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Events Leading Up to the 2003 Invasion of Iraq

Pre-war Planning for Post-Hussein Iraq

Project: Events Leading Up to the 2003 Invasion of Iraq
Open-Content project managed by Derek, KJF, mtuck

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UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter attempts to leak a confidential United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) report on Iraq’s production of VX nerve agent to the American press (see June 10, 1998). The attempt spirals into an effort by Ahmed Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress (INC—see 1992-1996) to recruit Ritter’s help in crafting a plan for Chalabi’s INC, with American assistance, to overthrow Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and place Chalabi in control. Ritter becomes aware of a report from a US military laboratory that proves in 1991 Iraq had manufactured VX nerve agent and deployed it in missile warheads. The Iraqis have admitted to attempting to produce the deadly toxin, but have long insisted that they were never successful in producing weaponized VX. Although there is no reason to believe that Iraq retains active VX from its former chemical weapons program, UNSCOM officials are furious about having been lied to for years by the Iraqis. UNSCOM chief Richard Butler, involved in delicate negotiations with the Iraqi government on developing a “road map” for addressing numerous outstanding issues between Iraq and the UN, decides to keep the report under wraps. UNSCOM officials are even more outraged at Butler’s decision; many believe that Butler is acquiescing to Clinton administration officials who want to avoid a confrontation with Iraq and the UN. When Ritter offers to leak the document in Washington in such a way that would not be traced to the UNSCOM officials who have seen the report, they quickly slip him a copy of the report, and Ritter prepares to fly to Washington.
First Meeting with Chalabi - Ritter is already scheduled to meet with CIA officials about other intelligence support programs. He calls Randy Scheunemann, the national security adviser for Senator Trent Lott (R-MS), the Senate Majority Leader, and sets up a meeting to, as Ritter will later write, “discuss some new developments” regarding the Iraqis. Scheunemann agrees, and asks if Ritter would be willing to meet with Chalabi at Chalabi’s Georgetown townhouse. Ritter is nonplussed at the request, but decides that since he had already discussed Iraqi weapons of mass destruction with Chalabi in a meeting authorized by Butler (see January 27, 1998), this Georgetown meeting could be construed as a legitimate followup. Ritter agrees. Upon arriving at Washington’s National Airport, he is met by Chalabi’s driver, who takes him to Georgetown. Chalabi presents Ritter with what Ritter will later recall as “an ambitious program, including briefings to senators and their staffs.” The meeting lasts well into the night, and Ritter agrees to stay overnight in a guest room.
Leaking the Report - The next day, Ritter meets with the CIA and then with Scheunemann. Ritter gives Scheunemann the UNSCOM report and explains its significance. “If it could find its way into the press in a way that removed any UNSCOM fingerprints, this would be ideal,” he tells Scheunemann. “That way the data remains uncompromised, and yet politically Butler and the White House can’t ignore it.” Scheunemann says with a smile, “I think we can manage that.”
'The Chalabi Factor' - Scheunemann then takes Ritter to meet Lott, who seems more interested in Ritter’s interactions with Chalabi than in the report. “I hope you take some time to talk with him, and some other interesting people I think you will be meeting with” Lott tells Ritter. “Exchange ideas. See if you can help him in any way. We’re all on the same side here, and we have to start finding ways to break down some barriers others have constructed between us.” Ritter returns to Chalabi’s home, where he meets with Francis Brooke, Chalabi’s principal American adviser, and Max Singer, a conservative foreign policy expert who specializes in what Ritter will term “political warfare.” Scheunemann has asked Singer to write a paper called “The Chalabi Factor” that touts Chalabi as the man to lead a revolution that would result in the ouster of Hussein. Chalabi asked Singer to share the paper with Ritter. Singer has sketched out a scenario that envisions Chalabi and INC fighters capturing the southern oil fields around Basra, giving the INC a political and military foothold inside Iraq, and then rallying disenchanted Shi’ites and Kurds into supporting his insurgency. Ritter later recalls: “I was somewhat taken aback by the content of the Singer paper. I was on dangerous political ground here, a UN weapons inspector charged with the disarmament of Iraq, suddenly dabbling in the world of regime change. Far from advising me on issues of intelligence regarding Iraqi WMD, Ahmed Chalabi had turned the tables and had me advising him on how to overthrow Saddam Hussein.” The three are soon joined by Chalabi and Stephen Rademaker, the lawyer for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and, as Ritter later describes him, an unabashed member of the far right and a Chalabi supporter. The conversation does not center on arms control, as Ritter had originally planned to discuss, but regime change. The others are uninterested in Ritter’s suggestion that pressure be brought to bear on the Hussein regime over the VX discovery. “[W]e all know Saddam is cheating, and that his days are numbered,” Rademaker says. “What we don’t have is a plan on what we are going to do once Saddam is out of office. Mr. Chalabi represents our best hopes in that regard, which is why we’re delighted that you and he are meeting like this.”
Handling the Ba'athists - Ritter tells the others that the Shi’ites and Kurds cannot be treated as “homogeneous movement[s],” but as loose, fractious amalgamations of disparate elements. He then asks: “The key to me is what is missing here: any discussion of the Ba’ath Party or the Sunni tribes. The Ba’ath Party is the only vehicle that exists in Iraq today that unites Sunnis, Shi’a and Kurds alike. It makes modern Iraq function. How do you plan on dealing with the Ba’ath Party in a post-Saddam environment? And what is your plan for winning over the Sunni tribes? How will you bring the tribes that represent the foundation of Saddam’s political support into the fold with your Kurdish and Shi’a supporters?” As Ritter later writes: “Steve Rademaker and Francis Brooke stared blankly. Chalabi was grinning ear to ear. ‘We have a plan. First, we will do away completely with the Baath Party. Those minor members who were forced to join out of survival, of course, they will be allowed to retain their jobs. But anyone who profited from Baathist rule will be punished. As for the Sunni tribes, we are already in contact with their representatives. We feel that the best way to negotiate with them, however, is to make them realize that there is no future with Saddam. Once they realize that, they will come over to our side.’ Chalabi’s ‘plan’ struck me as simplistic at best, and entirely unrealistic.”
The Downing Plan - In answer to Ritter’s questions about defeating the Iraqi military—the large Iraqi Army, the well-trained Republican Guard and other security forces—Chalabi shows Ritter a document, “The Military Plan.” Chalabi says: “This was written for me by Gen. Wayne Downing. I believe you know him from Operation Desert Storm.” Downing had been a Special Forces commander during the 1991 Gulf War; Ritter had worked with Downing’s unit in preventing Iraqi missile launches at Israel (see January 17, 1991). Downing has crafted a plan (see Late 1998) that calls for the US to train and arm several thousand INC fighters who would operate out of bases in western Iraq, out of Hussein’s control. They would fight from light vehicles armed with anti-tank missile launchers, and would rely on support from local tribes in the area, particularly the al-Duleimi in and around Ramadi and Anbar. Ritter is dubious, knowing that the al-Duleimi have provided many of Hussein’s best soldiers. Chalabi is unworried about their support, and tells Ritter, “My people have already had discussions with the tribal leaders of the al-Duleimi, who are ready to join us once we get situated on the ground.” Ritter then objects to Downing’s inclusion of US military advisers and US warplanes, both directly supporting and perhaps even fighting alongside the INC troops. “We don’t operate like that,” Ritter objects. “If we have forces on the ground, then we’ll need to have a base, with a base support element, and base security, and a quick-reaction force in case some of our boys get in trouble. The US presence would have to be much greater than what you’re saying here.” Chalabi merely smiles. “That may be so,” he says, “but we don’t have to highlight it at this time.” Ritter later observes: “The ‘Downing Plan’ was a nice bit of trickery, plotting what was ostensibly an Iraqi opposition military force with minor US military involvement, but masking what was in reality a much larger US military effort with a minor role played by Chalabi’s INC ‘army.’” Ritter is now thoroughly alarmed.
'My Friend Ahmed' - The small group is joined by Danielle Pletka, Rademaker’s wife and a staunchly conservative staffer on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and former CIA director James Woolsey. Over dinner, the group moves from discussing the military plans for overthrowing Hussein to a broader discussion of Chalabi’s political future. Woolsey, a vocal supporter of Chalabi, has no patience with the CIA’s objections to earlier actions by Chalabi and the INC (see January 1996). “This [criticism] is all bunk,” Woolsey says. “Chalabi is an Iraqi patriot and visionary who intimidates many lesser thinkers in Langley. My friend Ahmed is a risk taker who understands the reality of Iraq, unlike the desk-bound analysts and risk-averse operators at the CIA. Chalabi scares these people, so they have created false accusations in order to denigrate him and ultimately destroy him.” Pletka agrees: “We cannot allow this to happen. Ahmed Chalabi has many friends in Congress, and it is our goal to make sure Ahmed Chalabi gets the support he needs to not only survive as a viable opposition figure to Saddam Hussein but more importantly to prevail in Iraq.” Ritter is increasingly uncomfortable with what he will later call “a political strategy session.” It is clear, Ritter will write, “that Chalabi was being groomed for another run at power” (see March 1995).
Recruitment - According to Ritter, Chalabi suggests that Ritter would be very helpful to his organization, and Chalabi could be helpful to Ritter in return. “I have many friends here in Washington,” Chalabi says over breakfast. “With what you know about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction, you can be of invaluable assistance to our cause. The VX story is but the tip of the iceberg.” Ritter will describe himself as “taken aback,” since he never told Chalabi about the VX lab report. Ritter replies: “Well, I am just a simple weapons inspector. In any event, it wouldn’t go over well back at the UN to have an UNSCOM inspector plotting regime change down in Washington, DC.” Then, locking eyes with Chalabi, Ritter says: “This is why you must be very discreet about the VX lab report. It simply won’t do for you to have your fingerprints on this information.” Chalabi smilingly replies: “I understand completely. As for your status as a weapons inspector, you must understand that those days are nearly gone. The inspection process has run its course. You need to think about what you are going to be doing in the future. I would like you to work for me.” Ritter objects, noting that an American citizen can’t be involved in plots to overthrow heads of foreign nations. Chalabi corrects Ritter: “You wouldn’t be working for me, but for the US Senate. My friends would create an advisory position for you, and you would in turn advise me. It wouldn’t pay much upfront. But don’t worry. One day I will be the president of Iraq, and will be in control of Iraq’s oil. When that day comes, I will not forget those who helped me in my time of need. Let’s just say that my friends will be given certain oil concessions that will make them very wealthy.”
Meeting with the Senator - Chalabi’s butler drives Ritter to meet with Pletka at the Capitol Building; the two go to the office of Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS), who is fully aware of the VX lab report. Brownback is angry that the Clinton administration is reluctant to fully assist the UNSCOM inspectors. “This will not stand,” he tells Ritter. “Believe me when I say you and your colleagues have friends here in the US Senate who will make sure America honors its commitments and obligations, especially when it comes to disarming a cruel tyrant such as Saddam Hussein.” Afterwards, Ritter and Pletka are joined by Rademaker in the Senate cafeteria, who says he has the ear of several influential Congressmen. “We’ve got their attention,” Rademaker says, “and I think you’ll find that serious pressure will be brought on the Clinton administration to better support your work.” Pletka and Ritter then meet Lott and Scheunemann again; Scheunemann once again asks Ritter for his future collaboration. Lott reassures Ritter that there would be no legal or ethical conflicts: “Well, maybe we can find a way to bring you down here working for us. That might be the most useful thing to do.” Leaving the Senate building, Ritter muses that “Chalabi’s schemes seemed to have some substance behind them.”
Long-Term Ramifications - Butler will drastically revise his report to the UN Security Council, and the news of a “major breakthrough” in disarmament work with the Iraqis is shelved. The Clinton administration will issue statesments publicly supporting the UNSCOM inspectors, undercutting behind-the-scenes attempts by National Security Adviser Sandy Berger and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to have the US pull back from blanket support of the inspections. Conservative Republicans will rally around the cause of Iraqi duplicity; Scheunemann will use the VX report to drum up support for the Iraqi Liberation Act, which will pass several months after Ritter’s dinner with Chalabi (see October 31, 1998). And Chalabi and the INC will become the leading candidates for replacing Hussein. Reflecting on Chalabi’s prominence in the Post report, Ritter will write, “After watching the Republicans build up Chalabi, I should have known that they could not have passed up this opportunity to interject his name into the limelight.”
Iraqis Truthful about VX - Later evidence and inspection findings show that the Iraqi scientists had been truthful: they had never succeeded in stabilizing VX, and had never filled any warheads with the nerve toxin. The lab results are later shown to be severely flawed. Ritter will write, “In the end, I was wrong to have pushed so hard to have the lab results made public.” [New Yorker, 6/7/2004; TruthDig, 3/17/2008]

