!! History Commons Alert, Exciting News

Follow Us!

We are planning some big changes! Please follow us to stay updated and be part of our community.

Twitter Facebook

A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network

The A. Q. Khan Network's Operations Concerning United Arab Emirates

Project: A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network
Open-Content project managed by Paul, KJF

add event | references

Abdus Salam, a supplier for the Pakistani nuclear weapons program run by A. Q. Khan, moves from Britain to Dubai, United Arab Emirates. [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 102; Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 56] Salam had supplied equipment for the weapons program from Britain, but the local authorities became extremely interested in his activities (see (Fall 1979)), forcing his relocation. [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 102] The move is performed in co-operation with the British businessman Peter Griffin, a close associate of Salam and Khan who also wants to leave Britain because of heavy interest in his work by the authorities. Salam and Griffin agree that Salam will move to Dubai first, with Griffin remaining in Britain to look after that end of Khan’s supply chain. Griffin will say that one reason for the move is that “UK exports to Dubai were not so heavily watched and from there could go anywhere.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 56] In Dubai, Salam serves as a director of a company called Khalid Jassim General Trading, apparently named after his local partner. When visited by a reporter for The Times of London in September 1980 (see September 1980), the company consists of a single room inside a small apartment and has only two office staff. [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 102]

Entity Tags: Peter Griffin, Abdus Salam, Khalid Jassim General Trading

Category Tags: United Arab Emirates

Times of London reporter Simon Henderson finds equipment needed for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program outside the office of a supplier in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The equipment, found in a hallway outside the office of Khalid Jassim General Trading, is in four boxes labelled “Mikron infrared thermometers.” The manufacturer, Mikron Instruments of New Jersey, had been told the instruments were for a cement factory in Sharjah, near Dubai. However, Mikron says the instruments can be used to measure the temperature of “moving objects without making contact and in conditions of extreme radiation,” which Henderson thinks makes them “ideal” for use in uranium enrichment centrifuges. Khalid Jassim General Trading and one of its owners, Abdus Salam, have been shipping parts to A. Q. Khan, head of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, for some time (see Summer 1976). [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 106-7]

Entity Tags: Simon Henderson, Khalid Jassim General Trading, Abdus Salam, Mikron Instruments

Category Tags: United Arab Emirates

Some time in 1982 or 1983, Abdus Salam, a member of the nuclear proliferation ring run by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan, leaves Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Salam had been doing business there for some time, using the company Khalid Jassim General Trading (see Before September 1980). According to David Reed, who will later do business with Salam in Florida, Salam departs Dubai after being sued by the local partner in a joint venture, presumably Khalid Jassim. Salam will tell Reed that the partner claimed to a court that he—the partner—had started the business and put up all the money, the court had sided with the local, and Salam had lost all his money and been sent to jail. [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 108] Salam arrives in the US around this time (see December 31, 1982).

Entity Tags: Abdus Salam, David Reed, Khalid Jassim General Trading

Category Tags: United Arab Emirates

Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, a key associate of Pakistani nuclear proliferator A. Q. Khan, calls British businessman Peter Griffin to inquire about purchasing various machines for a workshop to be set up in Dubai. Griffin will later say he asks Tahir, “Is it nuclear?” but Tahir replies it is not. Tahir apparently tells Griffin the machines are for the Libyan National Oil Company, which wants to replace burnt-out machinery—a workshop in Dubai could manufacture spare parts without being troubled by sanctions. Griffin will say, “I saw no problem with that and sent over a container-load of catalogs, all the usual stuff for a standard machine shop.” Nothing will happen with the deal, which will turn out to be related to Libya’s nuclear program, until 1997 (see August 1997). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 366]

Entity Tags: Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, Peter Griffin

Category Tags: Libya, United Arab Emirates

An audit of SMB Distribution, a Dubai-based company owned by Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, finds a series problems in its accounts. The audit is conducted by Peter Griffin, like Tahir an associate of A. Q. Khan’s, at Tahir’s request. Based on an interview of Griffin, authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will say that Griffin discovers “major discrepancies between what was being bought and sold” by the company. This will lead Griffin to be suspicious of SMB Distribution, but he will continue to do business with Tahir (see, for example, July 2000). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 368]

