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Profile: Enver Hoxha
Enver Hoxha was a participant or observer in the following events:
Addressing the House of Commons, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain says that the UK has “no direct interests” in Albania. Later, Albanian leader Enver Hoxha will say this statement “gave Mussolini a free hand to carry out his plans towards our country.” The next day, Italy will invade Albania (see April 7, 1939). [Hoxha, 1974, pp. 488; Kola, 2003, pp. 22]
The Communist Party of Albania (CPA) is created at a conference of the main Albanian communist organizations, the Korca Group, Shkodra Group, and Youth Group. There are 15 Albanian communists and two members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia at the meeting. A few months earlier, communist operative Dusan Mugosa arrived in Albania seeking help in liberating Miladin Popovic, a Montenegrin who leads the Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) for Kosova, from an internment camp set up by Italian forces in central Albania. Korca Group member Enver Hoxha led the successful rescue attempt and Popovic was asked to remain in Albania and the CPY agreed, also stationing Mugosa there. The CPA is formed on November 8 and a leaderless Provisional Central Committee is elected. The CPA pledges “to fight for the national independence of the Albanian people and for a people’s democratic government in an Albania free from fascism,” by armed struggle, united with “all the honest Albanians who want to fight fascism,” and promoting “love and close militant collaboration” with neighboring nationalities. The role of the CPY in creating the CPA will become an issue of contention. CPY sources and anti-communists will claim the CPA is created and run by Popovic. Hoxha will later say there is no interparty communication until 1942 and that Popovic will deny credit for the CPA in 1943 when Blazo Jovanovic, representing the Central Committee of the CPY, claims the CPY created it. On the other hand, CPA Political Bureau member Liri Gega will later say Popovic led the CPA, and member Pandi Kristo will say the two Yugoslavs created the CPA. Gega and Kristo will be in the pro-CPY faction after the war and lose their positions when Albania breaks with Yugoslavia. Koco Tashko, leader of the Korca Group, will later say he turned leadership of his organization over to Mugosa and Popovic. The CPA will later be re-named the Party of Labor of Albania. [Kola, 2003, pp. 25-27]
Entity Tags: Youth Group, Enver Hoxha, Dusan Mugosa, Blazo Jovanovic, Koco Tashko, Korca Group, League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Liri Gega, Shkodra Group, Provincial Committee of the CPY for Kosova, Party of Labor of Albania, Pandi Kristo, Miladin Popovic
Timeline Tags: Kosovar Albanian Struggle
The Communist Party of Albania (CPA) organizes a conference in Peza, near Tirana, including nationalists, local leaders, Abaz Kupi representing former King Zog, the Communist Youth Organization, and female youth delegates. The conference elects a non-sectarian (Provisional) General National Liberation Council, and local councils to carry out government functions in liberated areas and organize guerrilla activities are planned. Nationalist guerrillas agree to fly the CPA’s red and black flag with a red star, as well as the Albanian double-headed eagle flag. Two months later, Yugoslav communist leader Josip Broz Tito will write to the CPA for the first time, saying the National Liberation Front should be re-formed with “different urban groups and tendencies” to broaden it. According to a Yugoslav source, in 1944 CPA leader Enver Hoxha will refer to the letter as “an historic event,” but in his 1982 memoir, The Titoites, he says the letter was too late to matter. [Kola, 2003, pp. 27-28]
Following an initial meeting on July 23 in Zall i Herrit, representatives of the National Liberation Council meet with the Balli Kombetar leadership at Mukje, Kruja district, on August 1 and 2. CPA Political Bureau member Ymer Dishnica leads a 12-member delegation, including non-communists Abaz Kupi and Myslim Peza. The Ballist delegation includes their chair, Mit-hat Frasheri. According to Enver Hoxha, the NLC delegation is told that unity must be based on the Balli Kombetar fighting the occupation and not continuing to fight the NLC’s forces or the CPA, then there could be “a broad conference to lay on the table and discuss many problems concerning unity.” Hoxha’s goal is to persuade the Balli Kombetar to fight the Italians and join the NLC, at the same time preventing it from being a rival military and political force. The result of the meeting is a plan to create a Committee for the Salvation of Albania, with each side having six representatives, by August 8. The Committee is to lead the guerrilla war until an independent, democratic, and “ethnic Albania” (including Albanian areas left out of the 1913 borders) is established. The Committee plans to dissolve when a provisional government is established. An election with universal suffrage is planned, to establish a constitutional assembly to determine Albania’s post-liberation government. During this time, Mussolini’s government loses power in Italy, so the delegates also call for a declaration of independence. Each side signs, with final approval pending from their organizations, and a proclamation signed by the Committee and the Ballists, and not mentioning the NLC or fascism, is released. The NLC rejects the agreement. Hoxha later says “Our comrades [at Mukje] did not know how to defend the line of the National Liberation Front, but fell right into the lap of the ‘Balli Kombetar‘… what they talked about there was ‘independent Albania’ and ‘ethnic Albania,’ and the war of today was forgotten.” He sees the proclamation of independence as a Ballist grab for credit and a way to “blot out April 12, 1939, because three quarters of the Ballists had recognized the Accord of the Crown [giving it to Italy], while we had never recognized it.” Yugoslav sources claim Hoxha tries to prevent open armed struggle with the Balli Kombetar. Miladin Popovic reportedly says: “[T]his union [with the Ballists] cannot be accepted. We are being strengthened with each passing day.… Then, this ethnic Albania! Impossible!” Dishnica claims that he acts at Mukje on directives from the CPA leadership. Subsequently, Abaz Kupi abandons the NLC and creates the Legaliteti, arguing that Zog is Albania’s legitimate leader. [Hoxha, 1974, pp. 172-189; Kola, 2003, pp. 41-44]
Entity Tags: Enver Hoxha, Albanian National Liberation Council, Ahmet Zog I, Abaz Kupi, Balli Kombetar, Committee for the Salvation of Albania, Legaliteti, Myslim Peza, Italy, Party of Labor of Albania, Mit’hat Frasheri, Miladin Popovic, Ymer Dishnica