Entity Tags: Washington Post, Stephen Rademaker, Wayne Downing, United Nations Special Commission, Sandy Berger, Trent Lott, Samuel Brownback, Scott Ritter, Richard Butler, Ahmed Chalabi, Central Intelligence Agency, Clinton administration, Danielle Pletka, Francis Brooke, James Woolsey, Randy Scheunemann, Iraqi National Congress, Max Singer, Madeleine Albright, Saddam Hussein

Category Tags: Alleged WMDs, Media Coverage, Politicization of Intelligence, Pre-war Planning, Chalabi and the INC

Photo of the cover of the Desert Crossing after-action briefing.Photo of the cover of the Desert Crossing after-action briefing. [Source: National Security Archives]The US Central Command, or CENTCOM (see October 1, 1986), conducts a series of war games called “Desert Crossing” centered on the scenario of Saddam Hussein being ousted as Iraq’s dictator. CENTCOM commander General Anthony Zinni will later say of the scenario, “I thought we ought to look at political reconstruction, economic reconstruction, security reconstruction, humanitarian need, services, and infrastructure development.” The game concludes that unless measures are taken, “fragmentation and chaos” will ensue after his overthrow. The after-action report finds that regime change may cause instability throughout the Middle East by giving impetus to “rival forces bidding for power” which, in turn, could cause societal “fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines” and antagonize “aggressive neighbors.” Securing borders and civil order may not be enough to restabilize Iraq, the report speculates, if the new government is perceived as either weak, subservient to outside governments, or out of touch with other Middle Eastern governments. The report finds that an exit strategy would be complicated by differing ideas for how a post-Saddam Iraq should be. Any US-supported transitional government will find it difficult to restrain various factions from pursuing their own tribal and sectarian vendettas against one another, the report finds. The game is quickly forgotten; years later, when the Bush administration will begin planning for its invasion of Iraq, the retired Zinni will recommend that his successors “dust off Desert Crossing,” and they will respond: “What’s that? Never heard of it.” [John Prados, 11/4/2006; Roberts, 2008, pp. 125, 233]

Entity Tags: Anthony Zinni, Saddam Hussein, US Central Command, Bush administration (43)

Category Tags: Pre-9/11 Plans for War, Pre-war Planning, Predictions, The Decision to Invade

“Within weeks” of taking office, the Bush administration begins planning for a post-Saddam Iraqi government. The State Department convenes a series of secret discussions attended by prominent Iraqi expatriates, many with ties to US industries, to plan for a post-Saddam Iraq. The meetings are held in the home of Falah Aljibury, an adviser to OPEC, Goldman Sachs, and Amerada Hess’s oil trading arm. He also served as Ronald Reagan’s backchannel to Saddam Hussein during the 1980s. According to Aljibury, the discussion group, led by Pamela Quanrud, an NSC economics expert, quickly evolves into an “oil group.” The plan they develop is said to represent the views of the oil industry and the State Department. According to the plan, Saddam Hussein would be replaced by some former Baathist general, while the rest of the government would continue to function as before. One of the candidates that is considered to head post-Saddam Iraq is Gen. Nizar Khazrahi (see Between February 2001 and February 2003), who is under house arrest in Denmark awaiting trial for war crimes. “The petroleum industry, the chemical industry, the banking industry—they’d hoped that Iraq would go for a revolution like in the past and government was shut down for two or three days,” Aljibury will later tell reporter Greg Palast. “You have martial law… and say Iraq is being liberated and everybody stay where they are… Everything as is.” [BBC Newsnight, 3/17/2005; Democracy Now!, 3/21/2005; Harper's, 4/2005, pp. 74-76]

Entity Tags: Falah Aljibury, Pamela Quanrud, Bush administration (43), Nizar Khazrahi

Category Tags: Motives, Pre-9/11 Plans for War, Pre-war Planning

The Bush White House holds its second National Security Council meeting. Like the first meeting (see January 30, 2001), the issue of regime change in Iraq is a central topic. [CBS News, 1/10/2004; New York Times, 1/12/2004] Officials discuss a memo titled “Plan for post-Saddam Iraq,” which talks about troop requirements, establishing war crimes tribunals, and divvying up Iraq’s oil wealth. [ [Sources: Paul O’Neill] Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld interrupts Colin Powell’s discussion of UN-based sanctions against Iraq, saying, “Sanctions are fine. But what we really want to discuss is going after Saddam.” He continues, “Imagine what the region would look like without Saddam and with a regime that’s aligned with US interests. It would change everything in the region and beyond it. It would demonstrate what US policy is all about.” [Suskind, 2004, pp. 85-86 Sources: Paul O’Neill] According to Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill, Rumsfeld talks at the meeting “in general terms about post-Saddam Iraq, dealing with the Kurds in the north, the oil fields, the reconstruction of the country’s economy, and the ‘freeing of the Iraqi people.’” [New York Times, 1/12/2004 Sources: Paul O’Neill] Other people, in addition to O’Neill, Bush, and Rumsfeld, who are likely in attendance include Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers. [US President, 2/13/2001]

Entity Tags: Paul O’Neill, George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, George J. Tenet, Richard B. Myers

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Pre-9/11 Plans for War, Pre-war Planning, The Decision to Invade, Key Events Related to DSM

Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz create a secretive, ad hoc intelligence bureau within the Pentagon that they mockingly dub “The Cabal.” This small but influential group of neoconservatives is tasked with driving US foreign policy and intelligence reporting towards the goal of promoting the invasion of Iraq. To this end, the group—which later is folded into the slightly more official Office of Special Plans (OSP) (see 2002-2003)—gathers and interprets raw intelligence data for itself, refusing the participation of the experts in the CIA and DIA, and reporting, massaging, manipulating, and sometimes falsifying that information to suit their ends. [New Yorker, 5/12/2003] In October 2005, Larry Wilkerson, Secretary of State Colin Powell’s chief of staff, will say of the Cabal and the OSP (see October 2005), “What I saw was a cabal between the vice president of the United States, Richard Cheney, and the secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, on critical issues that made decisions that the bureaucracy did not know were being made. Now it is paying the consequences of making those decisions in secret, but far more telling to me is America is paying the consequences.” [Financial Times, 10/20/2005]

Kellogg Brown & Root, a subsidiary of Halliburton, wins a 10-year no-bid contract to provide the Pentagon with support services in Iraq—everything from fighting oil-well fires to building military bases to feeding and housing soldiers. Vice President Dick Cheney is the former CEO of Halliburton. When he was defense secretary under George H. W. Bush, Cheney had pushed to outsource many of the military’s logistical and support functions to private contractors, part of what Vanity Fair will later term “a broader effort to transfer government functions of all kinds to the private sector.” [Vanity Fair, 2/2009]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Halliburton, Inc., Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Kellogg, Brown and Root

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning, The Decision to Invade