Entity Tags: SMB Distribution, Peter Griffin, Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir

Category Tags: United Arab Emirates

Peter Griffin, a British businessman who has been working with the A. Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network for two decades (see Summer 1976), sets up a company called Gulf Technical Industries (GTI) in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The company’s establishment is a result of an order one of Khan’s other associates, Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, has told Griffin he will place with him. Tahir first mentioned the order, said to be worth $10 million, in 1994 (see May 1994), but nothing had come of it then. Tahir now says that the deal, which he claims is for a machine shop to produce spare parts for the Libyan National Oil Company, is back on. As a result of Tahir’s inquiry, Griffin moves back to Dubai with his wife Anna and starts the company up. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 366]

Entity Tags: Anna Griffin, Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, Gulf Technical Industries, Peter Griffin

Category Tags: Libya, United Arab Emirates

At some point in early 1998, the Pakistani military tells nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan that he should keep a lower profile. The request is apparently made as a result of US pressure on Pakistani nuclear proliferation operations. In addition, Western and Israeli intelligence services are aware of Khan’s operations in Dubai, a hub for his business, making it unsecure. In response to these twin stimuli, Khan will decide to make use of his contacts in Southeast Asia and Africa, to which elements of his operations will be relocated. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 282]

Entity Tags: Abdul Qadeer Khan

Category Tags: United Arab Emirates

A shipment of special aluminum for the A. Q. Khan network is seized in London by British customs. The shipment was arranged by Abu Bakr Siddiqui, a British-based supplier for the Khan network. Siddiqui’s company, Orland Europe Ltd., received the order in November 1998 from a Dubai-based facilitator for Khan’s network named Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, but it had originated with Mohammad Farooq, director of foreign procurement at Khan Research Laboratories.
Siddiqui Warned - Customs learned of the order thanks to a tipoff from the British intelligence agency MI6. Customs agent Maxine Crook and a colleague called on Siddiqui in January 1999 to inform him that the export of some metals required a license, and, if there was any doubt, it was best to contact the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) to check if one was required for a specific transaction. Crook also told Siddiqui that he should contact the DTI if he again did business with three companies with which he had previously traded, and that Dubai was a well-known “diversionary point” for goods going to “countries of concern” related to the smuggling of components for nuclear programs. Finally, Crook told Siddiqui he should consult the DTI about the current order for the aluminum. After the visit, Crook sent Siddiqui a letter summarizing the main points of the visit, and Siddiqui acknowledged the letter.
Seizure - Siddiqui went ahead with the order without asking for a license anyway, and customs officials seize it on the docks in London. A search of his home and office yields records of millions of dollars’ worth of equipment that has been shipped to Khan over the last decade, a brochure describing the uranium enrichment process, a photo of Siddiqui and Khan together, and a magazine with an article on Khan in which he said he wanted to “buy whatever we can from the international market” to support Pakistan’s nuclear program. [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 178-180]

Entity Tags: UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Orland Europe Ltd., Kahuta Research Laboratories, Abu Bakr Siddiqui, Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, Mohammad Farooq, Maxine Crook, HM Customs and Excise

Category Tags: Western Intel on Pakistani Nukes, Britain, Atif Amin, United Arab Emirates

Following a raid on Abu Bakr Siddiqui, a supplier for A. Q. Khan’s nuclear proliferation ring (see May 7, 1999), British customs examines the evidence it has seized and realizes that the investigation is not a simple case of Siddiqui exporting specialized metals without a license, but that they have opened a much larger can of worms. The investigation, known as Operation Akin, is led by Atif Amin, a British-born Muslim of Pakistani descent assigned to a special counterproliferation team, and they question Siddiqui twice, learning a lot more about the Khan network in the process. Customs also arranges that if a contact of Siddiqui, the Dubai-based businessman Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, enters Britain, he will be arrested. [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 180-181]

Entity Tags: Abu Bakr Siddiqui, Atif Amin, Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, HM Customs and Excise

Category Tags: Western Intel on Pakistani Nukes, Britain, United Arab Emirates, Atif Amin

Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) minister for information, tours Pakistan. He meets with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan. He is also shown around Khan Research Laboratories, the main facility for producing nuclear weapons in Pakistan. According to the Pakistani newspaper Jasarat, the visit is directly linked to nuclear activities: “Prince Abdullah bin Zayed also asked Dr. Qadeer Khan what help he could give them. Dr. Qadeer replied that Pakistan would not present the atomic bomb or a missile on a platter but could train UAE manpower.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 286-287]

Entity Tags: Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, Kahuta Research Laboratories, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Nawaz Sharif

Category Tags: United Arab Emirates

The British intelligence agency MI6 monitors shipments made by the A. Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network from Pakistan to Libya via Dubai, United Arab Emirates. MI6 asks a British customs officer, Malcolm Nesbit, who is stationed in Dubai, to help with the operation. At MI6’s request, he finds when certain containers arrive in Dubai, how long they stay, when they leave port, and what they carry. Nesbit does not understand the full implications of this surveillance at the time, but will realize why MI6 wanted the information later, when another customs agent investigates Khan’s network in Dubai (see Late March 2000). The contents of the containers are not known, although it is known that Khan is shipping centrifuge parts to Libya through Dubai at this time (see Late March 2000). [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 189]

Entity Tags: UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Malcolm Nesbit

Category Tags: Libya, Western Intel on Pakistani Nukes, Britain, United Arab Emirates

After British customs expands an investigation into a supplier for A. Q. Khan’s nuclear smuggling network (see After May 10, 1999), it realizes that a key point of the operation is in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. In order for customs to prosecute the supplier for anything other than export license violations, they have to prove where the goods he shipped ended up. Customs submits a formal request to Dubai’s Ministry of Justice for permission to carry out the investigation in August 1999. The request contains a list of individuals and entities they plan to investigate, as well as phone numbers, bank accounts, and e-mail addresses they want to trace. Although the Dubai authorities usually cooperate with investigations into cigarette and drug smuggling, they have acquired a reputation for rejecting requests for counterproliferation investigations. It takes several appeals and over half a year before the request is approved and lead investigator Atif Amin is allowed to come to Dubai to pursue the investigation. [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 181]

Entity Tags: Dubai Ministry of Justice, HM Customs and Excise

Category Tags: Britain, Atif Amin, United Arab Emirates

Shortly before British customs agent Atif Amin is to leave for Dubai to pursue an investigation into the A. Q. Khan nuclear smuggling ring (see After May 10, 1999), he is warned off a particular company by the British intelligence agency MI6. According to authors David Armstrong and Joe Trento, the message comes through “liaison channels” and informs Amin that he should “steer clear” of a company called Desert Electrical Equipment Factory, even if the company comes up in his investigation. British customs are not investigating the company in connection with Khan’s operations, although its owner is reportedly a partner of Khan associate Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir in another company called SMB Computers. Libyan officials will later tell investigators that at this time Desert Electrical’s facilities are being used to manufacture centrifuge components and train Libyan scientists. [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 181-182] The MI6 station chief in Dubai will warn Amin off another company involved in the smuggling ring (see March 2000).

Entity Tags: Desert Electrical Equipment Factory, Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, HM Customs and Excise, SMB Computers, Atif Amin, UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)

Category Tags: Libya, Western Intel on Pakistani Nukes, United Arab Emirates, Britain, Atif Amin

After arriving in Dubai to investigate the A. Q. Khan nuclear smuggling ring, British customs agent Atif Amin meets the chief of the British intelligence agency MI6’s station in the United Arab Emirates. Amin briefs the station chief on the investigation he plans to conduct, and gives him a list of companies he intends to visit. The station chief asks to be kept up-to-date, but the only concern he expresses is that Amin should, in the words of authors David Armstrong and Joe Trento, “not get too close to one of the institutions on the list, Habib Bank.” The bank was used by one of Khan’s suppliers, Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, to send payments to another, Abu Bakr Siddiqui. It is unclear why the station chief makes this request. [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 182] MI6 had previously asked Amin to stay away from another of the companies involved in the smuggling ring (see March 2000).