Timeline Tags: Kosovar Albanian Struggle
The Second Session of the Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) releases a statement saying, “The peoples of Yugoslavia… proved in the course of the joint armed struggle their firm determination to remain united within Yugoslavia” and that, while “national minorities in Yugoslavia shall be ensured all national rights,” liberated Yugoslavia will be an equal federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia, without an Albanian republic or a statement that Kosova will be able to secede if it wishes. The Yugoslav communist party’s Kosova Regional Committee subsequently acts as if it is ignorant of the AVNOJ declaration, and Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha will later claim the CPA is never informed. [Kola, 2003, pp. 52, 56]
The First Conference of the National Liberation Council for Kosovo and Metohia meets at Bujan, Albania, and proclaims that the way to Kosovar Albanian self-determination is to unite with the Yugoslav Partisans. The Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia for Kosova, the Communist Party of Albania’s branch in Tropoja, and the “Perlat Rexhepi” Battalion of Shkodra (Albania), which is operating around Gjakova, organized the conference. The National Liberation Council has 51 members, including 42 Albanians. The Council unanimously endorses a resolution that “Kosova and the Dukagjin Plateau [Metohia] is a province inhabited for the most part by an Albanian population, which today, as always, wishes to be united with Albania… the only way for the Albanian people of Kosova and the Dukagjin Plateau to be united with Albania is to fight together against the blood-thirsty Nazi occupiers and those in their pay.” The signers, from the Council’s Presidium, include Mehmet Hoxha, Pavle Jovicevic, Rifat Berisha, Xhevdet Doda, Fadil Hoxha, Hajdar Dushi, and Zekerija Rexha. According to Enver Hoxha, General Secretary of the Party of Labor of Albania, the Yugoslav Communist leadership will subsequently cover up the resolution; that “Kosovo should be restored to Albania” was endorsed by the Yugoslav Communists in 1928 and 1940, at the 5th Party Conference. [Prifti, 1978, pp. 227-228; Hoxha, 1982, pp. 117-118]
Entity Tags: Xhevdet Doda, Hajdar Dushi, Fadil Hoxha, Enver Hoxha, League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Mehmet Hoxha, National Liberation Council for Kosovo and Metohia, Party of Labor of Albania, Yugoslav Partisans, Pavle Jovicevic, Zekerija Rexha, Rifat Berisha
Timeline Tags: Kosovar Albanian Struggle
For most of the war, Britain ignores Albania, and does not recognize a government in exile under Ahmet Zog. Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha will later say that Greece would have considered such a move a hostile act by the British. By 1942 at the latest, the British expected a Balkan Federation of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia to be formed after liberation. The War Office sends a memo to an office in Bari, Italy, in 1944 admitting that Britain cannot stop the partisans from winning political power and seeking Soviet assistance, so, “We must therefore aim at strengthening our position with partisans now in order that after the war we may be able to influence the partisan government.” By this point, envoys from the Special Operations Executive division, as well as some American envoys, are with the major Albanian political groups and they are receiving British aid. The envoys to the Partisans accept the War Office’s decision, but those with other groups believe more should have been done, up to a British or American landing in the fall of 1944 as happened in Greece. British army officer Julian Amery will later write: “Firstly, it was wrong to abandon the Albanians to Hoxha’s evil regime and Stalin’s imperial designs. Secondly, [Vlora] and [Sazan Island] control the Strait of Otranto, the entrance to the Adriatic, an important naval gateway.” [Kola, 2003, pp. 67-70]
The Third and Fifth Brigades of the Albanian National Liberation Army enter Kosova to fight the Germans. They will later be sent north, which Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha will say allows “unrestrained mass terror against the Albanians” by Yugoslav Partisans. Others say that as many as 30,000 Albanian soldiers aid the Yugoslavs in fighting Albanian nationalists. [Prifti, 1978, pp. 197-199; Kola, 2003, pp. 61-62]
Communist official Velimir Stoinic arrives to lead the Yugoslav military mission to Albania’s general staff and to represent the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. He immediately recalls Miladin Popovic back to Yugoslavia. Popovic is blamed for alleged mistakes by the Communist Party of Albania (CPA), such as the Mukje agreement with the Balli Kombetar and statements that Yugoslavia will allow Kosova to determine its future. He also says the CPA’s policies are wrong and that the leadership must change. The CPA will later accuse Stoinic of conspiring with a pro-Yugoslav faction against leading Albanian communist Enver Hoxha so Yugoslavia can take control of Albania. [PLA, 1971, pp. 227; Kola, 2003, pp. 58]
The Central Committee of the CPA convenes at Berat for its Second Plenum, along with CPY representative Velimir Stoinic. Sejfulla Maleshova and Pandi Kristo become CC members just before the meeting, apparently in a way that violates party rules. Along with organizational secretary Koci Xoxe, they are later accused of conspiring with Stoinic to attack the CPA. Some charges are that the CPA is not communist and that it acts both sectarian and opportunist. Liri Gega is removed from the Central Committee “for sectarianism and pronounced adventurism,” and those individual charges are said to come from the entire party’s policy. Maleshova says the CPA is becoming a terrorist “band of criminals,” for actions like the execution of Mustafa Gjinishi, one of the CPA’s representatives at the Mukje meeting. Xoxe says “a gang of four,” starting with Miladin Popovic, lead the CPA. Stoinic also criticizes the CPA and says: “You are small, a good bite for imperialism. You can’t hold power without Yugoslavia, especially present-day Yugoslavia.” Therefore, the two countries should have close links: “Their exact shape cannot be revealed at this conference, but let the link be confederal or closer than that. This is your perspective, this is what you should inculcate in people’s minds.” This is the first time the CPY’s wish to join the two countries is mentioned in public. Stoinic also says Tito should be praised more. Relying on documents published after capitalism is restored in Albania, Paulin Kola will later say that Hoxha and the rest of the CPA completely accepted the criticisms, and that Hoxha also blamed Popovic and Dusan Mugosa of the CPY, but Hoxha’s memoirs say that he rejected the charges against the CPA. The Central Committee is also enlarged by 18 at the Berat Plenum. [PLA, 1971, pp. 227-231; Kola, 2003, pp. 58-61]
