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Profile: Richard Barlow
Richard Barlow was a participant or observer in the following events:
State Department intern Richard Barlow. [Source: Richard Barlow]Richard Barlow, an intern at the State Department’s Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), finds that Pakistan has been attempting to build a nuclear bomb since the early 1970s, but his superiors do not follow up and he loses his job in a reorganization. Barlow, who has recently graduated from university after writing a thesis on counter-proliferation intelligence, is concerned about the burgeoning black markets in nuclear weapons technology. He will later comment, “Everywhere I looked I kept coming up against intelligence about Pakistan’s WMD program. I thought I was telling them what they needed to hear, but the White House seemed oblivious.” One reason the White House appears deaf is that Pakistan is now an important US ally, as it is a major supply point for the CIA-backed anti-Soviet Afghan mujaheddin. In addition, a group of “Republican hawks,” including Paul Wolfowitz, has convinced President Ronald Reagan that America needs a new strategy against potential nuclear threats, since long-term policies such as détente and containment are supposedly not working. When Reagan starts to build up US arms, the staff at ACDA is cut by a third and Barlow is one of the employees who loses his job. [Guardian, 10/13/2007]
The incoming Reagan administration marginalizes the State Department’s Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Its director is supposed to be the primary advisor to the president on non-proliferation issues, but, according to authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, he is “kept out of Reagan’s way.” In addition, many staffers are fired. Richard Barlow, an intern who will go on to have a long career in intelligence, will say that the firings greatly damaged the agency’s morale, commenting, “There were grown men crying around me in the office.” One reason for this may be that ACDA had kept former President Jimmy Carter well informed of Pakistan’s attempts to build a bomb, leading to sanctions against that country. However, the Reagan administration now wants to get close to Pakistan, whose support is viewed as necessary for the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 78]
The US sells forty F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan. One of the contractual preconditions of the sale is that Pakistan does not configure them to drop a nuclear bomb. However, US analyst Richard Barlow will conclude that in fact all of them are configured to carry nuclear weapons. [Guardian, 10/13/2007]
A 2007 satellite image of the Khan Research Laboratories in Kahuta. [Source: GeoEye]Richard Barlow, an analyst working on Pakistan’s nuclear program who was released by the State Department in the early 1980s (see 1981-1982), is hired by the CIA’s Office of Scientific and Weapons Research (OSWR). Barlow re-analyzes the data and confirms his earlier conclusions—that Pakistan is pursuing a covert nuclear weapons program. Barlow learns about the trade in dual-use components—tools and equipment that can be used to make nuclear weapons, but also for other, non-nuclear purposes, meaning trade in them is hard to spot and regulate. One example of this is a California couple that exports dozens of high-speed cathode-ray oscilloscopes and special cameras to Hong Kong, where they are picked up by Pakistani agents. Barlow realizes that such a large number of oscilloscopes must be for nuclear weapons manufacturing, and also finds a link between the purchase and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). Barlow will later comment, “There was tons of it and most of it was ending up in [Pakistan]. Pakistan had a vast network of procurers, operating all over the world.” Barlow also finds that the material is going to a secret nuclear facility near Islamabad, the Khan Research Laboratories, where sensors pick up high levels of enriched uranium in the air and in dust on [trucks] leaving the laboratories. [New Yorker, 3/29/1993; Guardian, 10/13/2007] Despite this, in order to prevent Congress from cutting of aid to the anti-Soviet mujaheddin, which flows through Pakistan, US authorities will repeatedly insist Pakistan is not working on a nuclear program (see August 1985-October 1990).
