recently worked as informants for MI5, helping them communicate with the radical imam Abu Qatada, who was said to be in hiding but was really an MI5 informant himself (see Late September 2001-Summer 2002 and Summer-Early November 2002). However, MI5 has given the CIA the impression that they were not informants but were plotting with Qatada. Al-Rawi will later say, “From the beginning, the questions made it plain that the Americans had been given the contents of my own MI5 file, which was supposed to be confidential. Lee even told me the British were giving him information. I had agreed to help MI5 because I wanted to prevent terrorism, and now the information I had freely given them was being used against me in an attempt to prove that I myself was some kind of terrorist.” [Observer, 7/29/2007] When Wahab refuses to cooperate and asks either for a lawyer or a representative from the British high commission, the Gambian agents laugh and tell him it was the British who ordered the arrests. [Guardian, 7/11/2003] According to Amnesty International, one of them is warned that if he does not cooperate he will be turned over to the Gambian police who will “beat and rape him.” [Amnesty International, 8/19/2003] The Washington Post will later report, “The primary purpose of this elaborate operation, documents and interviews suggest, was not to neutralize a pair of potential terrorists—authorities have offered no evidence that they were planning attacks—but to turn them into informers.” Al-Rawi’s lawyer will later speculate, “Either it was an attempt to put these guys at risk and to use them to find evidence that would implicate Abu Qatada, or it was an attempt to bring them within the closer control of MI5.” Just a day before leaving Britain, MI5 agents asked al-Banna to become a full-time informant and he had turned them down (see October 31, 2002). After about a month, all but Bisher al-Rawi and al-Banna are freed and allowed to return to Britain. The two of them, however, are flown to the US prison in Bagram, Afghanistan, where harsher interrogation methods can be used on them. [Washington Post, 4/2/2006] Before they leave Gambia, one of their US interrogators tells al-Rawi that they now realize the two of them were MI5 informants, but they will be sent to Bagram anyway. “He told me: ‘We know you were working for MI5’, and said if I told the truth I would get out.” [Observer, 7/29/2007]

Entity Tags: Jamil al-Banna, Central Intelligence Agency, Abdullah El-Janoudi, Wahab al-Rawi, “Lee”, Bisher al-Rawi, UK Security Service (MI5)

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Following six attacks by different radical Islamic groups in Tunisia (see April 11, 2002), Pakistan, Yemen (see October 6, 2002), Kuwait, Bali (see October 12, 2002), and Moscow, a new audio message is released by a man said by some to be Osama bin Laden, although the identity of the speaker will be disputed (see November 29, 2002). The voice on the tape outlines a principle he says he and his allies are using: reciprocity. He comments: “If it pains you to see your victims and your allies’ victims in Tunisia, Karachi, Failaka, and Oman, then remember that our children are murdered daily in Palestine and Iraq… If it pains you to see your victims in Moscow, then remember ours in Chechnya. How long will fear, killing, destruction, displacement, orphaning, and widowing be our sole destiny, while security, stability, and happiness is yours? This is injustice. The time has come to settle accounts. Just as you kill, so you shall be killed; just as you bomb, so you shall be bombed. And there will be more to come.” [Laden, 2005, pp. 173-5]

Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

The new commander at the Guantanamo detention facility, General Geoffrey Miller, receives a “voco”—a vocal command—to begin aggressively interrogating suspected “20th hijacker” Mohamed al-Khatani (see August 8, 2002-January 15, 2003). This is well before Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld gives written authorization for these techniques to be used (see November 27, 2002 and December 2, 2002), but after the request had been submitted for approval (see October 11, 2002). Considering Miller’s rank, it seems unlikely that anyone lower in the chain of command than Rumsfeld would have issued the order, and Rumsfeld is unlikely to make such a “voco” without the support of Pentagon general counsel William J. Haynes. The interrogation log of al-Khatani for November 23 indicates the immediate effect of the “voco”: “The detainee arrives at the interrogation booth. His hood is removed and he is bolted to the floor.” [Vanity Fair, 5/2008]

Entity Tags: William J. Haynes, Donald Rumsfeld, Mohamed al-Khatani, Geoffrey D. Miller

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Megawati Sukarnoputri.Megawati Sukarnoputri. [Source: Secretary of Vice President of Republic of Indonesia]The New York Times reports that Indonesia’s intelligence agency and its director are well regarded by the US. “But there are still senior intelligence officers here who believe that the CIA was behind the bombing,” according to a Western security official. As a result, the Bush administration has asked Megawati Sukarnoputri, president of Indonesia from 2001 to 2004, to publicly refute theories, popular in Indonesia, that the CIA was involved in the Bali bombings that took place one month earlier (see October 12, 2002). Megawati refuses to do so, and in fact condemns the US, saying, “a superpower that forced the rest of the world to go along with it,” adding, “We see how ambition to conquer other nations has led to a situation where there is no more peace unless the whole world is complying with the will of the one with the power and strength.” [New York Times, 11/25/2002]

Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), Megawati Sukarnoputri, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Habibullah.Habibullah. [Source: CBS]Mullah Habibullah, a 30-year-old Afghan from the southern province of Oruzgan, dies of complications related to “blunt force trauma” while in detention at the US base at Bagram. [Washington Post, 3/5/2003; BBC, 3/6/2003; Guardian, 3/7/2003; New York Times, 9/17/2004] Habibullah was captured by an Afghan warlord on November 28, 2002, and delivered to Bagram by the CIA on November 30. Habibullah is identified as the brother of a former Taliban commander, and later described as portly, well-groomed, and, in the words of American military police officer Major Bobby Atwell, “very confident.” [New York Times, 5/20/2005]
Injured When Delivered into US Custody - When Habibullah arrived at the US air base, he was reportedly already severely hurt. Despite his condition, according to one account, he was isolated “in a ‘safety’ position [stress position], with his arms shackled and tied to a beam in the ceiling.” He was left in that position for days, but regularly checked on. [Knight Ridder, 8/21/2004]
Targeted for Abuse - Though battered and ill, Habibullah’s defiance makes him a target for physical abuse, with the MPs and guards repeatedly attacking his legs. (Some guards will later claim Habibullah’s injuries were received when he tried to escape.) Most of the Americans will later describe Habibullah as insubordinate; one will recall being kneed in the groin by Habibullah after subjecting the prisoner to a rectal examination. Habibullah’s interrogations produce little of worth, in part because the MPs who interrogate him usually have no interpreters available. Sometimes the MPs demand that another prisoner translate for them; usually the interrogation sessions contain no more than physical restraints or beatings. [New York Times, 5/20/2005] At some point, Sgt. James P. Boland, a guard from the Army Reserve’s 377th MP Company from Cincinnati, allegedly watches as a subordinate beats Habibullah. [New York Times, 9/17/2004] The beating of Habibullah was likely witnessed by British detainee Moazzam Begg, who will later say he witnessed the death of “two fellow detainees at the hands of US military personnel” while at Bagram (see July 12, 2004). [Guardian, 10/1/2004; New York Times, 10/15/2004]
Complaints of Chest Pains Mocked - During his last interrogation session, on December 2, Habibullah spends the entirety of the session coughing and complaining of chest pains. His right leg is stiff and his right leg swollen. The interpreter for the session, Ebrahim Baerde, later recalls the interrogators “laughing and making fun of” Habibullah “because he was spitting up a lot of phlegm.” Habibullah is still defiant; when one interrogator asks if he wants to spend the rest of his life in handcuffs, Baerde will recall the prisoner retorting, “Yes, don’t they look good on me?” [New York Times, 5/20/2005]
Found Dead, Hanging from Shackles - On December 3, Habibullah is found dead, still hanging in his shackles. [Washington Post, 3/5/2003; BBC, 3/6/2003; Guardian, 3/7/2003; New York Times, 9/17/2004] Boland sees Habibullah hanging from the ceiling of his cell, suspended by two sets of handcuffs and a chain around his waist. His body is slumped forward and his tongue is protruding. Boland, along with Specialists Anthony Morden and Brian Cammack, enters the cell. Cammack puts a piece of bread in Habibullah’s mouth; another soldier puts an apple in Habibullah’s hand, and it falls to the floor. According to Cammack, Habibullah’s spit gets on Cammack’s chest. Later, Cammack will acknowledge, “I’m not sure he spit at me,” but now he screams, “Don’t ever spit on me again!” and knees Habibullah in the thigh “maybe a couple” of times. Habibullah makes no response; his body swings limply from the chains. Twenty minutes later, the guards unchain Habibullah and lay him on the floor. He has no pulse. Cammack, according to another guard, “appeared very distraught” and “was running about the room hysterically.” An MP is sent to wake a medic, who refuses to respond, telling the MP to call an ambulance instead. By the time a second medic arrives at the cell, Habibullah is laid spreadeagled on the floor, eyes and mouth open. “It looked like he had been dead for a while, and it looked like nobody cared,” the medic, Staff Sergeant Rodney Glass, will later recall. Atwell will later recall that Habibullah’s death “did not cause an enormous amount of concern ‘cause it appeared natural.” The autopsy, completed five days later, will show bruises and abrasions on Habibullah’s chest, arms, and head. The body has severe contusions on the calves, knees, and thighs, and the sole print of a boot is on his left calf. The death will be attributed to a blood clot, probably caused by the severe injuries to his legs, which traveled to his heart and blocked the blood flow to his lungs. [New York Times, 5/20/2005] His legs have been struck so forcefully, according to one death certificate, it complicated his coronary artery disease. Another certificate will say the beating led to a pulmonary embolism, which is a blockage of an artery in the lungs, often caused by a blood clot. [USA Today, 5/31/2004]
Commanding Officer Able to Hear Screams, Moans of Detainees - In charge of the military intelligence interrogators at Bagram at this time is Capt. Carolyn A. Wood. According to an anonymous intelligence officer, Wood should be aware of what is happening to prisoners at Bagram since interrogations take place close to her office. The intelligence officer will recall hearing screams and moans coming out from the interrogation and isolation rooms. [Knight Ridder, 8/21/2004]

Entity Tags: Carolyn A. Wood, Anthony Morden, Bobby Atwell, Brian Cammack, James P. Boland, Rodney Glass, Ebrahim Baerde, Mullah Habibullah, Moazzam Begg, Taliban

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, War in Afghanistan

Wazir Muhammad, a 31-year-old farmer turned taxi driver from Khost province in Afghanistan, is detained and taken to Bagram. At the time of his arrest, he was working and had four passengers with him in his taxi. During his time at Bagram, he is interrogated, prohibited from talking to other prisoners, and deprived of sleep through the use of loudspeakers. He is later sent to Kandahar and eventually to Guantanamo (see Beginning of 2004). [Guardian, 6/23/2004]

Entity Tags: Wazir Muhammad

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, War in Afghanistan

Rumsfeld’s handwritten note at the bottom of the memo he signs: “However, I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?”Rumsfeld’s handwritten note at the bottom of the memo he signs: “However, I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?” [Source: HBO]Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld approves General Counsel William J. Haynes’ recommendations for interrogations methods (see November 27, 2002) and signs the action memo. [Associated Press, 6/23/2004] He adds in handwriting: “However, I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?” In signing the memo, Rumsfeld adds for use at Guantanamo Bay 16 more aggressive interrogation procedures to the 17 methods that have long been approved as part of standard US military practice. [New York Times, 8/25/2004] The additional methods, like interrogation sessions of up to 20 hours at a time and the enforced shaving of heads and beards, are otherwise prohibited under US military doctrine. [MSNBC, 6/23/2004]

Entity Tags: William J. Haynes, Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

A sketch by MP Sergeant Thomas Curtis showing how Dilawar was chained to the ceiling of his cell. A sketch by MP Sergeant Thomas Curtis showing how Dilawar was chained to the ceiling of his cell. [Source: New York Times]Dilawar, a 22-year-old Afghan farmer and part-time taxi driver from the small village of Yakubi in eastern Afghanistan, is picked up by local authorities and turned over to US soldiers. Dilawar is described as a shy, uneducated man with a slight frame, rarely leaving the stone farmhouse he shares with his wife and family. He is captured while driving a used Toyota sedan that his family bought him to use as a taxi. He has three fares, men headed back towards his village, and is stopped by Afghan militiamen loyal to the guerrilla commander Jan Baz Khan. (Khan will later be taken into custody himself for allegedly attacking US targets and then turning over innocent villagers to US forces, accusing them of carrying out the attacks.) The militia confiscates a broken walkie-talkie from one of the passengers, and an electric stabilizer used to regulate current from a generator in the trunk of the Toyota (Dilawar’s family later says the stabilizer is not theirs; they have no electricity). All four men are turned over to American soldiers at Bagram Air Force Base as suspects in a recent rocket attack on the US base at Khost. They spend the first night handcuffed to the fence to deprive them of sleep. Dilawar is then examined by the base doctor, who pronounces him healthy.
Passengers Shipped to Guantanamo, Say Bagram Treatment Far Worse - Dilawar’s three passengers are eventually shipped to Guantanamo for a year, before being released without charge. The three will describe their ordeal at Bagram as far worse than their treatment at Guantanamo. All will claim to have been beaten, stripped in front of female guards, and subjected to repeated and harsh rectal exams. Abdul Rahim, a baker from Khost, will recall: “They did lots and lots of bad things to me [at Bagram]. I was shouting and crying, and no one was listening. When I was shouting, the soldiers were slamming my head against the desk.” Another of Dilawar’s passengers, Parkhudin, later recalls that Dilawar “could not breathe” in the black cloth hood pulled over his head.
Running Joke - Though Dilawar is shy and frail, he is quickly labeled “noncompliant.” One US military policeman, Specialist Corey Jones, reports that Dilawar spat on him and tried to kick him. Jones retaliated by giving him a number of “peroneal knee strikes” (see May 20, 2005). As Jones will later recall: “He screamed out, ‘Allah! Allah! Allah!’ and my first reaction was that he was crying out to his god. Everybody heard him cry out and thought it was funny. It became a kind of running joke, and people kept showing up to give this detainee a common peroneal strike just to hear him scream out ‘Allah.’ It went on over a 24-hour period, and I would think that it was over 100 strikes.” Several other guards will later admit to striking Dilawar. While most MPs deny any knowledge of Dilawar being injured by the physical assaults, Jones will remember seeing Dilawar’s legs when his orange drawstring pants fell off of him while he was shackled. “I saw the bruise because his pants kept falling down while he was in standing restraints,” Jones will later recall. “Over a certain time period, I noticed it was the size of a fist.” Dilawar’s repeated cries and pleas for his release do little besides annoy his captors.
Fourth Interrogation Marked by Beatings - Dilawar’s fourth interrogation, on December 8, turns sour. Lead interrogator Specialist Glendale Walls will contend that Dilawar is hostile and evasive. Sergeant Selena Salcedo, another interrogator, will say that Dilawar smiled, refused to answer questions, and refused to stay kneeling on the ground or in his ordered “chair-sitting” posture against the wall. But the interpreter present, Ahmad Ahmadzai, has a different recollection. According to Ahmadzai, Dilawar denies launching any rockets at the Americans. He is unable to hold his cuffed hands above him while kneeling, and Salcedo slaps them back up whenever they begin to droop. “Selena berated him for being weak and questioned him about being a man, which was very insulting because of his heritage,” Ahmadzai will tell investigators. Both Salcedo and Walls repeatedly slam Dilawar against the wall: “This went on for 10 or 15 minutes,” Ahmadzei will say. “He was so tired he couldn’t get up.” Salcedo begins stamping his foot, yanking his head by grabbing his beard, and kicking him in the groin. Ahmadzai will state: “About the first 10 minutes, I think, they were actually questioning him, after that it was pushing, shoving, kicking and shouting at him. There was no interrogation going on.” Salcedo orders the MPs to keep him chained to the ceiling of his cell until the next shift comes on. [Knight Ridder, 8/21/2004; New York Times, 5/20/2005]
Chained to the Ceiling - The next morning, Dilawar is still chained to his ceiling. He begins shouting during the morning, and is ignored until around noon, when MPs ask another interpreter, Ebrahim Baerde, to see if he can calm Dilawar. Baerde will tell investigators: “I told him, ‘Look, please, if you want to be able to sit down and be released from shackles, you just need to be quiet for one more hour.’ He told me that if he was in shackles another hour, he would die.” A half-hour later, Baerde returns to the cell to find Dilawar slumped in his chains. “He wanted me to get a doctor, and said that he needed ‘a shot,’” Baerde will recall. “He said that he didn’t feel good. He said that his legs were hurting.” Baerde tells a guard, who checks Dilawar’s circulation by pressing down on his fingernails. According to Baerde, the guard says: “He’s okay. He’s just trying to get out of his restraints.” [New York Times, 3/4/2003; Guardian, 3/7/2003; Independent, 3/7/2003; Knight Ridder, 8/21/2004; New York Times, 9/17/2004; New York Times, 5/20/2005]
Dead Days Later - Dilawar will be found dead in his cell days later (see December 10, 2002).