Entity Tags: UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), HM Customs and Excise, Habib Bank, Atif Amin

Category Tags: Western Intel on Pakistani Nukes, Britain, United Arab Emirates, Atif Amin

A joint investigation by British Customs agent Atif Amin and Dubai police lieutenant Alwari Essam uncovers links between the A. Q. Khan nuclear smuggling ring and “high-ranking Dubai officials.” This occurs in the first two weeks of the investigation, which the authorities in Dubai had tried to hamper (see August 1999-March 2000). The two investigators are able to uncover the links because they are following leads uncovered by Amin in Britain, and the two agents check out a number of businesses whose names have previously come up in the inquiry in Dubai. [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 183]

Entity Tags: HM Customs and Excise, Atif Amin, Alwari Essam

Category Tags: Western Intel on Pakistani Nukes, Britain, United Arab Emirates, Atif Amin

British customs agent Atif Amin, who is investigating the A. Q. Khan nuclear smuggling ring in Dubai, periodically briefs the local station of the British intelligence agency MI6 on how his investigation is proceeding. He tells MI6 that he has discovered new front companies and apartments used by Khan during his trips to Dubai. According to authors David Armstrong and Joe Trento: “But MI6 offered Amin no useful information or assistance. The general sense, according to a source familiar with the briefings, was one of displeasure that the inquiry was taking place at all.” However, the station chief does tell Amin that the Khan network is aware of the investigation, but does not think it will turn up much. Presumably, MI6 obtains this information from communications intercepts. [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 184]

Entity Tags: Atif Amin, HM Customs and Excise, UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)

Category Tags: Western Intel on Pakistani Nukes, Britain, United Arab Emirates, Atif Amin

During the course of an investigation into A. Q. Khan’s nuclear smuggling ring, British customs agent Atif Amin and Dubai policeman Alwari Essam visit a plastic bag manufacturer called Green Crest Industries (M.E.) Ltd. in Dubai. According to Amin, the visit is made because an entry in a suspect’s phone book listed a Dubai phone number for Khan that is registered to Green Crest. In addition, apartments and post office boxes rented for Khan by an associate named Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir appear to be linked to Green Crest. However, the manager and several other employees all deny any knowledge of Khan. At that point, another employee wanders past and says in Punjabi: “Sure we do. He has a flat and he comes here all the time.” Amin, who speaks Punjabi, understands the remark, as well as the manager’s sharp reply. The atmosphere turns hostile and the two investigators leave. Authors David Armstrong and Joe Trento will later talk to the company’s owner, Shaik Muhammad Farooq, who has a long history of dealings with Khan (see Late 1970s-1980s). Farooq will say that Green Crest had “absolutely no relationship” with Tahir, except that they had once swapped apartments in a Dubai building. However, when Farooq is asked later whether Khan ever visited Green Crest, he will curiously contradict himself as he replies: “He never visited our factories. He never visited our office. He never visited. Except sometimes he is there and he is inviting a lot of people including other businessman for dinner or so otherwise no. Absolutely baseless… I’m 100 percent sure he never visited us.” [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 184-5]

Entity Tags: Atif Amin, Alwari Essam, HM Customs and Excise, Joseph Trento, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, David Armstrong, Green Crest Industries (M.E.) Ltd.

Category Tags: Western Intel on Pakistani Nukes, Britain, United Arab Emirates, Atif Amin

Investigators Atif Amin of British customs and Alwari Essam of the Dubai police learn that the A. Q. Khan nuclear procurement ring has shipped ring magnets, key components for building centrifuges, from Pakistan to Libya, via Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The discovery is made when they visit a company called Deepsea Freight Services, a shipping agency that had been used by Abu Bakr Siddiqui, the subject of a British customs investigation, to ship goods from Britain to two Khan front companies in Pakistan, United Engineering and Trading Co. and Allied Engineering. The manager at Deepsea, K. Hafeez Uddin, shows the two investigators files about the traffic and they find documents about shipments of goods from Siddiqui in Britain to Dubai-based businessman Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, and then from Tahir to the Khan fronts in Pakistan. However, Amin then notices documents about shipments of the ring magnets from one of the front companies in Pakistan to Tahir in Dubai, and then on to Libya. The consignee for some of the ring magnet shipments is a company called Desert Electrical, a company the British intelligence service MI6 had warned Amin to avoid looking into (see March 2000). Amin asks to take the files, but Hafeez refuses permission, and also does not allow copies to be made, meaning the two investigators leave with no documentation. Hafeez will later make a series of contradictory statements about his business dealings with the Khan network, but a source on the British customs investigation will say, “The fact is that Deepsea received multiple shipments from Siddiqui and forwarded them on to Pakistan,” adding, “It also received multiple shipments from [Khan Research Laboratories]-related companies destined for Tahir’s front companies in Dubai.” [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 186-7]