Richard Barlow, a CIA analyst of Pakistan’s nuclear program (see 1985-1988), realizes that officials in the State Department are refusing to share information with the CIA, the Commerce Department, and US Customs about the Pakistani program. In particular, the State Department is aware of the identities of key Pakistani agents who are illicitly purchasing nuclear weapons technology in the US, but it does not pass their names on to the CIA and the other two agencies. By withholding this information, the State Department is able to neutralize the other agencies’ counter-proliferation attempts. State Department officials also approve questionable export licenses for Pakistan (see 1986). [Guardian, 10/13/2007]
CIA analyst Richard Barlow finds that a small group of senior US officials have been directly aiding the Pakistan nuclear weapons program by approving export licenses for US equipment to be shipped to Pakistan. The State Department is also withholding intelligence about the program from other US agencies to help Pakistan (see 1986). Barlow will later say, “They were issuing scores of approvals for the Pakistan embassy in Washington to export hi-tech equipment that was critical for their nuclear bomb program and that the US Commerce Department had refused to license.” Barlow complains to his boss, CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence Richard Kerr, who summons senior State Department officials to a meeting at CIA headquarters. Barlow will recall: “Kerr tried to do it as nicely as he could. He said he understood the State Department had to keep Pakistan on side—the State Department guaranteed it would stop working against us.” [New Yorker, 3/29/1993; Guardian, 10/13/2007]
The CIA sets a trap to catch operatives connected to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program who are buying components in the US, but “two high-ranking US officials extremely close to the White House” tip off Pakistan and only a minor player is caught. Initially, a Pakistani businessman contacts a Pennsylvania company called Carpenter Steel and asks to buy a specific type of metal used only in constructing centrifuges to enrich uranium. The Department of Energy learns of the contact and informs Richard Barlow, a CIA analyst focused on Pakistan’s nuclear program. Barlow realizes that both the businessman, Arshad Pervez, and his handler, Inam ul-Haq, a retired brigadier in the Pakistani army, are well-known Pakistan government operatives. Barlow and US Customs set up a sting at a bugged hotel room, but Pervez arrives without ul-Haq, the main target. Barlow then finds that the officials have tipped off Pakistan, even though the information about the operation was closely held (see Mid-1986 and After). Barlow finds cables implicating the two high-ranking officials in the tip-off: Robert Peck, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State of Near East Affairs, and another official at the under secretary level. A trail of paperwork definitively proves sabotage within the State Department and the tip-off is found “buried within the lawyerly language of a demarche to Islamabad, subtly phrased so as to protect those who had sent it.” Barlow will later comment: “The CIA went mad. These were criminal offenses.” However, the State Department argues an inquiry would disclose state secrets and the investigation is abandoned, just before President Ronald Reagan again certifies that “Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device.” There will later be a stormy congressional hearing about the affair (see July 1987 or Shortly After). [New Yorker, 3/29/1993; Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 169; Guardian, 10/13/2007] Ul-Haq will later be arrested in Germany and extradited to the US, but he will only serve a very short sentence. His nuclear transactions in the US will also be linked to the criminal BCCI bank (see July 11, 1991).
Following an incident where a Pakistani procurement agent was arrested in the US trying to buy components for a nuclear weapon (see Before July 1987), there is a serious row about it between a CIA manager and a CIA analyst at a Congressional hearing. The hearing is called by Stephen Solarz (D-NY), chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, to vet intelligence concerning Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. CIA manager General David Einsel says it is “not cut and dried” that the arrested Pakistani, Arshad Pervez, and his handler, Inam ul-Haq, are agents of the Pakistani government. Richard Barlow, a CIA analyst there to help Einsel, is surprised by the false answer, as it is a criminal offense to lie to Congress. He realizes, “Einsel’s testimony was highly evasive, and deliberately so.” He will also later comment: “These congressmen had no idea what was really going on in Pakistan and what had been coming across my desk about its WMD program. They did not know that Pakistan already had a bomb and was shopping for more with US help. All of it had been hushed up.” When Barlow is asked the same question, he says it is “clear” Pervez is working for Pakistan, at which point Einsel screams, “Barlow doesn’t know what he’s talking about.” Solarz then asks whether there are any more cases involving the Pakistan government. Einsel says there are not, but Barlow replies, “Yes, there have been scores of other cases.” Barlow is then hustled out of the room and returns to CIA headquarters. A senior government official not cleared to attend the briefing comes in and tries to repair the damage, saying that Barlow was referring to intelligence reports, but “not all intelligence reports are accurate.” The official will later indicate that he is not proud of what he does, saying, “I didn’t know what I was getting into.” [New Yorker, 3/29/1993; Guardian, 10/13/2007] Barlow will subsequently be forced out of the CIA because of this hearing (see August 1987-1988).
