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Profile: Directorate of Operations (DO)

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Directorate of Operations (DO) was a participant or observer in the following events:

Militant training camp facilitator Abu Zubaida is subjected to one more waterboarding session at the insistence of CIA headquarters. Zubaida has been subject to the CIA’s “enhanced” interrogation techniques for some time, and the agency team applying the techniques considers him compliant and wants to stop using them. However, according to a senior officer at the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, somebody thinks that Zubaida is continuing to withhold information. This person or persons generates substantial pressure from CIA headquarters to continue waterboarding, and senior officials at the agency’s Directorate of Operations decide to continue. Some people are sent to the facility where Zubaida is being held to observe the final waterboarding session he is subjected to. These people then report back that the enhanced techniques are no longer required. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 84-85 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Abu Zubaida, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The CIA’s Deputy Director for Operations, James Pavitt, informs the agency’s inspector general, John Helgerson, that the CIA Counterterrorist Center has established a program to detain and interrogate terrorists at foreign sites. At the same time, Pavitt also informs Helgerson that he has just learned of an apparently controversial incident and sent a team to investigate it. It appears that the incident triggered the notification to the inspector general about the program. [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 1 pdf file] The incident is the killing of detainee Gul Rahman at the Salt Pit prison in Afghanistan (see After October 2001 and November 20, 2002). [Associated Press, 3/28/2010] The detention and interrogation program has been in operation since March at the latest, as high-value detainee Abu Zubaida was arrested and then taken to a CIA black site at that time (see March 28, 2002 and April - June 2002). However, it is unclear whether Helgerson was aware of the program prior to being informed by Pavitt.

Entity Tags: Office of the Inspector General (CIA), James Pavitt, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, John Helgerson

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The CIA makes a fake video of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, although the video is apparently never used. The video shows bin Laden and some associates of his sitting around a campfire, swigging bottles of liquor and talking about having had sex with boys, according to a former CIA official. The actors are drawn from “some of us darker-skinned employees,” the official will say. The timing of this effort is unclear, although it is apparently linked to discussions about making similar videos, including one of a fake Saddam Hussein having sex with a boy, prior to the 2003 Iraq invasion (see Before March 20, 2003). According to another former officer, the projects grind to a halt as nobody can come to an agreement on them. In particular, they are opposed by Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt and his deputy, Hugh Turner, who keeps “throwing darts at it.” The officer will say that the ideas are ridiculous and, “They came from people whose careers were spent in Latin America or East Asia,” and do not understand the cultural nuances of the region. “Saddam playing with boys would have no resonance in the Middle East—nobody cares,” a third former official will say. “Trying to mount such a campaign would show a total misunderstanding of the target. We always mistake our own taboos as universal when, in fact, they are just our taboos.” After the CIA abandons the projects, they are apparently revived by the military. “The military took them over,” one former official will say. “They had assets in psy-war down at Ft. Bragg,” at the Army’s Special Warfare Center. The projects will be revealed in the Washington Post in 2010. [Washington Post, 5/25/2010]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, Directorate of Operations, Hugh Turner, Osama bin Laden, James Pavitt

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

The CIA’s Deputy Director for Operations, James Pavitt, asks the agency’s office of inspector general, headed by John Helgerson, to investigate allegations that a high-value detainee, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, has been abused. Apparently, Pavitt has just learned of the abuse of al-Nashiri, who was captured in October or November the previous year (see Early October 2002). [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 1-2 pdf file] The abuse took place at a black site in Poland and was apparently carried out by a CIA officer known only as “Albert,” with the approval of his superior, “Mike.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 5/7/2004, pp. 1-2 pdf file; Associated Press, 9/7/2010] The inspector general will issue a report on the incidents later in the year (see October 29, 2003).

Entity Tags: Office of the Inspector General (CIA), John Helgerson, Directorate of Operations, “Mike”, “Albert”, Central Intelligence Agency, James Pavitt

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

The CIA’s Iraq Operations Group discusses several ideas for discrediting Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in the eyes of his people using fake videos. One video would purport to show Hussein having sex with a teenage boy, according to two former CIA officials familiar with the project. “It would look like it was taken by a hidden camera,” one of the former officials will say. “Very grainy, like it was a secret videotaping of a sex session.” The idea is to then “flood Iraq with the videos,” the former official will add. Another idea is to interrupt Iraqi television programming with a fake special news bulletin. An actor playing Hussein would announce that he is stepping down in favor of his son Uday, who is unpopular with the Iraqi people. “I’m sure you will throw your support behind His Excellency Uday,” the fake Hussein would say. The agency’s Office of Technical Services collaborates on the ideas, which also include inserting fake “crawls”—messages at the bottom of the screen—into Iraqi newscasts. At the same time as these discussions, the agency makes a video with an Osama bin Laden impersonator (see (2003)). According to another former officer, the projects grind to a halt as nobody can come to an agreement on them. In particular, they are opposed by Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt and his deputy, Hugh Turner, who keeps “throwing darts at it.” The officer will say that the ideas are ridiculous and, “They came from people whose careers were spent in Latin America or East Asia,” and do not understand the cultural nuances of the region. “Saddam playing with boys would have no resonance in the Middle East—nobody cares,” a third former official will say. “Trying to mount such a campaign would show a total misunderstanding of the target. We always mistake our own taboos as universal when, in fact, they are just our taboos.” After the CIA abandons the projects, they are apparently revived by the military. “The military took them over,” one former official will say. “They had assets in psy-war down at Ft. Bragg,” at the Army’s Special Warfare Center. The projects will be revealed in the Washington Post in 2010. [Washington Post, 5/25/2010]

Entity Tags: James Pavitt, Central Intelligence Agency, Hugh Turner, Office of Technical Services, Saddam Hussein, Directorate of Operations

Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

Newsday reporters Timothy Phelps and Knut Royce have an article published that confirms Valerie Plame Wilson, whose covert CIA identity was blown eight days ago by conservative columnist Robert Novak (see July 14, 2003) based on information provided by two senior administration officials (see July 8, 2003 and July 8, 2003), works at the CIA on WMD issues as an undercover official with the directorate of operations. Phelps and Royce receive confirmation of this from unnamed intelligeice officials. Plame Wilson’s husband, embattled war critic Joseph Wilson, refuses to confirm his wife’s status as a CIA official, but says the leak of her identity to the press, as well as her position as his wife and even her maiden name, are attempts to intimidate others from speaking out against Bush administration intelligence failures. “It’s a shot across the bow to these people, that if you talk we’ll take your family and drag them through the mud as well,” he says. Wilson and retired CIA official Frank Anderson say that if Plame Wilson is indeed a covert official (see Fall 1992 - 1996), whoever leaked her identity violated the law, endangered her career, and put the lives of her contacts in foreign countries at risk. Anderson, who formerly headed the CIA’s Near East division, says, “When it gets to the point of an administration official acting to do career damage, and possibly actually endanger someone, that’s mean, that’s petty, it’s irresponsible, and it ought to be sanctioned.” Wilson adds: “If what the two senior administration officials said is true, they will have compromised an entire career of networks, relationships, and operations.… [T]his White House has taken an asset out of the” weapons of mass destruction fight, “not to mention putting at risk any contacts she might have had where the services are hostile.… This might be seen as a smear on me and my reputation, but what it really is is an attempt to keep anybody else from coming forward” to reveal similar intelligence lapses. A senior intelligence official also confirms that Plame Wilson did not send her husband to Niger, as some have alleged (see February 19, 2002 and July 22, 2003). “They [the officers who did ask Wilson to check the uranium story] were aware of who she was married to, which is not surprising,” he says. “There are people elsewhere in government who are trying to make her look like she was the one who was cooking this up, for some reason. I can’t figure out what it could be.… We paid his [Wilson’s] air fare. But to go to Niger is not exactly a benefit. Most people you’d have to pay big bucks to go there.” [Newsday, 7/22/2003]

Entity Tags: Robert Novak, Bush administration (43), Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Frank Anderson, Valerie Plame Wilson, Timothy Phelps, Joseph C. Wilson, Knut Royce

Timeline Tags: Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

According to anonymous current and former intelligence officials, the CIA has carried out an in-house investigation of the damage done to the agency by the exposure of covert agent Valerie Plame Wilson (see June 13, 2003, June 23, 2003, July 7, 2003, 8:30 a.m. July 8, 2003, July 8, 2003, 11:00 a.m. July 11, 2003, 8:00 a.m. July 11, 2003, Late Afternoon, July 12, 2003, 1:26 p.m. July 12, 2003, July 12, 2003, and July 14, 2003). That damage is described by the officials as “severe” and potentially far more damaging than has been previously reported, particularly to the agency’s ability to monitor Iran’s nuclear program (see February 13, 2006). The officials say that while CIA Director Porter Goss has not submitted a formal assessment of the damage caused by Plame Wilson’s exposure to Congressional oversight committees, the CIA’s Directorate of Operations did conduct a serious and aggressive investigation. That investigation, a “counter intelligence assessment to agency operations,” was ordered by the agency’s then-Deputy Director of the Directorate of Operations, James Pavitt. Former CIA counterintelligence officer Larry Johnson says that such an assessment would have had to have been carried out: “An exposure like that required an immediate operational and counter intelligence damage assessment. That was done. The results were written up but not in a form for submission to anyone outside of CIA.” A former counterintelligence officer says that the CIA’s reason for not submitting a report to Congress is that its top officials “made a conscious decision not to do a formal inquiry because they knew it might become public. They referred it [to the Justice Department] instead because they believed a criminal investigation was needed” (see September 16, 2003). According to that official, the assessment found the exposure of Plame Wilson caused “significant damage to operational equities.” Another counterintelligence official explains that “operational equities” includes both people and agency operations that involve the “cover mechanism,” “front companies,” and other CIA officers and assets. The assessment also shows that other CIA non-official cover (NOC) officers (see Fall 1992 - 1996) were compromised by Plame Wilson’s exposure. The officials will not say if American or foreign casualties were incurred as a result of her exposure. Several intelligence officials say it will take up to “10 years” for the agency to recover from the damage done by Plame Wilson’s exposure, and to recover its capability to adequately monitor nuclear proliferation on the level it had achieved prior to the White House’s leak of her identity. [Raw Story, 2/13/2006]

Entity Tags: Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, Valerie Plame Wilson, James Pavitt, Porter J. Goss

Timeline Tags: Niger Uranium and Plame Outing

CIA Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt convenes an accountability board to review the poor performance of the CIA’s personnel in Iraq. It is unclear exactly whose performance the board reviews, when the board is convened, or what conclusions it reaches. However, it may well be convened shortly after the firing of Baghdad station chief Gerry Meyer in late 2003 (see (Late December 2003)), possibly due to the deaths of two detainees. [McClatchy, 8/25/2009]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, CIA Baghdad Station, Gerry Meyer, James Pavitt, Directorate of Operations

Timeline Tags: Iraq under US Occupation

After media begin to report on the CIA’s rendition from Italy of Islamist extremist Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (see Noon February 17, 2003 and June 23, 2005 and After), the agency’s Director Porter Goss asks its inspector general to review the case. According to the New York Times, the review is to focus on the “amateurish tradecraft in the case, like operatives staying in five-star hotels and using traceable credit cards and cellphones.” However, CIA Deputy Director for Operations Jose Rodriguez says that there is no need for a review by the inspector general and that the directorate of operations, which is soon to be renamed the National Clandestine Service, will investigate itself. [New York Times, 2/20/2008] Rodriguez was the head of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center at the time of the rendition (see May 2002), but his role in approving the operation is unclear.

Entity Tags: Office of the Inspector General (CIA), Central Intelligence Agency, Jose Rodriguez, Jr., Porter J. Goss, Directorate of Operations

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives

Rob Richer, the second-ranking official in the CIA’s directorate of operations (DO), announces his retirement from the agency at a meeting of senior DO officials. The apparent reason for his departure is that he lacks confidence in the agency’s leadership, and is not getting his way in the debate over how to improve human intelligence in the wake of the establishment of the position of director of national intelligence. According to an account in the Washington Post, Richer complains that he and his boss have been frustrated by CIA Director Porter Goss and his staff in their efforts to implement certain measures. Richer had been in his position for less than a year. A few days later, Goss sends what the Post calls “an unusual worldwide message” to all CIA employees praising Richer for his nearly 35 years of service. The Post will comment that this “only fuel[s] the belief among some former intelligence officials that Richer’s resignation reflects ongoing problems at the agency.” [Washington Post, 9/9/2005]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Robert Richer, Directorate of Operations

Timeline Tags: Misc Entries

Rob Richer, the deputy head of the CIA’s directorate of operations, meets with CIA Director Porter Goss to explain the reasons for his recently announced resignation (see September 2, 2005). Reportedly, the central problem is that Richer wants to reform and expand operations conducted by the agency’s clandestine service, while reducing the side of the agency that conducts analysis, some of which would pass over to the director of national intelligence. In the private session, Richer is “blunt” about Goss’s leadership, according to sources the Washington Post will say are close to both men. He also advises Goss to, according to the Post, “communicate a vision for the agency and demonstrate leadership that senior career officials could rally behind.” An official will say: “Rob laid at his doorstep, in a collegial way, that Goss is out of touch.… It fell on deaf ears.” Richer apparently leaves the meeting angry, telling others he is disappointed with Goss’s response to his ideas. [Washington Post, 9/22/2005]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Porter J. Goss, Robert Richer

Timeline Tags: Misc Entries

Rob Richer, the outgoing deputy chief of the CIA’s directorate of operations (see September 2, 2005), appears before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to talk about the reasons for his departure from the agency. Richer is apparently unhappy over what he perceives as a lack of leadership by CIA Director Porter Goss and wants to expand the agency’s clandestine capability, while reducing analysis. The Washington Post will say that the appearance, at a closed session of the committee, is “unusual.” The session is not publicly announced; neither senators nor staff members who attend will officially confirm Richer’s presence. Nevertheless, one participant at the meeting will say that Richer is “impressive.” [Washington Post, 9/22/2005] Richer has also previously met with National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley to explain his decision. [Washington Post, 9/9/2005]

Entity Tags: Robert Richer, Directorate of Operations, Stephen J. Hadley, Central Intelligence Agency, Senate Intelligence Committee

Timeline Tags: Misc Entries

John Rizzo.John Rizzo. [Source: C-SPAN]Guidance is issued by CIA lawyers Robert Eatinger and Steven Hermes to the CIA’s National Clandestine Service (NCS) on the preservation of videotapes of detainee interrogations made by the CIA. [New York Times, 12/19/2007] The guidance is apparently used as justification for the tapes’ destruction (see November 2005), but its content is unclear. According to one account, “Lawyers within the clandestine branch of the Central Intelligence Agency gave written approval in advance to the destruction in 2005 of hundreds of hours of videotapes documenting interrogations of two lieutenants from al-Qaeda.” [New York Times, 12/11/2007] Another account supports this, saying the lawyers give “written guidance to [CIA manager Jose] Rodriguez that he had the authority to destroy the tapes and that the destruction would violate no laws.” [New York Times, 12/19/2007] However, according to another account: “[The guidance] advises that there is no explicit legal reason why the Clandestine Service had to preserve the tapes… The document does not, however, directly authorize the tapes’ destruction or offer advice on the wisdom or folly of such a course of action.” [Newsweek, 12/11/2007] Some CIA videotapes have been requested for court proceedings, meaning such tapes should not be destroyed, but it is unclear if the tapes that are destroyed in November 2005 have been requested by courts or not (see May 7-9, 2003 and November 3-14, 2005). The CIA’s top lawyer, John Rizzo, is not asked for an opinion, although he has been involved in discussions about what to do with the tapes for years and several high-ranking officials and legislators are of the opinion that the tapes should not be destroyed (see November 2005). [New York Times, 12/11/2007] Eatinger and Hermes apparently inform Rizzo they have issued the guidance and expect Rodriguez will consult him before destroying the tapes, but Rodriguez does not do so. [New York Times, 12/19/2007] The New York Times will comment, “It is unclear what weight an opinion from a lawyer within the clandestine service would have if it were not formally approved by Mr. Rizzo. But [an anonymous former official] said Mr. Rodriguez and others in the clandestine branch believed the legal judgment gave them the blessing to destroy the tapes.” The former official will also say they “didn’t need to ask Rizzo’s permission.” [New York Times, 12/11/2007] A lawyer acting for Rodriguez will later say, “He had a green light to destroy them.” [New York Times, 12/19/2007] However, other former CIA officers will express surprise that a lawyer junior to Rizzo would approve such a controversial decision without asking for his input. Former CIA lawyer John Radsan will say, “I’d be surprised that even the chief [NCS] lawyer made a decision of that magnitude without bringing the General Counsel’s front office into the loop.” He adds, “Although unlikely, it is conceivable that once a CIA officer got the answer he wanted from a [NCS] lawyer, he acted on that advice… But a streamlined process like that would have been risky for both the officer and the [NCS] lawyer.” [New York Times, 12/11/2007]

Entity Tags: Robert Eatinger, National Clandestine Service, Jose Rodriguez, Jr., Steven Hermes, John Radsan, Central Intelligence Agency, John Rizzo, Directorate of Operations

Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline, Civil Liberties

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