Entity Tags: Ebrahim Baerde, Glendale Walls, Jan Baz Khan, Dilawar, Abdul Rahim, Ahmad Ahmadzai, Corey Jones, Selena Salcedo, Parkhudin

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, War in Afghanistan

Jamil al-Banna.Jamil al-Banna. [Source: Public domain]On December 8, 2002, British residents Bisher Al-Rawi and Jamil al-Banna are secretly flown from Gambia to the US military base in Bagram, Afghanistan. They had been held in Gambia by the CIA after the British intelligence agency MI5 gave the CIA false information suggesting the two of them were Islamist militants. In fact, they had worked until recently as informants for MI5. In Gambia, they were pressured to resume their informant work (see November 8, 2002-December 7, 2002). Once in Bagram, they are again pressured to be informants. The CIA asks if they will inform for them, instead of MI5. Al-Banna in particular is offered increasing sums of money and a US passport if he works for the CIA, but he refuses. [Washington Post, 4/2/2006] They are initially taken to the “dark prison” near Kabul and kept in the cold in complete darkness for two weeks. Loudspeakers blare music at them 24 hours a day. Al-Rawi will later recall: “For three days or so I just sat in the corner, shivering. The only time there was light was when a guard came to check on me with a very dim torch—as soon as he’d detect movement, he would leave. I tried to do a few push-ups and jogged on the spot to keep warm. There was no toilet paper, but I tore off my nappies and tried to use them to clean myself.” After about two weeks, they are taken to the nearby Bagram prison. They are heavily abused there too, starting by beating beaten up as they arrive. The two of them had worked as go-betweens between MI5 and the radical imam Abu Qatada, and in Bagram they are heavily pressured to incriminate Abu Qatada. By this time, Abu Qatada is imprisoned in Britain and fighting deportation. [Observer, 7/29/2007] Al-Banna will later tell a detainee in Guantanamo, Asif Iqbal, that Bagram was “rough” and “that he had been forced to walk around naked, coming and going from the showers, having to parade past American soldiers or guards including women who would laugh at everyone who was put in the same position.” [Rasul, Iqbal, and Ahmed, 7/26/2004 pdf file] At no time during their detention are they permitted to see a lawyer, despite the fact that a habeas corpus petition has been filed on their behalf and is pending before British courts. In March 2003, they are sent to Guantanamo (see March 2003-November 18, 2007). [Amnesty International, 8/19/2003; Petition for writ of habeas corpus for Bisher al-Rawi, Jamil el-Banna and Martin Mubanga. Jamil el-Banna, et al. v. George Bush, et al., 7/8/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Jamil al-Banna, Central Intelligence Agency, Bisher al-Rawi, Asif Iqbal

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, War in Afghanistan

Dilawar.Dilawar. [Source: CBS]Dilawar, an Afghan farmer turned taxi driver who was detained by US troops on December 5 (see December 5-9, 2002), is found dead in his cell at Bagram. Earlier that day, he was taken to the interrogation room for what will be his last interrogation. An interpreter will later describes him with legs uncontrollably jumping and numbed hands; Dilawar had been chained by his wrists to the top of his cell for four days and suffered repeated beatings from guards. He is agitated and confused, crying that his wife is dead and complaining of being beaten by his guards. Interpreter Ali Baryalai will later tell investigators, “We didn’t pursue that.”
Making Sure the Prisoner is Hydrated - Dilawar is interrogated by two MPs, Specialists Glendale Walls and Joshua Claus. Though Walls is the lead interrogator, the more aggressive Claus quickly takes control of the proceedings. “Josh had a rule that the detainee had to look at him, not me,” the interpreter will tell investigators. “He gave him three chances, and then he grabbed him by the shirt and pulled him towards him, across the table, slamming his chest into the table front.” Both Walls and Claus slam Dilawar against the wall when he tries and fails to kneel; he begins to either fall asleep or pass out. Baryalai will later state, “It looked to me like Dilawar was trying to cooperate, but he couldn’t physically perform the tasks.” As Baryalai will later tell investigators, Claus grabs Dilawar, shakes him, and tells him that if he does not cooperate, he will be shipped to a prison in the United States, where he would be “treated like a woman, by the other men” and face the wrath of criminals who “would be very angry with anyone involved in the 9/11 attacks.” Dilawar asks for a drink of water, and Claus responds by taking a large plastic water bottle and, instead of giving Dilawar the water, punching a hole in the bottom of the bottle. As Dilawar fumbles with the bottle, the water pours over his orange prison garb. Claus then snatches the bottle back and begins spraying the water into Dilawar’s face. As Dilawar gags on the spray, Claus shouts: “Come on, drink! Drink!” A third interrogator, Staff Sergeant Christopher Yonushonis, enters the room and, as he will recall, finds a large puddle of water, a soaking wet Dilawar, and Claus standing behind Dilawar, twisting up the back of the hood that covers the prisoner’s head. “I had the impression that Josh was actually holding the detainee upright by pulling on the hood,” Yonushonis will recall. “I was furious at this point because I had seen Josh tighten the hood of another detainee the week before. This behavior seemed completely gratuitous and unrelated to intelligence collection.” When Yonushonis demands an explanation, Claus responds, “We had to make sure he stayed hydrated.”
Dies While Chained to the Ceiling - An interrogator, presumably Yonushonis, promises Dilawar that he can see a doctor after the interrogation session concludes, but Claus tells the guards not to take him to a doctor. Instead, Claus tell the guards to chain him to the ceiling again. “Leave him up,” one of the guards will later quote Claus as saying. Dilawar dies while chained up; hours later, an emergency room doctor sees Dilawar’s body already dead and stiffening. Yonushonis reports the abusive interrogation to his superior officer, Staff Sergeant Steven Loring, but Dilawar is already dead.
Autopsy Report: Legs 'Pulpified' - An autopsy will find Dilawar’s death caused by “blunt force injuries to the lower extremities.” At a pre-trial hearing for one of the guards involved in Dilawar’s abuse, a coroner will say the tissue in the prisoner’s legs “had basically been pulpified.” Major Elizabeth Rouse, another coroner and the one who termed Dilawar’s cause of death to be “homicide,” will add, “I’ve seen similar injuries in an individual run over by a bus.” Walls and Claus will both be charged with assault and maltreatment of a prisoner. [New York Times, 5/20/2005]
Changes Implemented - After Dilawar’s death, the second in a matter of days (see November 30-December 3, 2002), some changes are implemented at Bagram. A medic is assigned to work the night shift. Interrogators are prohibited from physical contact with the detainees. Chaining prisoners to fixed objects is banned, and the use of stress positions is curtailed. Yonushonis will not be interviewed until August 2004, when he contacts an agent of the Army’s Criminal Investigation Command on his own initiative to discuss his knowledge of Dilawar’s death. “I expected to be contacted at some point by investigators in this case,” he will say. “I was living a few doors down from the interrogation room, and I had been one of the last to see this detainee alive.” Of the last interrogation, Yonushonis will tell investigators, “I remember being so mad that I had trouble speaking.” He also adds one extra detail: by the time Dilawar was interrogated the final time, “most of us were convinced that the detainee was innocent.” [New York Times, 3/4/2003; Washington Post, 3/5/2003; BBC, 3/6/2003; Guardian, 3/7/2003; Independent, 3/7/2003; New York Times, 9/17/2004; New York Times, 5/20/2005]

Entity Tags: Joshua Claus, Dilawar, Steven Loring, Glendale Walls, Criminal Investigation Command, Elizabeth A. Rouse, Ali Baryalai, Christopher Yonushonis

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, War in Afghanistan

CIA Director Tenet says in a speech, “The Saudis are [providing] increasingly important support to our counterterrorism efforts, from making arrests to sharing debriefing results.” [Washington Post, 12/26/2002] Several terrorist suspects have been sent to Saudi Arabia for interrogation as part of a special rendition program. But US officials often “remain closely involved” with the questioning (see 1993).

Entity Tags: George J. Tenet

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

David Brant, the head of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), learns of the horrific abuse of a Saudi detainee, Mohamed al-Khatani (sometimes spelled “al-Qahtani”—see February 11, 2008), currently detained at Guantanamo Bay. Al-Khatani is one of several terror suspects dubbed the “missing 20th hijacker”; according to the FBI, al-Khatani was supposed to be on board the hijacked aircraft that crashed in a Pennsylvania field on 9/11 (see (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Al-Khatani was apprehended in Afghanistan a few months after the terrorist attacks. He is one of the examples of prisoner abuse (see August 8, 2002-January 15, 2003) that Brant takes to Naval General Counsel Alberto Mora (see December 17-18, 2002). In 2006, Brant will say that he believes the Army’s interrogation of al-Khatani was unlawful. If any NCIS agent had engaged in such abuse, he will say, “we would have relieved, removed, and taken internal disciplinary action against the individual—let alone whether outside charges would have been brought.” Brant fears that such extreme methods will taint the cases to be brought against the detainees and undermine any efforts to prosecute them in military or civilian courts. Confessions elicited by such tactics are unreliable. And, Brant will say, “it just ain’t right.” [New Yorker, 2/27/2006]

Entity Tags: David Brant, Alberto Mora, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mohamed al-Khatani

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

In a front-page article, the Washington Post reports on the US intelligence program of rendition (see 1993) and reveals that US agents are using “stress and duress” techniques to interrogate captives detained in Afghanistan. Persons being held in the CIA interrogation center at Bagram Air Base who refuse to cooperate “are sometimes kept standing or kneeling for hours in black hoods or spray-painted goggles,…. held in awkward, painful positions and deprived of sleep with a 24-hour bombardment of lights’ subject to what are known as ‘stress and duress’ techniques,” the article says. [Washington Post, 12/26/2002; Human Rights Watch, 5/7/2004] Each of the ten current national security officials who were interviewed for the article “defended the use of violence against captives as just and necessary.” [Washington Post, 12/26/2002] It quotes one official who reasons: “If you don’t violate someone’s human rights some of the time, you probably aren’t doing your job…. I don’t think we want to be promoting a view of zero tolerance on this.” [Washington Post, 12/26/2002; Human Rights Watch, 5/7/2004] Likewise, another official acknowledges that “our guys may kick them around a little bit in the adrenaline of the immediate aftermath.” A different source comments, with reference to the medical services provided for captives, that “pain control [in wounded patients] is a very subjective thing.” [Washington Post, 12/26/2002] Finally, in a very explicit remark, one of the officials interviewed by the Post, who is described as being directly involved in the rendition of captives, explains the program’s logic: “We don’t kick the [expletive] out of them. We send them to other countries so they can kick the [expletive] out of them.” [Washington Post, 12/26/2002; Human Rights Watch, 5/7/2004] After the report is published, Maj. Stephen Clutter, the deputy spokesman at Bagram, denies the allegations (see December 29, 2002), claiming that the Washington Post article was “false on several points, the first being that there is no CIA detention facility on Bagram.” He says, “The accusation of inhumane treatment is something that I can clearly refute. The things that they talked about, the inhumane conditions… are things that do not go on here.” [Agence France-Presse, 12/29/2002]

Entity Tags: Stephen Clutter

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Human Rights Watch writes to President Bush about the allegations of torture reported in the Washington Post (see December 26, 2002), asking that the allegations be investigated immediately. [Human Rights Watch, 12/26/2002; BBC, 12/26/2002; CBC News, 12/27/2002; Washington Post, 12/28/2002; Human Rights Watch, 5/7/2004] White House spokesman Scott McClellan denies that US interrogation practices violate international law and indicates no interest on the part of the administration to investigate the allegations. “We are not aware we have received the letter.… [W]e believe we are in full compliance with domestic and international law, including domestic and international law dealing with torture.” He adds that combatants detained by the US are always treated “humanely, in a manner consistent with the third Geneva Convention.” [Washington Post, 12/28/2002]