Entity Tags: Deepsea Freight Services, Allied Engineering, Alwari Essam, Atif Amin, United Engineering and Trading Co., HM Customs and Excise, K. Hafeez Uddin

Category Tags: Libya, Western Intel on Pakistani Nukes, Britain, Atif Amin, United Arab Emirates

Immediately after an investigation by Atif Amin of British customs and Alwari Essam of the police in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, finds that Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan is shipping centrifuge components to Libya (see Late March 2000), Essam’s superiors impose heavy restrictions on the inquiry. There is a “widespread commotion” at police headquarters when they arrive back from conducting a key interview and they are confronted by a group of police officers. The two men are split up and Essam receives a 40-minute talk from his police bosses and Dubai’s internal security service telling him that what he and Amin have been doing has to stop. He is accused of helping Amin “reveal A. Q. Khan in Dubai,” and asked why Amin wants to know where Khan stays in Dubai. The security service even suggests that Amin is really an MI6 agent plotting to assassinate the Pakistani. New limitations are imposed on their inquiry:
bullet They cannot conduct interviews in the field, but witnesses and suspects have to be invited to police headquarters, and may decline to come. Amin will be allowed to submit questions, but will not be allowed to perform the interviews himself. However, if the interviews are to be used in a British court case, Amin has to perform them himself under British rules of law;
bullet If Atif wants materials or records, he cannot go and get them himself, but must ask the Dubai police to do so;
bullet In addition, Amin must give the Dubai police all the documents he has collected during the investigation, including those from the British section of the inquiry.
Amin is understandably angry at the restrictions, which will make it impossible to conduct a meaningful inquiry, but, as there is little he can do at this time, he decides to continue and try to get the restrictions lifted. He asks the Dubai police to get him a file containing documents about shipments from Khan front companies in Pakistan to Libya, but, when the file arrives, the Libyan documents have been removed and the file is noticeably thinner. [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 187-9]

Entity Tags: Atif Amin, Alwari Essam

Category Tags: Libya, Britain, United Arab Emirates, Atif Amin

British customs agent Atif Amin briefs the chief of station for the British intelligence service MI6 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, about the state of his investigation into the A. Q. Khan nuclear smuggling ring, but the station chief fails to disclose important information to Amin. Amin has found that Khan is not only procuring material for Pakistan’s nuclear program, but is also shipping centrifuge components to Libya (see Late March 2000). MI6 is already aware that Khan is moving material to Libya and has actually been monitoring these shipments in Dubai (see Second Half of 1999), but the station chief fails to mention this to Amin. In fact, MI6 had previously warned Amin to stay away from one of the companies involved in the shipments to Libya (see March 2000). Instead, the station chief insists that Amin narrate a detailed report of his investigation, which is then immediately sent to London. When writing down what Amin tells him, the station chief embellishes some of the facts, and Amin has to go through the report and have the embellishments taken out. [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 189-190]

Entity Tags: UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Atif Amin

Category Tags: Libya, Western Intel on Pakistani Nukes, Britain, United Arab Emirates, Atif Amin