Entity Tags: Enver Hoxha, Dusan Mugosa, Albania, Koci Xoxe, Velimir Stoinic, League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia, Sejfulla Maleshova, Miladin Popovic, Paulin Kola, Pandi Kristo, Party of Labor of Albania, Mustafa Gjinishi
Timeline Tags: Kosovar Albanian Struggle
Enver Hoxha, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Government of Albania, writes to the UK, USSR, and USA seeking formal recognition. In part he says: “Now that Albania is liberated, the Democratic Government of Albania is the sole representative of Albania both at home and abroad.… Today the authority of our government extends over all regions of Albania, and over the entire Albanian people.” He reiterates Albania’s dedication to “the great cause of the anti-fascist bloc,” and the government’s “democratic principles” and defense of “the rights of man.” A few months later Yugoslavia will recognize the Hoxha government, along with the USSR and Poland, but it will be years before the UK and USA do so. [Hoxha, 1974, pp. 413-416]
In a report to the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Albania (CPA), Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha calls for re-examination of the Central Committee’s Second Plenum, which met in the southern Albanian town of Berat in November 1944. He argues that the decisions were made by a faction in secret and for egotistic reasons, making it a “coup d’etat,” and that the decisions are wrong because they condemn the course of the national liberation struggle and threaten the CPA’s independence. Allegedly, Hoxha is still unaware of the Yugoslav role, so he only blames Communist Party of Yugoslavia envoy Velimir Stoinic and Sejfulla Maleshova, who joined the Central Committee and Political Bureau at the Second Plenum. He criticizes Organizational Secretary Koci Xoxe, Pandi Kristo, and Communist Youth Political Secretary Nako Spiru, all of whom are also in the Political Bureau, for going along with Stoinic and Maleshova. Xoxe and Kristo try to blunt the attack on the Second Plenum and block an enlargement of the Political Bureau. Spiru does not reveal his hidden role in the pro-Yugoslav faction, but will support Hoxha in the future. [PLA, 1971, pp. 287 -290; Hoxha, 1974, pp. 543-575]
Albania and Yugoslavia sign a 20-year Treaty of Cooperation and Mutual Aid, to protect their independence and territorial integrity, and promising a joint defense if either country is attacked. Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha and Stanoje Simic, Yugoslavia’s foreign minister, are the signers. [Kola, 2003, pp. 77-78]
Albania is allowed to participate in the Paris Peace Conference, regarding the post-war settlements between the Allies and Italy, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Finland, but is not a full participant, instead being classed with Austria. The Albanian government argues that it was a full member of the Allied effort, fielding 70,000 Albanian Partisans, including 6,000 women, against around 100,000 Italians and 70,000 Germans. It says Italy and Germany suffered 53,639 casualties and prisoners and lost 100 armored vehicles, 1,334 artillery pieces, 1,934 trucks, and 2,855 machine guns destroyed or taken in Albania. Out of its population of one million, Albania says 28,000 were killed, 12,600 wounded, 10,000 were political prisoners, and 35,000 were made to do forced labor. Albania says 850 out of 2,500 of its communities were destroyed by the war.
Disputed by Greece - To oppose Albania’s demands, Greece argues that Albania is at war with it. Greece also claims Gjirokastra and Korca, south of the Shkumbin River, and there is some fighting along the border. By 11 votes to seven, with two abstentions, the conference votes to discuss Greece’s territorial claims. Italian King Victor Emmanuel III blames Albania for the invasion of Greece, and Greece points to a declaration of war by the Albanian occupation government after Daut Hoxha was found murdered at the border in summer 1940.
Hoxha's Address - Enver Hoxha addresses the conference. He points to hundreds of Albanians conscripted by Italy who deserted or joined the Greeks, who then treated them as POWs. Many were later sent to Crete and joined British forces who landed there. Others joined the Albanian Partisans or were captured by Italy, court-martialed for “high treason,” and imprisoned in the Shijak concentration camp. There are other cases of attacks on Italian forces by Albanian soldiers. Hoxha also mentions attacks on Albania by Greeks, such as the over 50 homes in Konispol burned by German soldiers guided by a captain under Greek collaborationist General Napoleon Zervas on September 8, 1943. His forces also joined German forces in their winter 1943-44 Albanian offensive. They invaded and burned again in June 1944. Hoxha refutes Greek claims that Albania is treading on the rights of the Greek minority, which Albania numbers at 35,000. There are 79 schools using Greek, one secondary school, autonomous Greek local government, and Greeks in the government and military. Between 1913 and 1923, Hoxha claims there were 60,000 Albanians in Greece, 35,000 of whom were classified as Turks and deported to Turkey in exchange for Turkish Greeks. In June 1944 and March 1945 Zervas’ forces attacked Greek Albanians, and at least 20,000 fled to Albania. Hoxha will later say that what Albania terms the “monarcho-fascist” Greek government commits 683 military provocations against Albania from its founding to October 15, 1948. Hoxha claims the Greek prime minister tells a Yugoslav official at the Peace Conference that he is open to dividing Albania with Yugoslavia, but Yugoslavia refuses. Hoxha tells the conference, “We solemnly declare that within our present borders there is not one square inch of foreign soil, and we will never permit anyone to encroach upon them, for to us they are sacred.” Italy is accused of harboring Albanian and Italian war criminals, including “fascists” who assassinated an Albanian sergeant at the Allied Mediterranean High Command in Bari in March. The Italian politicians are accused of threatening Albania during recent elections. In conclusion, Hoxha asks that the Peace Conference further limit Italy’s post-war military, claims Italy committed 3,544,232,626 gold francs worth of damage in Albania, and Albania wants to be classified as an “associated power.”