Entity Tags: Human Rights Watch, Scott McClellan, George W. Bush

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The US military responds to recent media stories about the torture and abuse of suspected al-Qaeda detainees in Afghanistan by denying that any such treatment takes place. Recent articles in the Washington Post have claimed that detainees held at Bagram Air Force Base were subjected to “stress and duress” techniques (see December 26, 2002). These techniques include “stress positions,” where detainees are shackled or strapped into painful positions and kept there for hours, and sleep deprivation. US military spokesman Major Steve Clutter denies the allegations. “The article was false on several points, the first being that there is no CIA detention facility on Bagram; there is a facility run by the US Army,” he says (see October 2001). “However, there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that persons under control of the US Army have been mistreated. The United States Army is treating enemy combatants under government control, humanely, and in conditions that are generally better than they were experiencing before we placed them under our control” (see December 2001 and After, Late 2002, January 2002, March 15, 2002, April-May 2002, April-May 2002, Late May 2002, June 4, 2002-early August 2002, June 5, 2002, July 2002, August 22, 2002, November 30-December 3, 2002, Late 2002-February 2004, Late 2002 - March 15, 2004, December 2002, December 2002, December 1, 2002, December 5-9, 2002, December 8, 2002-March 2003, and December 10, 2002). Clutter also denies that detainees have been subjected to “rendition”—being turned over to foreign governments who routinely torture prisoners. Instead, he says, most prisoners held at Bagram were released after being interrogated in a process overseen by the International Committee of the Red Cross. “I would like to point out that persons under US government control who come to Bagram are not automatically deemed to be terrorists or enemy combatants,” Clutter says. “When they arrive, they go through an interview process to determine whether they are enemy combatants or have information that can help us prevent terrorist attacks against Americans or attacks against US forces. If they are deemed to be enemy combatants or pose a danger, they become detainees. If they are not, they are ultimately released.” [Agence France-Presse, 12/29/2002]

Entity Tags: US Department of the Army, Central Intelligence Agency, International Committee of the Red Cross, Stephen Clutter, US Department of Defense

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Abdurahman Khadr, an al-Qaeda operative-turned-informant (see November 10, 2001-Early 2003 and Spring 2003), witnesses other detainees at the Bagram, Afghanistan, prison being hung from a wall by their shackles for as long as four days. [Toronto Star, 8/19/2004]

Entity Tags: Abdurahman Khadr

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, War in Afghanistan

Carolyn Wood.Carolyn Wood. [Source: CBC]On January 22, 2003, Capt. Carolyn A. Wood receives a Bronze Star for “exceptional meritorious service” as the head of military intelligence interrogators at Bagram. She and her small platoon of 15 interrogators from the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion returned from Afghanistan to their base at Fort Bragg, North Carolina earlier in the month. On May 8, 2003, Wood receives her second Bronze Star. [Knight Ridder, 8/21/2004] Wood was previously in charge of the US air base at Bagram, where detainees have alleged torture and where at least two detainees died as a result of physical abuse (see November 30-December 3, 2002) (see December 26, 2002) (see December 5-9, 2002). Wood and her battalion will be redeployed to Iraq and handle interrogations at the Abu Ghraib prison while abuses go on there (see July 15, 2003). She will implement nearly the same interrogation rules used in Bagram (see July 15, 2003).

Entity Tags: Carolyn A. Wood

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, War in Afghanistan

The US military command in Afghanistan, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 180, issues a memo on interrogation techniques, which includes nudity on the list of effective interrogation methods, despite this tactic being presumably barred by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld on January 15 (see January 15, 2003) for use at Guantanamo and in Afghanistan. According to Maj. Gen. George R. Fay, who will write a detailed report on detention operations (see August 25, 2004), the document “highlighted that deprivation of clothing had not historically been included in battlefield interrogations.” However he will add, “It went on to recommend clothing removal as an effective technique that could potentially raise objections as being degrading or inhumane, but for which no specific written legal prohibition existed.” [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] The document also speaks of exploiting the Arab fear of dogs. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] Rumsfeld also banned the use of dogs for interrogation purposes in his January 15 order (see January 15, 2003).

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, George R. Fay

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, War in Afghanistan

Lt. Gen. Daniel McNeill, the commander of US forces in Afghanistan (Commander of Joint Task Force 180), announces an investigation into the deaths of Bagram prisoners Dilawar (see December 10, 2002) and Mullah Habibullah (see November 30-December 3, 2002). Nevertheless, he claims both prisoners died of natural causes. Dilawar, according to McNeill had an advanced heart condition with his coronary arteries 85 percent blocked. “We haven’t found anything that requires us to take extraordinary action,” McNeill says. “We are going to let this investigation run its course.” But military pathologists have already determined both deaths were caused by beatings. Dilawar’s death certificate, signed by Maj. Elizabeth A. Rouse, a pathologist with the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology in Washington, stated that Dilawar’s cause of death was “blunt-force injuries to lower extremities complicating coronary artery disease.” [Guardian, 6/23/2004] When McNeill is asked whether the dead prisoners suffered injuries during detention, he denies this. “Presently, I have no indication of that,” he says. Later, McNeill claims that the prisoners had already suffered injuries before arriving at Bagram. When asked about the use of chains, he replies: “We are not chaining people to the ceilings. I think you asked me that question before.” [New York Times, 9/17/2004]

Entity Tags: Elizabeth A. Rouse, Dilawar, Daniel K. McNeill

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, War in Afghanistan

The Blind Sheikh’s sons Mohammad Omar Abdul-Rahman and Ahmad Abdul-Rahman in 1998. It is not clear which is which.The Blind Sheikh’s sons Mohammad Omar Abdul-Rahman and Ahmad Abdul-Rahman in 1998. It is not clear which is which. [Source: CNN]Pakistani authorities raid an apartment in Quetta, Pakistan, and apparently arrest Mohammad Omar Abdul-Rahman, a son of the Blind Sheikh,’ Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman. Supposedly, communications found at the apartment lead to the later arrest of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (see February 29 or March 1, 2003). [New York Times, 3/4/2003] Government officials say he is a senior al-Qaeda operative who ran a training camp in Afghanistan before 9/11 attacks and also had a role in operational planning. Another son of the blind sheik, Ahmad Abdul-Rahman, was captured in Afghanistan in late 2001, but Ahmad was not considered to be high ranking. [Associated Press, 3/4/2003] But even though Mohammad Omar’s arrest is reported in the New York Times and elsewhere, there is no official announcement. In December 2005, his name will be on a list published by ABC News of high-detainees being held in a secret CIA prison (see November 2005). [ABC News, 12/5/2005] In 2006, the US will announce that it is emptying the CIA prisons and transferring all high-level prisoners to Guantanamo, but he will not be one of those transferred and it is unclear what happened to him (see September 2-3, 2006).

Entity Tags: Ahmad Abdul-Rahman, Mohammed Omar Abdul-Rahman, Omar Abdul-Rahman

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Abdurahman Khadr.Abdurahman Khadr. [Source: Cageprisoners]Prisoner Abdurahman Khadr says he is forced at a US prison in Bagram, Afghanistan, to lie on a cold concrete block for two days in the spring of 2003. He also experiences US soldiers stepping on his shackles, which cut through his skin “to the bone.” A female guard drags him up a flight of stairs, he recalls, after smiling at her. He is then flown to the US prison in Guantanamo, Cuba. He says the flight was a “whole torture on its own,” because, “There were people screaming around me and there was people begging for water and nobody was getting anything.” At Guantanamo, he is placed in an isolation block for 30 days, in a dark cell with just a hole for food. He is only allowed out for 15 minutes every three days. He claims, “They use this room to torture us.… They put the heat up or they put it too low so we are freezing or we are suffering because there is no air. They put the music on so you can’t sleep. They throw rocks at the block so you can’t sleep.” Ironically, Khadr is serving as a CIA informant at the time (see November 10, 2001-Early 2003). When he asks his CIA handlers why he has to suffer so much, he is told it is to make the prisoners think he is one of them. [Toronto Star, 8/19/2004] He complains and in the early summer of 2003 he is transferred to better quarters and secretly allowed better treatment. Sometimes he is even allowed to secretly leave the prison. In September 2003, he will leave Guantanamo as the CIA gives him another assignment (see September-November 2003). [PBS Frontline, 4/22/2004]

Entity Tags: Abdurahman Khadr, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, War in Afghanistan

Majid Khan. Majid Khan. [Source: Defense Department]According to his father, al-Qaeda operative Majid Khan is arrested by Pakistani soldiers and police at his brother Mohammed Khan’s house in Karachi, Pakistan, on March 5, 2003. Both brothers are interrogated by Pakistani and US agents. Majid Khan is eventually transferred to a secret US prison and will remain there until 2006, when he will be sent to the Guantanamo prison as one of 14 “high-value” detainees (see September 2-3, 2006). [Reuters, 5/15/2007] The US apparently considers Khan of high value due to his involvement in plots targeting the US. Khan moved to the US from Pakistan as a teenager in 1996 and graduated from a high school in Baltimore in 1999. According to US charges against him, he became involved in a local Islamic organization and then returned to Pakistan in 2002. An uncle and cousin who were al-Qaeda operatives drafted Khan there, and he started working for al-Qaeda leader Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM). KSM worked with Khan because of Khan’s knowledge of the US, fluency in English, and willingness to be a suicide bomber. His family owned a gas station, and he allegedly plotted to blow up gas stations and poison water supplies in the US. [Baltimore Sun, 9/9/2006]

Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Majid Khan, Mohammed Khan

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

A working group appointed by the Defense Department’s general counsel, William J. Haynes, completes a 100-page-plus classified report justifying the use of torture on national security grounds. The group—headed by Air Force General Counsel Mary Walker and including top civilian and uniformed lawyers from each military branch—consulted representatives of the Justice Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and other intelligence agencies in drafting the report. It was prepared for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and was meant to respond to complaints from commanders working at the Guantanamo Bay base in Cuba who claimed that conventional interrogation tactics were inadequate. The conclusions in the report are similar to those of an August 1, 2002 memo (see August 1, 2002) drafted by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). The OLC is said to have also contributed to this report. [US Department of Defense, 3/6/2003; Wall Street Journal, 6/7/2004; Los Angeles Times, 6/10/2004] The report notes that both Congress and the Justice Department will have difficulty enforcing the law if US military personnel could be shown to be acting as a result of presidential orders. [Washington Post, 6/8/2004]
President's Authority During War Gives Power to Order Torture, Supersede Law - One of the main conclusions of the report is that the president’s authority as commander-in-chief permits him during times of war to approve almost any physical or psychological interrogation method—including torture—irrespective of any domestic or international law. The report finds, “[I]n order to respect the President’s inherent constitutional authority to manage a military campaign… [the 1994 law banning torture] must be construed as inapplicable to interrogations undertaken pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief authority.” The draft report clearly states that neither Congress, the courts, nor international law has jurisdiction over the president’s actions when the country is waging war. The report asserts that “without a clear statement otherwise, criminal statutes are not read as infringing on the president’s ultimate authority” to wage war. Furthermore, “any effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of unlawful combatants would violate the Constitution’s sole vesting of the commander-in-chief authority in the president.” According to the document, the federal Torture Statute simply does not apply. “In order to respect the president’s inherent constitutional authority to manage a military campaign… (the prohibition against torture) must be construed as inapplicable to interrogations undertaken pursuant to his commander-in chief authority,” the report states (The parenthetical comment is in the original document). A career military lawyer will later tell the Wall Street Journal that many lawyers disagreed with these conclusions, but that their concerns were overridden by the political appointees heading the drafting of the report. The lawyer explains that instead, military lawyers focused their efforts on limiting the report’s list of acceptable interrogation methods. [Wall Street Journal, 6/7/2004; Washington Post, 6/8/2004]
Guantanamo Bay Not Covered under Torture Restrictions - The report also finds that the 1994 law barring torture “does not apply to the conduct of US personnel” at Guantanamo Bay, nor does it apply to US military interrogations that occurred outside US “maritime and territorial jurisdiction,” such as in Iraq or Afghanistan. [Washington Post, 6/8/2004]
Legal Arguments to Defend against Torture Charges Conflict with International Statutes - The draft report lists several possible arguments that US civilian or military personnel might use to defend themselves against charges of torture or other war crimes. According to the administration’s lawyers, one argument would be that such actions were “necessary” in order to prevent an attack. However, this rationale seems to ignore very clear statements in the Convention Against Torture (see October 21, 1994) which states that “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.” Another line of defense, the report says, would be to claim that the accused had been acting under “superior orders” and that therefore no “moral choice was in fact possible.” Likewise, the report cites a Justice Department opinion, which the draft report says “concluded that it could not bring a criminal prosecution against a defendant who had acted pursuant to an exercise of the president’s constitutional power.” This also contradicts the Convention against Torture, which states that orders from superiors “may not be invoked as a justification of torture.” The authors of the report also suggest in the draft report that accused officials could argue that they had “mistakenly relied in good faith on the advice of lawyers or experts,” adding, “Good faith may be a complete defense.” The memo also argues that the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (ICCPR), to which the US is a party, “does not apply outside the United States or its special maritime and territorial jurisdiction (SMTJ), and that it does not apply to operations of the military during an international armed conflict,” as the US “has maintained consistently.” Since the “Guantanamo Bay Naval Station (GTMO) is included within the definition of the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” the ICCPR does not apply to Guantanamo Bay. The authors are also convinced that officials would not be prosecutable under US law, concluding that “constitutional principles” precluded the possibility that officials could be punished “for aiding the president in exercising his exclusive constitutional authorities” and neither Congress nor the courts had the authority to “require or implement the prosecution of such an individual.” [Wall Street Journal, 6/7/2004]
Defining Parameters of Interrogation Methods - The document attempts to define the parameters of lawful interrogation methods in terms of the degree of pain or psychological manipulation they cause. The report states that the infliction of physical or mental suffering does not constitute torture. To violate Section 2340 A of the US Code, prohibiting physical torture, suffering must be “severe,” the lawyers advise, noting that according to a dictionary definition, this would mean that the pain “must be of such a high level of intensity that… [it] is difficult for the subject to endure.” It must also be “inflicted with specific intent,” they say, meaning that the perpetrator expressly intends to cause severe pain and suffering. But if the defendant simply used pain and suffering as a means to an end, such specific intent would not exist. Under certain circumstances, the lawyers explain, the US would be justified in resorting to illegal measures like torture or homicide. They argue that such measures should be considered “self-defense” in cases where officials “honestly believe” that such actions would prevent an imminent attack against the US. “Sometimes the greater good for society will be accomplished by violating the literal language of the criminal law,” the draft document asserts. “In sum,” the panel determines, “the defense of superior orders will generally be available for US Armed Forces personnel engaged in exceptional interrogations except where the conduct goes so far as to be patently unlawful.” Civil law suits, the panel notes, by a foreign victim of torture will not apply to the US government. [US Department of Defense, 3/6/2003; Wall Street Journal, 6/7/2004]
Report May Not Define Practices, Pentagon Implies - A Pentagon spokesman later says the memo represents “a scholarly effort to define the perimeters of the law,” and notes: “What is legal and what is put into practice is a different story.” [Washington Post, 6/8/2004]

Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, US Department of Defense, Office of Legal Counsel (DOJ), International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Convention Against Torture, Defense Intelligence Agency, Donald Rumsfeld, Mary L. Walker, William J. Haynes

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

A New York Times article reports that the US government is rendering suspects abroad (see 1993) and that “stress and duress” techniques are being used at the secret CIA interrogation center located in a hangar at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan (see October 2001). “Intelligence officials… acknowledged that some suspects had been turned over to security services in countries known to employ torture. There have been isolated, if persistent, reports of beatings in some American-operated centers,” the article claims. [New York Times, 3/9/2003; Human Rights Watch, 5/7/2004]

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

When an Associated Press reporter asks the US military to comment on the accounts of two former Afghan detainees (see December 10, 2002) (see November 30-December 3, 2002), spokesman Roger King claims their accounts are mostly untrue. “Some of the stuff they are saying sounds like partial truths, some of it’s completely bogus,” he says. “They were stripped naked probably to prevent them from sneaking weapons into the facility. That’s why someone may be stripped…. We do force people to stand for an extended period of time…. Disruption of sleep has been reported as an effective way of reducing people’s inhibition about talking or their resistance to questioning….They are not allowed to speak to one another. If they do, they can plan together or rely on the comfort of one another. If they’re caught speaking out of turn, they can be forced to do things—like stand for a period of time—as payment for speaking out.” [Associated Press, 3/14/2003; Amnesty International, 8/19/2003]

Entity Tags: Roger King

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, War in Afghanistan

The platoon of 15 interrogators led by Capt. Carolyn A. Wood is sent to Iraq together with another 15 fellow soldiers from Company A of the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion. [Knight Ridder, 8/21/2004] Wood had been involved in detainee abuses in Afghanistan (see November 30-December 3, 2002) and will be involved in the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse scandal in Iraq (see (Early August 2003)).