Following a stormy Congressional subcommittee hearing where he contradicted CIA manager David Einsel about Pakistan’s nuclear program (see July 1987 or Shortly After), analyst Richard Barlow is forced out of the CIA. Barlow will later say that he leaves because Einsel makes his job impossible: “Einsel went crazy. I was told that my personal behavior at the hearing had been unprofessional. I was accused of being unpatriotic and almost scuttling the Afghanistan program. I was viewed as being disloyal.” [Guardian, 10/13/2007] He will also say: “These people were determined that nothing like this was ever going to happen ever again—no more arrests, no more truth to the Congress.… I was targeted by some in the Directorate of Operations; they made my life miserable.” [Raw Story, 4/30/2007] Commenting on his position during the Cold War, he will add: “We had to buddy-up to regimes we didn’t see eye-to-eye with, but I could not believe we would actually give Pakistan the bomb. How could any US administration set such short-term gains against the long-term safety of the world?” Barlow’s job description is re-written six weeks after the hearing, removing him from work on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and he leaves the CIA for the Customs Service a year later. [Guardian, 10/13/2007]
US ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley. [Source: Terry Mitchell / Public domain]According to some accounts, by this time it is common knowledge in certain Washington circles that Pakistan has nuclear weapons. Despite this, the US government and Congress continues to pretend that Pakistan does not have such weapons, so that aid to Pakistan and the anti-Soviet mujaheddin based there can continue (see 1987-1989). A former top-level Reagan Administration official will later question the integrity of members of Congress who outwardly pretended to be tough on nuclear proliferators, but did not really want the aid to be cut off: “All this morality horse****. We were caught in a dilemma, and I didn’t know how to solve it: there was no way to stop the Pakistanis.… All this talk about breaking the law—it’s just a morality play. Of course everybody in Congress knew. The Administration was carrying out a popularly based policy in Afghanistan. If we’d cut off the aid to Pakistan, would we have been able to withstand the political heat from Congress?”
Former Ambassador: Congress 'Acquiesced' to Pakistani Program - According to the New Yorker, “many former members of the Reagan and Bush Administrations,” such as former ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley, will say that the essential facts about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program were known fully at this time to Congress, whose members “acquiesced” to the program, because of the Soviet-Afghan War and the popularity of Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in the US. Journalist Seymour Hersh will later comment, “Oakley’s point seemed to be that passive approval by Congress of bad policy somehow justified bad policy.”
Glenn: Nonproliferation Initiatives Thwarted - Senator John Glenn (D-OH) will say that most lawmakers did not want to know anyway: “I always thought in terms of the bigger picture—the nonproliferation treaty… We made a commitment that we’d cut off aid to transgressors, and we had to keep faith with those Third World people who signed with us. I didn’t think I had any option but to press for enforcement of the law against Pakistan.” He adds: “The Administration would always come to me and say how important it is to keep the arms flowing through to Afghanistan. I’d take my case on nonproliferation to the floor and lose the vote.”