US, British Opposition - These requests are opposed by the UK and US. Albania afterward considers its share of the reparations to be too low. The UK and US will later oppose Albanian participation in the Moscow conference on peace with Germany, held in March-April 1947. An American delegate will say: “We are of the opinion that, first, Albania is not a neighbor of Germany, and second, it did not take part in the war against Germany. Only some individual Albanians, perhaps, took part in this war, but apart from this there were also Albanians who fought side by side with the Germans.” [PLA, 1971, pp. 258; Hoxha, 1974, pp. 539-542, 593-614; Hoxha, 1975, pp. 90-91, 99]
Entity Tags: Turkey, Greece, Germany, Enver Hoxha, Daut Hoxha, Albanian Partisans, Albania, Italy, Napoleon Zervas, Victor Emmanuel III, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, United States of America, United Kingdom
Timeline Tags: Kosovar Albanian Struggle
In Belgrade, Nako Spiru, Albania’s economy minister, and Boris Kidric, Yugoslavia’s minister of industry, sign a 30-year treaty unifying Albania’s economy with Yugoslavia. They agree to coordinate economic planning, make the value of Albania’s lek dependent on the value of Yugoslavia’s dinar, equalize prices (not based on international market prices), and create a customs union under Yugoslavia’s rules. According to author Paulin Kola, Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha praises the treaty highly, while Hoxha will later say he had many reservations. According to the Albanian communists’ official history, the Albanian government and Hoxha think economic conditions make currency parity impossible to achieve on Yugoslavia’s schedule and they say Yugoslavia sets parity “on an altogether arbitrary basis to the advantage of the dinar.” Albania also has reservations about unifying prices. It says the customs union is set up to benefit Yugoslavia, later causing shortages and inflation in Albania. Joint companies are later set up based on the convention, and Albania will complain that it is providing the capital it promised, while Yugoslavia provides not “even a penny in the original funds” but still “appropriated half of the profits.” A joint commission to coordinate the economies is created, and the Albanian government says Yugoslavia tries to “turn it into a super-government above the Albanian government.” Yugoslavia is supposed to provide two billion leks of credit in 1947, but reportedly does not provide even one billion, and credit in goods is overvalued by two to four times more than their prices in international trade. Yugoslavia provides four factories, which Albania considers too small and decrepit. The Albanian government subsequently says that the withholding of promised credit hinders the economic plan for 1947, and Albania says that the 1948 credits are also lacking. [PLA, 1971, pp. 306-309; Kola, 2003, pp. 78-79]
Yugoslav fighter planes land in Tirana, apparently without permission. Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha brings this complaint up with Stalin at their meeting on July 16, and says that Yugoslavia admits it was a mistake to violate Albanian airspace. According to Hoxha, Stalin replies in part, “It is a very good thing that you have friendly Yugoslavia on your border, because Albania is a small country and as such needs strong support from its friends,” and Hoxha agrees generally. However, Yugoslav official Vladimir Dedijer will claim in 1949 that the fighters are requested by the Albanian General Staff and that Hoxha visited central Albania accompanied by the fighters, at his request. [Hoxha, 1979, pp. 73; Kola, 2003, pp. 88]
Yugoslavia’s General Staff says Greece plans to attack Albania and therefore requests a base in the Korca region for an air force fighter division and an anti-aircraft missile division. An Albanian envoy will be sent to Belgrade regarding the request. Yugoslav communist leader Josip Broz Tito will then send a high-ranking military envoy in early 1948 to deliver a letter reiterating the request to Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha. [Kola, 2003, pp. 87]
According to Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha, Yugoslavia is very worried when a cultural delegation, including Economy Minister Nako Spiru and Nexhmije Hoxha (Enver Hoxha’s wife), visits the USSR. As soon as they arrive in Moscow, the Yugoslav ambassador to the USSR seeks out his Albanian counterpart. Hoxha will say the Yugoslavs “stuck like glue” to their Albanian counterparts, including the wives of diplomats and students, and sought information. The Yugoslavs think Albania has signed an economic agreement with the USSR. A few days after the trip is over, the Yugoslav ambassador to the USSR files a complaint with Albania, saying: “We do not understand how at a time when we are linked economically in this way you seek to make other economic and trade agreements with other countries, we cannot understand how you could take such actions without consulting us and reaching prior agreement with us.… These actions are not good, must not be done in this way again, these things are incompatible with our agreement.” [Hoxha, 1982, pp. 345-346]
Yugoslavia’s envoy to Albania Savo Zlatic tells the Albanian leadership that, while the Central Committee of the CPA is dealing properly with Yugoslavia, there is another anti-Yugoslav position in Albania. Hoxha will later recount in The Titoites, “Whenever we raised any opposition, [the Yugoslavs] immediately thought that the Soviets ‘had prompted us,’ although, without denying their merits, in 1946 and even 1947 the Soviets regarded us mostly through the eye of the Yugoslavs.” He will specifically mention that Zlatic complains to him that an Albanian has insulted Yugoslavia by disagreeing with a Yugoslav adviser on cotton in front of Albanian farmers, with the implication that the Albanian was repeating Soviet advice, because Albanians are ignorant about cotton farming. Hoxha will write that he says, “Leave the specialists to get on with their discussions, Comrade Zlatic, because this does not impair your prestige or ours or even that of the cotton!” Hoxha will say that two or three days later, Economy Minister Nako Spiru reports that Zlatic said, “there are two economic lines in our country: the line of the Central Committee, which is correct in principle, and, parallel with this, the concretization of a second line in practice, contrary to that of the Central Committee,” which Spiru sees as an attack on him. According to Paulin Kola, only Spiru publicly opposes the economic integration, and he is the highest ranking official in close contact with Soviet officials. Zlatic objects to the slow pace of economic integration and what Yugoslavia sees as Albanian appeals to the Soviets. Specifically, the unification of prices in the two countries is supposed to be done in May, but takes until late June, and rates of pay issues in late May are not resolved until July. On June 20 or 21, Hoxha sends Spiru and Koci Xoxe, who is close to Zlatic, to meet with Zlatic about the Yugoslav concerns. Xoxe believes the accusation should be investigated, and there is tension between him and Spiru. The Albanian leadership rejects the charge of two lines, and Xoxe does not put up opposition. [Hoxha, 1982, pp. 327-335; Kola, 2003, pp. 87-88]
When his plane lands in Leningrad on a trip to the Soviet Union, Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha receives a letter from Albanian Economy Minister Nako Spiru. The letter says that Yugoslav communist leader Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo told Albanian Interior Minister Koci Xoxe in Tirana before the delegation left for the USSR, “The union of Yugoslavia with Bulgaria has been achieved in principle. It is not good that Albania should lag behind.” When Hoxha asks Xoxe about it in Leningrad, Xoxe denies that it happened. Hoxha will later claim he first learns of the impending union of Albania with Yugoslavia from Yugoslavia’s envoy to Albania Savo Zlatic in November 1947, leading him to believe Xoxe lied in July. [Hoxha, 1982, pp. 362-363]
After World War II, both the Albanians and the Yugoslavs seek military aid from the USSR. Later, Hoxha says military regulations are changed too frequently, allegedly a Yugoslav effort to weaken the Albanian military. Therefore Hoxha supports the appointment of Mehmet Shehu, who led a division during the War and is studying in the USSR, as Chief of the General Staff. Nako Spiru recommends him and Koci Xoxe and Pandi Kristo do not oppose the appointment. (Decades later, when he recounts this, Hoxha states that Shehu was part of a multiple foreign plot to assassinate him.) Soviet advisers are brought in, and Hoxha says the Yugoslavs try to cause friction between the Albanians and Soviets. At a meeting in Belgrade, Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, Political Director of the Yugoslav military, tells Mehmet Shehu and Kristo Themelko, Director of the Political Directory of the Albanian military, that only Yugoslav military doctrine is relevant in the Balkans and Europe. In July Vukmanovic-Tempo and Koca Popovic, Chief of the Yugoslav General Staff, come to Albania and, according to Themelko, say that their two militaries should be unified, as the economies are being unified, and that Yugoslavia will fund the Albanian military. Shehu tells Hoxha that he did not hear these comments. Hoxha says he is “shocked” to hear this and disagrees. Hoxha says that Savo Zlatic confirms in November 1947 that the Yugoslavs do want military unification. [Hoxha, 1982, pp. 427 - 435]
Entity Tags: Koci Xoxe, Albania, Koca Popovic, Kristo Themelko, Enver Hoxha, Mehmet Shehu, Pandi Kristo, Nako Spiru, Yugoslavia, Savo Zlatic, Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo
Timeline Tags: Kosovar Albanian Struggle
Yugoslavia’s envoy to Albania Savo Zlatic requests a meeting with Albanian Prime Minister Enver Hoxha and Interior Minister Koci Xoxe regarding the views of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) on relations between the two countries. According to Hoxha’s later account, Zlatic starts by saying, “A general decline in our relations is being observed, and especially in the economy our relations are quite sluggish.” The Yugoslavs say disputes in joint enterprises are constantly being taken to an arbitration commission, that there is an improper attitude towards the Yugoslav advisers, and that Albanians are accusing the Yugoslavs of not fulfilling their obligations while being lax about fulfilling their own commitments.