Entity Tags: Carolyn A. Wood

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Bisher al-Rawi.Bisher al-Rawi. [Source: Craig Hibbert]In February 2003, British residents Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil al-Banna are transferred from Bagram in Afghanistan to the Guantanamo prison. They spend their first month in isolation. Al-Rawi’s head and beard are shaved off as has allegedly already happened to al-Banna during his detention at Bagram. Al-Banna is put in a cell next to detainee Asif Iqbal. “[S]oon after,” Iqbal will later recall, al-Banna “began to deteriorate.” At Guantanamo, according to Iqbal, “al-Banna was in constant pain from his joints because he suffered from rheumatism and he was diabetic.” [Rasul, Iqbal, and Ahmed, 7/26/2004 pdf file] Al-Rawi and al-Banna had served as informants for the British intelligence agency MI5, helping MI5 communicate with radical imam Abu Qatada, who also was an MI5 informant (see Late September 2001-Summer 2002 and Summer-Early November 2002). First in Gambia and then in Bagram, they were pressured to resume being informants, but they refused (see November 8, 2002-December 7, 2002 and December 8, 2002-March 2003). After about six months in Guantanamo, an MI5 officer visits al-Rawi and again asks him if he wants to resume being an informer. Later, one of his previous MI5 handlers comes to visit him. He will recall: “I suppose he was nice enough. He asked if I wanted anything. I asked for a book on base jumping. He never came back, and I never got the book.” Eventually, two other previous handlers visit him and try to recruit him yet again. “They said, “You know, Bisher, if you agree to work for us when you get back to Britain, we’ll get you out.” They promised to return, but never did.” When al-Rawi faces a tribunal in September 2004 to determine if his detention is justified, he asks for his previous MI5 handlers to corroborate that he had been an informant. The British government refuses to help in any way, and the tribunal decides that he should continue to be imprisoned. The two of them grow increasingly bored and depressed, and face harsh conditions. For instance, after three detainees commit suicide in June 2006, the jailers retaliate by keeping the air conditioning turned to maximum for months. “We were freezing the whole time. Other times they made it scorching hot,” al-Rawi says. Al-Banna is not even allowed to phone his sick mother just before she dies. [Washington Post, 4/2/2006; Observer, 7/29/2007] Al-Rawi will finally be freed and flown back to Britain on April 3, 2007. Al-Banna will be freed and returned to Britain on November 18, 2007.

Entity Tags: Bisher al-Rawi, Asif Iqbal, Jamil al-Banna, UK Security Service (MI5)

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Saudi detainee Ahmed Muhammad al-Darbi is transferred from Bagram, Afghanistan (see August 2002), to Guantanamo. According to a statement he will later make (see July 1, 2009), he is abused at Guantanamo. The abuse includes:
bullet Solitary confinement;
bullet Loud music;
bullet Cold temperatures;
bullet Bright lights;
bullet US personnel disrespecting the Koran by throwing it to the ground; and
bullet Not being allowed to go to the bathroom during interrogations.
Al-Darbi is mostly questioned by the FBI, including an agent he knows as “Tom” and who questioned him at Bagram. Tom allegedly tells al-Darbi that “if I did not stick with my Bagram confessions, I would not ‘escape Bagram.’” If he does not cooperate he is allegedly to be sentenced to death and executed, or tortured, raped, and sexually abused at Guantanamo, or sent back to Bagram or to other countries. Al-Darbi will later claim, “The interrogators at Bagram and Guantanamo fed me particular details in my statements and forced me to identify individuals based on photographs or to ascribe to those individuals certain conduct.” However, he apparently never signs a written statement and will say that he makes “numerous false statements” under questioning. [al-Darbi, 7/1/2009]

Entity Tags: Ahmed Muhammad al-Darbi

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Twenty-five al-Qaeda operatives are captured in Karachi, Pakistan, including two key 9/11 figures. The captured include Tawfiq bin Attash, better known by his nickname Khallad. He is considered one of the masterminds of the USS Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000) and attended a Malaysia summit where the 9/11 plot was discussed (see January 5-8, 2000). Also captured is Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, one of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s nephews. He made travel arrangements for and wired money to many of the 9/11 hijackers. One investigator will later say, “He was turning up everywhere we looked—like a chameleon.” [New York Times, 5/1/2003; Los Angeles Times, 5/21/2006] Both Aziz Ali and bin Attash will be sent to secret CIA prisons and remain there until 2006, when they will be transfered to the Guantanamo Bay prison (see September 2-3, 2006). Bin Attash will be extensively tortured while in US custody in Afghanistan (see April 29 - Mid-May, 2003). The identities and fates of the others captured with them are unknown.

Entity Tags: Khallad bin Attash, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

CIA officials ask for reauthorization of the controversial harsh interrogation methods (see April 2002 and After and August 1, 2002) that had been withdrawn (see December 2003-June 2004) after the revelation of abuse and torture at Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison (see November 5, 2003). The CIA has captured a new al-Qaeda suspect in Asia, and top agency officials ask the National Security Council Principals Committee—Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, CIA Director George Tenet, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Attorney General John Ashcroft—for permission to use extreme methods of interrogation against the new detainee. Rice, who chairs the Principals Committee, says: “This is your baby. Go do it.” [ABC News, 4/9/2008] The name of the new suspect captured in Asia is not mentioned, but Hambali is captured in Thailand in August 2003 (see August 12, 2003), and he is the only prominent al-Qaeda figure arrested that summer. He is considered one of al-Qaeda’s most important leaders. There are some reports that he is one of only about four prisoners directly waterboarded by the US (see Shortly After August 12, 2003).

Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, George J. Tenet, John Ashcroft, Hambali, National Security Council, Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline

At the Camp Whitehorse detention center near Nassiriya, Iraq, US marines beat and choke Najem Sa’doun Hattab, a former Ba’ath Party official, and then drag him by the neck to his cell. Hattab dies from his injuries. [San Diego Union-Tribune, 2/3/2004; Amnesty International, 3/18/2004] His autopsy reveals bone and rib fractures, and multiple bruises over his body. [American Civil Liberties Union, 10/24/2005]

Entity Tags: US Department of the Marines, Najem Sa’doun Hattab

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

President Bush issues a proclamation to mark the United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture. Bush states that the US is “committed to the worldwide elimination of torture and we are leading this fight by example.” He vows to prosecute torture and to prevent any “other cruel and unusual punishment.” The CIA’s chief lawyer, Scott Muller, complains to the White House that Bush’s statement could cause CIA interrogators, authorized by Bush to torture suspected al-Qaeda members (see February 7, 2002), to fear that they could be used as scapegoats by the administration. White House officials reassure Muller that despite Bush’s words, the administration still supports the CIA’s torture of prisoners. [New York Times, 5/3/2009]

Entity Tags: Scott Muller, Bush administration (43), George W. Bush, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

At Guantanamo, detainee Mohamed al-Khatani is given a tranquilizer, fitted with blackened goggles, and put on a plane. He is told he is being sent to a Middle Eastern country. What happens next is probably equivalent to the technique authorized under the description “false flag” by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s April 16, 2003 memo on interrogation methods (see April 16, 2003). The plane returns to Guantanamo several hours later and he is taken to an isolation cell in the base’s brig where he is subjected to harsh interrogation procedures. He is led to believe that his interrogators are Egyptian national security operatives. In order to maintain the deception, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is not permitted to visit Khatani during this time. [New York Times, 1/1/2005]

Entity Tags: Mohamed al-Khatani, Donald Rumsfeld, International Committee of the Red Cross

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The 519th Military Intelligence Battalion produces a memo laying down new “Interrogation Rules of Engagement” (IROE), for use in its new mission in Iraq. [US Department of the Army, 3/9/2004] The person apparently mostly responsible for writing the memo is Cpt. Carolyn A. Wood, formerly in charge of military intelligence interrogators at Bagram, which serves as the main screening area in Afghanistan. [Guardian, 6/23/2004] Col. Billy Buckner, the chief public affairs officer at Fort Bragg, home to the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, later says that Wood brought the interrogations rules used at Bagram with her to Iraq. [Associated Press, 5/24/2004] But the rules are also adapted and made somewhat less aggressive. “Those rules were modified,” according to Buckner, “to make sure the right restraints were in place.” [Guardian, 6/23/2004] The modifications nevertheless fall outside normal military doctrine. According to a classified portion of the later Fay report (see August 25, 2004), the memo allows the “use of stress positions during fear-up harsh interrogation approaches, as well as presence of military working dogs, yelling, loud music,… light control,” sleep management, and isolation. [New York Review of Books, 10/7/2004] The memo is adopted from interrogation procedures known as “Battlefield Interrogation Team and Facility Policy,” in use by a secretive unit called Joint Task Force (JTF) 121 , that is active in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The 519th Military Intelligence Battalion worked in close cooperation with Special Operations Forces like JTF-121 during its tour in Afghanistan, and “at some point,” according to the Fay report, it “came to possess the JTF-121 interrogation policy.” [New York Times, 8/27/2004] Cpt. Wood adopts the JTF-121 policy “almost verbatim.” [New York Times, 8/27/2004] Like the highest US command in Iraq, the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion apparently believes the standard Army Field Manual is an insufficient guideline for interrogations. Interrogation techniques falling outside the scope of standard military doctrine have already been devised at the Pentagon, but only for use in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay. These “non-doctrinal approaches, techniques, and practices,” according to Gen. George R. Fay, nevertheless, become “confused at Abu Ghraib.” [US Department of the Army, 3/9/2004] JTF-121 consists of CIA officials and Special Operations troops, including soldiers from the Army’s Delta Force and Navy Seals. The unit is later alleged to have been instrumental in the capture of Saddam Hussein. [New York Times, 5/17/2004]

Entity Tags: Troy Armstrong, George R. Fay, Saddam Hussein, Carolyn A. Wood

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

When Cpt. Carolyn A. Wood and the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion move to Abu Ghraib, the interrogation policy Wood used at the Baghdad airport facility (see July 15, 2003) needs to be adapted once again, and Capt. Wood is again responsible for devising the rules of engagement. In May 2004, Pentagon officials will give a description to the Senate Armed Services Committee of the instructions for interrogating prisoners used by Cpt. Wood at Abu Ghraib. They say that the rules of engagement Wood employed at Abu Ghraib included stress positions, use of dogs, sleep and sensory deprivation and dietary manipulation. Those rules of engagement would have had to have been authorized by higher levels in the military. A person of Cpt. Wood’s rank, explains a former member of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade to the Guardian, would not have been free to set interrogation policy herself. [Guardian, 6/23/2004]

Entity Tags: Carolyn A. Wood

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Damage to the front of the Marriott Hotel.Damage to the front of the Marriott Hotel. [Source: CNN]A suicide bomber crashes into the lobby of the J. W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, killing 16 people and wounding 150. All of those killed are Indonesian except for one Dutch man. No group takes credit for the bombing, but US and Indonesian officials quickly blame Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), al-Qaeda’s main affiliate in Southeast Asia. The New York Times calls the Marriott “the most visibly American building in the city, [leaving] little doubt about the intentions of the terrorists.” Two weeks before, a militant captured in a raid in central Java revealed that he had recently delivered two carloads of bombmaking materials to Jakarta. Furthermore, drawings were found indicating that JI was planning an attack on one of the following targets: the Grand Hyatt, Mulia, or Marriott hotels, two Jakarta shopping malls, or some Christian sites. Police claim they went on high alert. But the Marriott says they were never given any warning, and there was no public alert of any kind. The US ambassador to Indonesia, Ralph Boyce, says the US was not given any warning. Time magazine will later comment that “serious questions remain about just how much more police might have done to prevent the attack in the first place.” [New York Times, 8/7/2003; Time, 8/10/2003] One Indonesian later convicted for a role in the bombing, Mohammad Rais, will later testify in court that he had frequently met Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in recent years, and the bombing was inspired by bin Laden’s talk about waging war against the US and its allies. “We saw the Marriott attack as a message from Osama bin Laden.” [Associated Press, 12/2/2004] US treasury official Stuart Levey will later claim that al-Qaeda funded the attack by having a courier bring $30,000 in cash to Indonesia. [USA Today, 6/18/2006] The funds for the bombing allegedly passed through Hambali, an al-Qaeda and JI leader arrested in Thailand several days later (see August 12, 2003). [CNN, 8/19/2003] JI leaders Azhari Husin and Noordin Mohammed Top are said to have masterminded the bombing, together with Hambali. [New York Times, 10/7/2005]

Entity Tags: Ralph Boyce, Noordin Mohammed Top, Mohammad Rais, Azhari Husin, Hambali, Stuart Levey, Jemaah Islamiyah

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep (a.k.a. Lillie).Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep (a.k.a. Lillie). [Source: Defense Department]Hambali (a.k.a. Riduan Isamuddin) is arrested in Thailand in a joint US-Thai operation. He has been considered the operational leader of al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. He was involved in the Bojinka plot in 1995, attended the January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000), and was said to be involved in the 2002 bombing of two nightclubs in Bali, Indonesia (see October 12, 2002), the 2003 bombing of a Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia (see August 5, 2003), and other similar acts. He is taken into US custody and is said to quickly and fully cooperate with his captors. [Chicago Tribune, 12/7/2003] According to the Washington Post, at some point he will be transferred to the US naval base at the British island colony of Diego Garcia, where the CIA is believed to have a secret interrogation center. [Washington Post, 12/17/2004; Washington Post, 1/2/2005, pp. A01] Two of Hambali’s associates - Mohamad Farik Amin (a.k.a. Zubair), and Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep (a.k.a. Lillie) - are arrested with him. Both are Malaysians and are said to be al-Qaeda operatives. Supposedly they were members of a four person suicide squad working for Hambali and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to hijack an airplane (see October 2001-February 2002). [Time, 10/6/2003] The US will later classify both of them, and Hambali, as about a dozen of the top al-Qaeda operatives in US custody (see September 2-3, 2006).