Solarz: Balancing Concerns between Pakistan, Afghan War - Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-NY), one of the strongest opponents of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program during the Soviet-Afghan War, will admit that he and others who cared about non-proliferation constantly tried to balance that concern with a desire to support the anti-Soviet effort, which was based in Pakistan. “There were legitimate concerns that the Afghan war might spill over to Pakistan, and I felt we needed to give the President flexibility,” Solarz will say. “I didn’t want us to be in a worst-case scenario in case the Soviets moved across the border. I thought I was being responsible at the time.” Referring to allegations made by former State Department, CIA, and Pentagon analyst Richard Barlow that the administration was well-aware of the program and constantly lied to Congress (see July 1987 or Shortly After), he adds, “If what Barlow says is true, this would have been a major scandal of Iran-Contra proportions, and the officials involved would have had to resign. We’re not dealing with minor matters. Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons is one of the major foreign-policy issues of the nation—not to mention the law of the land.” [New Yorker, 3/29/1993]
Richard Barlow, an analyst previously forced out of the State Department and CIA for coming to the politically unacceptable conclusion that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons program (see 1981-1982 and August 1987-1988), is hired by the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon to become its first weapons of mass destruction intelligence analyst. Shortly after arriving, Barlow again builds up “a stack of evidence” about Pakistan’s WMD program, including intelligence that the Pakistan army was experimenting with a delivery system for its nuclear bomb, using US-provided technology. Barlow concludes, “Our side was at it again.” [Guardian, 10/13/2007] In the summer of 1989, Barlow is involved in investigating four criminal cases involving senior officers of the Pakistani Army who had attempted to make illegal purchases in the US or abroad of American-made nuclear-related materials, including highly enriched uranium. One of the cases involves evidence showing that Pakistan is attempting to obtain dual-use items for its nuclear program by claiming that the materials are to be used for its F-16 fleet. [New Yorker, 3/29/1993]
Richard Barlow, a WMD analyst at the Pentagon, is commissioned to write an intelligence assessment for Defense Secretary Dick Cheney about Pakistan’s nuclear program. The report is apparently “stark,” indicating that the program is ongoing and Pakistan has configured US-made fighters to drop nuclear bombs, despite promising not to do so. Barlow also says that Pakistan is still trying to procure components and will start selling its technology to other nations (note: it is already doing so—see 1987). Barlow’s analysis is supported by a separate Defense Intelligence Agency study, which reaches the same conclusion. Barlow will later say, “Officials at the [Office of the Secretary of Defense] kept pressurizing me to change my conclusions.” When he refuses to do so, however, files start to go missing from his office and a secretary tells him a senior official has been intercepting his papers. In July, one of the Pentagon’s top salesmen criticizes him for trying to scupper a forthcoming deal to sell another 60 F-16s to Pakistan (see August-September 1989). Barlow refuses to change the report, but after he is fired he finds that it has been rewritten to say that continued US aid to Pakistan will ensure the country stops its WMD program. [New Yorker, 3/29/1993; Guardian, 10/13/2007]
Arthur Hughes. [Source: Middle East Institute]The US agrees to sell Pakistan 60 more F-16 fighter jets in a deal worth $1.5 billion. The US previously sold forty F-16s to Pakistan and Pentagon analyst Richard Barlow believes they were adapted to carry nuclear weapons, in conflict with a promise made by the Pakistanis (see 1983-7). Despite this, shortly before the sale goes through, the Pentagon falsely claims to Congress, “None of the F-16s Pakistan already owns or is about to purchase is configured for nuclear delivery.” Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Hughes also tells Congress that the nuclear wiring has been removed from the planes and that to equip them to deliver nuclear bombs, “it first would be necessary to replace the entire wiring package of the aircraft.”
Testimony Known to Be False - However, this is contradicted by Pentagon analysis and the US intelligence community is well aware that the Pakistani air force has already practiced delivery of nuclear weapons by F-16s. [New Yorker, 3/29/1993; Guardian, 10/13/2007] Barlow will later say the US intelligence community was certain Pakistan had nuclear weapons (see 1987): “The evidence was unbelievable. I can’t go into it—but on a scale of 1 to 10, in terms of intelligence evidence, it was a 10 or 11. It doesn’t get any better than that.” Regarding the F-16 fighters, he will add: “All the top experts had looked at this question in detail for years, and it was a cold hard engineering question. There was no question about it—the jets could easily be made nuke-capable, and we knew that Pakistan had done just that.” [Raw Story, 4/30/2007] Barlow therefore urges that the testimony be corrected, but he is fired from his position two days later (see August 4, 1989). The US should not agree to the sale, as it has passed a law saying it will not sell such equipment to countries that obtain nuclear weapons, but President Reagan has repeatedly and falsely certified that Pakistan does not have a nuclear device, so the contract is signed. However, the deal will collapse the next year when President Bush fails to certify that Pakistan does not have a nuclear weapon (see October 1990). [New Yorker, 3/29/1993; Guardian, 10/13/2007]