The Bush administration develops plans for post-war Iraq. But the process is plagued with infighting between a small, highly secretive group of planners in the Pentagon and experts at the CIA and State Department who are involved with the “Future of Iraq Project” (see April 2002-March 2003). The two opposing groups disagree on a wide range of topics, but it is the Pentagon group which exerts the strongest influence on the White House’s plans (see Fall 2002) for administering post-Saddam Iraq. One State Department official complains to The Washington Post in October 2002 “that the Pentagon is seeking to dominate every aspect of Iraq’s postwar reconstruction.” The group of Pentagon planners includes several noted neoconservatives who work in, or in association with, the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans (see September 2002) and the Near East/South Asia bureau. The planners have close ties to the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), two think tanks with a shared vision of reshaping the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East in favor of US and Israeli interests. The Pentagon planning group “had a visionary strategy that it hoped would transform Iraq into an ally of Israel, remove a potential threat to the Persian Gulf oil trade and encircle Iran with US friends and allies,” Knight Ridder Newspapers will later observe. The group’s objectives put it at odds with planners at the CIA and State Department whose approach and objectives are much more prudent. The Pentagon unit works independently of the CIA and State Department and pays little attention to the work of those two agencies. Critics complain that the group is working in virtual secrecy and evading the scrutiny and oversight of others involved in the post-war planning process by confining their inter-agency communications to discussions with their neoconservative colleagues working in other parts of the government. The Pentagon planners even have a direct line to the office of Dick Cheney where their fellow neoconservative, Lewis Libby, is working. [Daily Telegraph, 11/12/2002; Washington Post, 4/2/2003; Knight Ridder, 7/12/2003] In the fall of 2002, the various groups involved in planning for post-war Iraq send their recommendations to the White House’s Executive Steering Committee, which reviews their work and then passes on its own recommendations to the cabinet heads (see Fall 2002). According to a July 2003 report by Knight Ridder Newspapers, the ultimate responsibility for deciding the administration’s post-war transition plans lay with Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. [Knight Ridder, 7/12/2003]
The Office of Special Plans -
bullet The civilian planners at the Pentagon believe that the UN should exert no influence over the structure, make-up, or policy of the interim Iraqi post-Saddam government. They seek to limit the UN’s role to humanitarian and reconstruction projects, and possibly security. The State Department, however, believes that the US will not be able to do it alone and that UN participation in post-Saddam Iraq will be essential. [Los Angeles Times, 4/2/2003; Observer, 4/6/2003]
bullet The Pentagon group wants to install Ahmad Chalabi, the controversial Iraqi exile leader of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), as leader of post-Saddam Iraq. [American Prospect, 5/1/2003; Knight Ridder, 7/12/2003 Sources: Richard Perle] The group thinks that the Iraqis will welcome Chalabi, who claims he has a secret network inside and outside the Ba’ath government which will quickly fill in the power vacuum to restore order to the country. Chalabi is a notorious figure who is considered untrustworthy by the State Department and CIA and who has a history of financial misdealings. [Knight Ridder, 7/12/2003] But the Pentagon is said to be enamored with Chalabi “because he [advocates] normal diplomatic relations with Israel” which they believe will “‘[take] off the board’ one of the only remaining major Arab threats to Israeli security.” Another geopolitical benefit to installing Chalabi is that he can help the US contain “the influence of Iran’s radical Islamic leaders in the region, because he would… [provide] bases in Iraq for US troops,” which would “complete Iran’s encirclement by American military forces around the Persian Gulf and US friends in Russia and Central Asia.” [Knight Ridder, 7/12/2003 Sources: Unnamed Bush administration official] Danielle Pletka, vice president of the American Enterprise Institute, with close ties to the Pentagon’s planning group, tells Robert Dreyfuss of American Prospect Magazine that the State Department’s perception of Chalabi is wrong. “The [Defense Department] is running post-Saddam Iraq,” said Pletka, almost shouting. “The people at the State Department don’t know what they are talking about! Who the hell are they?… the simple fact is, the president is comfortable with people who are comfortable with the INC.” [American Prospect, 5/1/2003]
bullet The Pentagon’s planning unit believes that the Iraqis will welcome US troops as liberators and that any militant resistance will be short-lived. They do not develop a contingency plan for persistent civil unrest. [Knight Ridder, 7/12/2003] However the State Department’s “Future of Iraq” planning project is more prudent, noting that Iraqis will likely be weary of US designs on their country. [New York Times, 10/19/2003]
bullet The Pentagon planners believe that Iraq’s oil reserves—estimated to contain some 112 billion barrels of oil—should be used to help fund the reconstruction of Iraq. They also advocate a plan that would give the US more control over Iraq’s oil. “[The Pentagon] hawks have long argued that US control of Iraq’s oil would help deliver a second objective,” reports the Observer. “That is the destruction of OPEC, the oil producers’ cartel, which they argue is ‘evil’—that is, incompatible with American interests.” The State Department, however, believes such aggressive policies will surely infuriate Iraqis and give credence to suspicions that the invasion is motivated by oil interests. One critic of the plan says “that only a puppet Iraqi government would acquiesce to US supervision of the oil fields and that one so slavish to US interests risks becoming untenable with Iraqis.” [Observer, 11/3/2002; Insight, 12/28/2002]

Entity Tags: Project for the New American Century, American Enterprise Institute, Donald Rumsfeld, Ahmed Chalabi, Danielle Pletka, Office of Special Plans, Condoleezza Rice

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning, Chalabi and the INC, Office of Special Plans

In a memo to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw advises the prime minister on his upcoming visit to Crawford, Texas (see April 6-7, 2002), where he is to discuss Britain’s role in the US confrontation with Iraq. Straw says that they “have a long way to go to convince” their colleagues in the Labor Party that military action against Iraq is necessary. He notes that “in the documents so far presented, it has been hard to glean whether the threat from Iraq is so significantly different from that of Iran and North Korea as to justify military action.” He points out that “there has been no credible evidence to link Iraq with [Osama bin Laden] and al-Qaeda” and that “the threat from Iraq has not worsened as a result of September 11.” Another issue that needs to be resolved, according to Straw, concerns establishing a legal basis for military action. “I believe that a demand for the unfettered readmission of weapons inspectors is essential, in terms of public explanation, and in terms of legal sanction for any subsequent military action.” The “big question,” Straw notes, which seems “to be a larger hole in this than anything,” is that the Bush administration has not “satisfactorily answered how that regime change is to be secured, and how there can be any certainty that the replacement regime will be better. Iraq has had no history of democracy so no one has this habit or experience.” [United Kingdom, 3/25/2002 pdf file; Washington Post, 6/12/2005]

Entity Tags: Tony Blair, Jack Straw

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: Key Events Related to DSM, Alleged Al-Qaeda Ties, Legal Justification, Pre-war Planning

The Future of Iraq dossier cover.The Future of Iraq dossier cover. [Source: Representational Pictures]The US State Department begins the “Future of Iraq” project aimed at developing plans for post-Saddam Iraq. The project eventually evolves into the collaborative effort of some 17 working groups involving more than 200 exiled Iraqi opposition figures and professionals including jurists, academics, engineers, scientists, and technical experts. These groups meet on numerous occasions over the next eight to ten months, preparing plans to address a wide range of issues. The 17 working groups include: Public Health and Humanitarian Needs; Water, Agriculture and the Environment; Public Finance and Accounts; Transitional Justice; Economy and Infrastructure; Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, and Migration Policy; Foreign and National Security Policy; Defense Institutions and Policy; Civil Society Capacity-Building; Public and Media Outreach; Economic and Infrastructure; Local Government; Anti-Corruption Measures; Oil and Energy; Education; Free Media; and Democratic Principles. [US Department of State, 1/22/2002; United Press International, 6/5/2002; US Department of State, 10/4/2002; US Department of State, 10/11/2002; US Department of State, 10/11/2002; Assyrian International News Agency, 10/31/2002; Washington File, 12/16/2002; Washington File, 12/16/2002; US Department of State, 12/19/2002; Washington File, 2/3/2003; Detroit Free Press, 2/10/2003; US Department of State, 2/12/2003; US Department of State, 4/23/2003 pdf file; New York Times, 10/19/2003; US News and World Report, 11/25/2003]
Problems and Setbacks - The project suffers from a serious lack of interest and funds. In July, The Guardian reports: “Deep in the bowels of the US State Department, not far from the cafeteria, there is a small office identified only by a handwritten sign on the door reading: ‘The Future of Iraq Project.‘… [T]he understaffed and underfunded Future of Iraq Project has been spending more effort struggling with other government departments than plotting Saddam’s downfall.” [Guardian, 7/10/2002] More than a month after the invasion, several of the project’s 17 working groups will still have not met. [Roberts, 2008, pp. 126]
Achievements - The $5 million project ultimately produces 13 volumes of reports consisting of some 2,000 pages of what is described as varying quality. The New York Times will later report, “A review of the work shows a wide range of quality and industriousness.” [New York Times, 10/19/2003] The newspaper cites several examples:
bullet “[T]he transitional justice working group, made up of Iraqi judges, law professors, and legal experts… met four times and drafted more than 600 pages of proposed reforms in the Iraqi criminal code, civil code, nationality laws and military procedure.” [New York Times, 10/19/2003]
bullet “The group studying defense policy and institutions expected problems if the Iraqi Army was disbanded quickly.… The working group recommended that jobs be found for demobilized troops to avoid having them turn against allied forces.” [New York Times, 10/19/2003]
bullet “The democratic principles working group wrestled with myriad complicated issues from reinvigorating a dormant political system to forming special tribunals for trying war criminals to laying out principles of a new Iraqi bill of rights.” [New York Times, 10/19/2003]
bullet “The transparency and anticorruption working group warned that ‘actions regarding anticorruption must start immediately; it cannot wait until the legal, legislative and executive systems are reformed.’” [New York Times, 10/19/2003]
bullet “The economy and infrastructure working group warned of the deep investments needed to repair Iraq’s water, electrical, and sewage systems.” [New York Times, 10/19/2003]
bullet “The free media working group noted the potential to use Iraq’s television and radio capabilities to promote the goals of a post-Hussein Iraq.” [New York Times, 10/19/2003]
Impact of the Project's Work - After the US and British invasion of Iraq, Knight Ridder will report, “Virtually none of the ‘Future of Iraq’ project’s work was used.” [Knight Ridder, 7/12/2003] It was “ignored by Pentagon officials,” the New York Times will also observe. [New York Times, 10/19/2003] Iraq expert and former CIA analyst Judith Yaphe, who is one of the American experts involved in the “Future of Iraq” project, will tell American Prospect magazine in May 2003: “[The Office of the Secretary of Defense] has no interest in what I do.” She will also complain about how the Defense Department prevented the State Department from getting involved in the post-war administration of Iraq. “They’ve brought in their own stable of people from AEI [American Enterprise Institute], and the people at the State Department who worked with the Iraqi exiles are being kept from [Jay] Garner,” she will explain. [American Prospect, 5/1/2003] One of those people is Tom Warrick, the “Future of Iraq” project director. When retired Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, the first US administrator in Iraq, requests that Warrick join his staff, Pentagon civilians veto the appointment. [Knight Ridder, 7/12/2003; New York Times, 10/19/2003] Other sources will also say that the Pentagon purposefully ignored the work of the “Future of Iraq” project. Air Force Lt. Col. Karen Kwiatkowski, who retires from the Pentagon’s Near East/South Asia bureau on July 1, will tell Knight Ridder Newspapers that she and her colleagues were instructed by Pentagon officials in the Office of Special Plans to ignore the State Department’s concerns and views. “We almost disemboweled State,” Kwiatkowski will recall. [Knight Ridder, 7/12/2003] After the fall of Saddam Hussein, critics will say that several of the post-war problems encountered could have been avoided had the Pentagon considered the warnings and recommendations of the “Future of Iraq” project. [American Prospect, 5/1/2003; New York Times, 10/19/2003]