Entity Tags: United States, Thailand, Hambali, Mohamad Farik Amin, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline

Shortly after he is arrested in Thailand (see August 12, 2003), al-Qaeda leader Hambali is taken to an unknown location and tortured. [MSNBC, 9/13/2007]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Hambali

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline

The “Hard Site” at Abu Ghraib is officially opened for use. Maj. Gen. George R. Fay, who much later reports (see August 25, 2004) on what happens at the prison, will say he believes the opening of the Hard Site “marked the beginning of the serious abuse that occurred.” [US Department of the Army, 3/9/2004]

Entity Tags: George R. Fay

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The King Fahd Mosque in Sarajevo, Bosnia.The King Fahd Mosque in Sarajevo, Bosnia. [Source: Ca adian Broadcasting Corporation]Abdurahman Khadr is a CIA informant (see November 10, 2001-Early 2003) and has been posing as a prisoner in Guantanamo so he can inform on the other prisoners there (see Spring 2003). But in September 2003, he leaves Guantanamo because the CIA gives him a new assignment, to infiltrate al-Qaeda-linked groups in Bosnia. He is given a brief training course in undercover work and then sent to Bosnia on a false passport. US intelligence believes that Bosnia has become an important pipeline for al-Qaeda volunteers who want to fight in Iraq. Khadr spends time at the King Fahd mosque, a large Sarajevo mosque which the US believes is a center of al-Qaeda activity. He becomes friendly with a suspected recruiter for al-Qaeda operations in Iraq. The CIA then wants him to follow the pipeline to Iraq and inform on al-Qaeda operations there. But Khadr considers Iraq far too dangerous. He is a Canadian citizen, and he contacts his grandmother in Canada and has her go public with part of his story so he will not be of use as an informant any more. In November 2003, he returns to Canada, after the CIA fails to give him most of his promised salary for his informant work. In February 2004, he contacts Canadian reporters and tells them his full story about being a CIA informant. His father, Ahmed Said Khadr, was a founding member of al-Qaeda, and his family disowns him when they find out about his involvement with the CIA. [PBS Frontline, 4/22/2004]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Abdurahman Khadr

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Shortly after Major General Geoffrey Miller’s visit (see August 31, 2003-September 9, 2003) to Iraq, three “Tiger Teams,” consisting of six personnel, arrive at the Abu Ghraib prison facility. Each team consists of an interrogator, analyst, and linguist, who work together as a team. The use of Tiger Teams is an approach that has been successfully used at the Guantanamo detention facility. Gen. George R. Fay, in his later report (see August 25, 2004), will say he believes the Tiger Team concept was not appropriate for Abu Ghraib, because the “method was designed to develop strategic level information,” instead of tactical intelligence. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: George R. Fay, Geoffrey D. Miller

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The legal experts at the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) issue a memorandum amending the set of interrogation rules included in a September 10 memo (see September 10, 2003) by military legal experts in Iraq. The additional methods included in that memo can only be used with prior approval by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez on a case-by-case basis, the OSJA document says. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] Like Major General Geoffrey Miller, the OSJA stresses the importance of collaboration between MPs and intelligence personnel. It also provides “safeguards such as legal reviews of the interrogation plans and scrutiny of how they were carried out,” the Washington Post later reports. [Washington Post, 6/12/2004] Additionally, the memo discusses how the Arab fear of dogs can be exploited. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] According to a later report (see August 25, 2004) by General George R. Fay, interrogators at Abu Ghraib immediately adopt the new set of rules. But Staff Judge Advocate Colonel Mark Warren will recall that the memo is not implemented until its approval by the US Central Command (CENTCOM). [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] Evidence, however, supports the Fay report. “After mid-September 2003,” Fay will write, “all [s]oldiers assigned to Abu Ghraib had to read a memorandum titled IROE [Interrogations Rules of Engagement], acknowledging they understood the ICRP, and sign a confirmation sheet indicating they had read and understood the ICRP.” [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] According to classified documents uncovered by the Senate Armed Services Committee (see April 21, 2009), CENTCOM lawyers begin objecting to the policies almost immediately. One e-mail, from a CENTCOM lawyer to a Staff Judge Advocate, warns, “Many of the techniques appear to violate [Geneva Conventions] III and IV and should not be used.” [Huffington Post, 4/21/2009]

Entity Tags: George R. Fay, Senate Armed Services Committee, Geoffrey D. Miller, Marc Warren, Ricardo S. Sanchez

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

A mortar attack kills two soldiers at Abu Ghraib, and injures Lt. Col. Steven L. Jordan and ten other soldiers. Jordan, who has only just arrived at the prison (see September 17, 2003), is extremely traumatized by the deaths of the two soldiers, one of whom suffered immensely. Two Iraqis, a man and a woman, are quickly apprehended on suspicion of involvement in the mortar attack and brought to the prison where a team of military intelligence soldiers and the MP Internal Reaction Force (IRF) are waiting for them. Two military intelligence soldiers yell at the man and begin hitting him, while he remains passive and handcuffed. MP 1st Lt. David Sutton intervenes and stops the beating. The detainee is released later in the day when his involvement in the attack is determined unlikely. The abuse is subsequently reported to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Commander Lt. Col. Jerry L. Phillabaum. The MPs and five military intelligence soldiers who were present at the incident all provide witness statements. Interestingly, as Maj. Gen. George R. Fay later relates (see August 25, 2004), “While the MP statements all describe abuse at the hands of an unidentified MI [Military Intelliigence] person…, the MI statements all deny any abuse occurred.” Phillabaum reports the incident to the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), which determines there are insufficient grounds for prosecution. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: George R. Fay, Jerry L. Phillabaum, David Sutton, Steven L. Jordan

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Amjed Isail Waleed arrives at Abu Ghraib and is designated a high-value detainee and assigned number 151365. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] He is immediately taken to the Hard Site and beaten by MPs. [Rolling Stone, 7/28/2004] Guards “put me in a dark room and started hitting me in the head and stomach and legs,” he later testifies. [Rolling Stone, 7/28/2004] He is then forced to strip and for five days he is left naked in his cell [Washington Post, 5/21/2004] where he is cuffed in stressful positions, a treatment known as “high cuffed.” [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] He is also forced to kneel with a bag over his head for four hours, denied bedding or blankets, [Washington Post, 5/21/2004] and chained to a window in his cell and forced to wear women’s underwear on his head. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] One time a soldier slams Waleed’s head against the wall, causing the hood he is wearing to fall off. “One of the police was telling me to crawl, in Arabic, so I crawled on my stomach, and the police were spitting on me when I was crawling and hitting me on my back, my head, and my feet. It kept going on until their shift ended at four o’clock in the morning. The same thing would happen in the following days.” Later, one day in November, five soldiers take him into a room, put a bag over his head and begin to beat him up. “I could see their feet, only, from under the bag.… Some of the things they did was make me sit down like a dog, and they would hold the string from the bag, and they made me bark like a dog, and they were laughing at me.” [Rolling Stone, 7/28/2004] A civilian interpreter, hired from Titan Corp., at one time hits him so hard, that he cuts his ear badly enough to require stitches. After several beatings that are so severe that he loses consciousness, he is forced to lie on the ground, while MPs jump onto his back and legs. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] “One of the police was pissing on me and laughing at me.” [Rolling Stone, 7/28/2004] Another day he is allegedly grabbed by US soldiers who hold him down and spread his legs. Another soldier meanwhile starts to open his trousers. “I started screaming,” he recalls. A soldier steps on his head. [Washington Post, 5/21/2004] He is also beaten with a broom. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] Someone breaks a chemical light and pours the liquid over his body, which is witnessed by another detainee. “I was glowing and they were laughing,” he says. [Washington Post, 5/21/2004] He is then taken to another room where a police baton is used to sodomize him. “And one of the police, he put a part of his stick that he always carries inside my ass, and I felt it going inside me about two centimeters, approximately. And I started screaming, and he pulled it out and he washed it with water inside the room.” [Rolling Stone, 7/28/2004] In the meantime, two female MPs are hitting him, throwing a ball at his penis, and taking photographs. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] “And the two American girls that were there when they were beating me, they were hitting me with a ball made of sponge on my dick. And when I was tied up in my room, one of the girls, with blond hair, she is white, she was playing with my dick. I saw inside this facility a lot of punishment just like what they did to me and more. And they were taking pictures of me during all these instances.” [Rolling Stone, 7/28/2004] Over the next few months, Waleed is subjected to six interrogations. Maj. George R. Fay (see August 25, 2004) will later conclude after an investigation into treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib, “It is highly probable [the detainee’s] allegations are true.” [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: George R. Fay, Amjed Isail Waleed, Titan

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez writes a classified memo calling for a “harmonization” of policing and intelligence tasks at Abu Ghraib in order to ensure “consistency with the interrogation policies… and maximize the efficiency of the interrogation.” [Washington Post, 5/16/2004] The memo instructs that intelligence is to work more closely with military police in order to “manipulate an internee’s emotions and weaknesses” by controlling the detainee’s access to “lighting, heating,… food, clothing, and shelter.” [Washington Post, 5/21/2004] It says that “it is imperative that interrogators be provided reasonable latitude to vary their approach” according to the prisoner’s background, strengths, resistance, and other factors. [Washington Post, 5/16/2004] The memo is a revision of Gen. Geoffrey Miller’s September 9 memo (see September 9, 2003), which included a list of acceptable interrogation techniques. Sanchez’s memo, however, drops the list replacing it with a general statement that “anything not approved, you have to ask for,” and adding that the detainees must be treated humanely and that any dogs used during the interrogations must be muzzled. [Washington Post, 5/16/2004; Washington Post, 5/21/2004] Larry Wilkerson, the chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, later says that such instructions are well understood to be honored on paper only. He will say, “When you read [a memo like this], you read, for example, that dogs can be used but they have to be muzzled. Well, I’m a soldier. I know what that means to an E-6 [noncommissioned officer] that is trying to question a guy and he’s got a German shepherd with a muzzle on there. If that doesn’t work, the muzzle comes off. If that doesn’t work, you kind of let the dog leap at the guy and maybe every now and then take a bite out of him (see November 20, 2003). It’s a very careful crafting of a memo… ” [Dubose and Bernstein, 2006, pp. 191-192]

Entity Tags: Ricardo S. Sanchez, Lawrence Wilkerson

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Abu Ghraib prisoner Abd Alwhab Youss is punished after guards accuse him of plotting to attack an MP with a broken toothbrush that he allegedly sharpened to make a weapon. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] In the MP log book, Staff Sgt. Ivan Frederick writes that the detainee should be kept naked in his cell for six days. Youss, who denies having made the weapon, is denied the privilege of a mattress as well. The following day, he is cuffed to his cell door for several hours. Afterwards, MPs take him into a closed room, pour cold water on him, push his face into someone’s urine and beat him with a broom. Then a female soldier “pressed my _ss with a broom and spit on it,” Youss claims. [Rolling Stone, 7/28/2004] Meanwhile she stands on his legs. For the next three days, he is left naked only during the night. During the day an MP will hand him his clothes back. Gen. George R. Fay in his later report (see August 25, 2004), notes, “It is plausible his interrogators would be unaware of the alleged abuse.” [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Ivan L. Frederick II, Abd Alwhab Youss

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Omar al-Faruq.Omar al-Faruq. [Source: Public domain]In a meeting with Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri, President Bush falsely promises to let Hambali stand trial in Indonesia. Hambali, an Indonesian citizen wanted for a string of attacks in Indonesia, including the 2002 Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002), was recently arrested in Thailand and taken in US custody (see August 12, 2003). White House communications director Dan Bartlett tells reporters that Bush has “committed to work with [the Indonesian authorities] at an appropriate time, that he would work to make sure that Hambali was handed over.” An Indonesian foreign ministry spokesman adds: “Absolutely, Bush promised to hand over Hambali to Indonesia for trial. The only condition is that the process of interrogation (by US agents) has to be completed. Bush said that still needed more time.” The US has been sharing some information from Hambali’s interrogation with Indonesian authorities, but does not allow them to question him directly, allegedly for fear of information leaks. [Associated Press, 10/24/2003] In 2002, the US did allow Indonesian investigators to directly interrogate another Indonesian in US custody, Omar al-Faruq. Ironically, it appears that extensive details of al-Faruq’s interrogation were leaked to the media, but by US officials, not Indonesian ones (see June 5, 2002). The US will not allow Indonesian officials to directly interrogate Hambali during a 2005 trial of his alleged close associate Abu Bakar Bashir, allowing Bashir to go free (see March 3, 2005). In late 2005, Hank Crumpton, a senior State Department official visiting Indonesia, again makes the promise that the US will eventually turn Hambali over to the Indonesian government. [New York Times, 10/19/2005] But in 2006, the US transfers Hambali to the Guantanamo prison with the intention of eventually trying him before a military tribunal (see September 2-3, 2006).