Motivation Said to Be Profit - Given that the Soviet-Afghan War is over and there is therefore no need to be friendly with Pakistan to ensure it supports the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, Barlow believes that Hughes is lying not to support US national interests, but simply for the profits to be made by the planes’ manufacturer. “They sold out the world for an F-16 sale,” Barlow will comment. [Raw Story, 4/30/2007]
Richard Barlow, an analyst who has repeatedly insisted that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons program (see July 1987 or Shortly After and Mid-1989), is fired from his position at the Pentagon. Barlow will later say, “They told me they had received credible information that I was a security risk.” When he asks why he is thought to be a security risk, “They said they could not tell me as the information was classified,” but “senior Defense Department officials” are said to have “plenty of evidence.” His superiors think he might leak information about Pakistan’s nuclear program to congressmen in favor of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. He spends the next eighteen months in the Pentagon personnel pool, under surveillance by security officers. Apparently, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby and two officials who work for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz are involved in the sacking. It is also rumored that Barlow is a Soviet spy. Barlow’s conclusions about Pakistan’s nuclear program are unpopular with some, because if the US admitted the nuclear program existed, this would lead to a break between the US and Pakistan and endanger US aid to the anti-Soviet mujaheddin and US arms sales (see August 1985-October 1990 and August-September 1989). After he is fired, rumors are started saying that Barlow is a tax evader, alcoholic, adulterer, and in psychiatric care. As his marriage guidance counseling is alleged to be cover for the psychiatric care, the Pentagon insists that investigators be allowed to interview his marriage guidance counselor. Due to this and other problems, his wife leaves him and files for divorce. [New Yorker, 3/29/1993; Guardian, 10/13/2007] Barlow will later be exonerated by various investigations (see May 1990 and Before September 1993).
A Pentagon investigation finds that Richard Barlow, an analyst of Pakistan’s nuclear program, is not a security risk. Based on the investigation, Barlow is told, “after thorough investigation . . . any question of your trustworthiness for access to sensitive information was resolved in a manner completely favorable to you.” His top-secret security clearances are reinstated, but the Pentagon does not restore his clearances to compartmentalized intelligence, without which he cannot do his job. Therefore, Barlow remains in the Pentagon personnel pool, where he performs menial tasks. Barlow was fired from his position in August 1989 (see August 4, 1989), and has been in the pool since then. According to his superiors, he was dismissed for “poor performance” and due to the worry he was a security risk, although it appears that it was actually due to his opposition to false Congressional testimony by a Pentagon official intended to smooth the way for a large sale of F-16 fighters to Pakistan (see August-September 1989). [New Yorker, 3/29/1993]
Staff at the US embassies in India and Pakistan underestimate the seriousness of a crisis between the two countries (see January-May 1990), because they have been given manipulated intelligence about Pakistan’s nuclear capability. As they think Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons, they assume the crisis will not escalate into war. The US has been aware that Pakistan does have a nuclear weapons program and a nuclear weapon for some time (see 1987-1989 and May 1990), but has been suppressing this knowledge so that it could continue to support anti-Soviet mujaheddin and sell fighters to Pakistan (see August-September 1989). An example of the way the seriousness of the crisis is not appreciated is that US ambassador to India William Clark learns that the Pakistani air force is practicing dropping nuclear bombs, but is wrongly told that this is not important because the intelligence suggests Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons. The CIA, State Department, Pentagon, and White House are actually aware that this is a serious warning sign (see May 1990), but the intelligence has been altered to indicate Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons. For example, a report to Defense Secretary Dick Cheney by Pentagon analyst Richard Barlow was completely rewritten and Barlow’s conclusions were reversed to say Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons (see Mid-1989). Barlow was later fired from his job due to his opposition to an arms deal (see August 4, 1989). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 209-210]
Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM), a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, asks the Defense Department to re-open its inquiry into the sacking of Richard Barlow, an analyst who worked on assessments of Pakistan’s nuclear program (see August 4, 1989). The request is made because Bingaman has seen evidence that a report by the Pentagon’s inspector general mischaracterized or possibly even fabricated evidence against Barlow. [New Yorker, 3/29/1993] The inspector general will write a report clearing Barlow, but this report will be rewritten to damage him (see Before September 1993).