Plans for a Balkan Federation - Zlatic says Yugoslav relations with Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria are advancing much more than relations with Albania. Further, Zlatic says Albania’s draft five-year plan is autarchic, in going beyond grain growing and light industry, when the Yugoslavs can provide the products of heavy industry. Hoxha will later say that the Albanian leadership never intended to make their economy “an appendage of the Yugoslav economy” in the way Zlatic is suggesting, although perhaps Albanian Economy Minister Nako Spiru did when he signed an Economic Convention in Belgrade (see November 27, 1946). Hoxha says Spiru kept silent about any concerns he had. Hoxha will also later claim that Xoxe knew of plans for union between Yugoslavia and Albania, but he did not. Zlatic says “The present-day Yugoslavia is its embryo, the nucleus of the federation [of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria],” and “In practice the ‘economic union’ is the federation itself.” The Yugoslav plan is to form joint military, culture, and foreign policies later, and include additional countries. The leadership should only talk about economic unification for the time being, Zlatic says, but “this is the best way for the rapid development of the relations of our joint economies,” which is a necessity for Albania. Therefore, Zlatic says, this is not Yugoslav “pressure” to unify. Zlatic says Spiru “put his trust in the advice of the Soviets” regarding the five-year plan, creating a “wrong, unrealistic, anti-Yugoslav and anti-Albanian” plan. Hoxha will later recount saying that the Albanian leadership sent Spiru to consult the Soviets and backs the plan. Yugoslavia calls for a strengthened Co-ordination Commission, as “a kind of joint economic government,” but Zlatic cannot give Hoxha details. The Yugoslavs have not allocated funds for Albania’s five-year plan, so Zlatic says there should only be a one-year plan for 1948. Scholar Paulin Kola will later write that Zlatic says Albania receives more aid than a republic of Yugoslavia and that Zlatic repeats the Yugoslav demand that Albania not make economic agreements with other countries without Yugoslavia’s approval.
Yugoslavs Accuse Spiru of Treason - Zlatic blames all of the problems on Spiru and his allies, while Hoxha expresses doubt and says Spiru is not in control. Zlatic says Spiru lied about Yugoslavia promising 21 billion dinars to Albania. Hoxha will later say that the Vice-President of the State Planning Commission, Kico Ngjela, verifies that the Yugoslavs promised the funding. Spiru is allegedly an “agent of imperialism” sabotaging Yugoslavia’s relations with Albania and the USSR. Hoxha requests Zlatic’s statements in writing, and Zlatic is evasive. Hoxha will later say the Yugoslavs’ real attack was on him, and that the allegations were a signal to Xoxe to try to replace him. [PLA, 1971, pp. 312; Hoxha, 1974, pp. 750 -753; Hoxha, 1982, pp. 353-373; Kola, 2003, pp. 89-90]
Through Soviet influence, an Albanian delegation headed by Prime Minister Enver Hoxha, and including Interior Minister Koci Xoxe, Hysni Kapo, and Kristo Themelko is invited to Bulgaria. Hoxha later recounts that the Yugoslavs do not know about the invitation until he informs the Yugoslav ambassador. The delegation stops in Belgrade on December 12 and meets with Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito. Xoxe and Themelko also meet with Yugoslav Interior Minister Alexsandr Rankovic, which Hoxha will later say was probably at Rankovic’s request. The first night in Bulgaria, Hoxha says Xoxe and Themelko tell him he should have praised Tito more in the meetings with the Bulgarians. Later Xoxe says the Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Aid with Bulgaria should be in agreement with the Yugoslavs, and his amendment is added. According to the official PLA history, Xoxe tries to make the treaty dependent on Yugoslav approval, but Hoxha prevents this. According to academic Paulin Kola, Bulgarian leader Georgii Dimitrov says an eastern European federation, including Greece, is inevitable, an idea quickly rejected subsequently in an issue of the Soviet newspaper Pravda. Hoxha’s account says the Albanians do not reveal their tensions with Yugoslavia to the Bulgarian leadership. The delegation again stops in Belgrade on the way back, but Hoxha says they are received by lower ranking leaders than before, with a colder reception, and are told Tito is in Romania. [PLA, 1971, pp. 313; Hoxha, 1982, pp. 391-418; Kola, 2003, pp. 91-92]
Entity Tags: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Greece, Georgi Dimitrov, Enver Hoxha, Bulgaria, Alexander Rankovic, Albania, Hysni Kapo, Josip Broz Tito, Koci Xoxe, Kristo Themelko, Yugoslavia, Romania, Soviet Communist Party, Paulin Kola, Party of Labor of Albania, Pravda
Timeline Tags: Kosovar Albanian Struggle
Yugoslav representative Savo Zlatic meets with Albanian Prime Minister Enver Hoxha, Koci Xoxe, and Pandi Kristo and lays out the Yugoslav plan for a commission to coordinate the Yugoslav and Albanian economies. As Zlatic puts it, “Our governments should not quarrel with each other through the fault of a few directors or specialists of the economy.” The Yugoslavs appoint Sergej Krajger to chair the Commission, and Xoxe says Kristo should be the Albanian liaison. Hoxha is still concerned whether it will be “an organ above our governments.” Zlatic denies this, and says “…the commission will be engaged with the problems which have to do with common plans, with the most effective ways for the co-ordination of plans, with the definition and detailing of the budgets, investments and income, with checkup on the accomplishment of tasks and measures which will be allocated, hence with all the major problems in [the economic] field. After that let the government decide about the economy.” He also says “We came with the idea that the time was over when doubts and frictions began over every issue” and that Hoxha should trust Yugoslavia. Hoxha later recounts that the Commission did become “a kind of government over the government,” duplicating the Albanian government’s departments and allowing Yugoslavia to legally rob Albania. [Hoxha, 1974, pp. 760-762; Hoxha, 1982, pp. 421 - 427]