Entity Tags: Hambali, Dan Bartlett, George W. Bush, Hank Crumpton, Megawati Sukarnoputri

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Lynndie England drags a detainee known as Gus by a leash around the neck. Megan Ambuhl looks on.Lynndie England drags a detainee known as Gus by a leash around the neck. Megan Ambuhl looks on. [Source: Public domain]At the Abu Ghraib prison, three detainees who were photographed naked the day before (see October 24, 2003), are again striped naked, handcuffed together, placed on the ground, and forced to lie on top of each other and simulate sex acts while they are being photographed. This treatment happens, according to a CID (Criminal Investigation Division) investigation, “on several occasions over several days.” Those present or participating in the abuse are the MPs Spc. Charles Graner, Ivan Frederick, Pfc. Lynndie England, and Spc. Sabrina Harman, all of the 372nd MP Company. Also directly involved are three military intelligence soldiers from the 325th Military Intelligence Battalion. Two of the military intelligence soldiers arrive at the Hard Site when the abuse is already taking place. One appears to have known beforehand that something was going to happen. [Washington Post, 5/22/2004] When they arrive, one MP is yelling through a megaphone at the naked detainees, who are forced to crawl on their stomachs and are handcuffed together. Gen. George Fay will later conclude in his report (see August 25, 2004) that this incident “was most likely orchestrated by MP personnel.” On the other hand, England says, “MI [Military Intelligence] Soldiers instructed them [MPs] to rough them up.” One of the most clearly humiliating photographs taken at Abu Ghraib is also dated October 25. It depicts an unidentified naked detainee, nicknamed “Gus,” with a leash around his neck and with the end held by Pfc. England. Spc. Megan Ambuhl is also present, watching. According to England, Cpl. Graner put on the leash and then asked her to pose for the photograph. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: George R. Fay, Sabrina Harman, Megan Ambuhl, Ivan L. Frederick II, Charles Graner, Lynndie England

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Sabrina Harman giving the thumbs up over Manadel al-Jamadi’s dead body.Sabrina Harman giving the thumbs up over Manadel al-Jamadi’s dead body. [Source: Public domain]Detainee Manadel al-Jamadi, is brought to Abu Ghraib prison by US Navy SEAL Team 7. The Iraqi, captured during a joint Task Force 121/CIA mission, is suspected of having been involved in an attack against the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] Members of the Navy SEAL team punch and choke Al-Jamadi and stick their fingers in his eyes. A SEAL lieutenant is involved in the abuse. [Associated Press, 1/11/2005] Al-Jamadi resists his arrest, and one SEAL Team member hits him on the head with the butt of a rifle. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] MP Spc. Dennis E. Stevanus is on duty when two CIA representatives bring the man to the Hard Site. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] Spc. Jason A. Kenner, an MP at Abu Ghraib, will later say the detainee was “in good health” when he was brought in. [Guardian, 5/20/2004] According to Kenner’s later account, the detainee’s head is covered with an empty sandbag. MPs are then ordered to take him to a shower room, and told not to remove the hood, according to Kenner. [Guardian, 5/20/2004] The detainee is then interrogated by CIA and military intelligence personnel. Less than an hour later, the detainee will be found dead (see (7:00 a.m.) November 4, 2003). [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Dennis E. Stevanus, Jason A. Kenner, Manadel al-Jamadi, International Committee of the Red Cross

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Charles Graner giving the thumbs up over Manadel al-Jamadi’s dead body on November 4, 2003.Charles Graner giving the thumbs up over Manadel al-Jamadi’s dead body on November 4, 2003. [Source: Public domain]Spc. Dennis E. Stevanus is summoned to the shower stall of the Hard Site in Abu Ghraib. When he arrives he discovers that detainee Manadel al-Jamadi, interrogated by the CIA less than an hour before (see Between 4:30 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. November 4, 2003), is dead. Jamadi’s body is still shackled to the stall. When the hood is removed, he is found to have severe head wounds. (It is unclear whether these wounds were present when the prisoner was taken in, or whether they were inflicted during the interrogation.) [Los Angeles Times, 5/18/2004; US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] Stevanus calls a medic and notifies his superiors. Lt. Col. Steven Jordan arrives at the site at around 7:15 a.m. He finds several MPs and medics in the shower stall. The deceased prisoner is still handcuffed with his hands behind his back, lying on the floor face down. When the body is uncuffed and turned over, Jordan notices a small spot of blood on the floor where his head has lain. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file Sources: Jason A. Kenner] There is also extensive bruising on the body. [Guardian, 5/20/2004 Sources: Jason A. Kenner] Jordan alerts Col. Thomas M. Pappas. A CIA supervisor is also notified. He arrives and requests that the Hard Site hold the body until the next day. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] According to ABC News, Spc. Jason A. Kenner sees the body packed in ice while a “battle” rages between CIA and military intelligence interrogators over who should dispose of the corpse. [Guardian, 5/20/2004] The body is then put in a body bag, packed in ice, and stored in the shower area. [New Yorker, 5/10/2004; US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file Sources: Ivan L. Frederick II] Photographs are later released of MP Spcs. Charles Graner and Sabrina Harman posing next to the dead body wrapped in cellophane and packed in ice, giving a “thumbs up.” [New Yorker, 5/10/2004] According to MP Spc. Bruce Brown, an MP with the 372nd, they spray “air freshener to cover the scent.” [Los Angeles Times, 5/18/2004] The Criminal Investigation Division (CID) is also alerted. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Thomas M. Pappas, Sabrina Harman, Manadel al-Jamadi, Steven L. Jordan, Dennis E. Stevanus, Bruce Brown, Charles Graner, Criminal Investigation Division, Jason A. Kenner

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

An Afghani civilian later identified as Abdul Wahid dies from what his autopsy report calls “multiple blunt force injuries to head, torso, and extremities.” Wahid is being held by US forces at a forward operating base in Helmand province. [American Civil Liberties Union, 10/24/2005]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Abdul Wahid

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, War in Afghanistan

Top: the seven detainees are forced to form a human pyramid. Charles Graner and Sabrina Harman stand behind them smiling and giving thumbs up signs. Bottom: Some of the same detainees are forced to simulate oral sex on each other. Top: the seven detainees are forced to form a human pyramid. Charles Graner and Sabrina Harman stand behind them smiling and giving thumbs up signs. Bottom: Some of the same detainees are forced to simulate oral sex on each other. [Source: Public domain]At Abu Ghraib, seven Iraqi detainees are brought to Cellblock 1A from one of the tent camps escorted by MPs. The seven Iraqis are suspected of having taken part in a fight. They include Nori al-Yasseri, Hussein Mohssein Mata al-Zayiadi, and four others known only by their first names: Haidar, Ahmed, Ahzem, Hashiem and Mustafa. [Washington Post, 5/21/2004; US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] They are repeatedly punched and attacked by Staff Sgt. Ivan L. Frederick, Spc. Charles Graner, and other MPs (see Evening November 7, 2003). The MPs then take out their cameras to take pictures of the seven naked men and begin putting them in humiliating poses, often placing themselves in the picture as well, smiling. Graner makes them climb on top of each other to form a human pyramid, as is reported by Spc. Sabrina Harman. [Washington Post, 5/22/2004; Rolling Stone, 7/28/2004] “They put us two on the bottom, two on top of them, and two on top of those and on top,” Al-Zayiadi will say. [Washington Post, 5/21/2004] “The pyramid lasted about 15 to 20 minutes,” according to Harman. [Washington Post, 5/22/2004] The prisoners are also made to crawl on hands and knees with MPs riding on their backs. [Rolling Stone, 7/28/2004] “They were sitting on our backs like riding animals,” Al-Zayiadi says. Meanwhile, others are taking photographs. [Washington Post, 5/21/2004] Frederick then takes hold of the prisoner whom he has singled out for additional punishment and motions him to masturbate. “I grabbed his arm by the elbow, put it on his genitals and moved it back and forth with an arm motion, and he did it.” [Los Angeles Times, 10/21/2004] He makes another detainee do the same. “I lifted his hood and gave him a hand gesture, telling him to keep doing it himself.” [New York Times, 10/21/2004] Spc. Matthew Wisdom, who complained to his team leader Sgt. Robert Jones earlier in the evening about the treatment of the detainees, returns to Tier 1A to find a naked detainee being forced to masturbate in front of another naked detainee on his knees before him. “I saw two naked detainees,” Wisdom will later recall, “one masturbating to another kneeling with its mouth open. I thought I should just get out of there. I didn’t think it was right.” [New Yorker, 5/10/2004] According to Wisdom, Frederick says to him: “Look what these animals do when we leave them alone for two seconds.” [New Yorker, 5/10/2004; Los Angeles Times, 8/5/2004] Meanwhile, Pfc. Lynndie England makes sexually suggestive comments “in a somewhat sarcastic, fun tone of voice,” according to Wisdom. [Los Angeles Times, 8/5/2004] “I heard Pfc. England shout out, ‘He’s getting hard.’” [New Yorker, 5/10/2004] Again Wisdom leaves the building to tell Sgt. Jones, who assures him the “problem [will] be addressed and dealt with,” [Los Angeles Times, 8/5/2004] and Wisdom assumes that the problem will be taken care of. [New Yorker, 5/10/2004] Others, meanwhile, are lined up and forced to masturbate. These facts are corroborated by photographs that show the MPs laughing as they look on. [Rolling Stone, 7/28/2004] Al-Zayiadi later identifies himself in one of these pictures. “They told my friend to masturbate and told me to masturbate also, while they were taking pictures,” he says. [Washington Post, 5/21/2004] In the end, Al-Zayiadi says they are tossed naked but still hooded into a cell. “They opened the water in the cell and told us to lay face down in the water and we stayed like that until the morning, in the water, naked, without clothes.” [Washington Post, 5/21/2004] One of the seven prisoners is likely Haydar Sabbar Abed who says he was originally arrested for not carrying his ID card. After being involved in a fight with an Iraqi prison employee in one of the tent camps, he is taken to the Hard Site. He later recalls: “They cut off our clothes and… told us to masturbate towards this female soldier. But we didn’t agree to do it, so they beat us.” He also says: “They made us act like dogs, putting leashes around our necks. They’d whistle and we’d have to bark like dogs. We thought they were going to kill us.” [BBC, 8/4/2004] The next day, Wisdom asks for and is granted a transfer to a job elsewhere in the prison. Although he and Sgt. Jones say they have been angered by the abuse, they do little more than mildly confront their colleagues with their objections. [Los Angeles Times, 8/5/2004] To the detainees, the experience has been harrowing. Al-Yasseri will later call it a “night which we felt like 1,000 nights.” “I was trying to kill myself,” says Al-Zayiadi, “but I didn’t have any way of doing it.” [Rolling Stone, 7/28/2004] Gen. George Fay will also describe these incidents in his report (see August 25, 2004), which he concludes was an the affair of MPs alone. He states that military intelligence “involvement in this abuse has not been alleged nor is it likely.” However, one of the pictures taken that night, depicting the “human pyramid,” is later used as a screen saver for a computer in the Hard Site. The screen saver is later seen by a female military intelligence interrogator, but she states, according to Gen. Fay, that she did not report the picture because she did not see it again. The same interrogator, Fay will report, had a “close personal relationship” with Staff Sgt. Frederick, [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] one of the main instigators of the abuse that night.

Entity Tags: Javal Davis, Ivan L. Frederick II, Jeremy C. Sivits, Matthew Wisdom, Shannon K. Snider, Hussein Mohssein Mata Al-Zayiadi, Lynndie England, Nori al-Yasseri, Mustafa, Haydar Sabbar Abed, George R. Fay, Haidar, New Yorker, Hashiem, Ahmed, Charles Graner, Ahzem, Sabrina Harman, Robert Jones II

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

An Abu Ghraib detainee bleeding after being biting by a dog on December 12, 2003.An Abu Ghraib detainee bleeding after being biting by a dog on December 12, 2003. [Source: Public domain]Dog teams arrive at Abu Ghraib and “almost immediately” are used against the detainees (see November 24, 2003). Gen. George Fay’s investigation (see August 25, 2004) of Abu Ghraib abuses will conclude that, “The use of dogs in interrogations to ‘fear up’ detainees was generally unquestioned.” Most military intelligence personnel apparently believe dogs can be used in interrogations with specific approval from Col. Thomas M. Pappas. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] According to Sgt. Michael J. Smith and Sgt. Santos A. Cardona, they are acting under instructions from Col. Thomas M. Pappas when they use unmuzzled dogs to intimidate prisoners. [New York Times, 5/22/2004] And Pappas himself believes, “incorrectly,” Gen. Fay notes, that Lt. Col. Ricardo S. Sanchez has delegated this authority to him. Pappas, concludes Gen. Fay, “[i]mproperly authorized the use of dogs during interrogations.” [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] Nevertheless, Gen. Fay also believes, “there were early indications that MP and MI [Military Intelligence] personnel knew the use of dog teams in interrogations was abusive.” Only the Army dog teams join in with the abuse. Three Navy dog teams, who arrive simultaneously at Abu Ghraib, refuse to lend their dogs for interrogation purposes. The Navy dog handlers always ask for what specific purpose the dog is required, and when they are told “for interrogation,” they refuse to comply. “Over the next few weeks, the Navy dog teams received about eight similar calls, none of which [are] fulfilled.” [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Ricardo S. Sanchez, Michael J. Smith, George R. Fay, Santos A. Cardona, Thomas M. Pappas

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Abed Hamed Mowhoush.Abed Hamed Mowhoush. [Source: New York Times]At the Al Qaim detention facility northwest of Baghdad, Iraqi Major General Abed Hamed Mowhoush is interrogated by two officers of the 66th Military Intelligence Company. They force him head-first into a sleeping bag and question him as they roll him back and forth. One of the soldiers, Chief Warrant Officer Lewis Welshofer, sits on the Iraqi general’s chest and covers his mouth. [Human Rights Watch, 6/2004] The prisoner dies of asphyxia due to smothering and chest compression. [Denver Post, 5/18/2004] Later in the day, US military officials issue a statement saying that a prisoner has died of natural causes during questioning. “Mowhoush said he didn’t feel well and subsequently lost consciousness,” the statement reads. “The soldier questioning him found no pulse, then conducted CPR and called for medical authorities. According to the on-site surgeon, it appeared Mowhouse died of natural causes.” [Denver Post, 5/18/2004; New York Times, 5/22/2004] But the autopsy report will say there is “evidence of blunt force trauma to the chest and legs.” [Human Rights Watch, 6/2004] The incident is investigated and a report is issued in early 2004 (see Late January 2004).