The British intelligence service MI6 tells Atif Amin, a British customs agent investigating the A. Q. Khan nuclear smuggling ring in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, that the ring may attempt to kill him. However, Amin will later suspect that MI6 exaggerates these threats in an attempt to hamper his investigation. MI6 passes the news to Amin by having him woken at two o’clock in the morning at his Dubai hotel, and telling him to come down to the lobby, where he is met by the MI6 station chief and another customs agent.
Threats - At a table, the station chief leans over and whispers to Amin, “You’re at risk here,” and, when Amin seems not to understand the urgency of the threat, adds, “You’re in danger.” He also tells Amin, “You can’t stay here,” and: “You can’t keep doing what you’re doing. You have to get out.” The station chief then says he has received a telex from London that said Khan and his associates were discussing Amin and were angry about him. Apparently, physical reprisals had been mentioned, and, implying MI6 is monitoring Khan’s phone, the station chief says that the Pakistani scientist has called Amin—a Muslim—a “traitor” to the “cause.” The station chief adds, “These people are dangerous,” because: “They have assets in the local mafia they use for smuggling. They won’t hesitate to kill people.” He even suggests Amin might not be safe in his hotel and that he should move in with the other customs agent, Malcolm Nesbit. However, Amin does not regard the threats as serious and remains in his hotel.
Exaggerated - Later that day, Amin speaks to Nesbit on the phone and expresses the idea that the station chief may have been playing up the threat from Khan’s network. Nesbit agrees and suggests it is because Amin has stumbled across information showing that Khan is shipping nuclear technology to Libya (see Late March 2000). MI6 had been monitoring these shipments (see Second Half of 1999), had warned Amin off one of the companies involved (see March 2000), and had failed to disclose information about the Libyan shipments to him (see Late March 2000). Authors David Armstrong and Joe Trento will comment, “It seemed both Khan and MI6 shared an interest in shutting down Amin’s inquiry.” [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 190-191]

Entity Tags: UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Malcolm Nesbit, Joseph Trento, Atif Amin, David Armstrong

Category Tags: Libya, Western Intel on Pakistani Nukes, Britain, United Arab Emirates, Atif Amin

Euan Stewart, a senior official at British customs, talks to a high-level representative for the British intelligence service MI6 about a British customs investigation into the A. Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. According to lead investigator Atif Amin, who Stewart later tells about the discussion, the MI6 official compliments customs on its work, “Your man’s turned over far more stones over there than we’ve managed in the last few years and he’s found lots of insects crawling around underneath.” This is apparently a reference to Amin’s discovery that the network is shipping centrifuge components from Pakistan to Libya via Dubai (see Late March 2000). MI6 has been monitoring Khan’s operations in Dubai and knows a lot about them, but did not know of these components. However, the MI6 official then says, “If I was you, I’d get my man out of there.” This is seemingly a reference to threats coming from the Khan network against Amin (see Late March 2000) and also MI6’s displeasure at the investigation (see March 2000 and Late March 2000). Authors David Armstrong and Joe Trento will explain: “But while Amin had turned up valuable intelligence, he had also created what MI6 and the policy makers who control it perceived to be a quandary: Should they act on the intelligence, disrupt Khan’s network, and expose Libya’s nuclear program, or should they continue their monitoring operation? They chose the later option. In fact, it would be another three years before MI6 and its American counterpart finally deemed the time right to take action—a move that would be accompanied by great fanfare and self-congratulation. In the meantime, Khan’s network had been allowed to continue peddling its dangerous goods.” [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 192-193]

Entity Tags: UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), David Armstrong, Atif Amin, Joseph Trento, Euan Stewart

Category Tags: Libya, Western Intel on Pakistani Nukes, Britain, United Arab Emirates, Atif Amin

British customs recalls one of its agents, Atif Amin, from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, where he was investigating the A. Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network. Amin learns of his recall in a phone call from his acting boss, who tells him to “[g]et your ass on the next flight to London.” Amin protests, saying that threats that have apparently been made against him by the network are not as bad as is being made out (see Late March 2000), and that he could stay at the British embassy, rather than a hotel. However, his boss says that the orders have come from above and there can be no discussion. Amin had been about to interview a key Khan associate, Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, but is forced to return home before doing so. [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 191-192]

Entity Tags: Atif Amin, HM Customs and Excise

Category Tags: Western Intel on Pakistani Nukes, Britain, United Arab Emirates, Atif Amin

Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, a Malaysia-based associate of A. Q. Khan, pays $2 million into the account of Gulf Technical Industries (GTI), a Dubai-based company run by another of Khan’s associates named Peter Griffin. According to Griffin, Tahir told him the money was to pay for a workshop to manufacture spare parts for the Libyan oil industry (see August 1997), although in reality it is to pay for components for Libya’s nuclear weapons program. The workshop is understandably not built and Tahir regularly calls Griffin to ask him to transfer money to different accounts. Griffin will comment: “He’d say, ‘I promised to send some money, can you send it for me to [Gotthard] Lerch, to Gunes [Cire, both associates of Khan], to Nauman Shah [Khan’s son-in-law]?’” Griffin apparently does not ask any questions about the payments, of which there are at least nine. He will recall: “I did point out to Tahir at one stage that this money was coming out of the Libyan National Oil Company cash. He said, ‘Don’t worry, I’ll pay you back,’ and he did. The only problem, as I realized to my cost later, was I had no paperwork for these deals. Nothing to protect myself with.” Griffin is suspicious, but having known Tahir for years, not unduly so: “I was asked later if it had not appeared unusual to use money set aside for one thing to pay off another, without making any official receipts. But I said: ‘Tahir was a good friend. It was like a mate asking to borrow a fiver.’ But since there was nothing in writing I could not prove that Tahir had lied to me. I was disappointed. I’d known Tahir since he was a kid.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 366-367]

Entity Tags: Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, Gotthard Lerch, Gulf Technical Industries, Gunes Cire, Peter Griffin

Category Tags: Libya, United Arab Emirates

Two lathes ordered by Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, an associate of A. Q. Khan, are delivered to Dubai from Spain. The delivery is organized by another associate of Khan’s, Peter Griffin, who set up a company used by Khan’s network in Dubai in 1997 (see August 1997). “Again, he [Tahir] said they [the lathes] were for the Libyan National Oil Company,” Griffin will say. “They were 15.6 tons each, enormous machines as big as my living room, each costing $350,000. I delivered them to Dubai in July or August 2000. Tahir asked if I could rent some factory space and set them up so his clients could see them running.” However, the clients do not show up and Tahir calls a month later to say that the clients will take the lathes away. When the Khan network begins to unravel in early 2004, Griffin will learn that Tahir has told Malaysian authorities that the lathes were for the Libyan nuclear weapons program. Griffin will then investigate what happened to the lathes and learn from customs authorities in Dubai that Tahir had sent at least one of them to South Africa in November 2000, using a forged invoice from Gulf Technical Industries (GTI), a company owned by Griffin. Griffin will claim not to have known anything about the shipment to South Africa, but the freight is allegedly paid in Dubai by GTI. The delivery address is Tradefin Engineering, a metalworking company based in Vanderbijlpark, a town close to Johannesburg. Documents indicate the lathe remains in South Africa for 13 months, until it is shipped back to Dubai, apparently en route to Malaysia. Griffin will comment: “It was possible that it had been adapted while away in South Africa, modified to be able to perform very fine definition work, something it couldn’t do when it left my warehouse.” The lathe is dispatched to Malaysia in December 2001, apparently on the orders of a Mr. Hussain of GTI. However, Griffin will say that he does not employ anyone of that name and that the contact number Mr. Hussain gave was for SMB Distribution, a company owned by Tahir. Based on these events, authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will conclude that Tahir had attempted to frame Griffin for the deal. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 367]

Entity Tags: Catherine Scott-Clark, Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, Tradefin Engineering, Peter Griffin, Adrian Levy, Gulf Technical Industries, SMB Distribution

Category Tags: Libya, United Arab Emirates

Peter Griffin, an associate of A. Q. Khan’s who has been doing business with him for decades (see Summer 1976), decides to return to Europe. Griffin has spent the last several years in Dubai running a company called Gulf Technical Industries, which has been used for Khan’s assistance to Libya (see (July or August 2000) and July 2000). However, Griffin now decides to leave Dubai and return to Europe, where he takes up residence in a villa in France. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 365, 368]

Entity Tags: Peter Griffin

Category Tags: United Arab Emirates

Abu Bakr Siddiqui, a procurement agent for A. Q. Khan’s nuclear smuggling ring, is convicted in Britain on three counts of violating British export regulations. He had been shipping materials and technology to be used to build nuclear weapons, but his activities were uncovered by British customs (see May 7, 1999). The prosecution had argued that Siddiqui knew well that what he exported was destined for Pakistan’s nuclear program, and linked him to Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, a Dubai-based middleman in the network. Many of the details of Khan’s operations are revealed in court, but, due to obstruction by authorities in Dubai, not all of them can be submitted as evidence. [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 194] Siddiqui will be given an extremely lenient sentence (see October 8, 2001).