A combined inquiry by the inspectors general of the Defense Department, CIA, and State Department finds that numerous charges made against Richard Barlow (see 1981-1982 and August 4, 1989), a former analyst of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program for all three agencies, are without merit. However, the report is re-written before it is published. Lead inspector Sherman Funk finds that the accusation that Barlow is a traitor is “an error not supported by a scintilla of evidence,” adding, “The truth about Barlow’s termination is, simply put, that it was unfair and unwarranted.” Funk calls the whole affair “Kafka-like” and says Barlow was fired for “refusing to accede to policies which he knew to be wrong.” Despite this, the report is rewritten before it is published. The new version exonerates the Pentagon and says that Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons, although the US is well aware it does (see July 1987 or Shortly After). [New Yorker, 3/29/1993; Guardian, 10/13/2007] Funk will comment: “Yesterday, I received a copy of the Barlow report I had co-signed. Reviewing it I was startled and dismayed to realize that the summary of conclusions had not been revised to reflect the changes we had made.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 233, 507]
Fabricated Evidence - Commenting on an earlier version of the Pentagon inspector general’s report, one of Barlow’s former bosses, Gerald Oplinger, said that it contained evidence fabricated by the inspector general’s office. The report alleges that Oplinger deliberately inflated his annual evaluation of Barlow in order to avoid “an unpleasant personnel situation.” However, in a sworn affidavit Oplinger says this charge is “devoid of merit,” and also denies ever having spoken to anyone from the inspector general’s office, even though an interview with him is listed as one of the sources for the report.
'Many' Colleagues Support Barlow - Journalist Seymour Hersh previously interviewed “many” of Barlow’s former CIA and State Department colleagues and they confirmed Barlow’s essential allegation—that the full story of the Pakistani purchases was deliberately withheld from Congress, for fear of provoking a cut-off in military and economic aid that would adversely affect the Soviet-Afghan War. [New Yorker, 3/29/1993]
Richard Barlow, a former intelligence analyst who was repeatedly fired for correctly claiming that Pakistan had a nuclear weapons program (see 1981-1982, August 1987-1988 and August 4, 1989), is awarded a total of $1 million by President Bill Clinton in compensation for the treatment he received. However, Barlow does not receive the money, as the settlement has to be ratified by Congress. When it runs into procedural problems, it is moved to the Court of Federal Claims to be reviewed. After Clinton is replaced by George W. Bush, CIA Director George Tenet and NSA Director Michael Hayden assert the government’s “state secrets privilege” (see March 9, 1953) over Barlow’s entire legal claim, causing it to collapse due to lack of evidence. [Guardian, 10/13/2007]
Paul Wolfowitz, who served as undersecretary of defense for policy in the George H. W. Bush administration, first learns of the case of Richard Barlow, according to a statement made later by Wolfowitz. Barlow was an analyst of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program who was fired for attempting to tell Congress the truth about what the US knew about the program. Wolfowitz will say he learns of the case around this time when he is asked to supply an affidavit to Barlow’s lawyers, who are involved in a civil action. According to a statement made by Wolfowitz in February 2001 during a hearing to confirm him as deputy secretary of defense, the reason Wolfowitz did not know of the case before was that most of the events concerning Barlow’s termination occurred before he became undersecretary of defense for policy. Wolfowitz joined the Defense Department at some time in mid-to-late 1989 (see March 20, 1989 and After) after leaving his position as US ambassador to Indonesia that May (see May 1989). The Barlow situation came to a head that August (see August 4, 1989). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 300, 518] The case of Barlow is fairly well known at this time and has been the subject of several media reports, one of the most prominent being a 1993 New Yorker piece by Seymour Hersh. [New Yorker, 3/29/1993]
Richard Barlow, around 2007. [Source: AP / Tim Kupsick]Following the Democratic victory in the midterm elections, Richard Barlow, an intelligence analyst who was repeatedly fired for correctly saying Pakistan had a nuclear weapons program (see 1981-1982, August 1987-1988, and August 4, 1989), again applies for compensation. He was previously awarded compensation, but did not receive it (see 1999-2001). Although Barlow hopes to get his $80,000 pension back as well, he comments: “But this final hearing cannot indict any of those who hounded me, or misshaped the intelligence product. And it is too late to contain the flow of doomsday technology that Pakistan unleashed on the world.” [Guardian, 10/13/2007] The outcome of his application is not known as of February 2008.
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