Entity Tags: Lewis Welshofer, Abed Hamed Mowhoush

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

A detainee is attacked by a dog on December 12, 2003.A detainee is attacked by a dog on December 12, 2003. [Source: Public domain]A detainee, who appears to be mentally unstable, is bitten by a dog in the Hard Site at Abu Ghraib. The incident is photographed, and according to the later report (see August 25, 2004) by Gen. George Fay, “appears to be the result of MP harassment and amusement.” [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file]

Entity Tags: George R. Fay

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The chief of the CIA’s station in Baghdad, Iraq, is removed from his position. [Los Angeles Times, 2/20/2004; New York Times, 2/27/2005] At this time the chief, whose name is apparently Gerry Meyer (see May 18, 2006), is not in Iraq, but reporting to superiors in Washington. He is simply told not to return to his station. [Risen, 2006, pp. 147] However, the reason for the chief’s removal is unclear and three contradictory accounts will be given. The first account, put about by anonymous officials, is that Meyer does not have the management skills to administer the station, one of the largest the CIA has ever had. [New York Times, 2/27/2005; Risen, 2006, pp. 128] One unnamed official will comment, “There was just a belief that it was a huge operation and we needed a very senior, very experienced person to run it.” A second version holds that Meyer is fired for drafting two pessimistic “Aardwolf” reports about the US’s prospects in Iraq (see August 30, 2003 and November 10, 2003). [Los Angeles Times, 2/20/2004] According to a Harper’s magazine post, White House officials ask for “dirt” on Meyer, including his political affiliation. “He was a good guy,” an anonymous CIA official will comment, “well-wired in Baghdad, and he wrote a good report. But any time this administration gets bad news, they say the critics are assholes and defeatists, and off we go down the same path with more pressure on the accelerator.” [Harper's, 5/18/2006] However, a third version will later emerge. In this account, the firing is due to concern over the deaths of two Iraqis questioned by CIA officials shortly before Meyer’s removal. After senior agency officials learn of the deaths of Abed Hamed Mowhoush (see November 26, 2003) and Manadel al-Jamadi (see Between 4:30 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. November 4, 2003), in which CIA personnel were involved, they become unhappy with Meyer and have him removed. [New York Times, 2/27/2005; Risen, 2006, pp. 127-128] This version will apparently be supported by a document released subsequent to a Freedom of Information Act request in 2009. The document is a redacted set of May 2004 talking points to be used by a senior CIA official in a briefing of the House Intelligence Committee. The talking points do not say specifically why Meyer was fired, but do say he committed errors in detainee treatment. This will be confirmed by an anonymous former official, who will say that Meyer “wasn’t paying enough attention to the detainee situation,” as well as the issue of “ghost detainees.” [McClatchy, 8/25/2009] Whatever the reason for his firing, Meyer soon leaves the CIA. [New York Times, 2/27/2005; Harper's, 5/18/2006] According to author James Risen, his departure comes after he faces “piercing questions from CIA officials stemming from a series of inflammatory accusations about his personal behavior, all of which he flatly denied.” Risen will add that Meyer leaves the CIA “in disgust.” Whatever the reason, some CIA officials come to believe that Meyer ran into trouble because of the candid report. “When I read that November aardwolf,” a CIA official who knows Meyer will comment, “I thought that he was committing career suicide.” [Risen, 2006, pp. 127-128]

Entity Tags: Manadel al-Jamadi, Gerry Meyer, Central Intelligence Agency, Abed Hamed Mowhoush, CIA Baghdad Station

Timeline Tags: Iraq under US Occupation

Afghan taxi driver Wazir Muhammad is released from Guantanamo due to long campaigning by his brother Taji and Amnesty International. [Guardian, 6/23/2004] “At the end of my time in Guantanamo,” he recalls, “I had to sign a paper saying I had been captured in battle which was not true. I was stopped when I was in my taxi with four passengers. But they told me I would have to spend the rest of my life in Guantanamo if I did not sign it, so I did.” [Guardian, 6/23/2004]

Entity Tags: Amnesty International, Wazir Muhammad

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, War in Afghanistan

A male Iraqi dies while being interrogated by American officials, probably from the CIA. According to a report by the American Civil Liberties Union (see October 24, 2005), the male, detained in the city of Al Asad, is “standing, shackled to the top of a door frame with a gag in his mouth at the time he died.” The cause of death is asphyxia and blunt force injuries—in essence, being beaten to death while choking on a gag. The ACLU believes the Iraqi’s name was Abdul Jaleel. [American Civil Liberties Union, 10/24/2005]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Abdul Jaleel, American Civil Liberties Union

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The final report of an investigation into the death of Iraqi Maj. Gen. Abed Hamed Mowhoush (see November 26, 2003) is completed. It concludes that Mowhoush died from asphyxia after being suffocated and sat upon by his interrogators. It also reveals that approximately 24 to 48 hours before his death, he was questioned by “other governmental agency officials.” Statements suggest that he was beaten during that interrogation, the report says. [Denver Post, 5/18/2004; Human Rights Watch, 6/2004] The interrogating soldiers are subsequently reprimanded and barred from conducting further interrogations. [Denver Post, 5/18/2004]

Entity Tags: Abed Hamed Mowhoush

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

During a hearing on the June 2003 death of Najem Sa’doun Hattab (see June 5, 2003) at Camp Whitehorse detention center near Nassiriya, Iraq, a former US marine, granted immunity for testifying, says that it was common for Coalition forces “to kick and punch prisoners who did not cooperate—and even some who did.” [San Diego Union-Tribune, 2/3/2004; Amnesty International, 3/18/2004]

Entity Tags: Najem Sa’doun Hattab

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The US learns that Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, a former al-Qaeda camp commander, was allegedly tortured in Egypt, where he was rendered by the CIA (see January 2002 and After). Although CIA Director George Tenet will describe al-Libi’s handling by the Egyptians as “further debriefing,” after being returned to US custody, al-Libi tells CIA officers he was tortured and these claims are documented in a series of cables sent to CIA headquarters on February 4 and 5. These cables are the final proof, many believe, that the US is illegally “outsourcing” torture to other countries, against suspects who have not been convicted or even charged with a crime. After being tortured by his Egyptian captors (see November 11, 2001), al-Libi was returned to US custody on November 22, 2003. The February 5 cable reads, in part, that al-Libi was told by the Egyptians that “the next topic was al-Qaeda’s connections with Iraq…. This was a subject about which he said he knew nothing and had difficulty even coming up with a story.” The Egyptians didn’t like al-Libi’s response, and locked him in a 20 inch by 20 inch box for 17 hours—effectively burying him alive. The Egyptians released him and gave him one more change to “tell the truth.” When al-Libi did not give the proper response, he was knocked to the ground and beaten. The CIA debriefers send this information straight to Washington (see February 14, 2004), thus informing the CIA that not only was this key piece of evidence about the link between Iraq and al-Qaeda false, but it was obtained by extreme, US-sanctioned torture. Although stories and witness accounts about torture in such US-allied countries as Egypt, Syria, Morocco, and Uzbekistan have long been known, this is the first time such torture has been detailed in an official US government document. It will be almost a year before the Bush administration will confirm the CIA’s rendition program (see March 11, 2002), and even then it will begin a litany of reassurances that the US does not torture, nor does it hand over prisoners to countries that torture. The CIA cables will be declassified in September 2006, and roundly ignored by the mainstream media. And as of late 2007, al-Libi will still be a “ghost prisoner” whose whereabouts and circumstances are considered a US state secret. [ABC News, 11/6/2007]

Entity Tags: Colin Powell, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, George J. Tenet

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

An Army memorandum records an interview of a US interrogator stationed at the Orgun-E Military Intelligence Detention Facility in Afghanistan. According to the interrogator, “standard operating procedure” with detainees includes extended sleep deprivation, stress positions, and withholding food. The interrogator also refers to standard practices of “OGA” officials (OGA means “other goverment agency” and is a reference to the CIA), who drug prisoners and subject them to lengthy sensory deprivation. Another memo records the use of what interrogators call “fear up harsh” techniques, which include “disrespect for the Koran,” insults, subjecting prisoners to blinding lights, and exposing them to extremely loud music for prolonged periods. The memoranda will be released to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in 2006 (see January 12, 2006). [American Civil Liberties Union, 1/12/2006]

Entity Tags: US Department of the Army, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Paul Butler, chief of staff for Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, claims in a briefing that the prisoners being held in Guantanamo are “very dangerous people” who include “senior al-Qaeda operatives and leaders and Taliban leaders.” However, the New York Times will later report that “several senior officials with detailed knowledge of the Guantanamo detainees described Mr. Butler’s portrait of the camp as a work of verbal embroidery, saying none of the detainees at the camp could possibly be called a leader or senior operative of al-Qaeda.” [New York Times, 6/21/2004] Probably the closest to an al-Qaeda leader being held is one of bin Laden’s former bodyguards who nonetheless will be released later in 2004 (see Late November 2001). There were media reports as far back as August 2002 that no al-Qaeda leaders were being held at Guantanamo (see August 18, 2002). Some al-Qaeda leaders will be sent into the prison from secret CIA prisons in September 2006 (see September 2-3, 2006).

Entity Tags: Paul Butler

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Gouled Hassan Dourad.Gouled Hassan Dourad. [Source: US Defense Department]Alleged “high value” al-Qaeda leader Gouled Hassan Dourad is captured. Dourad is captured by Djibouti government forces in his house in Djibouti. He is turned over to US custody at an unknown date and held as a ghost prisoner in the CIA’s secret prison system. On September 4, 2006, he will be transferred to the US-run prison in Guantanamo, Cuba, and will be officially declared a “high value” prisoner (see September 2-3, 2006).
Who Is Dourad? - Very little is publicly known about Dourad or why he is deemed an important militant leader. Virtually nothing has appeared about him in the media either before or after his capture. But his 2008 Guantanamo file will detail his history. According to that file, Dourad is a Somali who is an admitted member of both al-Qaeda’s East Africa branch and Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI), an Islamist militant group based in Somalia that was blacklisted by the US shortly after 9/11. In 1993, he was granted asylum in Sweden, and lived there for nearly three years. In 1996, he trained in al-Qaeda linked training camps in Afghanistan. Returning to East Africa, he fought against Ethiopian forces for several years. Dourad grew more involved with al-Qaeda and took part in various plots. When he is caught, he allegedly is in the final stages of planning an operation against US military bases and various embassies in Djibouti. He does not seem to have been in frequent contact with many top al-Qaeda leaders, but it is claimed he worked closely with Abu Talha al-Sudani, a leader of al-Qaeda operations in East Africa. [US Department of Defense, 9/19/2008] Note that the Guantanamo files of prisoners often contain dubious information, and in some cases information that was extracted by torture (see April 24, 2011).

Entity Tags: Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, Gouled Hassan Dourad, Al-Qaeda, Abu Talha al-Sudani

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba submits the final version of his report (see February 26, 2004) on the investigation into prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib by MPs. He concludes that military intelligence personnel played a part in the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. But due to the fact that his investigation was limited to the conduct of MPs (see January 19, 2004), he did not investigate military intelligence conduct. Another investigation (see August 25, 2004), however, is launched that will examine military intelligence’s role in the abuses. It will be conducted by Maj. Gen. George R. Fay, the Army’s deputy chief of staff for intelligence. But the scope of this investigation is also limited from the outset, for two reasons. First, as a two-star general, he cannot hold any officer of his own rank or higher accountable. Second, Fay is appointed by Lt. Col. Ricardo S. Sanchez and therfore the scope of investigation is limited to the people under Sanchez’s command. [Newsweek, 6/7/2004] Additionally, Fay may be less inclined to report negatively on military intelligence personnel, since his superior, Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, head of Army Intelligence, has already stated that the abuse at Abu Ghraib was committed by “a group of undisciplined military police” who were acting on their own, and not upon instructions from military intelligence officers. [Truthout (.org), 5/14/2004]

Entity Tags: George R. Fay, Ricardo S. Sanchez, Antonio M. Taguba, Keith Alexander

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

A report by the inspector general of the US Army’s Combined/Joint Task Force 180 in Bagram, Afghanistan, finds numerous problems with detainee treatment at Bagram and other facilities. The problems include a lack of training and oversight on acceptable interrogation techniques (see July 2002). According to the report, “Army doctrine simply does not exist” at the base, and detainees are not afforded “with the privileges associated with enemy or prisoner of war status” or the Geneva Conventions. The memoranda will be released to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in 2006 (see January 12, 2006). [American Civil Liberties Union, 1/12/2006]

Entity Tags: US Department of the Army

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian militant leader fighting against US-led forces in Iraq, allegedly says on an audiotape that prisons in Jordan have become “the Arab Guantanamo.” He says: “Whoever the Americans find hard to investigate in Pakistan and Afghanistan, they move to Jordan, where they are tortured in every way.” [Observer, 6/13/2004] Jordan is a country that is notorious for its use of torture (see 1993).

Entity Tags: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

A 27-year-old Iraqi male dies during his interrogation by US Navy SEALs in Mosul. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) will later find (see October 24, 2005) that during his confinement, “he was hooded, flex-cuffed, sleep deprived, and subjected to hot and cold environmental conditions, including the use of cold water on his body and hood.” The cause of death is officially “undetermined,” though the autopsy speculates that the prisoner may have died from hypothermia and/or related conditions. Notes from his interrogators say that he “struggled/ interrogated/ died sleeping.” [American Civil Liberties Union, 10/24/2005]

Entity Tags: US Department of the Navy, American Civil Liberties Union

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

A Supreme Court Justice, during the oral arguments in the cases of Jose Padilla and Yaser Esam Hamdi, asks how the Court can be certain that government interrogators are not abusing detainees. Deputy Solicitor General Paul Clement answers that the court will have to “trust the executive to make the kind of quintessential military judgments that are involved in things like that.” [First, 6/2004 pdf file] The government’s legal strategy is so inflexible in part because of Vice President Cheney, who through his lawyer David Addington refuses to allow the Justice Department to budge from its intransigent position. For months, Solicitor General Theodore Olson and his deputy, Clement, have pled for modest shifts in policy that would bolster their arguments in court. Hamdi has languished in a Navy brig for two and a half years without a hearing or a lawyer. British citizen Shafiq Rasul has been held under similar conditions at Guantanamo for even longer (see November 28, 2001 and January 11, 2002-April 30, 2002). Olson says that Cheney’s position—the president has unlimited authority to order the indefinite detention of anyone suspected of terrorist activity without benefit of counsel or any judiciary intervention—would be easier to argue in court if he could “show them that you at least have some system of due process in place” to ensure against wrongful detention, according to a senior Justice Department official familiar with the issue. But Addington wins the argument, overriding Olson and the Justice Department by his arguments that any such retreat would restrict the freedom of future presidents and open the door to further lawsuits. The Supreme Court will find against Cheney in both the Hamdi (see June 28, 2004) and Rasul (see June 28, 2004) cases. Olson will resign as solicitor general 11 days later. [Washington Post, 6/25/2007]

Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, David S. Addington, Jose Padilla, Paul Clement, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Theodore (“Ted”) Olson, Shafiq Rasul, Yaser Esam Hamdi, US Supreme Court