Entity Tags: Abu Bakr Siddiqui, Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir

Category Tags: Other Countries, Britain, United Arab Emirates, Atif Amin

A set of aluminum tubes arrives at the docks in Dubai addressed to a company called Gulf Technical Industries (GTI), which is owned by Peter Griffin, a long-time A. Q. Khan associate. Griffin will later recall that he gets a call from his office manager: “He said he’d been advised by a shipping company there was a consignment of aluminum tubes that had just arrived at Dubai docks for GTI but he could not find any record of us having ordered them.” Griffin realizes immediately that the aluminum tubes may well be for use in a nuclear weapons program by the Khan network. He will comment, “I sensed right away it was [Bukhary Sayed Abu] Tahir,” an associate of both Khan and Griffin (see August 1997). Griffin calls Tahir, who admits the tubes are really for him, but that he has used the name of Griffin’s company for the delivery. Although Griffin and Tahir have an ongoing business relationship, Griffin is angry at being used, and says: “This is the end of it. If you do anything like this again I’ll take you to court in Dubai. Do you hear?” It appears that the tubes are for Libya’s illicit nuclear weapons program, and that, in Griffin’s words, he is being set up “as the fall guy” if anything should go wrong. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 366-367]

Entity Tags: Peter Griffin, Gulf Technical Industries, Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir

Category Tags: Libya, United Arab Emirates

Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, an associate of A. Q. Khan, sends an emissary to see one of his business partners, Peter Griffin, to tell him to destroy all records of his dealings with Tahir. Griffin and Tahir have been assisting Khan’s activities for some time, but their most recent transactions concerned equipment for Libya’s outlaw nuclear program (see August 1997). Griffin will later say: “A Dubai sponsor who had helped us start up a company arrived on my doorstep in France in November or December 2003. He just turned up out of the blue. He had an important message from Tahir in Kuala Lumpur. He wanted me to destroy all records of our business together. I rang Tahir and asked what was going on. He said, ‘I can’t say, I can’t talk to you. Just destroy everything.’ I said, ‘No, these documents are my only insurance.’” At this time Tahir is under investigation by Malaysian authorities for nuclear proliferation activities in their country (see December 2001), and this is apparently an attempt to get Griffin to destroy documents showing he did not know the equipment he helped Tahir procure was for Libya’s nuclear program. If Griffin destroyed the documents, Tahir would be able to place a greater part of the blame on him. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 365-366]

Entity Tags: Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir, Peter Griffin

Category Tags: Libya, United Arab Emirates

Gulf Technical Industries, a Dubai-based company used by the A. Q. Khan proliferation network to facilitate Libya’s nuclear weapons program (see August 1997 and July 2000), collapses. The reason is that the firm, owned by long-term Khan associate Peter Griffin, suffers adverse publicity following Khan’s public confession to his nuclear proliferation activities (see February 4, 2004). This leads its local sponsor to pull out and its bank to close its accounts, meaning the company has to close. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 529]

Entity Tags: Gulf Technical Industries, Peter Griffin

Category Tags: United Arab Emirates

At some point after the A. Q. Khan network begins to unravel (see February 4, 2004), Saeed Buhary, the younger brother of one Khan’s most important associates, is arrested in Dubai. Buhary is the brother of Bukhary Sayed Abu Tahir and the chairman of SMB Distribution, a Dubai-based company Tahir owned that was involved in Khan’s proliferation operations. According to authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Buhary is locked up “without a proper trial” in a prison known as the “Jumeira Hilton,” which has “a reputation for harsh conditions.” Buhary will reportedly still be there in 2007. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 369, 529]

Entity Tags: SMB Distribution, Saeed Buhary

Category Tags: United Arab Emirates

Ordering 

Time period


Email Updates

Receive weekly email updates summarizing what contributors have added to the History Commons database

 
Donate

Developing and maintaining this site is very labor intensive. If you find it useful, please give us a hand and donate what you can.
Donate Now

Volunteer

If you would like to help us with this effort, please contact us. We need help with programming (Java, JDO, mysql, and xml), design, networking, and publicity. If you want to contribute information to this site, click the register link at the top of the page, and start contributing.
Contact Us

Creative Commons License Except where otherwise noted, the textual content of each timeline is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike