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Profile: Feroz Khan
Feroz Khan was a participant or observer in the following events:
The US and Pakistan establish an experts group at the assistant secretary level to discuss Pakistan’s proliferation of nuclear weapons. The group, which meets at least twice a year for some time, involves Robert Einhorn, assistant secretary of state for non-proliferation from 1999. On the Pakistani side there is an official from the foreign ministry, but it is military officials who are in charge, often General Feroz Khan, head of the Combat Development Directorate and a close family friend of General Pervez Musharraf (who will soon take power in Pakistan). On the first occasion Einhorn says Pakistan may be supplying nuclear technology to North Korea, his counterpart responds furiously and is “incredibly angry” and “deeply chagrined.” However, the expert group makes no headway in stopping Pakistan from engaging in nuclear proliferation because the US is only willing to use non-specific information at the meetings, apparently because it thinks more specific information will reveal it has penetrated Khan Research Laboratories, a key organization in Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation efforts (see 1998). The conversations are so vague that one Pakistani official involved in them wonders if the US really knows anything, or is just trying to bluff the Pakistanis into revealing something. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 280-281]
A. Q. Khan (left) and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. [Source: CBC]Due to US pressure over Pakistan’s links to North Korea’s nuclear program, some Pakistani officials begin to question whether nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan should continue to play such an active part in his country’s nuclear dealings. General Feroz Khan will later reflect: “It began to dawn on everyone that perhaps Khan had done enough. It was time for others to take over—who were a little less public and whose anonymity suited the secret program better.” Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will add, “A. Q. Khan, Islamabad’s greatest asset, was becoming a liability because of his ubiquity and ego.” The pressure results from a White House group formed in 1998 (see (Mid-1998)). One of the members of the group, Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation Robert Einhorn, will later say: “I recall a meeting at the residence of [Pakistani President] Nawaz Sharif where we raised the North Korean centrifuge connection. It was raised at the [Deputy Secretary of State] Strobe Talbott level, at the Clinton level too. Eventually the Pakistanis said, ‘We’ll look into this.’ They knew that they had to do something as we were not going to go away.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 516]
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