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Conservative talk show host Rush Limbaugh dismisses photos taken of prisoners at Abu Ghraib over the course of several broadcasts. The excerpts are collected by Newsweek, researchers from the Annenberg Public Policy Center, and the progressive media watchdog site Media Matters. On May 3, he tells his listeners, “You know, if you look at—if you really look at these pictures, I mean, I don’t know if it’s just me, but it looks just like anything you’d see Madonna or Britney Spears do onstage—maybe I’m, yeah—and get an NEA [National Education Association] grant for something like this” (see October 2003, October 17-22, 2003, October 24, 2003, Evening October 25, 2003, November 4, 2003, November 4-December 2, 2003, and Between 4:30 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. November 4, 2003, among others). On May 4, he says: “You know, those [US soldiers in Iraq] are being fired at every day. I’m talking about people having a good time. These people—you ever heard of emotional release? You ever heard of needing to blow some steam off? … It is no different than what happens at the Skull and Bones initiation.” On May 5, he says: “I think a lot of the American culture is being feminized. I think the reaction to the stupid torture is an example of the feminization of this country.” On May 6: he says, “The thing, though, that continually amazes—here we have these pictures of homoeroticism that look like standard good old American pornography, the Britney Spears or Madonna concerts or whatever.… I mean, this is something that you can see onstage at Lincoln Center from an NEA grant, maybe on Sex and the City.” In that same broadcast, he praises the torturers by saying: “And we hear that the most humiliating thing you can do is make one Arab male disrobe in front of another. Sounds to me like it’s pretty thoughtful.… Maybe the people who executed this pulled off a brilliant maneuver. Nobody got hurt. Nobody got physically injured.… Sounds pretty effective to me if you look at us in the right context.” And on May 11, he says, “If you take these pictures and bring them back and have them taken in an American city and put on an American Web site, they might win an award from the pornography industry.” [Media Matters, 5/6/2004; Newsweek, 5/13/2004; Boehlert, 2006, pp. 118; Jamieson and Cappella, 2008, pp. 160]

Entity Tags: Rush Limbaugh, Britney Spears, Annenberg Public Policy Center, Madonna, Media Matters, Newsweek

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Domestic Propaganda

An Army officer writes that, in light of the recently released photos from Abu Ghraib, abusive interrogation techniques such as the application of cold or ice, loud music, sleep deprivation, and confining detainees to a metal box, will “continue to cause us problems, as some interrogation techniques aren’t real defensible given the Abu Ghraib fallout.” The memorandum will be released to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in 2006 (see January 12, 2006). [American Civil Liberties Union, 1/12/2006]

Entity Tags: US Department of the Army, American Civil Liberties Union

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Lt. Col. Tucker Mansager tells reporters that the media will not be permitted access to secret detention facilities in Afghanistan, claiming that to do so would violate the prisoners’ rights under the Geneva Conventions. However in February 2002, the administration had denied “prisoner of war” status to all Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters captured in Afghanistan (see February 7, 2002) on grounds they were “illegal combatants.” Since then, the US has maintained that these prisoners are not protected by the Conventions. Nonetheless, Mansager explains: “Part of… spirit [of the Geneva Conventions] is to ensure that the persons under confinement are not subject to any kind of exploitation. It is the coalition’s position that allowing media into the facilities would compromise that protection.” [Reuters, 5/19/2004]

Entity Tags: Tucker Mansager

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

After speaking to the media (see May 18, 2004) (see May 19, 2004), Sgt. Samuel Provance receives a disciplinary order from his battalion commander, Lt. Col. James Norwood, notifying him that he has been stripped of his security clearance, transferred to a different platoon, and made ineligible for promotions or awards. He is also informed that he may be prosecuted for speaking out because his comments were “not in the national interest.” [ABC News, 5/21/2004] Norwood says: “There is reason for me to believe that you may have been aware of the improper treatment of the detainees at Abu Ghraib before they were reported by other soldiers.” The conclusions of Maj. Gen. George Fay’s investigation (see August 25, 2004), Norwood warns, “may reveal that you should face adverse action for your failure to report.” [Newsweek, 6/7/2004] Indeed, the Fay report will conclude that Provance “[f]ailed to report detainee abuse” and “[f]ailed to obey a direct order.” Maj. Gen. Fay will also write, “He interfered with this investigation by talking about the investigation, giving interviews to the media, and passing the questions being asked by investigators to others via a website.” [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] Provance’s attorney, Scott Horton, believes the military is intimidating soldiers in an effort to prevent them from speaking out about what they know. “I see it as an effort to intimidate Sgt. Provance and any other soldier whose conscience is bothering him, and who wants to come forward and tell what really happened at Abu Ghraib,” he says. [ABC News, 5/21/2004]

Entity Tags: George R. Fay, Scott Horton, James Norwood, Samuel Provance

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The Washington Post reveals the existence of a secret August 2002 memo from the Justice Department. This memo advised the White House that torturing al-Qaeda terrorists in captivity “may be justified,” and that international laws against torture “may be unconstitutional if applied to interrogations” conducted in the US war on terrorism (see August 1, 2002). The legal reasoning was later used in a March 2003 report by Pentagon lawyers assessing interrogation rules governing the military detention center at Guantanamo Bay (see March 6, 2003). Bush officials say that despite the memo, it has abided by the Geneva Conventions and other international treaties proscribing torture (see February 7, 2002). The incidents at Abu Ghraib, where numerous Iraqi prisoners were tortured, maimed, and sometimes murdered, were not policy, officials say. Human rights organizations and civil libertarians are appalled at the memo. “It is by leaps and bounds the worst thing I’ve seen since this whole Abu Ghraib scandal broke,” says Tom Malinowski of Human Rights Watch. “It appears that what they were contemplating was the commission of war crimes and looking for ways to avoid legal accountability. The effect is to throw out years of military doctrine and standards on interrogations.” A senior Pentagon official says that the Judge Advocate Generals (JAGs) were quick to challenge the Justice Department opinion when it was promoted by the Pentagon. “Every flag JAG lodged complaints,” the official says. A senior military attorney says of the memo: “It’s really unprecedented. For almost 30 years we’ve taught the Geneva Convention one way. Once you start telling people it’s okay to break the law, there’s no telling where they might stop.” [Washington Post, 6/8/2004] Attorney General John Ashcroft tells the Senate Judiciary Committee that he will not discuss the contents of the August 2002 memo, nor turn it over to the committee. “I believe it is essential to the operation of the executive branch that the president has the opportunity to get information from the attorney general that is confidential,” he says. [Washington Post, 6/8/2004]

Entity Tags: Senate Judiciary Committee, Bush administration (43), Geneva Conventions, John Ashcroft, Tom Malinowski, US Department of Justice, Judge Advocate General Corps, US Department of Defense

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties

Vice President Cheney has called the prisoners being held by the US at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, “the worst of a very bad lot” (see January 27, 2002) and other US officials have suggested that information from them has exposed terrorist cells and foiled attacks. But a lengthy New York Times investigation finds that US “government and military officials have repeatedly exaggerated both the danger the detainees posed and the intelligence they have provided.… In interviews, dozens of high-level military, intelligence and law-enforcement officials in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East said that contrary to the repeated assertions of senior administration officials, none of the detainees at the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay ranked as leaders or senior operatives of al-Qaeda. They said only a relative handful—some put the number at about a dozen, others more than two dozen—were sworn al-Qaeda members or other militants able to elucidate the organization’s inner workings.” While some information from the prisoners has been useful to investigators, none of it has stopped any imminent attacks. Information from Guantanamo is considered “only a trickle” compared to what is being learned from prisoners held by the CIA in secret prisons elsewhere. Brig. Gen. Jay W. Hood, in charge of the task force running the prison, says, “The expectations, I think, may have been too high at the outset. There are those who expected a flow of intelligence that would help us break the most sophisticated terror organization in a matter of months. But that hasn’t happened.” Ironically, although few prisoners have been released, it appears about five have rejoined the Taliban and resumed attacks against US forces. Abdullah Laghmani, the chief of the National Security Directorate in Kandahar, Afghanistan, says, “There are lots of people who were innocent, and they are capturing them, just on anyone’s information. And then they are releasing guilty people.” [New York Times, 6/21/2004] Abdurahman Khadr, a CIA informant posing as a Guantanamo inmate for much of 2003 (see November 10, 2001-Early 2003 and Spring 2003), will later say about the prison: “There’s only, like, a 10 percent of the people that are really dangerous, that should be there. And the rest are people that, you know, don’t have anything to do with it, don’t even- you know, don’t even understand what they’re doing here.” [PBS Frontline, 4/22/2004] The Los Angeles Times reported back in August 2002 that no al-Qaeda leaders are being held at Guantanamo (see August 18, 2002). Some al-Qaeda leaders will be transferred into the prison from secret CIA prisons in September 2006 (see September 2-3, 2006).

Entity Tags: Abdurahman Khadr, Abdullah Laghmani, Jay W. Hood

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline

To demonstrate that President Bush has never authorized torture against prisoners, the White House declassifies and releases a large number of internal documents, including the February 7, 2002 memo (see February 7, 2002) signed by Bush, and documents, inter alia from Gen. James T. Hill, showing that the US military interrogators were seeking more aggressive interrogation techniques. The disclosures are made, according to Alberto R. Gonzales, because the government “felt that it was harmful to this country, in terms of the notion that perhaps we may be engaging in torture.” [Washington Post, 6/23/2004]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Bush administration (43), Alberto R. Gonzales, James T. Hill

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Yaser Esam Hamdi.Yaser Esam Hamdi. [Source: Associated Press]In the case of Yaser Esam Hamdi v. Donald Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court rules 8-1 that, contrary to the government’s position, Hamdi (see December 2001), as a US citizen held inside the US, cannot be held indefinitely and incommunicado without an opportunity to challenge his detention. It rules he has the right to be given the opportunity to challenge the basis for his detention before an impartial court. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor writes for the majority: “It would turn our system of checks and balances on its head to suggest that a citizen could not make his way to court with a challenge to the factual basis for his detention by his government, simply because the Executive opposes making available such a challenge. Absent suspension of the writ by Congress, a citizen detained as an enemy combatant is entitled to this process.” Hamdi, on the other hand, apart from military interrogations and “screening processes,” has received no process. Due process, according to a majority of the Court, “demands some system for a citizen detainee to refute his classification [as enemy combatant].” A “citizen-detainee… must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the government’s factual assertions before a neutral decision-maker.” However, O’Connor writes, “an interrogation by one’s captor… hardly constitutes a constitutionally adequate factfinding before a neutral decisionmaker.”
Conservative Dissent: President Has Inherent Power to Detain Citizens during War - Only Justice Clarence Thomas affirms the government’s opinion, writing, “This detention falls squarely within the federal government’s war powers, and we lack the expertise and capacity to second-guess that decision.” [Supreme Court opinion on writ of certiorari. Shafiq Rasul, et al. v. George W. Bush, et al., 6/28/2004] Thomas adds: “The Founders intended that the president have primary responsibility—along with the necessary power—to protect the national security and to conduct the nation’s foreign relations. They did so principally because the structural advantages of a unitary executive are essential in these domains.” [Dean, 2007, pp. 105]
'A State of War Is Not a Blank Check for the President' - The authority to hold Hamdi and other such US citizens captured on enemy battlefields derives from Congress’s Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF—see September 14-18, 2001). Justice Antonin Scalia dissents from this portion of the majority ruling, saying that because Congress had not suspended habeas corpus, Hamdi should either be charged with a crime or released. The Court also finds that if Hamdi was indeed a missionary and not a terrorist, as both he and his father claim, then he must be freed. While the Court does not grant Hamdi the right to a full criminal trial, it grants him the right to a hearing before a “neutral decision-maker” to challenge his detention. O’Connor writes: “It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in these times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.… We have long made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the president when it comes to the rights of the nation’s citizens.”
Affirms President's Right to Hold US Citizens Indefinitely - Although the media presents the ruling as an unmitigated defeat for the Bush administration, it is actually far more mixed. The White House is fairly pleased with the decision, insamuch as Hamdi still has no access to civilian courts; the administration decides that Hamdi’s “neutral decision-maker” will be a panel of military officers. Hamdi will not have a lawyer, nor will he have the right to see the evidence against him if it is classified. This is enough to satisfy the Court’s ruling, the White House decides. In 2007, author and reporter Charlie Savage will write: “[T]he administration’s legal team noted with quiet satisfaction that, so long as some kind of minimal hearing was involved, the Supreme Court had just signed off on giving presidents the wartime power to hold a US citizen without charges or a trial—forever.” The Justice Department says of the ruling that it is “pleased that the [Court] today upheld the authority of the president as commander in chief of the armed forces to detain enemy combatants, including US citizens.… This power, which was contested by lawyers representing individuals captured in the War on Terror, is one of the most essential authorities the US Constitution grants the president to defend America from our enemies.” [Savage, 2007, pp. 193-194]

Entity Tags: Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, Donald Rumsfeld, Yaser Esam Hamdi, Clarence Thomas, Charlie Savage

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline, Civil Liberties

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld reportedly pressures the Army to conclude the investigations (see August 25, 2004) of Generals George Fay and Anthony R. Jones by late August, before the Republican Convention in New York. [Guardian, 9/13/2004 Sources: Scott Horton]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, George R. Fay, Anthony R. Jones

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

British detainee Moazzam Begg, being held in Guantanamo, manages to send a handwritten four-page letter uncensored by US authorities. Begg’s lawyers in Britain describe this as an “oddity.” His solicitor Stafford Smith says the letter must have been released either “by mistake or because someone in the US has a conscience.” In the letter, Begg describes having been subjected to “pernicious threats of torture, actual vindictive torture, and death threats, amongst other coercively employed interrogation techniques.” This happened “particularly, though unexclusively in Afghanistan.” Interviews, Begg writes, “were conducted in an environment of generated fear, resonant with terrifying screams of fellow detainees facing similar methods. In this atmosphere of severe antipathy towards detainees was the compounded use of racially and religiously prejudiced taunts. This culminated, in my opinion, with the deaths of two fellow detainees (see November 30-December 3, 2002) (see December 10, 2002) at the hands of US military personnel, to which I myself was partially witness.” [Guardian, 10/1/2004]

Entity Tags: Moazzam Begg, Stafford Smith

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Referring to the forthcoming Fay report (see August 25, 2004), an unnamed Pentagon adviser tells the Telegraph of London: “Some of the military lawyers are incandescent. There’s been a deliberate attempt to make sure the buck stops well before it gets to the doors of the civilian hierarchy.” [Sunday Telegraph, 8/15/2004]

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

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