Entity Tags: US Department of State, Jay Garner, Judith Yaphe, US Department of Defense, Tom Warrick, Karen Kwiatkowski

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning

The British Cabinet Office issues an eight-page briefing note to prepare officials for an upcoming meeting (see July 23, 2002) on Britain’s role in the United States’ confrontation with Iraq. The paper, titled “Conditions for Military Action,” addresses a number of issues including US invasion and post-war planning, legal justification for the use of military force, and what the US and British hope to achieve through “regime change.” [United Kingdom, 7/21/2002; London Times, 5/2/2005; Newsweek, 6/15/2005]
British support for use of military force against Iraq - The briefing summarizes the main points of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s April meeting (see April 6-7, 2002) with President Bush, recalling that Blair pledged British support for “military action to bring about regime change” as long as “certain conditions” were met. Blair told Bush that the US and Britain would have to first develop a strategy to build a coalition and “shape public opinion.” Additionally, Britain would prefer that all “options for action to eliminate Iraq’s WMD through the UN weapons inspectors [are] exhausted” and that the Israel-Palestine crisis be quiescent before going to war against Iraq. [United Kingdom, 7/21/2002]
US objectives in Iraq - The briefing paper reports that US military planners see the removal of Saddam Hussein as the primary objective, to be “followed by [the] elimination of Iraqi WMD [weapons of mass destruction].” The briefing notes that within the British government there are doubts that “regime change,” by itself, would be sufficient to gain control over any WMD present in Iraq. [United Kingdom, 7/21/2002]
Creating conditions necessary for legal justification - Noting that “US views of international law vary from that of the UK and the international community,” the briefing paper makes it clear that the British government believes “[r]egime change per se is not a proper basis for military action under international law.” Because Blair told Bush in April that the British would support military action against Iraq, it will be necessary develop a realistic political strategy that would involve, among other things, working with the US to create “the conditions necessary to justify government military action.” It is suggested in the briefing note that an Iraqi refusal to cooperate with weapons inspections could help create such conditions. Saddam Hussein would “likely” agree to admit inspectors and allow them to operate freely during the first six months of inspections when UNMOVIC is in the process of establishing a monitoring and verification system. After this point, the briefing notes, Hussein would probably begin limiting cooperating with inspectors. This would likely not occur until January 2003. Another alternative—one that would provide a legal basis for “regime change” much sooner—is that “an ultimatum could be cast in terms which Saddam would reject… and which would not be regarded as unreasonable by the international community.” [United Kingdom, 7/21/2002; London Times, 5/2/2005; Guardian, 5/2/2005; Daily Telegraph, 5/4/2005; Los Angeles Times, 5/12/2005]
US invasion plan - According to the briefing paper, US military planners seem to favor an invasion plan that would provide a “running start” to the ground invasion. It would consist of “[a]ir strikes and support for opposition groups in Iraq [that] would lead initially to small-scale land operations.” It would likely begin around November 2002 “with no overt military build-up,” followed by the ground invasion that could commence as early as January 2003. The other option under consideration is the “generated start” plan, which would involve a longer build-up. [United Kingdom, 7/21/2002; London Times, 5/2/2005]
US post-war plan - The briefing paper notes that US “military planning for action against Iraq is proceeding apace” —but with “little thought” to issues such as “the aftermath and how to shape it.” It predicts that a “post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise.” The Pentagon’s plans “are virtually silent on this point,” the document notes, warning of the possibility that “Washington could look to [the British] to share a disproportionate share of the burden.” [United Kingdom, 7/21/2002; Washington Post, 6/12/2005]

Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Tony Blair

Category Tags: Key Events Related to DSM, Legal Justification, Pre-war Planning, Predictions, Propaganda, The Decision to Invade

Top British officials attend a meeting to discuss Britain’s potential role in the Bush administration’s confrontation with Iraq. According to the minutes of the meeting, transcribed by Matthew Rycroft, Sir Richard Dearlove, head of the British intelligence service, MI6, says that during his last visit (see July 20, 2002) to Washington he noticed a “perceptible shift in attitude. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and [weapons of mass destruction]. But the intelligence and the facts were being fixed around the policy.” Furthermore, he states, Bush’s National Security Council indicated it “had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record.” He also noted that there “was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.” [United Kingdom, 7/23/2002; Salon, 5/6/2005; Los Angeles Times, 5/12/2005] Foreign Minister Jack Straw appears to agree with Dearlove’s assessment, saying that it seems clear that President Bush has already decided on using military force to depose Saddam Hussein. But Straw notes that the Bush administration’s case against Saddam was “thin.” The Iraqi leader “was not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea, or Iran,” the minutes say, summarizing his remarks. [Guardian, 5/2/2005; Los Angeles Times, 5/12/2005] There is no indication in the minutes that anyone present at the meeting disputed Dearlove’s or Straw’s observations. [United Kingdom, 7/23/2002] Furthermore, the account provided by the intelligence official and Straw are corroborated by a former senior US official who is later interviewed by Knight Ridder. It is “an absolutely accurate description of what transpired,” the official will say. [Knight Ridder, 5/2/2005] Straw proposes that the next step would be to “work up an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors,” which “would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.” [Guardian, 5/2/2005; Los Angeles Times, 5/12/2005] Britain’s attorney general, Lord Peter Goldsmith, warns that “the desire for regime change [is] not a legal base for military action,” the minutes say. But Blair says that “it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors.” [Los Angeles Times, 5/12/2005] Finally, the officials agree that the British government “should continue to work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action” but “not ignore the legal issues.” [Guardian, 5/2/2005] The minutes do not provide any indication that officials discussed how war might be avoided. [Salon, 6/10/2005] The minutes of this meetings will be revealed by the British Sunday Times three years later (see May 1, 2005). Commonly referred to as the “Downing Street Memo,” the minutes will re-spark the controversy over politicized intelligence.

Entity Tags: Richard Wilson, Michael Boyce, Peter Henry Goldsmith, Richard Dearlove, Jonathan Powell, Geoff Hoon, Jack Straw, Alastair Campbell, Francis Richards, Sally Morgan, John Scarlett, Tony Blair

Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

Category Tags: The Decision to Invade, Key Events Related to DSM, Key Events Related to DSM, The Decision to Invade, Pre-war Planning, Legal Justification, Propaganda

A panel of experts on Iraq warns the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that administering Iraq after the toppling of Saddam’s government will be expensive and difficult. The panel says that “there are no obvious successors to Saddam Hussein and that the Bush administration should be prepared to help install and protect a pro-American government if it decides to topple him—a proposition, they added, that would be long and expensive,” the New York Times reports. “Nearly all the experts argued that setting up a stable, pro-Western government in Baghdad would require a huge infusion of aid and a long term commitment of American troops to maintain peace.” [New York Times, 8/2/2002] Phebe Marr, a professor from the National Defense University who has written prolifically on Iraq, tells the panel, “If the US is going to take the responsibility for removing the current leadership, it should assume that it cannot get the results it wants on the cheap.” Scott Feil, a retired Army colonel who studies postwar reconstruction programs, says that 75,000 troops will be needed in Iraq to stabilize the country after Saddam is removed from power. He estimates that such a deployment will cost in excess of $16 billion per year. After the first 12 months, the colonel says that the force could be reduced in number, possibly to as low as 5,000, though this military presence would have to be maintained for at least another five years. In contrast, Caspar W. Weinberger, the secretary of defense under President Ronald Reagan argues that the United States will not need to undertake a major effort in rebuilding Iraq. [New York Times, 8/2/2002]

Entity Tags: Phebe Marr, Caspar Weinberger, Scott Feil

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning, Predictions

Military planners in the US’s Central Command (CENTCOM) finalize their plans for invading Iraq. “[T]he end state for this operation is regime change [with] an acceptable provisional/permanent government in place,” the plans read. However, the plans do not tell how the goal of an acceptable, permanent government will be achieved. They do not even address what US troops should do once they reach Baghdad. Public policy professor Alasdair Roberts will later write that there are what he will call two main reasons for “CENTCOM’s neglect.” One, “occupation and reconstruction [are] not a core function for the military” (see May 14, 2004). The military has no real component for performing such tasks, and most military commanders have little interest in the subject, Roberts will write. Two, other government agencies, most notably the State Department, have responsibility for this subject. CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks tells subordinates that once Saddam Hussein is overthrown, the State Department will take the lead in directing the occupation and reconstruction. [Roberts, 2008, pp. 125]

Entity Tags: US Department of State, Alasdair Roberts, US Central Command, Thomas Franks

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning, Predictions

General Frederick Kroesen.General Frederick Kroesen. [Source: US Army]General Frederick Kroesen, a former commander of US forces in Europe, warns that the Pentagon seems to be embarking on a “campaign based on hope” in its planning for an Iraq invasion and occupation. If the Defense Department’s assumptions of an easy victory and a welcoming populace prove faulty, Kroesen warns, the occupation could become a disaster. [Roberts, 2008, pp. 141]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Frederick Kroesen

Category Tags: Internal Opposition, Pre-war Planning, Predictions

Washington Post syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer, speaking on “Inside Washington” in a discussion with fellow Post columnist Charlie King and Post military reporter Thomas Ricks, argues in favor of the Bush administration’s policy on Iraq. At one point, moderator Gordan Petersons asks what the US should do after deposing Saddam Hussein. Krauthammer responds: “We don’t speak about exit strategies; this is not Bosnia, or Haiti, or the Balkans. This is very important, everybody understands it, we are not going to run away. We are going to get there, and we are going to stay. We are going to try to make a reasonably civil society, reasonably pro-American, a good influence on the neighbors, and disarmed. That’s a large undertaking, and I think we are absolutely [unintelligible] everybody who is supporting the war or the invasion is in favor of staying and doing the job.” When Thomas Ricks notes that Krauthammer’s proposal would involve nine of the US Army’s ten active-duty divisions, he counters, “That assumption is entirely unwarranted. I think we will be accepted as liberators, as we were in Afghanistan.” He also shoots down a comment from Peterson referring to the cost of invading Iraq. “If we win the war, we are in control of Iraq, it is the single largest source of oil in the world, it’s got huge reserves, which have been suppressed because of Iraq’s actions, and Saddam’s. We will have a bonanza, a financial one, at the other end, if the war is successful,” Krauthammer explains. [WUSATV, 8/3/2002; Unger, 2007, pp. 289]

Entity Tags: Charlie King, Charles Krauthhammer, Thomas Ricks, Washington Post

Category Tags: Media Coverage, Motives, Pre-war Planning

After dinner at the White House, Secretary of State Colin Powell speaks privately with George W. Bush and convinces him that international backing would be crucial for an invasion of Iraq and the inevitable occupation that would follow. Powell cites polls which indicate that a majority of Americans favor seeking a UN resolution. Bush reluctantly agrees. [Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp. 284]

Entity Tags: Colin Powell, George W. Bush

Category Tags: Legal Justification, Pre-war Planning

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger joins Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and his advisers for a meeting. Describing the meeting, the New York Times reports three days later that they “have decided that they should focus international discussion on how Iraq would be governed after Mr. Hussein—not only in an effort to assure a democracy but as a way to outflank administration hawks and slow the rush to war, which many in the department oppose.” [New York Times, 8/16/2002]

Entity Tags: Colin Powell, Henry A. Kissinger

Category Tags: Internal Opposition, Pre-war Planning

The British government is “shocked” when it learns “that in the postwar period, the Defense Department would still be running the show.” [Washington Post, 6/12/2005]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning

Dismayed at the lack of post-invasion planning in the Defense Department (see August 2002), the Joint Chiefs of Staff advance their own proposal for a military command to govern Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld insists on a split between military and civilian functions; he places Undersecretary for Policy Douglas Feith in charge of planning for the civilian administration. Feith, whom CENTCOM commander Tommy Franks calls “the dumbest f_cking guy on the planet,” is an academic with no experience at administration on such a level, and will be roundly excoriated for his incompetence in handling the assignment. Author and public administration professor Alasdair Roberts will later write that beyond Feith’s lack of competence is a bureaucratic failure: the Pentagon “was simply reaching beyond its abilities.” A RAND report will later find the Defense Department “lacked experience, expertise, funding authority, local knowledge, and established contacts with other potential civilian organizations” to do the task it had set for itself. Roberts will write that the Pentagon will substitute improvisation for meticulous planning (see January 2003). [Roberts, 2008, pp. 126, 134]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Alasdair Roberts, Donald Rumsfeld, Douglas Feith, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Thomas Franks, RAND Corporation

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning

The Bush White House establishes a “high-level, interagency task force” charged with the task of “coordinating all Iraq war planning efforts and postwar initiatives.” The task force is headed by the Deputies Committee, which is made up of the “No. 2 officials at the Pentagon, Joint Chiefs of Staff, State Department, CIA, National Security Council, and vice president’s office.” The committee’s job is to review the work of other groups who have been involved in the planning of post-war Iraq, and provide recommendations to President Bush’s top advisers. The committee draws on the work of the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans (OSP) (see 2002-2003 and September 2002), Elliott Abrams’s group (see November 2002-December 2002 and December 2002) and the State Department’s “Future of Iraq” project (see April 2002-March 2003). Later accounts make clear that Abrams’s and the OSP’s recommendations have much more influence. The Deputies Committee usually meets in the White House situation room. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice keeps Bush updated on the progress of the task force’s work. In November, US News and World Report reports that a consensus is forming “at the highest levels of the Bush administration over how to run the country after Saddam and his regime are history.” [Financial Times, 11/4/2002; US News and World Report, 11/25/2003; Reuters, 11/25/2003]
Some Conclusions of the Deputies Committee -
No US-Created Government - The US should not create a provisional government or a government in exile. “We are not going to be in the business of choosing” who should lead Iraq, a senior official tells US News and World Report. [US News and World Report, 11/25/2003]
Lengthy Occupation - The invasion of Iraq will likely be followed by a lengthy occupation. This conclusion is passed on to Bush. “I have been with the president when he has been briefed about the need to have US forces there for an extended period of time,” a senior administration official will later tell US News and World Report. [US News and World Report, 11/25/2003]
Military Occupation Rule before Turning over Rule to Iraqis - During the first phase of the occupation, Iraq will be ruled by the military, probably a US general. The primary objective during this phase will be maintaining security and preventing the emergence of hostilities between the Shi’ites and Sunnis. Pentagon officials involved in planning this stage are reported to have reviewed the archived plans for the occupation of Germany and Japan. The second phase of the occupation will involve some sort of international civilian administration, with a diminished US military presence, and Iraqis will be given a larger role in the government. In the last phase, a constitution will be drafted, transferring power to a representative, multiethnic Iraqi government that commits to being free of weapons of mass destruction. [US News and World Report, 11/25/2003]
War Paid for by Iraqi Oil - Revenue generated from the sale of Iraq’s oil will be used for the cost of reconstruction and for conducting humanitarian operations. Hardliners however want the funds to pay for the military costs of the invasion as well. [US News and World Report, 11/25/2003]
Dissension over Roles of Iraqi Exiles - No firm decisions are made about the what role, if any, Iraqi exiles affiliated with the Iraqi National Congress (INC) will play in post-Saddam Iraq. Pentagon hardliners and some top officials in the White House favor giving them a prominent role, while the CIA and State Department adamantly oppose their inclusion, arguing that the exiles cannot be trusted. [US News and World Report, 11/25/2003]
US Will Not Be Seen as 'Liberators' - Iraqis will not necessarily treat the invading American soldiers as “liberators.” Many Iraqis harbor a deep resentment against the US for the decades-long sanction policy. [US News and World Report, 11/25/2003]

Entity Tags: Office of Special Plans, National Security Council, Office of the Vice President, US Department of State, Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Department of Defense, George W. Bush, Iraqi National Congress, Bush administration (43), Central Intelligence Agency, Ahmed Chalabi, Condoleezza Rice, Elliott Abrams

Category Tags: Politicization of Intelligence, Pre-war Planning

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld tells Fortune magazine, “If you [worry about just] the cost, the money, Iraq is a very different situation from Afghanistan… Iraq has oil. They have financial resources.” [Financial Times, 1/16/2004]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld

Category Tags: Motives, Pre-war Planning

The Bush administration picks Philip Carroll, a former CEO of Royal Dutch/Shell’s US division, to advise post-Saddam Iraq’s oil ministry. [Harper's, 4/2005, pp. 74-76] He is formally appointed in January 2003 along with Gary Vogler of ExxonMobil, three employees of the US Department of Energy, and an employee of the Australian government. In the months before the invasion, they are sent to Kuwait where they “begin planning for the restructuring of the ministry of oil to improve its efficiency and effectiveness [and] begin thinking through Iraq’s strategy options for significantly increasing its production capacity,” Carroll later explains. [Muttitt, 2005]

Entity Tags: US Department of State, Gary Vogler, Australia, Philip J. Carroll

Category Tags: Motives, Pre-war Planning

In a paper titled, “The Road to Economic Prosperity for a Post-Saddam Iraq,” which is a part of the study, “A Future of a Post-Saddam Iraq: A Blueprint for American Involvement,” authors Ariel Cohen and Gerald P. O’Driscoll argue for the implementation of neoliberal reforms including the privatization of Iraq’s major industries. The document says that poverty in Iraq is a result of Saddam Hussein’s mismanagement, namely Saddam’s decision to nationalize certain industries; Iraq’s war with Iran; the invasion of Kuwait; and Saddam’s refusal to comply with the requirements for the suspension of UN sanctions. The paper’s proposal for jumpstarting Iraq’s economy focuses on privatization of Iraq’s industries and several other neoliberal reforms. To complement this, the authors recommend using the “media and the educational system to explain the benefits of privatization and the changes to come in order to ensure broad public support.” The costs of reconstruction, they suggest, could be paid for with funds generated from the sale of Iraq’s oil. “Iraq’s vast oil reserves are more than ample to provide the funds needed to rebuild and boost economic growth,” the report says. [Observer, 11/3/2002; Cohen and O'Driscoll, 3/5/2003] But in order to generate this amount, Cohen and Driscoll write, the post-Saddam government would probably have to reconsider its membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). “Following the demise of Saddam Hussein, it is unlikely that the Saudi kingdom would transfer a fraction of its production quota under the [OPEC] regime to Iraq to compensate for those lost profits and facilitate its rebuilding,” the authors note. “Iraq will need to ensure cash flow for reconstruction regardless of OPEC supply limitations. Combined with the potential privatization of the oil industry, such measures could provide incentive for Iraq to leave the OPEC cartel down the road, which would have long term, positive implications for global oil supply.… An Iraq outside of OPEC would find available from its oil trade an ample cash flow for the country’s rehabilitation.” [Cohen and O'Driscoll, 3/5/2003] Cohen will later admit in an interview after the invasion of Iraq that his interest in Iraq withdrawing from OPEC was to destabilize Saudi Arabia (see Early 2005).

Entity Tags: Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Saddam Hussein, Ariel Cohen

Category Tags: Motives, Pre-war Planning

Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the London-based Iraqi National Congress (INC), meets with the executives of “three US oil multinationals to negotiate the carve-up of Iraq’s massive oil reserves post-Saddam.” Also in attendance are “leading oilmen, exiled Iraqis, and lawyers.” The meeting, titled “Invading Iraq: dangers and opportunities for the energy sector,” meets “behind the closed doors of the Royal Institute of International Affairs” in London. Several weeks after the meeting one delegate will tell The Guardian that the whole day could have been summarized with, “Who gets the oil?” The meeting is confirmed by INC spokesman Zaab Sethna. [Observer, 11/3/2002; Guardian, 11/22/2002] Sethna says: “The oil people are naturally nervous. We’ve had discussions with them, but they’re not in the habit of talking about them.” [Unger, 2007, pp. 264]

Entity Tags: Zaab Sethna, Iraqi National Congress, Ahmed Chalabi

Category Tags: Motives, Pre-war Planning, Chalabi and the INC

The CIA sets up two field stations in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq to prepare for the coming invasion. [Unger, 2007, pp. 267]

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning

Former Central Command (CENTCOM) commander General Anthony Zinni, a critic of the push for war with Iraq (see October 10, 2002), says that he “bristle[s] against ideas of small forces” in any possible invasion of Iraq, directly contradicting Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s constant exhortation to “do it smaller.” The US will need to maintain order in Iraq during a lengthy and fractious period of transition to self-rule, Zinni warns, and to do that properly will require a large number of troops. [Roberts, 2008, pp. 141] Zinni publicly spoke out against the invasion earlier in the month (see October 10, 2002).

Entity Tags: US Central Command, Donald Rumsfeld, Anthony Zinni

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning, Predictions, The 'Generals' Revolt'

Elliott Abrams, a well-known neoconservative and former Iran-Contra figure, leads one of a dozen Bush administration working groups charged with drafting post-invasion plans. Involved in his group are adamant neoconservatives Joe Collins, a deputy assistant secretary at the Pentagon, and Robin Cleveland, a former aide to Republican Sen. Mitch McConnell of Kentucky. His working group is supposed to draft plans for rapid humanitarian planning. But critics in the State Department complain that it involves itself in the issue of post-Saddam politics and economic reconstruction. Abrams’ group is backed by Paul Wolfowitz and the vice president’s office. An ally of Secretary of State Colin Powell tells Insight magazine, “This is a case of stealthy micromanagement by the Wolfowitz hawks—they use what bureaucratic vehicles are available to make their imprint on policy.” Additionally the group is very secretive. It refuses “to brief not only top State Department officials but also aides of Gen. Tommy Franks, the commanding officer of the US Central Command [CENTCOM], about what it is doing.” Instead it stovepipes its work to its contacts in the White House. Sources in the State Department and CIA believe that one of the group’s apparent aims is reducing the influence of the State Department, CIA and the United Nations in post-Saddam Iraq. These critics also question “why a convicted felon [Abrams], pardoned or not, is being allowed to help shape policy.” Within the Pentagon, there is also resentment of Abrams’ group. An unnamed Pentagon source says General Tommy Franks is being “left out of the loop.” A Defense official says, “CENTCOM is for the most part unaware of what Abrams is doing, but friction is developing and the military end of the equation feels that they are being mislead.” [Insight, 11/26/2002; Insight, 12/28/2002]

Entity Tags: Joe Collins, Elliott Abrams, Paul Wolfowitz, American Enterprise Institute

Timeline Tags: Iran-Contra Affair, Neoconservative Influence

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning

The US Navy looks for merchant ships to carry huge amounts of armor and ammunition to the Persian Gulf, in preparation for the upcoming invasion of Iraq. [Unger, 2007, pp. 267]

Entity Tags: US Department of the Navy

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning

Republicans win control of Congress in the midterm elections. For the first time in modern history, the GOP controls all three branches of federal government, with a Republican president, Republican majorities in the House and Senate, and a Republican/conservative majority on the Supreme Court. For the next two years, the Bush administration will enjoy near-complete cooperation from Congress in prosecuting and funding the war in Iraq. [Unger, 2007, pp. 267]

Entity Tags: Republican Party, Bush administration (43)

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning, The Decision to Invade

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says that if there is to be a war with Iraq, it will be short and relatively painless: “The idea that it’s going to be a long, long, long battle of some kind, I think is belied by the fact of what happened in 1990 (see August 7, 1990). Five days or five weeks or five months, but it certainly isn’t going to last any longer than that. It won’t be a World War III.”
Invasion about Iraqi WMDs, Not Oil - Rumsfeld refuses to say directly what the US will do if Iraq uses chemical or biological weapons on US invasion forces: “The United States government, the president and others, are communicating with people in Iraq, in the military, very forcefully that they ought not to use those weapons. Anyone in any way connected with weapons of mass destruction and their use will be held accountable, and people who helped avoid that would be advantaged.” If UN weapons inspectors find no weapons of mass destruction, Rumsfeld says that would prove only that “the inspections process had been successfully defeated by the Iraqis.” The upcoming invasion is entirely about WMD, he insists: “It has nothing to do with oil, literally nothing to do with oil. It has nothing to do with the religion.” [US Department of Defense, 11/14/2002; CBS News, 11/15/2002; Unger, 2007, pp. 267-268]
Iraq and 9/11 - Rumsfeld then directly conflates the upcoming invasion with September 11. Interviewer Steve Kroft asks how he would explain the invasion to a family whose son or daughter is in the military and about to be placed in harm’s way. Rumsfeld replies: “What would I say to you? Well, I would look you in the eye and I would say, go back before September 11th and ask yourself this question, was the attack that took place on September 11th an imminent threat the month before, or two months before, or three months before, or six months before? When did the attack on September 11th become an imminent threat? When was it sufficiently dangerous to our country that had we known about it that we could have stepped up and stopped it and saved 3,000 lives? Now, transport yourself forward a year, two years, or a week, or a month, and if Saddam Hussein were to take his weapons of mass destruction and transfer them, either use them himself, or transfer them to the al-Qaeda, and somehow the al-Qaeda were to engage in an attack on the United States, or an attack on US forces overseas, with a weapon of mass destruction you’re not talking about 300, or 3,000 people potentially being killed, but 30,000, or 100,000 of human beings. So the question is, when is it such an immediate threat that you must do something, is a tough question. But if you think about it, it’s the nexus, the connection, the relationship between terrorist states and weapons of mass destruction with terrorist networks that has changed our lives, and changed the security environment in the world.… Our task, your task as a mother, and as a citizen, as a voter, and my task, is to try to connect the dots before something happens, not afterwards. People say, well where’s the smoking gun? Well, we don’t want to see a smoking gun from a weapon of mass destruction.” [US Department of Defense, 11/14/2002]

Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Steve Kroft, Donald Rumsfeld, Saddam Hussein

Category Tags: Alleged Al-Qaeda Ties, Alleged WMDs, Pre-war Planning, The Decision to Invade, WMD Allegations

Elliott Abrams, a special assistant to President George W. Bush on the National Security Council [NSC] and a well-known neoconservative and former Iran-Contra figure, is appointed to senior director for Near East and North African affairs within the NSC. Neoconservatives working at the Pentagon’s Near East South Asia (NESA) desk worked hard to get Abrams appointed. “The day he got (the appointment), they were whooping and hollering, ‘We got him in, we got him in,’” Karen Kwiatkowski, a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel, tells Inter Press Service. Abrams, a controversial figure with close ties to Richard Perle and Douglas Feith, had been convicted of withholding information from Congress during the Iran-Contra scandal, though he was later pardoned by George W. Bush’s father. [Insight, 12/28/2002; Inter Press Service, 8/7/2003]

Entity Tags: Douglas Feith, Richard Perle, Elliott Abrams, Karen Kwiatkowski

Timeline Tags: Iran-Contra Affair, Neoconservative Influence

Category Tags: Politicization of Intelligence, Pre-war Planning

Elliott Abrams drafts a proposal, in which he argues that the United States should take de facto control of Iraqi oil fields. The proposal is not well-received by moderates in the Bush administration who question the legality of the proposal, and who argue “that only a puppet Iraqi government would acquiesce to US supervision of the oil fields and that one so slavish to US interests risks becoming untenable with Iraqis,” reports Insight Magazine. Such a move would also lend credence to suspicions that the invasion is motivated by oil interests, the critics add. [Insight, 12/28/2002] A similar recommendation was made in a paper published by the Heritage Foundation in late September (see September 25, 2002).

Entity Tags: Heritage Foundation, Elliott Abrams

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning

Andrew Marshall.Andrew Marshall. [Source: George Lewis]Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz receives a draft report by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment which, according to a source interviewed by Newsday, recommends that “the cost of the occupation, the cost for the military administration and providing for a provisional administration, all of that would come out of Iraqi oil.” The report was commissioned by Andrew Marshall, the Pentagon’s influential director of Net Assessment. [Newsday, 1/10/2003] This contradicts a report titled, Potential Costs of a War with Iraq and Its Post War Occupation, which is published by the Center two months later on February 25, 2003. It notes that “given the enormity of Iraq’s reconstruction requirements and the size of its foreign debt, if the Bush Administration’s goal is to turn Iraq into a stable, pro-US democracy, it would probably prove counterproductive to use Iraqi oil revenues to reimburse [Defense Department] for its costs.” [Kosiak, 2/5/2003]

Entity Tags: Andrew Marshall, Paul Wolfowitz

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning

The Oil and Energy Working Group, one of 17 such groups working under the US State Department’s “Future of Iraq” project (see April 2002-March 2003), meets to discuss plans for the oil industry in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The only known member of the 15-member group is Ibrahim Bahr al-Ulum, who will become Iraq’s oil minister after the invasion. Other people likely involved include Ahmed Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress, Sharif Ali Bin al Hussein of the Iraqi National Congress; recently defected personnel from Iraq’s Ministry of Petroleum; the former Iraqi head of military intelligence; Sheikh Yamani, the former Oil Minister of Saudi Arabia; and unnamed representatives from the US Energy Department. The responsibilities of this working group include: (1) developing plans for restoring the petroleum sector in order to increase oil exports to partially pay for a possible US military occupation government. (2) reconsidering Iraq’s continued membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and “whether it should be allowed to produce as much as possible or be limited by an OPEC quota.” (3) “consider[ing] whether to honor contracts made between the Hussein government and foreign oil companies, including the US $3.5 billion project to be carried out by Russian interests to redevelop Iraq’s oilfields.”] [Oil and Gas International, 10/30/2002; Observer, 11/3/2002; US Department of State, 12/19/2002; Financial Times, 4/7/2003; Financial Times, 9/5/2003; Muttitt, 2005] By April 2003, the working group will have met a total of four times. One of the policies they agree on is that Iraq “should be opened to international oil companies as quickly as possible after the war” and that development of Iraq’s oil fields should be done through the use of Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs). Under a typical PSA, oil ownership remains with the state, while exploration and production are contracted to the private companies under highly favorable terms. [Muttitt, 2005; Los Angeles Times, 12/8/2006]

Entity Tags: Ahmed Chalabi, Sheikh Yamani

Category Tags: Motives, Pre-war Planning, Chalabi and the INC

Jay Garner.Jay Garner. [Source: US Army]The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) is created by the Pentagon to direct the post-war administration of Iraq, and signed into existence by President Bush. Its head, retired Army General Jay Garner, ostensibly reports to Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith (see Fall 2002), but Garner will later say that once he is in Iraq proper, General Tommy Franks of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) “will be my boss.” ORHA is later renamed the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). David Kay, a senior fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and a former UN weapons inspector, had initially been selected to head the office, but he declined the invitation. Associates of Kay tell the New York Times that Kay felt the new agency seemed relatively uninterested in the task of promoting democracy. [New York Times, 2/23/2003; New York Times, 4/2/2003; Roberts, 2008, pp. 126, 134] Garner is considered an excellent selection, having led the relief effort for the Kurds of northern Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War. But he faces an uphill battle, as ORHA’s functionality is plagued from the outset by a severe lack of time, uncertain funding, and incessant interdepartmental strife, particularly between the State and Defense Departments. Most ORHA workers will not have reported for duty by the time the invasion begins. And attempts to recruit experts from other agencies will be blocked by Feith and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who impose strict ideological and bureaucratic restrictions on Garner’s selections for his staff. [Roberts, 2008, pp. 126, 134]

Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, US Department of State, George W. Bush, Jay Garner, Thomas Franks, David Kay

Timeline Tags: Iraq under US Occupation

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning

President George W. Bush meets with Iraqi exiles. According to a former senior White House official, after the meeting, Bush decides that the exiles will not be put in power in post-Saddam Iraq. “The future of this country… is not going to be charted by people who sat out the sonofabitch (Saddam) in London or Cambridge, Massachusetts,” Bush is said to have stated. This effectively kills the Pentagon’s plan to create an Iraqi-government-in-exile which was to include the Ahmed Chalabi, the president of the Iraqi National Congress (INC). [Knight Ridder, 7/12/2003]

Entity Tags: Ahmed Chalabi, George W. Bush

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning, Chalabi and the INC

The Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, a group affiliated with the Heritage Foundation’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, releases a report entitled “Play to Win,” which addresses the problem of reconstruction in post-invasion Iraq. The commission, a bipartisan group of retired military and civilian leaders, cautions: “Given the sheer complexity of post-conflict reconstruction efforts, developing a clear strategic plan of action is critical to success. Such a plan should articulate the US interests at stake, define US objectives for the intervention, and lay out the strategy for achieving these policy objectives, and a clear division of labor delineating who is responsible for what aspects of the plan’s implementation. Perhaps even more important than the plan itself is the strategic development and planning process, which allows key players to build working relationships, identify potential inconsistencies and gaps, synchronize their actions, and better understand their roles.” Unfortunately, the report concludes, the federal government lacks the mechanisms necessary for proper planning and coordination of such an effort. [Roberts, 2008, pp. 124-125]

Entity Tags: Heritage Foundation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Bush administration (43), Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning, Predictions

Retired General Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of US forces during the 1991 Gulf War (see January 16, 1991 and After), says he is worried about the “cockiness” of the US war plans for Iraq. Schwarzkopf has already warned that the US must forge broader multinational alliances if it plans to invade and occupy Iraq with any reasonable expectation of success (see August 18, 2002). He adds that his active-duty friends are preoccupied by “the Rumsfeld thing,” the perception that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has little regard for their judgment. [Roberts, 2008, pp. 141]

Entity Tags: Norman Schwarzkopf, Donald Rumsfeld

Category Tags: Internal Opposition, Pre-war Planning, Predictions

The Bush administration completes a 100-page blueprint for post-Saddam Iraq. The document replaces the State Department- and Big Oil- sanctioned plan (see February 2001 and After) with one favored by neoconservatives calling for the privatization of Iraq’s oil reserves and supporting industries as a means to undermine the OPEC cartel and destabilize Saudi Arabia (see Early 2005). It new plan bears strong resemblance to the recommendations that were put forth in a September 2002 Heritage Foundation paper by Ariel Cohen and Gerald P. O’Driscoll (see September 25, 2002). It is also heavily influenced by corporate lobbyists, including Grover Norquist, the outspoken advocate for a flat-tax system. The plan advocates changing Iraq’s tax and copyright law, as well as implementing a variety of other neoliberal reforms. [Cohen and O'Driscoll, 3/5/2003; BBC Newsnight, 3/17/2005; Democracy Now!, 3/21/2005; Harper's, 4/2005, pp. 74-76]

Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), Gerald P. O’Driscoll

Timeline Tags: Neoconservative Influence

Category Tags: Motives, Pre-war Planning

Karen Kwiatkowski.Karen Kwiatkowski. [Source: CBC]The US Department of Defense wires Turkey a 10-page document containing answers to a list of 51 questions that had been given to the US ambassador in Ankara by the Turkish government. Lt. Col. Karen Kwiatkowski, who saw the list, will later recall: “The questions addressed things like after-war security arrangements, refugees, border control, stability in the Kurdish north, and occupation plans. But every third answer was either ‘To be determined’ or ‘We’re working on that’ or ‘This scenario is unlikely.’ At one point, an answer included the ‘fact’ that the United States military would physically secure the geographic border of Iraq.” Commenting on this last answer, Kwiatkowski notes, “Curious, I checked the length of the physical border of Iraq. Then I checked out the length of our own border with Mexico. Given our exceptional success in securing our own desert borders, I found this statement interesting.” [American Conservative, 12/1/2003]

Entity Tags: Karen Kwiatkowski

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning

Ari Fleischer says during his daily press briefing: “Iraq, unlike Afghanistan, is a rather wealthy country. Iraq has tremendous resources that belong to the Iraqi people. And so there are a variety of means that Iraq has to be able to shoulder much of the burden for their own reconstruction [sic].” [White House, 2/18/2003; Financial Times, 1/16/2004]

Entity Tags: Ari Fleischer

Category Tags: Motives, Pre-war Planning

President Bush and Prime Minister Aznar.President Bush and Prime Minister Aznar. [Source: Rod Aydelotte/Getty Image]President Bush tells Spanish prime minister Jose Maria Aznar that the US will invade Iraq whether the United Nations Security Council passes a resolution or not (see February 24, 2003). The private conversation takes place at Bush’s Crawford, Texas ranch; the transcript of the conversation is not made public until September 26, 2007, when it is published in El Pais, Spain’s highest-circulation news daily; its accuracy will not be challenged by the White House. The transcript is prepared by Spain’s ambassador to the UN, Javier Ruperez, from a secret US transcript of the meeting. According to English translations of Ruperez’s Spanish transcript, Bush says the US will invade Iraq whether there is “a United Nations Security Council resolution or not.… My patience has ended. I’m not thinking of waiting beyond mid-March.… We have to get rid of Saddam [Hussein].… There are two weeks left.” Bush tells Aznar that Hussein’s government will be overthrown with little destruction, and that he is willing to play “bad cop” to British prime minister Tony Blair’s “good cop.” [Agence France-Presse, 9/26/2007; Harper's, 9/26/2007]
Bush Threatens Economic Retaliation If Other Countries Do not Support Invasion - Aznar pleads for patience from Bush, and says that a UN resolution is vital. Aznar notes that public opinion in Spain is heavily against the war. Bush retorts that should certain countries not support the war in the UN, they could face retaliation from the US: “Countries like Mexico, Chile, Angola, and Cameroon should know that what’s at stake is the security of the United States.” Bush mentions negative votes could endanger a free trade agreement with Chile and financial support for Angola. [Agence France-Presse, 9/26/2007]
'Chinese Water Torture' - Bush says that Hussein is playing endless games with his “pretenses” towards disarmament. “This is like Chinese water torture,” he says. “We have to put an end to it.… Saddam Hussein will not change and will continue playing.” He says that the US has a package of humanitarian aid already in the works, and has prepared for a post-Hussein Iraq. It is possible, Bush says, that Iraq will be reorganized into a federation, presumably of semi-autonomous ethnic enclaves for the Shi’a, Sunnis, and Kurds. To Aznar’s statement that he is working closely with France’s Jacques Chirac to get a resolution passed in the UN, Bush replies: “Chirac knows perfectly well the reality. His intelligence services have explained. The Arab countries are sending Chirac a clear message: Saddam Hussein must go. The problem is that Chirac thinks he’s Mister Arab and is making life impossible.” [Harper's, 9/26/2007; ABC News, 9/26/2007]
No Exile for Hussein; Bush 'At Peace' With Himself - Bush says that suggestions from Egyptian leaders in touch with Hussein that the Iraqi leader could go into exile with $1 million and documents about Iraq’s weapons programs are not being considered. Hussein is “a thief, a terrorist and a war criminal,” he says. After Hussein is overthrown, the US will prosecute him in the International Criminal Court, Bush says. Bush is well aware of the “destruction and death” that the war will bring, he avers, and he is the one who will have to console “the mothers and the widows” of the dead. He says he is optimistic because he believes he is right: “I am optimistic because I believe I am right. I am at peace with myself.” [Agence France-Presse, 9/26/2007; Editor & Publisher, 9/26/2007]

Entity Tags: Jose Maria Aznar, El Pais, Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), George W. Bush, Javier Ruperez, United Nations Security Council, Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair, Mother Teresa, Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein

Category Tags: Legal Justification, Motives, Pre-war Planning, The Decision to Invade, Decision to Invade Quotes

The US trains between Iraqi exiles at the Taszar military base in Hungary. At the base, dubbed “Camp Freedom,” the exiles, or “Free Iraqi Forces” (FIF), are taught both survival skills and support functions. Most of those trained are believed to be supporters of INC president Ahmed Chalabi. [BBC, 4/1/2003; Associated Press, 4/1/2003; Knight Ridder, 7/12/2003]

Entity Tags: Ahmed Chalabi

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning, Chalabi and the INC

State Department officials Ariel Cohen and Gerald P. O’Driscoll update their September 2002 paper titled, “The Road to Economic Prosperity for a Post-Saddam Iraq,” (see September 25, 2002) expanding the section which addresses plans for post-Saddam Iraq’s oil industry. The update is apparently a reaction to the State Department’s opposition to the neoconservatives’ proposal to sell off Iraq’s oil fields. They say that despite Secretary of State Colin Powell’s remarks that the “oil of Iraq belongs to the Iraqi people… [and] will not be exploited for the United States’ own purpose…” the US should still provide “guidance to the future government of Iraq on establishing sound economic and trade policies to stimulate growth and recovery.” [Cohen and O'Driscoll, 3/5/2003]

Entity Tags: US Department of State, Colin Powell, Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Ariel Cohen

Category Tags: Motives, Pre-war Planning

During a conference held at the American Enterprise Institute, an audience member asks the panel of guests—made up of James Woolsey, Richard Perle, and Michael Ledeen—where they see “the level of acceptance of US society in terms of casualties, not only on the US side, but as well on the Iraqi side, and in terms of duration of the operation?” Ledeen responds: “I think the level of casualties is secondary. I mean, it may sound like an odd thing to say, but all the great scholars who have studied American character have come to the conclusion that we are a warlike people and that we love war.… What we hate is not casualties but losing. And if the war goes well and if the American public has the conviction that we’re being well-led and that our people are fighting well and that we’re winning, I don’t think casualties are going to be the issue.” [American Enterprise Institute, 3/25/2003]

Entity Tags: Michael Ledeen, James Woolsey, Richard Perle

Timeline Tags: Neoconservative Influence

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz tells the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee that Iraq’s oil wealth will help fund post-war reconstruction. “There’s a lot of money to pay for this that doesn’t have to be US taxpayer money, and it starts with the assets of the Iraqi people,” he says. “On a rough recollection, the oil revenues of that country could bring between $50 billion and $100 billion over the course of the next two or three years.” [St. Petersburg Times, 4/2/2003; Financial Times, 1/16/2004] He adds, “We’re dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.” [New York Times, 10/5/2003; CNN, 4/15/2004]

Entity Tags: Paul Wolfowitz

Timeline Tags: Iraq under US Occupation

Category Tags: Motives, Pre-war Planning

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says during a Senate hearing, “When it comes to reconstruction, before we turn to the American taxpayer, we will turn first to the resources of the Iraqi government and the international community.” [Financial Times, 1/16/2004] Rumsfeld says that the US would most likely convene an “international donors’ conference” to put together reconstruction financing. [Rich, 2006, pp. 85]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: Iraq under US Occupation

Category Tags: Motives, Pre-war Planning

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage tells the House Committee on Appropriations during a hearing on a supplemental war regulation: “This is not Afghanistan… When we approach the question of Iraq, we realize here is a country which has a resource. And it’s obvious, it’s oil. And it can bring in and does bring in a certain amount of revenue each year… $10, $15, even $18 billion… this is not a broke country.” [US Congress, 9/30/2003]

Entity Tags: Richard Armitage

Timeline Tags: Iraq under US Occupation

Category Tags: Motives, Pre-war Planning

As the initial media exuberance over the “shock and awe” assault on Iraq (see March 19-20, 2003) begins to fade, questions begin to mount about the plans for rebuilding Iraq after the invasion and inevitable toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime. Bush administration officials had assumed that military operations would end in 30 days, according to White House briefings. Some senior administration officials admit to the New York Times that that assumption now seems “overly optimistic.” As reported by David Sanger, those officials “say that the American military will likely need to retain tight control over the country for longer than they anticipated.” But administration officials insist that they remain committed to giving over control of the country to the newly liberated Iraqis very soon. “The Iraqi people will administer Iraq,” says White House press secretary Ari Fleischer, adding that President Bush is as committed to that goal now as he was before the war began. However, some military officials now admit that the Iraqi resistance is far stiffer than had been anticipated, and the reception of American occupiers by the Iraqi people has been far less welcoming than US planners foresaw. The White House says that initial plans for an “Iraqi Interim Authority” as the genesis of a new Iraqi government have been put on hold until Baghdad can be secured and the remnants of the Hussein regime can be eliminated. Similarly, plans to turn over power to local Iraqi governance have also been delayed indefinitely, until cities like Basra can be purged of guerrilla resistance. “There were many of us who hoped to be creating a new government even before Iraq was fully under coalition control,” says one senior official. The White House intended to demonstrate quickly that “this is a liberation, not an occupation.” Now, “[t]hat may not be possible for some weeks.” To make matters more difficult, turf wars between the State Department and the Pentagon are inhibiting efforts to implement post-invasion plans, with Defense Department officials such as Douglas Feith blocking the hiring of outside experts for General Jay Garner’s reconstruction team (see January 2003). State officials say that Feith and other Pentagon ideologues want to place “like-minded former officials who have strong views about what a new Iraq should look like” in those slots, a charge which the Pentagon denies. [New York Times, 4/2/2003]

Entity Tags: US Department of State, Ari Fleischer, Bush administration (43), Jay Garner, David Sanger, George W. Bush, Douglas Feith, US Department of Defense

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning, Predictions

US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is asked, “When do you think there might be a government in place, even a provisional government in place in Iraq?” Rumsfeld reponds, “I don’t know.” [Infinity Radio, 5/29/2003]

Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld

Timeline Tags: Iraq under US Occupation

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning, Democracy Rhetoric

The administration’s plan to overthrow Saddam Hussein, give off governance of Iraq to Ahmed Chalabi and other exiles, and withdraw gracefully from the country without further expenditures, has come to a crashing end, writes reporter and author George Packer. According to a senior administration official interviewed by Packer: “There was a desire by some in the vice president’s office and the Pentagon to cut and run from Iraq and leave it up to Chalabi to run it. The idea was to put our guy in there and he was going to be so compliant that he’d recognize Israel and all the problems in the Middle East would be solved. He would be our man in Baghdad. Everything would be hunky-dory.… It isn’t pragmatism, it isn’t Realpolitik, it isn’t conservatism, it isn’t liberalism. It’s theology.” [New Yorker, 11/24/2003]

Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), Ahmed Chalabi, US Department of Defense, Saddam Hussein, Office of the Vice President, George Packer

Category Tags: Motives, Pre-war Planning, Predictions, Chalabi and the INC

A report published by the Army War College accuses the Bush administration of putting the US in an “unnecessary” war in Iraq—which it calls a “strategic error”—and pursuing an “unrealistic” war against terrorism that may lead to the US fighting wars with nations that pose no real threat. The report, titled “Bounding the Global War on Terrorism,” is compiled by visiting professor Jeffrey Record, a defense specialist and author of six books on military strategy and related issues, a former aide to the former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sam Nunn (D-GA), and a visiting professor at the War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. As a result of the Bush administration’s actions, the report finds, the US Army is “near the breaking point.” The report recommends that the “global war on terrorism” be scaled back to focus on the far narrower threat posed by the al-Qaeda terror network. “[T]he global war on terrorism as currently defined and waged is dangerously indiscriminate and ambitious, and accordingly… its parameters should be readjusted,” Record writes. Iraq “was a war-of-choice distraction from the war of necessity against al-Qaeda.” The anti-terrorism campaign “is strategically unfocused, promises more than it can deliver, and threatens to dissipate US military resources in an endless and hopeless search for absolute security.” The study adds that the administration’s plans to spread democracy throughout the Middle East are baseless: “The potential policy payoff of a democratic and prosperous Middle East, if there is one, almost certainly lies in the very distant future. The basis on which this democratic domino theory rests has never been explicated.” It concludes, “The United States may be able to defeat, even destroy, al-Qaeda, but it cannot rid the world of terrorism, much less evil.” While the study carries the standard disclaimer that its views are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Army, the Pentagon, or the US government, both SSI director Colonel Douglas Lovelace and the War College commandant, Major General David Huntoon, stand behind it. Pentagon spokesman Lawrence Di Rita says he has not read the study, and adds, “If the conclusion is that we need to be scaling back in the global war on terrorism, it’s not likely to be on my reading list anytime soon.” Daniel Benjamin, a member of the National Security Council staff in the late 1990s, says of the report, “The criticism does not seem out of line with many of the conversations I have had with officers in every branch of the military.” [Record, 12/2003 pdf file; Washington Post, 1/12/2004; Los Angeles Times, 1/12/2004; BBC, 1/13/2004] The report was compiled in December 2003 but just now released. [Record, 12/2003 pdf file]

Entity Tags: Lawrence Di Rita, Daniel Benjamin, Bush administration (43), Al-Qaeda, David Huntoon, Jeffrey Record, US Department of Defense, US Department of the Army, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Douglas Lovelace

Category Tags: Internal Opposition, Pre-war Planning, Predictions

Former ambassador Joseph Wilson, in his newly published book The Politics of Truth, reflects on what he perceives as the absolute lack of need for the invasion and occupation of Iraq. He writes: “[J]ust what was required to ensure the [Hussein] regime’s eventual collapse was already happening before the middle of March 2003. We had infiltrated Saddam’s intelligence services; we had turned several of his senior military commanders. We were locked and loaded, but we did not need to fire. Not at all. A little patience would have achieved everything we wanted, without creating the whirlwind that we are now reaping in our bloody and chaotic occupation of the country.” While it has been trying on the nation’s patience to impose economic and military sanctions on Iraq for 12 years, Wilson notes, the Cold War lasted far longer and featured a much more dangerous opponent. How the US handled the Cold War provides “a useful blueprint on how to subvert an oppressive regime and achieve regime change without resorting to brute force,” he writes. [Wilson, 2004, pp. 422-423]

Entity Tags: Joseph C. Wilson

Category Tags: Pre-war Planning

Former Bush administration press secretary Scott McClellan, reflecting on the buildup to the Iraq invasion, says that President Bush “managed the [Iraq] crisis in a way that almost guaranteed that the use of force would become the only feasible option.” Between the increasingly belligerent rhetoric, the UN ultimatum (see September 12, 2002), and the “massive buildup of American arms and military forces in the region, which, for logistical reasons, couldn’t remain in the area indefinitely without being used,” war became the only viable option. McClellan blames Bush’s advisers as much as Bush, and observes: “[D]uring the buildup to war, the president’s advisers allowed his own hands to be tied, putting Bush in a position where avoiding conflict was more difficult than launching it. By creating this enormous momentum for war, the president and his advisers achieved several things. He made the job of his political opponents extraordinarily difficult, putting those who opposed the war in the position of arguing against what was almost a fait accompli. He trapped Saddam Hussein in a shrinking box, making it less and less acceptable for the dictator to continue to temporize and play games with his neighbors. He forced other countries… to make hard decisions as to whether or not they would permit a US-led invasion absent a clear imminent threat. Most important, the White House forestalled any debate about the fundamental goals and long-term plans for such an invasion. By pushing so hard on the WMD issue, reducing the larger issue of the future of the Middle East into a short-term emergency threat that must be dealt with now, the president and his advisers avoided having to discuss the big issues of what would happen after the invasion. Who would rule Iraq? How would the region respond? How long would the United States have to remain on the ground? How would tensions among the nation’s ethnic and religious groups be resolved? Few of these questions ever appeared on the national radar screen during the run-up to war. But they would come back to haunt the president, and the nation, in years to come, when it became clear that the stated rationales for war—the WMD threat and Iraq’s link to terrorism—were less than convincing. The lack of candor underlying the campaign for war would severely undermine the president’s entire second term in office.” [McClellan, 2008, pp. 142-144]

Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), George W. Bush, United Nations, Scott McClellan

Category Tags: Alleged WMDs, Media Coverage, Motives, Politicization of Intelligence, Pre-war Planning, Propaganda, Public Opinion on Iraqi Threat, The Decision to Invade

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