In a letter dated January 26, 1948, and delivered by Yugoslav General Milan Kupresanin, Tito tells Albanian leader Enver Hoxha that Greece, aided by the British and Americans, is about to invade Albania, so Yugoslavia wants to quietly station a division and supporting soldiers in the Korca region. Academic Paulin Kola will later claim that Albania proposes that the Albanian and Yugoslav soldiers should be under a unified command, as a step towards military unification. In his memoir, The Titoites, Hoxha will say that he tells Kupresanin that the request has to be discussed by the leadership and that he personally is against it. Kristo Themelko and Chief of the Albanian General Staff Beqir Balluku, who replaced Hoxha ally Mehmet Shehu, previously met with Tito and said Albania would accept the military assistance. Kupresanin comes with a team to survey the area. Hoxha replies that Albania can defend itself, the Greek government forces are wrapped up in an offensive against the Greek Democratic Army, the plan should not be hidden from the Albanian public, and that hosting the division would destabilize the region. Hoxha says to Kupresanin that “the worst thing would be if, from such a precipitate action, enemies or friends were to accuse us that Albania has been occupied by the Yugoslav troops!” and says Kupresanin briefly blanched. Xoci Xoxe is also at the meeting and supports the Yugoslav request, and says action should be taken quickly. Kupresanin is insulted when Hoxha says Yugoslavia should reinforce its own border with Greece if war is so imminent. Privately, Hoxha believes that “the urgent dispatch of Yugoslav to our territory would serve as an open blackmail to ensure that matters in the [Eighth] Plenum would go in the way that suited the Yugoslavs.” In a report to the Tirana party organization on October 4, 1948, Hoxha will say Yugoslavia was seeking to create “a phobia of imminent war” and divide Albania from the Soviets by “the stationing of a Yugoslav division in Korca and the dispatch of other divisions.” Since he cannot stop the Plenum from being held in February, he tries to stop the division from being approved, by requesting advice from the Soviets. The Soviet government subsequently says it does not expect a Greek invasion and that it agrees with Hoxha. In With Stalin, Hoxha will say that Stalin will tell him in spring 1949 that the USSR was not aware of the situation, though Yugoslavia claimed to be acting with Soviet approval.
Yugoslav Accounts - Subsequent memoirs by Yugoslav leaders Milovan Djilas, Edvard Kardelj, and Vladimir Dedjier will say that Albania was already hosting a Yugoslav air force regiment, and that Yugoslavia wanted to station two army divisions, at Albania’s request. Dedjier says that Stalin wanted Hoxha to make the request, and Jon Holliday will later outline several interpretations, based on the various possibly inaccurate accounts.
The Yugoslav Reaction - According to Hoxha’s report to the Tirana party organization, after Albania rejects the division, the Yugoslav envoy, presumably Kupresanin, calls for reorganization of the Albanian military, new roads and bridges to accommodate Yugoslav tanks, stringing new telegraph wires, and the mobilization of 10,000 soldiers and mules for transport, over two to three months. The Yugoslav also says Albania should tell the Soviets that it wants the Yugoslav division and ask why the Soviets oppose it. He asserts that Albania would only be able to defend itself for 10 days, while it would take 15 days for Yugoslav forces to reach southern Albania, and the UN would get involved, preventing Yugoslav intervention, which would be Hoxha’s fault. Albania agrees to make improvements and mobilize the soldiers and mules, on Yugoslav credits. Hoxha says the Yugoslavs are working through Kristo Themelko, who two or three times tells the Political Bureau that Albania needs to unify with Yugoslavia to carry out these measures. After March 30, Yugoslavia will reduce its involvement with Albania after a critical letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. [Hoxha, 1974, pp. 763 - 767; Hoxha, 1979, pp. 92-93; Hoxha, 1982, pp. 439-446; Halliday and Hoxha, 1986, pp. 106-108; Kola, 2003, pp. 93]
Entity Tags: Milovan Djilas, Paulin Kola, Greece, Milan Kupresanin, Mehmet Shehu, League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Soviet Communist Party, Josip Broz Tito, Kristo Themelko, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United Nations, Albania, Beqir Balluku, Eduard Kardelj, Enver Hoxha, Yugoslavia, Jon Halliday, United States of America, Vladimir Dedijer, Greek Democratic Army
Timeline Tags: Kosovar Albanian Struggle
At the Eighth Plenum of the Communist Party of Albania’s Central Committee, Yugoslavia’s criticism of the CPA and the Yugoslav plan to accelerate unification are endorsed. Koci Xoxe, as interior minister and the CPA’s organizational secretary, uses his power to threaten, remove, or arrest people. Mehmet Shehu is barred from the meeting. In an unusual turn, there is no report to the Plenum, other than what Prime Minister and CPA General Secretary Enver Hoxha will call “a so-called conclusion of a meeting of the Political Bureau,” presented by Xoxe. According to Hoxha, Xoxe conspires with Xhoxhi Blushi, Nesti Kerenxhi, Pellumb Dishnica, Tahir Kadare, Gjin Marku, and others, who turn the meeting from questions of substance to reviewing alleged misconduct by the recently deceased Economy Minister Nako Spiru and others. Hoxha does accept some of the criticisms of Spiru, Liri Belishova (Spiru’s wife), and Shehu; many years later Belishova and later Shehu will be charged with treason. At the Plenum, it is implied that Hoxha allowed Spiru to act. Xoxe and Pandi Kristo urge the Plenum to expand its criticism of the leadership, but Hoxha will later say his clean record prevented attack, and he makes few comments. According to Hoxha, Xoxe comes close to accusing him of leading a faction with Spiru. Nonetheless, Hoxha later says that he thinks the majority in the CPA and Albania do not approve of the Plenum’s conclusions. The Political Bureau is enlarged. A committee is formed to draft a resolution to be approved at a later Plenum.
Results of the Plenum - According to the official party history, Xoxe uses intimidation and surveillance to control the party and plans to execute opponents, weakens mass organizations such as the unions, and wants to abolish the Communist Youth Organization, formerly headed by Spiru. Yugoslav advisers become unquestionable. The Co-ordination Commission becomes “almost a second government,” and joint companies come under Yugoslav control. Fraternization is encouraged to make unification look like a popular demand. Hoxha prevents Xoxe from expelling all Soviet advisers, merging the Albanian military with the Yugoslav military, and unifying the countries. Subsequently Savo Zlatic, Xoxe, Kristo, and Themelko will say the Soviet advisers are generally no longer needed, but Hoxha, Hysni Kapo, and Gogo Nushi are able to keep them in the country. Yugoslavia wants Albania to request unification, and the Political Bureau decides to ask for clarification from Yugoslavia and the USSR leadership.
Varying Accounts - According to Albanian academic Paulin Kola, Hoxha will endorse federation at a Political Bureau meeting on March 14 and say that was the plan from the beginning, and is ready for formal announcement. Kola will portray both Hoxha and Xoxe as pro-Yugoslav and pro-Soviet. [PLA, 1971, pp. 314-317; Hoxha, 1982, pp. 446-469; Kola, 2003, pp. 92]
Entity Tags: Nako Spiru, Nesti Kerenxhi, Enver Hoxha, Mehmet Shehu, Liri Belishova, Kristo Themelko, Pandi Kristo, Hysni Kapo, Koci Xoxe, Party of Labor of Albania, Paulin Kola, Pellumb Dishnica, Yugoslavia, Albania, Albanian Communist Youth Organization, Xhoxhi Blushi, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Gogo Nushi, Savo Zlatic, Tahir Kadare, Gjin Marku
Timeline Tags: Kosovar Albanian Struggle
In response to a March letter from the Albanian government to Yugoslavia, Yugoslav representative to Albania Savo Zlatic meets with Albanian Prime Minister Enver Hoxha, Interior Minister Koci Xoxe, leading Albanian communists Hysni Kapo and Pandi Kristo, and Yugoslav economic planner Sergej Krajger. In what Hoxha sees as a retreat, the Yugoslavs focus on economic unification and say that Albania and Yugoslavia should coordinate their policies, but not unify politically at this point. Yugoslavia proposes coordination of foreign policy, economic planning methodology, trade, finance, laws, passports, education, and open borders. It says coordination commissions should be created in each country, the one in Albania having an Albanian minister and a Yugoslav deputy minister, and vice versa in Yugoslavia, as “the beginning of the future joint government.” Zlatic says they should draft a joint protocol at the meeting, and Hoxha asks why the Yugoslavs refuse to commit their proposals to paper. He says Albania wants to know why they should unify, not start working on it. Kraejger says the unification only covers economic matters, but Hoxha counters that the coordination commission has not streamlined things. Kraejger says Albania is making unreasonably large requests for tweezers, boot polish, and nails, pen nibs, beverage essence, etc., but Kristo says the Yugoslavs suggested it, because they had stock to get rid of. Hoxha demands that the Yugoslavs present a document. He will later recount that Albania still had not been informed of Soviet-Yugoslav tensions, and only receives a copy of a key March 27, 1948 letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia two or three days after this meeting. [Hoxha, 1982, pp. 477-484; Kola, 2003, pp. 93-94]
Entity Tags: Koci Xoxe, Enver Hoxha, Albania, Hysni Kapo, Josip Broz Tito, Pandi Kristo, Savo Zlatic, League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Party of Labor of Albania, Sergej Krajger, Yugoslavia
Timeline Tags: Kosovar Albanian Struggle
Yugoslav envoy to Albania Savo Zlatic demands a meeting with representatives of the Albanian government, and Albanian communist Prime Minister Enver Hoxha sends Interior Minister Koci Xoxe and Political Bureau member Hysni Kapo. Zlatic says the private screening in Tirana of a Soviet documentary being made about Albania is an anti-Yugoslav insult, because more Soviets were invited than Yugoslavs. Hoxha will later describe the gathering as “a social evening quite without protocol.” Military cooperation has ended between Yugoslavia and Albania and Zlatic says all agreements will be reviewed, “because your friendship with Yugoslavia has no foundation,” as relations are deteriorating, because of Hoxha. Hoxha says Albania has done nothing and has been very forgiving of Yugoslav actions. The Albanians send out another letter about the situation, on April 20, to Yugovlav communist Prime Minister Josip Broz Tito. [Hoxha, 1982, pp. 492 - 496]
Yugoslav communist leader Josip Broz Tito says Albania does not have enough “faith” in Yugoslav opinions about Albania, Yugoslavia cannot make sacrifices for Albania while relations do not improve, and Albania needs to increase cooperation if it wants to improve relations. Tito adds that Albania is squandering Yugoslav aid, according to Albanian scholar Paulin Kola. Therefore, Yugoslavia backs off from Yugoslav-Albanian military unification and decides to review its relationship with Albania. Albania will reply on May 23, saying that the deterioration is the Yugoslav communists’ fault, and that the mistake of the Communist Party of Albania [CPA] was “with great belief and trust in the CPY [Communist Party of Yugoslavia], hav[ing] more than once accepted harsh criticisms made verbally by the [Central Committee] of the CPY against our party, against its leadership, and members of the party,” thus violating Marxism-Leninism. Kola says Albanian Prime Minister and CPA General Secretary Enver Hoxha writes the letter, with a conciliatory tone. The CPY will reply on May 27, with a letter signed by high Yugoslav official Milovan Djilas, saying relations will improve only if Albania sends a delegation to “examine all the questions and conclude protocols about our economic relations on the basis of our former proposals.” [Hoxha, 1982, pp. 496 - 498; Kola, 2003, pp. 94]
Albanian Prime Minister Enver Hoxha goes on a lone trip to Romania, where he confers with Romanian leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Andrey Vyshinsky, the Soviet deputy foreign minister. Hoxha flies on a Soviet aircraft, crossing southern Yugoslavia without incident, though the Yugoslavs at some point began to bar Soviet aircraft. According to a later account by Hoxha, he indirectly criticizes the Soviets for not informing Albania about their disagreements with Yugoslavia earlier. Vyshinsky says that Stalin criticized Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito over the issue of the Yugoslav requests to station soldiers in Albania earlier in 1948. Hoxha says he does not know the details of the proposed and now scuttled Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation. [Hoxha, 1982, pp. 509-511, 533-536]
Albanian Prime Minister Enver Hoxha and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin discussed the treatment of Yugoslav Albanians at their second meeting, in March-April 1949, and do so in more detail at a third meeting, that November, with both meetings taking place in the Soviet Union. At the November meeting, Hoxha says these matters are up to those Albanians living in Yugoslavia to resolve, “However we for our part, without ever interfering in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, will never cease supporting the rights of our brothers of the one blood, living in Yugoslavia, and will raise our voice against the terror, the policy of extermination, which the Tito-Rankovich clique is pursuing towards them.” Stalin says that he read Hoxha’s previous letter about Kosova and agrees that the Kosovar Albanians will decide their own destiny. He says that the Soviet Union will not attack Yugoslavia and that “we must attack that anti-Marxist views and actions of Tito and the Yugoslav leadership, but I stress that in no way should we ever interfere in their internal affairs,” which are up to the Yugoslav people to determine. He also says, “We must not leave any way for the Titoite enemy to accuse us later of allegedly waging our fight to break up the Yugoslav Federation.” This echoes the advice Hoxha heard from Soviet deputy foreign minister Andrey Vyshinsky at a summer 1948 meeting in Romania (see After June 1948). [Hoxha, 1979, pp. 107-109, 137-143; Hoxha, 1982, pp. 536-537]
The Party of Labor of Albania’s newspaper, Zeri i Popullit, prints an article on April 8, condemning Yugoslavia’s police actions and the treatment of Yugoslav Albanians, and supporting the protest demands. It also says, “The London and Versailles Treaties, which settled the frontiers between Yugoslavia and Albania, can no longer be imposed to the detriment of the Albanian people.” PLA First Secretary Enver Hoxha may be the anonymous author of the article. A Zeri i Popullit article two weeks later says hundreds were killed, wounded, missing, or arrested, and that it is Albania’s right to condemn Yugoslavia’s repeated actions, which it has not done officially. Zeri i Popullit points to Yugoslavia’s charges about the treatment of Croats and Slovenes across its border in Carinthia, which the article compares to Albanian concerns about Kosovar Albanians. Albania denies seeking to annex Kosova. The Yugoslav government sees these articles as evidence that Albania is behind the demonstrations, after initially blaming domestic and Western sources. As a result, previously increasing economic and cultural cooperation between the two countries will be reduced. On April 29, Lazar Kolisevski, a member of the Yugoslav Presidency, presents a report to a meeting of the Presidency and the Federal Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order, charging that the PLA caused the demonstrations, which were “hostile and counter-revolutionary,” and sought unification with Albania. Kolisevski calls nationalism the greatest threat to Yugoslavia and says “economic nationalism,” economic divisions between groups in Yugoslavia, is the main cause of friction, which a Zeri i Popullit article also pointed out.
Allegedly PLA-Linked Kosovar Groups - Several allegedly PLA-linked organizations will be blamed for the protests: the Revolutionary Movement of Albanian Unification (whose leader, Adam Demaci, has been in jail since 1975), the Red Popular Front (considered closer to the PLA), eight “irredentist” groups arrested before the events, and the Albanian Communist Marxist-Leninist Party in Yugoslavia (represented at the 8th Congress of the PLA, in September 1981, and having almost the same program as the PLA). Besides these “extremists,” Kosovo President Xhavid Nimami blames “Ballists” led by Abaz Ermeni and “Zogists” led by Leka Zog, Zog I’s son, and equates calls for “united Albanians” to “United Serbs,” etc., saying they would destroy Yugoslavia. In 1997 an anonymous high-ranking official will allege that a meeting of officials and professors was held in Tirana to propose inciting Kosovars to seek more rights. Albanian anti-communist scholar Paulin Kola will suggest that this was done to distract Albanians from economic problems caused by the break in relations with China in the late ‘70s. Others will allege that Albania’s Sigurimi security agency organized the demonstrations, through ties with Albanians in Western Europe, especially Switzerland. Some Kosovars will say they received support from Albanians, but not from the Albanian government. Kola will point to the alleged role of the ex-communist Socialist Party of Albania in the formation of the KLA in the ‘90s as evidence that Albania was behind the 1981 events. In 1992-1993 and 2001 interviews, Xhafer Shatri will tell Kola that he thought the March 1981 demonstrations were unplanned. On the other hand, Albania benefits from trade with Yugoslavia and Yugoslavia acts as a buffer against the USSR. Albania will repatriate 249 Kosovar Albanian asylum seekers back to Yugoslavia from 1981 to 1983.
Alleged Soviet Involvement - In late April, Yugoslavia’s Fadil Hoxha says “Greater Albanian nationalism” would destabilize the Balkans as much as other nationalisms, and implies that the USSR wants to destabilize the Balkans to undermine the Non-Aligned Movement. In June, Zeri i Popullit will accuse the USSR of trying to use Serbia’s crackdown to cause problems in the Balkans and NATO. [Vickers, 1998, pp. 202-207, 211-212; Kola, 2003, pp. 158-160, 163]
Entity Tags: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Non-Aligned Movement, Leka Zog, League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Lazar Kolisevski, Kosovo Liberation Army, Adem Demaci, Enver Hoxha, Fadil Hoxha, Party of Labor of Albania, Red Popular Front, Revolutionary Movement of Albanian Unification, Yugoslavia, Zeri i Popullit, Abaz Ermeni, Albania, Xhavid Nimami, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Xhafer Shatri, Sigurimi, Socialist Party of Albania, Ahmet Zog I
Timeline Tags: Kosovar Albanian Struggle
Jusuf Gervalla, founder of the Movement for the National Liberation of Kosova (MNLK), his brother Bardhosh Gervalla, and Kadri Zeka, leader of the Group of Marxist-Leninists of Kosova (GMLK), are shot to death following a meeting near Stuttgart, which some say is about finalizing an alliance between the groups. The MNLK and GMLK are the primary pro-Hoxha communist dissident groups in Kosovo province, and were discovered and hunted for by the police following the unrest in 1981. Subsequently those behind the assassination will remain unidentified; Albania will blame the Yugoslavs and the Yugoslavs will say Albania did it, to gain control and ideological dominance in the Kosovar struggle. On the other hand, Albania at this time sees Yugoslavia as a buffer against the USSR and a valuable trade partner, following the break in relations with China. Albania returns Kosovars seeking asylum to Yugoslavia. The MNLK and GMLK are not destroyed by the killings and will subsequently be involved in the Movement for an Albanian Socialist Republic in Yugoslavia, whose leader will also fall to assassination. [Vickers, 1998, pp. 203-205; Kola, 2003, pp. 317-318]
Entity Tags: Group of Marxist-Leninists of Kosova, China, Bardhosh Gervalla, Albania, Enver Hoxha, Federal Republic of Germany, Jusuf Gervalla, Movement for the National Liberation of Kosova, Yugoslavia, Movement for an Albanian Socialist Republic in Yugoslavia, Kadri Zeka, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Timeline Tags: Kosovar Albanian Struggle
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