The Center for Grassroots Oversight

This page can be viewed at http://www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=torture,_rendition,_and_other_abuses_against_captives_in_iraq,_afghanistan,_and_elsewhere&hr_us_bases_and_interrogation_centers=&startpos=300


Follow Us!

We are planning some big changes! Please follow us to stay updated and be part of our community.

Twitter Facebook

Torture, Rendition, and other Abuses against Captives in US Custody

US Bases and Interrogation Centers

Project: Prisoner Abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan and Elsewhere
Open-Content project managed by Derek, KJF, mtuck

add event | references

Page 4 of 7 (670 events)
previous | 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 | next

Upon arrival at Abu Ghraib prison on October 27, a detainee is stripped and left naked for six days at the Hard Site. After that, he is given a blanket, which is his only piece of cloth for the next three days. The following evening he is taken by Spc. Charles Graner to the shower room, where he is interrogated by a female interrogator. The session ends and the interrogator leaves, when Graner and another MP, who fits a description of Staff Sgt. Ivan Frederick, enter the room. They throw pepper in his face and beat him for half an hour. The detainee claims being beaten with a chair until it breaks, hit in the chest, kicked, and finally choked until he is unconscious. When the detainee is first interrogated, the female interrogator and her analyst think he is lying and they recommend a “fear up” approach. After a second interrogation, the military intelligence team recommends that he be moved to isolation since he continues “to be untruthful.” Ten days later he is interrogated for the third time and he is put in “the hole,” which is a “small lightless isolation closet.” The interrogation report reads: “[We] let the MPs yell at him” and “used a fear down,” but “he was still holding back.” And for the following day, the log instructs MPs to “use a direct approach with a reminder of the unpleasantness that occurred the last time he lied.” (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

The CIA’s inspector general, John Helgerson, issues a report on the use of a handgun and power drill to intimidate al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri during an interrogation. A CIA officer known only as “Albert” threatened al-Nashiri with the gun and drill at a CIA black site in Poland around late 2002 (see Between December 28, 2002 and January 1, 2003). (Central Intelligence Agency 5/7/2004, pp. 42 pdf file; Goldman 9/7/2010) The incidents have already been referred to the Justice Department, which has declined to prosecute (see September 11, 2003). What conclusions Helgerson comes to in the report are unknown. (Central Intelligence Agency 5/7/2004, pp. 42 pdf file)

The Associated Press reports that detainees in Iraq are being subjected to torture and inhumane living conditions and tells of an instance where a prisoner was shot and killed. It recounts the story of one prisoner, Saaed Naif, who said he saw another prisoner “shot dead at Abu Ghraib when he approached the razor wire.” The report also describes a type of punishment where the victim is confined to a razor-wire enclosed area—known as “The Gardens”—and forced to lie face down, hands tied behind the back, on the burning sand for two or three hours. In one incident, when a woman was sent to the “The Gardens,” her infuriated brother attempted to leave the razor wire enclosure around his tent but prison personnel “shot him in the shoulder.” Many former prisoners of the detainment centers agreed that some of the worst atrocities at the prisons were the guards’ treatment of the women, sick, and disabled. (Hanley 11/3/2003)

A CIA officer known only as “Albert” is reprimanded by the agency for threatening detained al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri with a gun and drill. The incidents took place at a CIA black site in Poland in December 2002 or January 2003 (see Between December 28, 2002 and January 1, 2003) and Albert’s actions were approved by his supervisor, “Mike,” who is also reprimanded. (Goldman 9/7/2010) The timing of the reprimand is unknown, although it may follow the completion of a report into the matter by the CIA’s inspector general (see October 29, 2003). Both Mike and Albert leave the agency, although Albert will later be rehired as a contractor (see 2003 and Before 2008).

The CIA complies with the Office of Legal Counsel’s (OLC) opinion that Hiwa Abdul Rahman Rashul should be returned to Iraq (see October 2003). But CIA Director George Tenet asks Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to see that Rashul is hidden from Red Cross survey teams and that he not be given a registration number. The secretary of defense complies with the request. On June 16, 2004, (Regan 6/17/2004) Rumsfeld will admit that he ordered Rashul to be hidden from the Red Cross in order to prevent the detainee’s interrogation from being interrupted. (CBS News 6/18/2004) For the next seven months, Rashul remains a so-called “ghost detainee” at the High Value Detention facility near the Baghdad airport at Camp Cropper. (Pound 6/21/2004)

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, at the request of CIA Director George Tenet, orders military officials in Iraq to keep an unnamed high-value detainee being held at Camp Cropper off the records. The order is passed down to Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then to Gen. John P. Abizaid, the commander of American forces in the Middle East, and finally to Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, the ground commander in Iraq. “At each stage, lawyers reviewed the request and their bosses approved it,” the New York Times will report. “This prisoner and other ‘ghost detainees’ were hidden largely to prevent the International Committee of the Red Cross from monitoring their treatment, and to avoid disclosing their location to an enemy,” the newspaper will report, citing top officials. The prisoner—in custody since July 2003—is suspected of being a senior officer of Ansar al-Islam, an Islamic group with ties to al-Qaeda. Shortly after being captured by US forces, he was deemed an “enemy combatant” and thus denied protection under the Geneva conventions. Up until this point, the prisoner has only been interrogated once. As a result of being kept off the books, the prison system looses track of the detainee who will spend the next seven months in custody. “Once he was placed in military custody, people lost track of him,” a senior intelligence official will tell the New York Times. “The normal review processes that would keep track of him didn’t.” (Schmitt and Shanker 6/17/2004; Aldinger 6/17/2004; Fox News 6/17/2004)

Fran Townsend, deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism, visits Abu Ghraib for approximately two hours. She is given a tour of the prison by Army Lt. Col. Steven Jordan. Townsend will later say that the purpose of her visit was to learn more about resistance against the US occupation and to ensure that information coming from the facility would be shared effectively among the various intelligence agencies. She will also say that she did not discuss interrogation methods, pressure military prison personnel to produce more intelligence, or witness any incidents of abuse. (Morrison and Diamond 6/17/2004)

US military officials in Baghdad receive internal documents citing at least 20 complaints of abuse at Abu Ghraib. (Elliott 6/19/2004)

The detainee nicknamed Gilligan stands on a box, fearing electrocution. Ivan Frederick stands at the side with a camera in his hands.The detainee nicknamed Gilligan stands on a box, fearing electrocution. Ivan Frederick stands at the side with a camera in his hands. [Source: Public domain]Spc. Sabrina Harman and Staff Sgt. Ivan Frederick connect electric wires to the fingers, toes, and penis of a detainee who is jokingly referred to as “Gilligan.” Harman tells him that he will be electrocuted if he falls off the box he is standing on. She later tells investigators, who ask for an explanation, that she was “just playing with him.” (Higham and Stephens 5/22/2004) One picture taken of Gilligan standing on the box will later become iconic and will symbolize the Abu Ghraib abuse scandal. Frederick also will later recall telling the detainee he will be electrocuted if he falls off the box. (Morin 10/21/2004) An Army investigator had instructed Frederick to “stress out” the detainee so he will talk. The detainee allegedly knows the location of soldiers’ remains. Frederick says the investigator has told him he can treat the prisoner anyway he wants “as long as you don’t kill him.” Despite these directions, Frederick will later confess he was aware he is committing abuse. “I was wrong about what I did, and I shouldn’t have done it. I knew it was wrong at the time because I knew it was a form of abuse.” (Oppel 10/21/2004) Haj Ali Shallal Abbas, the mayor of a nearby town, will later claim that he was the person photographed on the box (see Mid-October 2003-January 2004). (NOW with Bill Moyers 4/29/2005) However, investigators will later conclude the person was someone else known as Saad. But Abbas was also in the same detention block that night, and investigators don’t rule out that more than one person was forced to stand on a box and threatened with electrocution. (Scherer 3/14/2006; New York Times 3/14/2006) The next day, another detainee is also forced to stand on a box in a humiliating position (see November 5, 2003). Saad is a likely reference to Abdou Hussain Saad Faleh, detainee No. 18170. He is taken from his cell in the Hard Site in Abu Ghraib that night. He will later testify, “Mr. [Charles] Graner came and took me to room Number 37, which is the shower room, and he started punishing me. Then he brought a box of food and he made me stand on it with no clothing, except a blanket. Then a tall black soldier came and put electrical wires on my fingers and toes and on my penis, and I had a bag over my head.” (Higham and Stephens 5/21/2004; US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

“Sh_tboy” in a variety of self-inflicted poses. Top: he is hanging upside down in his cell. Middle: Charles Graner sits on him while he is in restraints. Bottom: he has covered his face and chest with his own feces.“Sh_tboy” in a variety of self-inflicted poses. Top: he is hanging upside down in his cell. Middle: Charles Graner sits on him while he is in restraints. Bottom: he has covered his face and chest with his own feces. [Source: Public domain]In addition to managing detainees suspected of criminal activity, the Abu Ghraib MPs have to manage some mentally disturbed detainees. One such detainee is given the name Sh_tboy by his guards. For over a month, guards repeatedly photograph him engaging in a series of humiliating and self-destructive situations. But guards let him run wild rather than attempt to stop him in any way. And when he is retrained, MP Charles Graner poses for photographs on top of him “like a big-game hunter displaying a catch.” The US Army’s Fay report will later conclude that he generally was abusing himself, but guards nonetheless committed abuse by facilitating his behavior instead of trying to help or stop him from hurting himself or others. (Scherer and Benjamin 3/14/2006)

Sabrina Harman giving the thumbs up over Manadel al-Jamadi’s dead body.Sabrina Harman giving the thumbs up over Manadel al-Jamadi’s dead body. [Source: Public domain]Detainee Manadel al-Jamadi, is brought to Abu Ghraib prison by US Navy SEAL Team 7. The Iraqi, captured during a joint Task Force 121/CIA mission, is suspected of having been involved in an attack against the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) Members of the Navy SEAL team punch and choke Al-Jamadi and stick their fingers in his eyes. A SEAL lieutenant is involved in the abuse. (Associated Press 1/11/2005) Al-Jamadi resists his arrest, and one SEAL Team member hits him on the head with the butt of a rifle. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) MP Spc. Dennis E. Stevanus is on duty when two CIA representatives bring the man to the Hard Site. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) Spc. Jason A. Kenner, an MP at Abu Ghraib, will later say the detainee was “in good health” when he was brought in. (Wright 5/20/2004) According to Kenner’s later account, the detainee’s head is covered with an empty sandbag. MPs are then ordered to take him to a shower room, and told not to remove the hood, according to Kenner. (Wright 5/20/2004) The detainee is then interrogated by CIA and military intelligence personnel. Less than an hour later, the detainee will be found dead (see (7:00 a.m.) November 4, 2003). (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

Charles Graner giving the thumbs up over Manadel al-Jamadi’s dead body on November 4, 2003.Charles Graner giving the thumbs up over Manadel al-Jamadi’s dead body on November 4, 2003. [Source: Public domain]Spc. Dennis E. Stevanus is summoned to the shower stall of the Hard Site in Abu Ghraib. When he arrives he discovers that detainee Manadel al-Jamadi, interrogated by the CIA less than an hour before (see Between 4:30 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. November 4, 2003), is dead. Jamadi’s body is still shackled to the stall. When the hood is removed, he is found to have severe head wounds. (It is unclear whether these wounds were present when the prisoner was taken in, or whether they were inflicted during the interrogation.) (Serrano 5/18/2004; US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) Stevanus calls a medic and notifies his superiors. Lt. Col. Steven Jordan arrives at the site at around 7:15 a.m. He finds several MPs and medics in the shower stall. The deceased prisoner is still handcuffed with his hands behind his back, lying on the floor face down. When the body is uncuffed and turned over, Jordan notices a small spot of blood on the floor where his head has lain. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file Sources: Jason A. Kenner) There is also extensive bruising on the body. (Wright 5/20/2004 Sources: Jason A. Kenner) Jordan alerts Col. Thomas M. Pappas. A CIA supervisor is also notified. He arrives and requests that the Hard Site hold the body until the next day. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) According to ABC News, Spc. Jason A. Kenner sees the body packed in ice while a “battle” rages between CIA and military intelligence interrogators over who should dispose of the corpse. (Wright 5/20/2004) The body is then put in a body bag, packed in ice, and stored in the shower area. (Hersh 5/10/2004; US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file Sources: Ivan L. Frederick II) Photographs are later released of MP Spcs. Charles Graner and Sabrina Harman posing next to the dead body wrapped in cellophane and packed in ice, giving a “thumbs up.” (Hersh 5/10/2004) According to MP Spc. Bruce Brown, an MP with the 372nd, they spray “air freshener to cover the scent.” (Serrano 5/18/2004) The Criminal Investigation Division (CID) is also alerted. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

Major General Marshal Donald Ryder files a report on the prison system in Iraq, as requested by Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez earlier in the fall (see Late January 2004). He concludes that there are potential systemic human rights, training, and manpower issues that need immediate attention at Abu Ghraib. But he also says that he found “no military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices.” (US Department of the Army 3/9/2004) Ryder suggests that the problem may stem from methods used in Afghanistan where MPs have worked with intelligence operatives to “set favorable conditions for subsequent interviews.” He recommends that military police no longer participate in military intelligence supervised interrogations. Guidelines need to be drawn up that “define the role of military police soldiers… clearly separating the actions of the guards from those of the military intelligence personnel,” he says. (Hersh 5/10/2004; Hersh 5/17/2004) An investigation by Gen. Antonio M. Taguba completed next year (see March 9, 2004) will come to the same conclusion. “I concur fully with MG Ryder’s conclusion regarding the effect of AR 190-8. Military Police, though adept at passive collection of intelligence within a facility, should not participate in military intelligence supervised interrogation sessions. Moreover, Military Police should not be involved with setting ‘favorable conditions’ [emphasis by Taguba] for subsequent interviews. These actions… clearly run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility.” (US Department of the Army 3/9/2004) Ryder does not appear to report on actual instances of prisoner abuse and downplays the gravity of the situation, saying it has not yet reached a crisis point. (Hersh 5/10/2004; Hersh 5/17/2004) Ryder’s report also notes that a great number of people being held in the Iraq prison system appear to be innocent of any crime. It notes that some Iraqis have been held for several months for nothing more than expressing displeasure or ill will towards US troops (see February 2004).

Manadel al-Jamadi in a body bag on November 4, 2003.Manadel al-Jamadi in a body bag on November 4, 2003. [Source: Public domain]The body of deceased Abu Ghraib detainee Manadel al-Jamadi is taken away on a litter to make it appear he is only ill. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) Medics soon arrive, put his body on a stretcher with a fake IV in his arm, and take him away. The identity of the prisoner is never recorded in the prison’s files and the man is never assigned a detainee identification number. (Hersh 5/10/2004 Sources: Ivan L. Frederick II) An autopsy is performed at the morgue of the prison facility at Baghdad International Airport concluding that the Iraqi “died of a blood clot in the head, likely a result of injuries he sustained during apprehension.” (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) According to an internal Pentagon report later obtained by the Denver Post, the “autopsy revealed the cause of death was blunt force trauma complicated by compromised respiration.” (Moffeit 5/18/2004) However, others will say they believe the prisoner died as a result of harsh interrogation tactics. Staff Sgt. Ivan Frederick will later write in one of his letters home (see (Mid-January 2004)), “They stressed him out so bad that the man passed away.” (Hersh 5/10/2004) The CIA’s inspector general will eventually investigate the case as a possible criminal homicide. (Jehl 5/17/2004)

Detainee Assad is allegedly stripped, beaten, and forced to crawl at Abu Ghraib prison. Made to stand on a box, he is also hit in his genitals. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

Under the heading “recommendations/future approaches,” an interrogation report states: “Detainee has been recommended for the hole in ISO [Isolation]. Detainee should be treated harshly because friendly treatment has not been productive and because Col. Thomas M. Pappas wants fast resolution, or he will turn the detainee over to someone other than the 205th.” Other entries in November read: “walked and put in the Hole”; “pulled out of extreme segregation”; “did not seem to be bothered to return to the Hole”; “Kept in the Hole for a long time unless he started to talk”; “was in good spirits even after three days in the Hole”; and “feared the isolation Hole, and it made him upset, but not enough to break.” (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

Top: Charles Garner punches one of the seven detainees. Bottom: Lynndie England points at the word “Rapeist” written on the leg of another one of the seven detainees. Other detainees are forced to sit naked on each other in the background.Top: Charles Garner punches one of the seven detainees. Bottom: Lynndie England points at the word “Rapeist” written on the leg of another one of the seven detainees. Other detainees are forced to sit naked on each other in the background. [Source: Public domain]At Abu Ghraib, seven Iraqi detainees are brought to Cellblock 1A from one of the tent camps escorted by MPs. The seven Iraqis are suspected of having taken part in a fight. They include Nori al-Yasseri, detainee number 7787; Hussein Mohssein Mata al-Zayiadi, detainee number 19446; and four others known only by their first names: Haidar, Ahmed, Ahzem, Hashiem and Mustafa. (Higham and Stephens 5/21/2004; US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) At least one of them was detained on suspicion of car theft. (Morin 10/21/2004) When they arrive, they all have their hands tied behind their backs with plastic handcuffs. Empty sandbags (“gunnysacks”) are put over their heads. (Davidson 7/28/2004) According to an account later provided by MP Spc. Matthew Wisdom, the other MPs suddenly begin striking at the prisoners. Spc. Charles Graner, Staff Sgt. Ivan Frederick and Sgt. Javal Davis “rotate around the detainees and abuse and hit them,” Wisdom later testifies. Graner poses for a photograph with his fist, clenched as if about to strike, close to a detainee’s head. “Right after the picture [is] taken, he actually hit[s] him,” Wisdom says in his testimony. (Serrano 8/5/2004) The MPs then throw the tied-up Iraqi men against the walls until they fall on the floor. Wisdom later recounts, “Sfc [Sgt. First Class] Snider grabbed my prisoner and threw him into a pile.” (Hersh 5/10/2004) Pfc. Lynndie England, who had her birthday the day before and has come to the cellblock to visit her boyfriend Spc. Graner, says the prisoners fall in what she calls a “dog pile.” (Davidson 7/28/2004) According to Wisdom, he sees “Staff Sgt. Frederic, Davis and Cpl. Graner walking around the pile hitting the prisoners.” (Hersh 5/10/2004) Several guards take turns leaping on top of the pile. Also present is Spc. Jeremy Sivits, who later testifies: “That is when Sgt. Davis ran across the room and lunged in the air and landed in the middle of where the detainees were. I believe Davis ran across the room a total of two times and landed in the middle of the pile of detainees.” (Higham and Stephens 5/22/2004) “A couple of the detainees kind of made an ‘ah’ sound, as if this hurt them or caused them some type of pain.” In the meanwhile Pfc. England and Sgt. Javal Davis stomped on the lying prisoners’ fingers and feet. Sivits heard them scream because of it. (Davidson 7/28/2004) The alleged car thief later testified during Frederick’s trial, he felt someone putting his foot on his head when he was thrown into the pile of men. “He put his whole weight on my head and on my knee. I was screaming and crying.” (Morin 10/21/2004) At this point, MP Sgt. Shannon K. Snider of the 372nd MP Company, who is working in an office on the top floor, hearing the cries of pain, leans over the railing and angrily yells at Sgt. Davis to stop abusing the prisoners. When Davis steps away from the pile of men, Snider leaves. “I believe that Sgt. Snider thought it was an isolated incident,” Sivits says, “and that when he ordered Sgt. Davis to stop, it was over.” (Davidson 7/28/2004) It was not. Testimony by Spc. Wisdom suggests some ringleaders among the MPs pressured the others to join in with the abuse. According to Wisdom, he too asked Davis not to stomp on toes. Davis then allegedly tells Wisdom: “Who are you to tell me to stop?” (Serrano 8/5/2004) Wisdom witnesses Frederick hitting a prisoner “in the side of his chest.” (Hersh 5/10/2004; Serrano 8/5/2004) Frederick then takes notice of Wisdom looking on. Wisdom testifies that Frederick “looked at me and said: ‘Wisdom, you’ve got to get some of this,’ meaning I should hit the detainees as well.” (Serrano 8/5/2004) According to Wisdom’s account, he goes outside after this incident, (Hersh 5/10/2004) and proceeds to alert his team leader Sgt. Robert Jones. (Serrano 8/5/2004) After Snider has left the scene, and possibly Wisdom as well, the MPs put the prisoners back to their feet and remove their handcuffs. Graner orders the detainees in Arabic to take their clothes off. Graner takes the head of one of the naked but hooded prisoners in one arm and smashes his free fist into his temple, causing the prisoner to sag down on the floor. “Damn, that hurt!” Graner says jokingly. Sivits walks over to see if the detainee is still alive. “I could tell that the detainee was unconscious, because his eyes were closed and he was not moving, but I could see his chest rise and fall, so I knew he was still alive.” Maybe this is the same incident witnessed by Wisdom, as perhaps is the following. Staff Sgt. Ivan Frederick writes an X on another detainee’s chest with his finger and says, “Watch this.” Then he punches the prisoner on the indicated spot so massively that the hooded prisoner sways backward, falls to his knees and is gasping for air. (Davidson 7/28/2004) Frederick has singled out the alleged car thief for extra punishment. “I stood him up and punched him in the chest. I was angry. They told me he was the ringleader. He hit a female soldier in the face with a rock.” (Morin 10/21/2004) Sivits testifies that Frederick says that “he thought he put the detainee in cardiac arrest.” (Davidson 7/28/2004) When the detainee subsequently collapses, he is checked by a female medic. She says he is “faking.” (Morin 10/21/2004) The seven detainees will continue to be abused into the night and will be forced to form naked human pyramids (see Evening November 7, 2003).

Top: the seven detainees are forced to form a human pyramid. Charles Graner and Sabrina Harman stand behind them smiling and giving thumbs up signs. Bottom: Some of the same detainees are forced to simulate oral sex on each other. Top: the seven detainees are forced to form a human pyramid. Charles Graner and Sabrina Harman stand behind them smiling and giving thumbs up signs. Bottom: Some of the same detainees are forced to simulate oral sex on each other. [Source: Public domain]At Abu Ghraib, seven Iraqi detainees are brought to Cellblock 1A from one of the tent camps escorted by MPs. The seven Iraqis are suspected of having taken part in a fight. They include Nori al-Yasseri, Hussein Mohssein Mata al-Zayiadi, and four others known only by their first names: Haidar, Ahmed, Ahzem, Hashiem and Mustafa. (Higham and Stephens 5/21/2004; US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) They are repeatedly punched and attacked by Staff Sgt. Ivan L. Frederick, Spc. Charles Graner, and other MPs (see Evening November 7, 2003). The MPs then take out their cameras to take pictures of the seven naked men and begin putting them in humiliating poses, often placing themselves in the picture as well, smiling. Graner makes them climb on top of each other to form a human pyramid, as is reported by Spc. Sabrina Harman. (Higham and Stephens 5/22/2004; Davidson 7/28/2004) “They put us two on the bottom, two on top of them, and two on top of those and on top,” Al-Zayiadi will say. (Higham and Stephens 5/21/2004) “The pyramid lasted about 15 to 20 minutes,” according to Harman. (Higham and Stephens 5/22/2004) The prisoners are also made to crawl on hands and knees with MPs riding on their backs. (Davidson 7/28/2004) “They were sitting on our backs like riding animals,” Al-Zayiadi says. Meanwhile, others are taking photographs. (Higham and Stephens 5/21/2004) Frederick then takes hold of the prisoner whom he has singled out for additional punishment and motions him to masturbate. “I grabbed his arm by the elbow, put it on his genitals and moved it back and forth with an arm motion, and he did it.” (Morin 10/21/2004) He makes another detainee do the same. “I lifted his hood and gave him a hand gesture, telling him to keep doing it himself.” (Oppel 10/21/2004) Spc. Matthew Wisdom, who complained to his team leader Sgt. Robert Jones earlier in the evening about the treatment of the detainees, returns to Tier 1A to find a naked detainee being forced to masturbate in front of another naked detainee on his knees before him. “I saw two naked detainees,” Wisdom will later recall, “one masturbating to another kneeling with its mouth open. I thought I should just get out of there. I didn’t think it was right.” (Hersh 5/10/2004) According to Wisdom, Frederick says to him: “Look what these animals do when we leave them alone for two seconds.” (Hersh 5/10/2004; Serrano 8/5/2004) Meanwhile, Pfc. Lynndie England makes sexually suggestive comments “in a somewhat sarcastic, fun tone of voice,” according to Wisdom. (Serrano 8/5/2004) “I heard Pfc. England shout out, ‘He’s getting hard.’” (Hersh 5/10/2004) Again Wisdom leaves the building to tell Sgt. Jones, who assures him the “problem [will] be addressed and dealt with,” (Serrano 8/5/2004) and Wisdom assumes that the problem will be taken care of. (Hersh 5/10/2004) Others, meanwhile, are lined up and forced to masturbate. These facts are corroborated by photographs that show the MPs laughing as they look on. (Davidson 7/28/2004) Al-Zayiadi later identifies himself in one of these pictures. “They told my friend to masturbate and told me to masturbate also, while they were taking pictures,” he says. (Higham and Stephens 5/21/2004) In the end, Al-Zayiadi says they are tossed naked but still hooded into a cell. “They opened the water in the cell and told us to lay face down in the water and we stayed like that until the morning, in the water, naked, without clothes.” (Higham and Stephens 5/21/2004) One of the seven prisoners is likely Haydar Sabbar Abed who says he was originally arrested for not carrying his ID card. After being involved in a fight with an Iraqi prison employee in one of the tent camps, he is taken to the Hard Site. He later recalls: “They cut off our clothes and… told us to masturbate towards this female soldier. But we didn’t agree to do it, so they beat us.” He also says: “They made us act like dogs, putting leashes around our necks. They’d whistle and we’d have to bark like dogs. We thought they were going to kill us.” (Asser 8/4/2004) The next day, Wisdom asks for and is granted a transfer to a job elsewhere in the prison. Although he and Sgt. Jones say they have been angered by the abuse, they do little more than mildly confront their colleagues with their objections. (Serrano 8/5/2004) To the detainees, the experience has been harrowing. Al-Yasseri will later call it a “night which we felt like 1,000 nights.” “I was trying to kill myself,” says Al-Zayiadi, “but I didn’t have any way of doing it.” (Davidson 7/28/2004) Gen. George Fay will also describe these incidents in his report (see August 25, 2004), which he concludes was an the affair of MPs alone. He states that military intelligence “involvement in this abuse has not been alleged nor is it likely.” However, one of the pictures taken that night, depicting the “human pyramid,” is later used as a screen saver for a computer in the Hard Site. The screen saver is later seen by a female military intelligence interrogator, but she states, according to Gen. Fay, that she did not report the picture because she did not see it again. The same interrogator, Fay will report, had a “close personal relationship” with Staff Sgt. Frederick, (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) one of the main instigators of the abuse that night.

A bomb explodes on the roadside within the close vicinity of Abu Ghraib. Its intended target is an Army convoy but it ends up killing a detainee instead, cutting off the back of his head. Sgt. Kenneth Davis, who is in the targeted convoy, believes the detainee was one of the prisoners he saw being tortured in late October. (Williamson 8/20/2004)

Six detainees escape from Camp Ganci in Abu Ghraib. (US Department of the Army 3/9/2004)

Lynndie England smiling at pointing at the penis of one of the Abu Ghraib detainees.Lynndie England smiling at pointing at the penis of one of the Abu Ghraib detainees. [Source: Public domain]Seven Iraqi detainees in Abu Ghraib prison have been punched, attacked, and humiliated all evening long on November 7, 2003, by their US captors (see Evening November 7, 2003 and Evening November 7, 2003). This abuse continues into the early morning hours of November 8. Pfc. Lynndie England is photographed pointing at the penises of several of the same seven detainees while Charles Graner and other MPs look on. (Scherer and Benjamin 3/14/2006)

Spc. Luciana Spencer of the 66th Military Intelligence Group of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade submits an interrogation plan proposing the use of the “Pride and Ego Down” technique on a detainee who she thinks is “arrogant.” In the submitted plan, she does not mention that her intent is to strip him. When she and her analyst “[place] him against the wall,” the detainee struggles and pushes the analyst. Spencer warns him that if he does so again, he will have to hand in his shoes. Spencer then instructs the detainee no to touch the other soldier, but the detainee does so anyway. The detainee finally has “his shirt, blanket, and finally his pants removed.” Spencer then concludes that the detainee is “completely uncooperative” and terminates the interrogation. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) Spencer and her analyst then walk the half-naked detainee from the Hard Site, past other detainees, to his cell at Camp Vigilant. An anonymous analyst later tells the New York Times: “I remember we said, ‘Do you really have to walk him out naked?’ And they said, ‘Yeah, yeah, we have to embarrass him.’” Civilian interrogator Steven Stephanowicz reports the incident when he sees Spencer and the analyst escort the half-naked detainee back to his cell. Spencer is subsequently removed from the interrogation unit. (Zernike and Rohde 6/8/2004) The reason is not the abuse itself. Rather, as Spencer’s section chief, Sgt. Adams, comments, “walking a semi-naked detainee across the camp could have caused a riot.” (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

An Abu Ghraib detainee bleeding after being biting by a dog on December 12, 2003.An Abu Ghraib detainee bleeding after being biting by a dog on December 12, 2003. [Source: Public domain]Dog teams arrive at Abu Ghraib and “almost immediately” are used against the detainees (see November 24, 2003). Gen. George Fay’s investigation (see August 25, 2004) of Abu Ghraib abuses will conclude that, “The use of dogs in interrogations to ‘fear up’ detainees was generally unquestioned.” Most military intelligence personnel apparently believe dogs can be used in interrogations with specific approval from Col. Thomas M. Pappas. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) According to Sgt. Michael J. Smith and Sgt. Santos A. Cardona, they are acting under instructions from Col. Thomas M. Pappas when they use unmuzzled dogs to intimidate prisoners. (Jehl and Schmitt 5/22/2004) And Pappas himself believes, “incorrectly,” Gen. Fay notes, that Lt. Col. Ricardo S. Sanchez has delegated this authority to him. Pappas, concludes Gen. Fay, “[i]mproperly authorized the use of dogs during interrogations.” (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file) Nevertheless, Gen. Fay also believes, “there were early indications that MP and MI [Military Intelligence] personnel knew the use of dog teams in interrogations was abusive.” Only the Army dog teams join in with the abuse. Three Navy dog teams, who arrive simultaneously at Abu Ghraib, refuse to lend their dogs for interrogation purposes. The Navy dog handlers always ask for what specific purpose the dog is required, and when they are told “for interrogation,” they refuse to comply. “Over the next few weeks, the Navy dog teams received about eight similar calls, none of which [are] fulfilled.” (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

Twenty detainees are transferred from Guantanamo to their home countries. Whether they are to be released upon arrival or to remain in detention in these countries is not revealed. (US Department of Defense 11/24/2003) Two days later, about 20 new detainees arrive. The total number of detainees at Guantanamo now stands at approximately 660. Little information about the identities and home countries of the detainees is released to the public. (US Department of Defense 11/24/2003)

Iraqi Major General Abed Hamed Mowhoush is questioned by “other governmental agency officials” (In military parlance, this means the CIA) and possibly beaten. (Human Rights Watch 6/2004)

The first incident of abuse involving guard dogs reportedly occurs at Abu Ghraib. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

Abed Hamed Mowhoush.Abed Hamed Mowhoush. [Source: New York Times]At the Al Qaim detention facility northwest of Baghdad, Iraqi Major General Abed Hamed Mowhoush is interrogated by two officers of the 66th Military Intelligence Company. They force him head-first into a sleeping bag and question him as they roll him back and forth. One of the soldiers, Chief Warrant Officer Lewis Welshofer, sits on the Iraqi general’s chest and covers his mouth. (Human Rights Watch 6/2004) The prisoner dies of asphyxia due to smothering and chest compression. (Moffeit 5/18/2004) Later in the day, US military officials issue a statement saying that a prisoner has died of natural causes during questioning. “Mowhoush said he didn’t feel well and subsequently lost consciousness,” the statement reads. “The soldier questioning him found no pulse, then conducted CPR and called for medical authorities. According to the on-site surgeon, it appeared Mowhouse died of natural causes.” (Moffeit 5/18/2004; Jehl and Schmitt 5/22/2004) But the autopsy report will say there is “evidence of blunt force trauma to the chest and legs.” (Human Rights Watch 6/2004) The incident is investigated and a report is issued in early 2004 (see Late January 2004).

Ivan Frederick.Ivan Frederick. [Source: Associated Press]A civilian contractor starts interrogating a detained Iraqi policeman at Abu Ghraib. He asks the detainee a question, and then warns that if he does not answer he will bring Staff Sgt. Ivan Frederick into the cell. A military intelligence soldier witnesses Frederick going in and out of the cell several times. At one point, Frederick puts his hand over the detainee’s nose, not allowing him to breathe. Frederick also uses a “collapsible nightstick” to possibly twist the detainee’s arm. At the end of the session, Frederick tells the military intelligence soldier he knows ways to do this without leaving marks. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

Two military intelligence interrogators tell a detainee at Abu Ghraib that “he [will] go into the Hole if he didn’t start cooperating.” (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

Personnel at Abu Ghraib photograph a detainee “dressed only in his underwear, standing with each foot on a separate box, and bent over at the waist.” (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

In downtown Baghdad, Saddam Salah al-Rawi, a 29-year-old Iraqi Sunni Muslim, reports to an Iraqi police officer that he believes a car on Saddoun Street is wired with explosives. The Iraqi police then take him to a US Army base in Baghdad “on Palestine Street.” Upon arrival at the base, he is immediately taken in custody. According to al-Rawi, the US captain cuffs him, pushes him around, and kicks him in the thigh before putting him in a room. After two hours he is visited by two US soldiers—a specialist and a sergeant first class—and an Arab translator, who begin interrogating him. He is left the rest of the day and night without food, water, a blanket, or mattress. (CPTnet 5/12/2004; McCarthy 5/13/2004; Fisher 5/14/2004; ABC News 8/8/2004)

At Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, MPs hide prisoners from a Red Cross delegation by shifting them around the complex. These prisoners, or “ghost detainees,” are a group of detainees that have been imprisoned without names, charges, or other documentation. According to Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba’s February 26 report (see February 26, 2004), a number of jails operated by the 800th Military Police Brigade “routinely held” such prisoners “without accounting for them, knowing their identities, or even the reason for their detention.” Taguba will note that the practice is a “violation of international law.” (US Department of the Army 3/9/2004; Drogin 5/5/2004; Higham, White, and Davenport 5/9/2004; Priest and Stephens 5/11/2004, pp. A01)

In February 2004, Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, leading an investigation into detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison, will come to believe that Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, US Army commander in Iraq, and some other generals at the military headquarters in Baghdad had extensive knowledge of the abuse even before a CD-ROM of abuse photographs was given to military intelligence. Taguba was aware that in late 2003, when most of the photographed abuse took place, Sanchez routinely visited the prison, and personally witnessed at least one interrogation. In 2007, Taguba will say, “Sanchez knew exactly what was going on.” (Hersh 6/17/2007)

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco rules that federal courts have jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay, and that the prisoners can file writs of habeas corpus in US courts challenging the legality of their detention. (Montgomery 12/29/2003) The San Francisco Court argues: “Under the government’s theory, it is free to imprison [detainees] indefinitely…, and to do with… these detainees as it will, when it pleases, without any compliance with any rule of law of any kind…. Indeed, at oral argument, the government advised us that its position would be the same even if the claims were that it was engaging in acts of torture or that it was summarily executing the detainees…. It is the first time that the government has announced such an extraordinary set of principles—a position so extreme that it raises the gravest concerns under both American and international law.” (Human Rights Watch 1/9/2004)

Guantanamo detainee Mohammed Jawad, who has been in custody since he was 16 years old (see December 17, 2002 and January 13, 2009), attempts to commit suicide. Shortly thereafter, Guantanamo guards begin subjecting Jawad to what is known as the “frequent flier” program, in which the detainee is moved from cell to cell every few hours for days or weeks on end, in order to deny him sleep. Jawad is moved 122 times in 14 days, an average of less than 3 hours per move (see June 19, 2008). (Greenwald 1/21/2009)

A man in Baghdad speaks to an American journalist about atrocities at Abu Ghraib: “Why do they use these actions? Even Saddam Hussein did not do that! This is not good behavior. They are not coming to liberate Iraq!” (Jamail 1/7/2005)

A picture is taken of an unidentified detainee being interrogated. In the photograph he is squatting on a chair, in what appears to be a “stress position.” (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

In an article published by the Guardian of London, Daryl Matthews, a forensic psychiatrist who worked at Guantanamo, describes the difference between Guantanamo and an ordinary US prison. “[A]t Guantanamo there’s an added level of stress, and I think that is the thing that’s somewhat unique. Inmates in a normal prison are focused on how much time they are going to serve, on contacting their lawyers, on being able to take constructive efforts to get out; these are important ways prisoners deal with the stress of confinement, and these guys can’t do anything.” (Meek 12/3/2003)

Lt. Col. Steven Jordan is reported in the MP log book at Abu Ghraib to have specifically allowed the removal of clothes. The entry for December 4 reads: “Spoke with Ltc. Jordan… about MI [military intelligence] holds in Tier 1A/B. He stated he would clear up with MI and let MPs run Tiers 1A/B as far as what inmate gets (clothes).” Additionally, Lt. Col. Jerry L. Phillabaum will remembers that when he asked Jordan about the nudity of detainees, Jordan said it was “an interrogation technique.” (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

Saddam Salah al-Rawi is taken to Abu Ghraib and registered under number 200144. (McCarthy 5/13/2004) For the first 18 days of his detention at Abu Ghraib, he will be subjected to a series of techniques. Interrogations follow only after this period. The first MP Al-Rawi encounters puts a hood over his head, cuffs his hands, and leads him away, “intentionally smashing [his] face against several doors along the way.” (CPTnet 5/12/2004) “He locked his arm under mine and holding the back of my head he beat my head against the doors of the cells,” Al-Rawi will later recall. (McCarthy 5/13/2004) In another testimony, Al-Rawi repeats the same allegation: “Wherever he saw a wall, he would hit me against it. Wherever there’s a door, he would push me and hit me against it.” (ABC News 8/8/2004) He is left in a cell, still hooded and cuffed, with three or four other prisoners, who are also tied up but have no hoods on. He asks one of them, whom he later names as Thamir Issawi, to lift up his hood to allow him to breathe more easily. “When he opened my hood I could see his back. He was naked. All of them around me were naked.” (McCarthy 5/13/2004) It was, according to Al-Rawi, “something I have never seen in my life. A man’s buttocks were facing me.” (ABC News 8/8/2004) “I was so shocked and disgraced that I asked the man to put my hood back on, which he did.” (CPTnet 5/12/2004) An hour later, soldiers take him into the hall, and order him to strip. “I refused to because it is forbidden for Muslims.” Al-Rawi faces the inevitable. “They forced off my clothes and beat me,” he says. (CPTnet 5/12/2004) “I was completely naked with two bags on my head.” (ABC News 8/8/2004) The soldiers then force him to stand on a box with his hands on his head. “I stood like this for an hour, or an hour and a quarter. Then some American soldiers came and they were laughing and some were beating me. They were beating me on my back and my legs. They were beating and laughing.” (McCarthy 5/13/2004) His next experience is an example of the “stress positions” tactic. “Next, they made me hold a plastic chair over my head for a long time. All along, I could hear them laughing and snapping photographs.” (CPTnet 5/12/2004) Elsewhere, he reportedly says, “I remember them taking pictures. I remember there were these prisoners standing beside me. I was hooded but I remember a flash from the camera and the sound of a click when they took the picture.” (McCarthy 5/13/2004) At one point, he cannot take it any longer. “I became so exhausted that I fell down and hit my head on the wall.” (CPTnet 5/12/2004) At that moment, “I lost consciousness.” (McCarthy 5/13/2004) The soldiers then remove his hood, (ABC News 8/8/2004) and when he regains consciousness, Al-Rawi comes face to face with his attackers. “I saw Sgt. Joyner, an Egyptian translator who wore fatigues, named Abu Hamed, two male soldiers, one with glasses, and one female soldier.… Then a soldier from another group came and peed on me.” (CPTnet 5/12/2004) [In a May 30, 2005 email to the Center for Cooperative Research, Sgt. Joyner denied abusing detainees] Next, Al-Rawi later recounts, “they started to drop cold water on me.” (McCarthy 5/13/2004) “Other soldiers then dragged me along the floor in the hall and did other similar things to keep me awake all night.” (CPTnet 5/12/2004) In the morning he is put in cell 42 in Tier 1-A, and allowed a few moments alone. His cell has a water tap, a loo, and a metal bunk bed, but no sheets, blanket, or mattress. (CPTnet 5/12/2004; McCarthy 5/13/2004) “I was still naked and very tired. I sat against the wall, shivering and trying to sleep. I could see through some small openings in the wall that the sun was rising.” Somewhat later that morning, Al-Rawi meets with Staff Sgt. Ivan Frederick and a female sergeant who take him to another room. “I was still unhooded and untied. They gave me some cloth to cover myself. Sergeant Ivan threatened me, saying that if I didn’t give up any information, he would have other soldiers rape me. (Abu Hamed was translating.) I was so stunned that I couldn’t reply.” (CPTnet 5/12/2004) Al-Rawi is often left in his cell with his hands and feet bound; sometimes in a way designed to be highly uncomfortable. One such “stress position” leaves him with his hands and feet stuck through the metal bars of his cell door and tied together at the outside. A civilian American with a goatee beard, whom Al-Rawi identifies as “Steven,” possibly private contractor Steven Stephanowicz, forces him to adopt the so-called “scorpion” position. “They tied my hands to my feet behind my back,” explains Al-Rawi. “My left hand to my right foot and my right hand to my left foot. I was lying face down and they were beating me like this.” (McCarthy 5/13/2004) During his first 18 days at Abu Ghraib, Al-Rawi says he is almost constantly tortured, “for 23 hours per day.” During this time, there are no interrogations, no investigations, and no medical treatment. He encounters the whole range of techniques, starting with the familiar nudity. “They left me naked the entire time.” (CPTnet 5/12/2004) He is also subjected to sleep deprivation. “There was a stereo inside the cell and it played music with a sound so loud I couldn’t sleep. I stayed like that for 23 hours.” (McCarthy 5/13/2004) Al-Rawi is beaten repeatedly. “One time they knocked out two of my teeth [lower left molars].” He is also threatened with dogs. “Whenever they took me out of my cell, they used dogs to threaten me.” (CPTnet 5/12/2004) On one occasion a naked Al-Rawi is pushed from behind by a guard towards another guard holding a dog on a leash. At some point the experience becomes too much to bear. “In my cell I was shouting,” said Al-Rawi, “‘Please come and take me. Please kill me. I am Osama bin Laden, I was in the plane that hit the World Trade Centre.’ I wished for death at that time,” he says. “I wanted to be dead 1,000 times. I asked my God to take my soul.” (McCarthy 5/13/2004) After these 18 days, his preparation for interrogation has finished. He has his clothes returned and is finally questioned. Having lost all defenses he gives any answer his interrogators want. “I just didn’t care anymore.” (CPTnet 5/12/2004) “Whatever they asked me, I said yes. They told me I was from Ansar al-Islam [a militant Iraqi group] and I said yes. I told them the leader of Jaish-e-Mohammad [another Iraqi militant group] was my cousin. They asked me about Zarqawi [a Jordanian militant thought to be in Iraq] and al-Qaeda and I said yes even though I don’t know who they are.” (McCarthy 5/13/2004) He even declared being Osama bin Laden himself. “I did the explosions on September 11,” he said. “The interrogators just said, ‘Bullsh_t!’ to all of my answers and beat me.” (CPTnet 5/12/2004)

An FBI official complains in a memo about questionable interrogation practices being used by Defense Department interrogators at Guantanamo, and calls attention to one incident in particular (see June 2003) when an interrogator impersonating an FBI agent employed certain interrogation methods not practiced by FBI: “These tactics have produced no intelligence of a threat neutralization nature to date and CITF believes that techniques have destroyed any chance of prosecuting this detainee. If this detainee is ever released or his story made public in any way, DOD [Department of Defense] interrogators will not be held accountable because these torture techniques were done [by] the ‘FBI’ interrogators. The FBI will [be] left holding the bag before the public.” (Federal Bureau of Investigation 12/5/2003 pdf file) An FBI official will later say in an email that these techniques were “approved by the Dep. Sec. Def.,” (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1/21/2004 pdf file) meaning possibly Stephen A. Cambone, who is responsible for interrogation policy at the Pentagon.

Top: Sgt. Evans fills out paperwork. A naked detainee and Adel Nakhla’s shoulder can also been seen. Bottom: Two naked detainees are cuffed together.Top: Sgt. Evans fills out paperwork. A naked detainee and Adel Nakhla’s shoulder can also been seen. Bottom: Two naked detainees are cuffed together. [Source: Public domain]In the early morning hours of Dec. 6, more photographs are taken of naked detainees at Abu Ghraib prison. According to MP Charles Graner, some of them are OGA (other government agency) prisoners, which typically means CIA prisoners. In one picture, a medic known as Sgt. Evans fills out paperwork while one of these OGA detainees stands naked next to him. Adel Nakhla, a Titan Corp. interrogator, can also be partially seen. That evening, another photo shows two naked detainees cuffed together. One of them has what appear to be several cuts on his head and arm. (Scherer and Benjamin 3/14/2006)

A detainee is attacked by a dog on December 12, 2003.A detainee is attacked by a dog on December 12, 2003. [Source: Public domain]A detainee, who appears to be mentally unstable, is bitten by a dog in the Hard Site at Abu Ghraib. The incident is photographed, and according to the later report (see August 25, 2004) by Gen. George Fay, “appears to be the result of MP harassment and amusement.” (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

Barbara Fast.Barbara Fast. [Source: US Army]Col. Stuart A. Herrington, the head of an investigative commission charged with providing recommendations for improving intelligence and detention operations (see Fall 2003), issues a confidential 13-page report in which he documents several instances of abuse in Iraqi detention facilities. Herrington advises Gen. Barbara Fast that intelligence capabilities need to be significantly improved. Given that many detainees have been rounded up in Iraq, he concludes it is “disappointing that the opportunity to thoroughly and professionally exploit this source pool has not been maximized, in spite of your best efforts and those of several hundred MI [military intelligence] soldiers. Even one year ago, we would have salivated at the prospect of being able to talk to people like the hundreds who are now in our custody. Now that we have them, we have failed to devote the planning and resources to optimize this mission.” In addition, Herrington notices the practice of abusing prisoners. He specifically mentions Joint Task Force (JTF) 121. Some of its practices during arrest and detention, he writes, could “technically” be termed illegal. JTF-121 members are found to be abusing detainees throughout Iraq and to be using a secret interrogation facility. Captives delivered at Abu Ghraib have clearly been beaten. “Detainees captured by TF-121 have shown injuries that caused examining medical personnel to note that ‘detainee shows signs of having been beaten’.” Herrington concludes: “It seems clear that TF-121 needs to be reined in with respect to its treatment of detainees.” Sweeping roundups of Iraqis and their mistreatment will be “counterproductive… to win the cooperation of the Iraqi citizenry.” The report also mentions the practice of “Other Government Agencies,” referring to the CIA, creating so-called “ghost detainees” by not formally registering them when they are taken into custody. (White 12/1/2004)

A dog harassing an Abu Ghraib detainee on December 30, 2003.A dog harassing an Abu Ghraib detainee on December 30, 2003. [Source: Public domain]Dogs are used during an interrogation at Abu Ghraib. An interrogation team requests the use of dogs for a detainee arrested in relation to the capture of Saddam Hussein. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

An Abu Ghraib detainee being harassed by a dog.An Abu Ghraib detainee being harassed by a dog. [Source: Public domain]A picture is taken of an incident of abuse at Abu Ghraib involving a dog. A “high value” Syrian detainee is photographed kneeling on the floor with his hands cuffed behind his back. An Army dog handler stands in front of him with his black dog, on a leash but not muzzled, a few feet away from the detainee. (US Department of Defense 8/23/2004 pdf file)

“We have a very high rate with our style of getting them to break,” Sgt. Ivan Frederick writes to a relative, Mimi Frederick, in an e-mail sent from Abu Ghraib. “They usually end up breaking within hours.” (Jehl and Schmitt 5/9/2004)

On December 22 (Hennion 10/12/2004) or 23 (Harding 9/20/2004) , Ayad, one of Huda al-Azzawi’s brothers is arrested by US troops, apparently as a result of her ignoring an Iraqi who is trying to blackmail her (see November 2003). In an effort to get Al-Azzawi out, she goes to the US base in Adhamiya, one of Saddam Hussein’s former palaces, where Ayad is presumably being held. (Hennion 10/12/2004) “A US captain,” she recalls, “told me to come back with my two other brothers. He said we could talk after that.” She did what she was told and returned, on Christmas Eve, together with her brothers Ali and Mu’taz. After waiting four hours, an American captain begins interrogating her. (Harding 9/20/2004) “An officer listened to me politely for ten minutes. Then we were interrupted by a soldier who brought in a document. The officer read it. One second later, I wasn’t ‘Mrs.’ anymore, but ‘terrorist.’” (Hennion 10/12/2004) The captain says she is under arrest. (Harding 9/20/2004) Her brothers, as well as her sister, Nahla, are detained. But she is not aware of this at this time. (Hennion 10/12/2004) “They handcuffed me and blindfolded me and put a piece of white cloth over my eyes. They bundled me into a Humvee and took me to a place inside the palace. I was dumped in a room with a single wooden chair. It was extremely cold. After five hours they brought my sister in. I couldn’t see anything but I could recognize her from her crying.” That whole night US guards keep her sitting on the chair. (Harding 9/20/2004)

The day after her arrest, Huda al-Azzawi is taken from her cell to another room, which other detainees call “the torturing place,” she says. “The US officer told us: ‘If you don’t confess we will torture you. So you have to confess.’ My hands were handcuffed. They took off my boots and stood me in the mud with my face against the wall. I could hear women and men shouting and weeping. I recognized one of the cries as my brother Mu’taz. I wanted to see what was going on so I tried to move the cloth from my eyes. When I did, I fainted.” She allegedly sees her brother being sexually assaulted. After that she is questioned. “The informant and an American officer were both in the room. The informant started talking. He said, ‘You are the lady who funds your brothers to attack the Americans.’ I speak some English so I replied: ‘He is a liar.’ The American officer then hit me on both cheeks. I fell to the ground.” (Harding 9/20/2004) For the next 12 hours, US guards make her stand with her face against the wall. Approaching midnight she and her sister are returned to a cell. “The cell had no ceiling. It was raining,” she later tells the Guardian. The Americans have another surprise in store for her. “At midnight they threw something at my sister’s feet.” (Harding 9/20/2004) Both women are blindfolded. “I heard a muffled noise and my sister’s screams,” Al-Azzawi says. “The naked body of a man had been thrown across her. She was panicking. She then realized that the body didn’t move. With my hands cuffed in front of me, I was able to lift a corner of my blindfold. The naked man was Ayad, my brother, and his face was covered in blood.” (Hennion 10/12/2004) Ayad, she remembers, “was bleeding from his legs, knees, and forehead. I told my sister: ‘Find out if he’s still breathing.’ She said: ‘No. Nothing.’ I started crying.” (Harding 9/20/2004) Nahla “spent the night with Ayad’s corpse on her knees.” (Hennion 10/12/2004) “The next day they took away his body.” (Harding 9/20/2004) A death certificate is later issued by the US military. It cites the cause of death as “cardiac arrest of unknown etiology [cause].” (Hennion 10/12/2004)

After her brother’s dead body has been taken away, Huda al-Azzawi and 18 other Iraqi detainees at the US base in Adhamiya are put inside a minibus. “The Americans told us: ‘Nobody is going to sleep tonight.’ They played scary music continuously with loud voices. As soon as someone fell asleep they started beating on the door. It was Christmas. They kept us there for three days. Many of the US soldiers were drunk.” (Harding 9/20/2004) During the coming days, she is subjected to severe physical violence when a US guard either breaks (Harding 9/20/2004) or dislocates her shoulder. It leads to her being examined by a doctor. “Paradoxically, that was the best thing that happened to me. The doctor was furious with the guard and demanded that they cuff my hands in front of me, instead of behind my back, a less painful position.” For a week she is kicked or hit with rifle butts in her breasts and her stomach. She is forced to squat or stand up for hours. She is denied sufficient food and sleep, and is forced to listen to “terrifying” music. (Hennion 10/12/2004)

Afghan taxi driver Wazir Muhammad is released from Guantanamo due to long campaigning by his brother Taji and Amnesty International. (Campbell and Goldenberg 6/23/2004) “At the end of my time in Guantanamo,” he recalls, “I had to sign a paper saying I had been captured in battle which was not true. I was stopped when I was in my taxi with four passengers. But they told me I would have to spend the rest of my life in Guantanamo if I did not sign it, so I did.” (Campbell and Goldenberg 6/23/2004)

Iraqi prisoner Farhad Mohamed dies while in US custody in Mosul. Later examination finds contusions under his eyes and the bottom of his chin, a swollen nose, and cuts and large bumps on his forehead. Mohamed’s death will be investigated as a possible murder by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS—see May 14, 2008). (American Civil Liberties Union 5/14/2008)

At Guantanamo, Salim Ahmed Hamdan from Yemen is placed in isolation, where he stays until at least August, according to a sworn statement. Hamdan allegedly develops symptoms, like sudden mood changes and suicidal tendencies, that medical experts say indicate a serious and worsening mental illness. This information will later come to light during a hearing in a lawsuit filed in Seattle challenging the authority of the Bush administration to try prisoners as enemy combatants before military tribunals. (Lewis 8/7/2004)

After 15 months of brutal torture in Morocco (see July 21, 2002 -- January 2004), British terror suspect Binyam Mohamed (see May-September, 2001) is flown to Afghanistan by the CIA.
Shock at Brutal Treatment - Even the hardened CIA agents in Afghanistan are shocked by the treatment meted out by the Moroccans, who, among other treatments, had repeatedly slashed and lacerated Mohamed’s genitals with scalpels and knives. Mohamed will later recall: “When I got to Kabul a female agent started taking close-up pictures of my genitals. She was shocked. When they removed my diaper she could see blood was still oozing from the cuts on my penis. For the first two weeks they had me on antibiotics and they took pictures of my genitals every day. They told me, ‘This is not for us. It’s for Washington.’ They wanted to be sure it was healing.”
'The Dark Prison' - But the initial shock gives way to a new session of brutality at the hands of his American captors. Mohamed will later call his Afghani detention facility “the dark prison,” and recall it as one of the lowest points of his life. In Morocco, Mohamed confessed to anything he was asked—being part of a plot to build a radioactive “dirty bomb,” being a confidant of 9/11 planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, having met Osama bin Laden dozens of times—in order to, he says, avoid further torture. Now the Americans want him to be a prosecution witness against high-ranking al-Qaeda already in US custody. But Mohammed knows nothing of these people or their crimes, he will later say. The tortures with scalpels are not repeated, but Mohamed will recall seemingly endless ordeals of being shackled by the wrists to his door frame, often in complete darkness, and in one memorable instance, being subjected to a rap CD being played in his cell at ear-shatteringly loud volumes for an entire month without stop. “It’s a miracle my brain is still intact,” he will later say. In September, he is transferred to Guantanamo (see September 2004 and After). (Rose 3/8/2009)

Huda al-Azzawi and her siblings are detained at Abu Ghraib. Numbered 156283, she is to spend a total of 197 days in the prison, (Hennion 10/12/2004) of which 156 days will be in solitary confinement at the Hard Site in one of the upstairs cells. (Harding 9/20/2004) She will be interrogated thirty times. (Hennion 10/12/2004) Her cell at the Hard Site measures two square meters, and initially it has no bed and just a bucket for a loo. For the first three weeks she is forbidden to talk. Guards give her a Koran. With a stolen pen, she records her experiences in its margins. In the first weeks at Abu Ghraib, Al-Azzawi witnesses many instances of torture. “The guards used wild dogs. I saw one of the guards allow his dog to bite a 14-year-old boy on the leg. The boy’s name was Adil. Other guards frequently beat the men. I could see the blood running from their noses. They would also take them for compulsory cold showers even though it was January and February. From the very beginning, it was mental and psychological war.” (Harding 9/20/2004) Possibly the worst she sees, are incidents of rape. “I saw men that had water bottles forced up their butt by soldiers.” To the question whether women also ran the risk of rape, she says, “the women were relatively sheltered.” But it may also be more difficult to learn of women being raped. “You won’t find a single one who will testify to having been raped. A rape, for a man, is the supreme humiliation, but for a woman, it is a death sentence by her own family.” (Hennion 10/12/2004)

Joseph Darby.Joseph Darby. [Source: Richard Lambert / US Army]Spc. Joseph Darby, a 24-year-old member of the 372nd MP Company at Abu Ghraib, slips an envelope under the door of the Army’s Criminal Investigations Division. The envelope contains an anonymous note and a CD with roughly one thousand photographs of abuses that took place at the prison, mostly between October and December of the previous year. (Becker 5/10/2004; Hersh 5/24/2004) Darby was collecting photographs from his tour in Iraq and received them inter alia from Spc. Charles Graner. “It was just wrong,” Darby later declares. “I knew I had to do something.” He talked about it with Graner who allegedly replied: “The Christian in me says it’s wrong, but the corrections officer in me says, ‘I love to make a grown man piss himself.’” (Higham and Stephens 5/22/2004)

The Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) agent who received the Abu Ghraib prison photographs from Spc. Joseph Darby (see January 13, 2004), calls his boss, a colonel, who takes them to Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez. (Worden 7/4/2004) Within three days, a report on the photos makes its way to Donald Rumsfeld, who informs President Bush, though it is not clear exactly when Bush is informed (see Late January-Mid-March 2004). (Hersh 5/24/2004) Within the Pentagon, few people are informed—unusually few—according to Hersh, who will later write that knowledge of the abuses were “severely, and unusually restricted.” A former intelligence official will tell him: “I haven’t talked to anybody on the inside who knew; nowhere. It’s got them scratching their heads.” Rumsfeld and his civilian staff, Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez and Gen. John P. Abizaid, reportedly try to suppress the issue during the first months of the year. “They foresaw major diplomatic problems,” according to a Pentagon official. (Hersh 5/17/2004) According to one former intelligence official, the Defense Secretary’s attitude is: “We’ve got a glitch in the program. We’ll prosecute it.” The former official explains to Seymour Hersh, “The cover story was that some kids got out of control.” (Hersh 5/24/2004)

Bantz Craddock.Bantz Craddock. [Source: US European Command]On January 15, 2004, Lieutenant General Bantz Craddock, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s senior military assistant, and Vice-Admiral Timothy Keating, director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are e-mailed a summary of the Abu Ghraib abuses depicted on a CD-ROM recently given to an army investigative unit two days before (see January 13, 2004). The summary says that about ten soldiers are shown in the pictures and are involved in acts including: “Having male detainees pose nude while female guards pointed at their genitals; having female detainees exposing themselves to the guards; having detainees perform indecent acts with each other; and guards physically assaulting detainees by beating and dragging them with choker chains.” On January 20, Central Command sends another e-mail to Keating, Craddock, and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the top US Army commander in Iraq. It confirms the detainee abuse took place, is well-documented with photos, and says that “currently [we] have 4 confessions implicating perhaps 10 soldiers.” General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will later acknowledge in testimony that around this time, information about the abuse and the photographs had been given “to me and the Secretary [Rumsfeld] up through the chain of command.… And the general nature of the photos, about nudity, some mock sexual acts and other abuse, was described.” (Hersh 6/17/2007)

Staff Sgt. Ivan L. Frederick II, a member of the 372nd Military Police Company who will be a central figure in the prison photos scandal, sends a letter to relatives back home. In his letter he says: “I questioned some of the things that I saw… such things as leaving inmates in their cell with no clothes or in female underpants, handcuffing them to the door of their cell-and the answer I got was, ‘This is how military intelligence (MI) wants it done.‘… MI has also instructed us to place a prisoner in an isolation cell with little or no clothes, no toilet or running water, no ventilation or window, for as much as three days.” Frederick goes on to say that the military intelligence officers have “encouraged and told us, ‘Great job,’ they were now getting positive results and information. CID has been present when the military working dogs were used to intimidate prisoners at MI’s request.” When Frederick asked his superior officer, Lt. Col. Jerry Phillabaum, the commander of the 320th MP Battalion, about the abuse of the prisoners, “His reply was ‘Don’t worry about it.’” (Hersh 5/10/2004)

Ricardo Sanchez.Ricardo Sanchez. [Source: US Army]US Central Command issues a short press release announcing that Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez has ordered a criminal investigation “into reported incidents of detainee abuse at a coalition forces detention facility.” It is later learned that the facility in question is Abu Ghraib prison. (Associated Press 1/16/2004) The fact that the investigation is reported to be initiated by the central US military command in Iraq rather than an individual unit, the BBC Pentagon correspondent calls unusual. “It suggests that senior commanders are taking the issue very seriously.” (BBC 1/16/2004) At some point between January 16 and 21, the CID will begin taking sworn witness statements from detainees. (Higham and Stephens 5/21/2004)

Gen. Janis Karpinski is informed of the abuses depicted in the photographs turned in by Spc. Joseph Darby a few days before (see January 13, 2004). She is an hour and a half away from Baghdad engaged in some kind of “security mission.” The Criminal Investigation Division (CID) commander informs her by e-mail “almost as if he thought of me as an after-fact or an afterthought,” she later says. (Worden 7/4/2004)

Gen. Janis Karpinski is disciplined by Lt. Col. Ricardo S. Sanchez with a Memorandum of Admonishment and relieved of duty. She herself suspends Lt. Col. Jerry L. Phillabaum and Cpt. Donald Reese from their duties. (US Department of the Army 3/9/2004)

Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez orders a high level administrative investigation into the 800th Military Police Brigade apart from the criminal investigation that was announced three days earlier (see January 16, 2004). He appoints Major General Antonio M. Taguba to conduct the inquiry and limits the scope of the investigation to the conduct of the military police brigade. Taguba’s report will be filed on February 26 (see February 26, 2004). (US Department of the Army 3/9/2004; Sydney Morning Herald 5/4/2004; Jehl 5/10/2004) As preparations for investigation are underway, investigators reportedly give the MPs at Abu Ghraib “a week’s notice before inspecting their possessions.” ( [Sources: Several unnamed soldiers) Whether it is an attempt to sabotage the investigation, or a matter of clumsiness on the part of the military leadership or the CID, the result may well be that evidence of abuse is deliberately destroyed. “That shows you how lax they are about discipline. ‘We are going to look for contraband in here, so hint, hint, get rid of the stuff,’ that’s the way things work in the Guard,” MP Ramone Leal will say. (Reuters 5/6/2004)

CNN reports that US male and female soldiers posed for photographs with partially unclothed Iraqi prisoners and that the focus of the Army’s investigation is Abu Ghraib. (Starr 1/21/2004)

Gen. Janis Karpinski sees Abu Ghraib photos. (Worden 7/4/2004)

Al-Qaeda leader Hassan Ghul is caught at the Iraq-Iran border. Details are sketchy, both about the arrest and Ghul himself, who has never been publicly mentioned before. Several days later, President Bush will say: “[L]ast week we made further progress in making America more secure when a fellow named Hassan Ghul was captured in Iraq. [He] reported directly to [9/11 mastermind] Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.… He was captured in Iraq, where he was helping al-Qaeda to put pressure on our troops.” (Milbank 1/27/2004) Ghul had been living in Pakistan, but the Pakistani government refused to arrest him, apparently because he was linked to a Pakistani military group supported by Pakistani intelligence (see (2002-January 23, 2004)). Pakistan is reportedly furious when it is told he has been arrested in Iraq. (Associated Press 6/15/2011) US officials point to his arrest as proof that al-Qaeda is heavily involved in the resistance in Iraq. One official says that Ghul was “definitely in Iraq to promote an al-Qaeda, Islamic extremist agenda.” (Fox News 1/24/2004) The 9/11 Commission will later claim: “Hassan Ghul was an important al-Qaeda travel facilitator who worked with [al-Qaeda leader] Abu Zubaida assisting Arab fighters traveling to Afghanistan. In 1999, Ghul and Zubaida opened a safe house under the cover of an import/export business in Islamabad [Pakistan]. In addition, at Zubaida’s request, Ghul also successfully raised money in Saudi Arabia.” (9/11 Commission 8/21/2004, pp. 64 pdf file) But despite acknowledgment from Bush that Ghul is in US custody, Ghul subsequently completely disappears, becoming a “ghost detainee.” Apparently, he will provide vital intelligence during US interrogation (see Shortly After January 23, 2004). The US will eventually transfer Ghul to Pakistani custody (see (Mid-2006)), and Pakistan will release him, allowing him to rejoin al-Qaeda (see (Mid-2007)).

Khalid el-Masri.Khalid el-Masri. [Source: Reuters]In Macedonia, Khalid el-Masri is told he is free to return to Germany. His guards videotape him as evidence that he is in good health when he leaves their country. El-Masri steps out the door of the motel where he has been held, and walks a few meters, when a pick-up truck pulls up next to him. Several men pull him inside, handcuff him, and put a hood over his head. The truck appears to be driving towards the airport. (van Natta and Mekhennet 1/9/2005; Meek 1/14/2005) He hears the sounds of a plane, and the voice of one of his Macedonian minders saying he will receive a medical examination. (Meek 1/14/2005) He is then taken into a building. (van Natta and Mekhennet 1/9/2005) “I heard the door being closed,” he recalls. “And then they beat me from all sides, from everywhere, with hands and feet. With knives or scissors they took away my clothes. In silence. The beating, I think, was just to humiliate me, to hurt me, to make me afraid, to make me silent. They stripped me naked. I was terrified. They tried to take off my pants. I tried to stop them so they beat me again. And when I was naked I heard a camera.” He is then rectally examined by force. (Meek 1/14/2005) “After I was naked they took off my mask so I could see, and all the people were in black clothes and black masks. There were seven or eight people.” El-Masri is then dressed in a blue warm-up suit, and his hands are cuffed and tied to a belt; his feet shackled. Plugs are put in his ears and he is blindfolded. Next, they put him on a plane and force him to lie on the floor, while someone injects him with a drug that makes him fall asleep. (van Natta and Mekhennet 1/9/2005) But he vaguely notices the plane taking off. He receives a second injection during the flight. When he awakes, the plane has landed and he finds himself driven in the boot of car. Taken inside a building, he is thrown into the wall and onto to the floor of a small room that is to become his cell for the next five months. His head and back are stepped upon, while his chains are removed. (Meek 1/14/2005) “Everything was dirty, a dirty blanket, dirty water, like from a fish aquarium.” Guards and fellow prisoners will later tell him he is in Kabul, Afghanistan. (van Natta and Mekhennet 1/9/2005) On the first evening of his captivity in Afghanistan, El-Masri receives a visit from a masked man, he assumes is a doctor, who takes a blood sample and appears to be an American. Accompanying guards repeatedly punch El-Masri in the head and neck. El-Masri says he nevertheless has the nerve to ask the American for fresh water. “And he said: ‘It’s not our problem, it’s a problem of the Afghan people.’” (Meek 1/14/2005) He is also forced to run up and down a stairs while his hands are tied behind his back. The next morning, an interrogator shouts at him: “Where you are right now, there is no law, no rights; no one knows you are here, and no one cares about you.” (van Natta and Mekhennet 1/9/2005) Perhaps the same interrogator says, while seven or eight men with black masks watched silently, “Do you know where you are?” El-Masri answers: “Yes, I know. I’m in Kabul.” The interrogator replies: “It’s a country without laws. And nobody knows that you are here. Do you know what this means?” (Meek 1/14/2005) He discovers the identity of some of the other prisoners. There are two Pakistani brothers, who have Saudi citizenship, a man from Tanzania, who has been detained for several months, a Pakistani who has been there for nearly two years, a Yemeni, and a number of Afghans. (van Natta and Mekhennet 1/9/2005; Meek 1/14/2005) Comparing his situation to that of the others, El-Masri concludes: “It was a crime, it was humiliating, and it was inhuman, although I think that in Afghanistan I was treated better than the other prisoners. Somebody in the prison told me that before I came somebody died under torture.” The identity of his interrogators remains a secret, though after about a month, he is visited by two unmasked Americans. One, referred to by the prisoners as “the Doctor,” is tall, pale, in his 60s and has long grey hair. The other, named “the Boss,” has red hair and blue eyes and wears glasses. (Meek 1/14/2005) In the meantime, el-Masri’s wife, Aisha, completely unaware of her husband’s whereabouts, begins to think he has gone to marry another woman. Together with their children, she moves to Lebanon. (van Natta and Mekhennet 1/9/2005)

The FBI’s on-scene commander in Baghdad sends an e-mail to senior FBI officials at FBI headquarters in Washington, discussing the allegations of abuse at Abu Ghraib prison. The e-mail advises the senior officials not to investigate the allegations. “We need to maintain good will and relations with those operating the prison,” it reads. “Our involvement in the investigation of the alleged abuse might harm our liaison.” (American Civil Liberties Union 2/23/2006)

The rate at which detainees are released from Abu Ghraib appears to be increasing. (Pound 6/21/2004) On this day, the total number of detainees held by US troops in Iraq stands at 8,968 according to a report by Human Rights Watch. (Human Rights Watch 5/7/2004)

Three juvenile Guantanamo detainees are released to their home countries, where they will be resettled with the assistance of non-governmental organizations. According to the Defense Department, two of them “were captured during US and allied forces raids on Taliban camps.” One was captured “while trying to obtain weapons to fight American forces.” Medical tests have determined they were under the age of 16 when captured. The Defense Department says they were housed separately from the adult prison population, and “were not restricted in the same manner.” The Pentagon stresses that “every effort was made to provide the juvenile detainees a secure environment free from the influences of the older detainees, as well as providing for their special physical and emotional care. While in detention, these juveniles were provided the opportunity to learn math, as well as reading and writing in their native language.” (US Department of Defense 1/29/2004)

The Pentagon reports that, to date, 87 detainees have been released from Guantanamo and four have been transferred to the Saudi Arabian government for continued detention. (US Department of Defense 1/29/2004)

The final report of an investigation into the death of Iraqi Maj. Gen. Abed Hamed Mowhoush (see November 26, 2003) is completed. It concludes that Mowhoush died from asphyxia after being suffocated and sat upon by his interrogators. It also reveals that approximately 24 to 48 hours before his death, he was questioned by “other governmental agency officials.” Statements suggest that he was beaten during that interrogation, the report says. (Moffeit 5/18/2004; Human Rights Watch 6/2004) The interrogating soldiers are subsequently reprimanded and barred from conducting further interrogations. (Moffeit 5/18/2004)

Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba begins investigating abuses at Abu Ghraib prison. He is limited to investigating the 800th MP (military police) unit, as the abuse photographs mainly involve them. However, he suspects that superiors are to blame as well. He will later comment, “From what I knew, troops just don’t take it upon themselves to initiate what they did without any form of knowledge of the higher-ups.… These MP troops were not that creative. Somebody was giving them guidance, but I was legally prevented from further investigation into higher authority. I was limited to a box.” (Hersh 6/17/2007)

According to journalist Seymour Hersh, “Within three days” of when army investigators are given photographs depicting Abu Ghraib prison abuse on January 13, 2004, “a report made its way to Donald Rumsfeld, who informed President Bush” (see January 13-16, 2004). (Hersh 5/24/2004) But Rumsfeld is vague in later public testimony about just when he first informs Bush. He suggests it could have been late January or early February. He explains that he routinely met with Bush “once or twice a week… and I don’t keep notes about what I do.” But he remembers that in mid-March, he and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Richard Myers “meeting with the President and discussed the reports that we had obviously heard” about Abu Ghraib. But Hersh later comments that regardless of when Bush was first informed, “Bush made no known effort to forcefully address the treatment of prisoners before the scandal became public, or to reevaluate the training of military police and interrogators, or the practices of the task forces that he had authorized. Instead, Bush acquiesced in the prosecution of a few lower-level soldiers. The President’s failure to act decisively resonated through the military chain of command: aggressive prosecution of crimes against detainees was not conducive to a successful career.” (Hersh 6/17/2007)

The investigation of the Abu Ghraib abuse case is taken up by Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba. Taguba is the deputy commanding general of the Third Army and of the CFLCC in Kuwait, a post he was assigned in July 2003. (Semple 5/11/2004) He is administratively a direct superior of Karpinski. Taguba is given the job mainly because of circumstance. The senior officer of the 800th Military Police Brigade, to which the soldier involved in the abuse photographs belonged, is a one-star general. Army regulations say someone of higher rank must lead the investigation, and Taguba is both a two-star general and available at the time. (Hersh 6/17/2007)

Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba begins investigating the MPs (military police) involved in the Abu Ghraib abuse photographs, but he soon begins to suspect involvement by military intelligence and the CIA in the abuse as well. For instance, the name of Lt. Col. Steven Jordan repeatedly comes up in interviews with MPs. For three weeks, Taguba is unable to find any sign of Jordan. When he finally does find him, Jordan has a beard, which suggests that he’s been in hiding. In interviews, Jordan claims, “I’m a liaison officer for intelligence from Army headquarters in Iraq.” But Taguba suspects that Jordan is involved in the sometimes brutal interrogations of important detainees. Taguba will later note, “Jordan denied everything, and yet he had the authority to enter the prison’s ‘hard site’ carrying a carbine and an M9 pistol, which is against regulations.” The hard site is where the most important detainees are held. Furthermore, Jordan’s record showed an extensive intelligence background and it appeared Jordan was not reporting through the regular chain of command. But because Taguba only has a mandate to investigate MPs, he is limited in what he can ask Jordan and what he can report. He will later recall, “I suspected that somebody was giving [the MPs] guidance, but I could not print that.” (Hersh 6/17/2007)

In February 2004, a confidential report by the International Committee of the Red Cross says that “military intelligence officers told [us] that in their estimate between 70 percent and 90 percent of the persons deprived of their liberty in Iraq had been arrested by mistake.” Half or more of all prisoners in Iraq are held at Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad. This report echoes the conclusions of an unpublished US Army report by Maj. Gen. Donald Ryder given to Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the top US commander in Iraq, on November 5, 2003 (see November 5, 2003). Ryder, the US Army’s provost marshal, reported that some Iraqis had been held for several months for nothing more than expressing “displeasure or ill will” towards US troops. And it said the process for deciding which arrested Iraqis posed security risks and which should be released violated the military’s own policies. It also complains that the continuing influx of new prisoners detained despite little evidence against them threatens to strain the prison system. Senior officers claim that Brig. Gen. Barbara Fast, the top Army intelligence officer in Iraq, often ruled last against the release of prisoners, even vetoing the recommendations of a military police commander and military intelligence officers. (Jehl and Zernike 5/30/2004) Similarly, Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, who investigates abuses at Abu Ghraib prison around this time (see February 26, 2004), will later say very few prisoners there were affiliated with any terrorist group. Taguba saw classified documents revealing that there were only “one or two” suspected al-Qaeda prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Most of the detainees were not even connected to the Iraqi insurgency. (Hersh 6/17/2007) Despite this evidence, Pentagon spokesperson Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt will later claim, “If they were innocent, they wouldn’t be at Abu Ghraib.… The number that were released because they were innocent? That number… is zero. Persons are held at Abu Ghraib because they are determined to be security threats, imminent security threats here in [Iraq].” (Jehl and Zernike 5/30/2004)

An Army dog handler at Abu Ghraib tells military investigators that, as per the directive from Defense Secretary Rumsfeld (see December 2, 2002), “[S]omeone from [military intelligence] gave me a list of cells, for me to go see, and pretty much have my dog bark at them.… Having the dogs bark at detainees was psychologically breaking them down for interrogation purposes.” Using attack dogs to threaten or harm prisoners is a violation of the Geneva Conventions. (Levin 4/21/2009)

A CIA review of the passport of Khalid el-Masri determines that it is genuine, not a forgery. El-Masri had been arrested in Macedonia (see December 31, 2003-January 23, 2004) and rendered to Afghanistan, where he is being tortured (see January 23 - March 2004), partly because the CIA thought he was traveling on a false German passport. However, the news that the passport is legitimate does not inspire the CIA to release him, as a manager at Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, still wants him held. A former colleague will say that this is because of a “gut feeling” the manager, Alfreda Frances Bikowsky, has and because she “can’t admit a mistake.” Another former colleague will say, “She just looked into her crystal ball and it said that he was bad.” Although it is clear by now that there was no problem with el-Masri’s passport and that he is not an associate of the 9/11 hijackers (note: the hijackers knew a different man with the same name), Bikowsky insists el-Masri “had phone calls to people who were bad. Or to people who knew people who were bad.” Some other CIA officers are unhappy with this state of affairs. One CIA official comes in every morning and asks, “Is that guy still locked up in the Salt Pit?” (Mayer 2008, pp. 284-285)

During a hearing on the June 2003 death of Najem Sa’doun Hattab (see June 5, 2003) at Camp Whitehorse detention center near Nassiriya, Iraq, a former US marine, granted immunity for testifying, says that it was common for Coalition forces “to kick and punch prisoners who did not cooperate—and even some who did.” (Rogers 2/3/2004; Amnesty International 3/18/2004)

The US learns that Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, a former al-Qaeda camp commander, was allegedly tortured in Egypt, where he was rendered by the CIA (see January 2002 and After). Although CIA Director George Tenet will describe al-Libi’s handling by the Egyptians as “further debriefing,” after being returned to US custody, al-Libi tells CIA officers he was tortured and these claims are documented in a series of cables sent to CIA headquarters on February 4 and 5. These cables are the final proof, many believe, that the US is illegally “outsourcing” torture to other countries, against suspects who have not been convicted or even charged with a crime. After being tortured by his Egyptian captors (see November 11, 2001), al-Libi was returned to US custody on November 22, 2003. The February 5 cable reads, in part, that al-Libi was told by the Egyptians that “the next topic was al-Qaeda’s connections with Iraq…. This was a subject about which he said he knew nothing and had difficulty even coming up with a story.” The Egyptians didn’t like al-Libi’s response, and locked him in a 20 inch by 20 inch box for 17 hours—effectively burying him alive. The Egyptians released him and gave him one more change to “tell the truth.” When al-Libi did not give the proper response, he was knocked to the ground and beaten. The CIA debriefers send this information straight to Washington (see February 14, 2004), thus informing the CIA that not only was this key piece of evidence about the link between Iraq and al-Qaeda false, but it was obtained by extreme, US-sanctioned torture. Although stories and witness accounts about torture in such US-allied countries as Egypt, Syria, Morocco, and Uzbekistan have long been known, this is the first time such torture has been detailed in an official US government document. It will be almost a year before the Bush administration will confirm the CIA’s rendition program (see March 11, 2002), and even then it will begin a litany of reassurances that the US does not torture, nor does it hand over prisoners to countries that torture. The CIA cables will be declassified in September 2006, and roundly ignored by the mainstream media. And as of late 2007, al-Libi will still be a “ghost prisoner” whose whereabouts and circumstances are considered a US state secret. (Grey 11/6/2007)

Paul Butler, chief of staff for Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, claims in a briefing that the prisoners being held in Guantanamo are “very dangerous people” who include “senior al-Qaeda operatives and leaders and Taliban leaders.” However, the New York Times will later report that “several senior officials with detailed knowledge of the Guantanamo detainees described Mr. Butler’s portrait of the camp as a work of verbal embroidery, saying none of the detainees at the camp could possibly be called a leader or senior operative of al-Qaeda.” (Golden and van Natal 6/21/2004) Probably the closest to an al-Qaeda leader being held is one of bin Laden’s former bodyguards who nonetheless will be released later in 2004 (see Late November 2001). There were media reports as far back as August 2002 that no al-Qaeda leaders were being held at Guantanamo (see August 18, 2002). Some al-Qaeda leaders will be sent into the prison from secret CIA prisons in September 2006 (see September 2-3, 2006).

“There was never enough food and one day,” Huda al-Azzawi, detained at Abu Ghraib (see January 4, 2004), recalls, “I came across an old woman who had collapsed from hunger. The Americans were always eating lots of hot food. I found some in a packet in a bin and gave it to her. They caught me and threw me in a one-meter-square punishment cell. They then poured cold water on me for four hours.” (Harding 9/20/2004)

Antonio M. Taguba.Antonio M. Taguba. [Source: US Army]Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba files a 53-page classified report which finds that between October and December of 2003, members of the 372nd Military Police Company and US intelligence community engaged in numerous incidents of “sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses” against prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad. As evidence, he cites “detailed witness statements and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence.” The photographs—which are later leaked to the press (see Mid-April 2004), causing an enormous international public outcry—are not included in the report. (US Department of the Army 3/9/2004; Hersh 5/10/2004; Hersh 5/17/2004) Taguba also takes issue with the November 5 (see November 5, 2003) Ryder report which concluded that the military police units had not intentionally used inappropriate confinement practices. “Contrary to the findings of MG [Maj. Gen.] Ryder’s report, I find that personnel assigned to the 372nd MP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed to change facility procedures to ‘set the conditions’ for MI interrogations.” Army intelligence officers, CIA agents, and private contractors “actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses.” (US Department of the Army 3/9/2004; Hersh 5/10/2004) He presents his report to his commander on March 3 (see March 3, 2004).

Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni is flown from Egypt to Bagram air base in Afghanistan and then taken to Guantanamo, where he provides the three Britons known as the Tipton Three with information on Moazzam Begg, whom he encountered at Bagram. (Rasul, Iqbal, and Ahmed 7/26/2004 pdf file) Madni had been sent to Egypt at the request of the US, presumably so he could be tortured and interrogated there (see January 11, 2002). Asif Iqbal, another inmate at Guantanamo, says Madni told him that in Egypt “he had had electrodes put on his knees and something had happened to his bladder.” (Rasul, Iqbal, and Ahmed 7/26/2004 pdf file) As of early 2008, there have been no reports of his release.

Saddam Salah al-Rawi has spent three months in room 42 of Tier 1A at the Hard Site of Abu Ghraib. He is given one meal every 12 hours. When his health deteriorates he is moved to camp 7, tent 2. “I was weak at that time, and I had many health problems.” (CPTnet 5/12/2004)

A new interrogation policy is approved for US personnel regarding prisoners detained in Iraqi facilities such as Abu Ghraib. The policy will remain classified as late as mid-2009, but the Senate Armed Services Committee (see April 21, 2009) will release excerpts from it. The policy warns that interrogators “should consider the fact that some interrogation techniques are viewed as inhumane or otherwise inconsistent with international law before applying each technique. These techniques are labeled with a [CAUTION].” Among the techniques labeled as such are a technique involving power tools, stress positions, and the presence of military working dogs, all potential violations of the Geneva Conventions. (Levin 4/21/2009)

Khalid el-Masri and the other prisoners at the mysterious US-run prison in Kabul begin a hunger strike. An Afghan guard tells him: “The Americans don’t care if you live or die.” Two days later, according to one report, El-Masri is beaten and forcibly fed through a tube down his throat. (van Natta and Mekhennet 1/9/2005) 27 days into the hunger strike, El-Masri is taken to a room one night to meet the Americans and a senior Afghan. He demands to see a German representative, be put before a court or released. The “Boss,” according to El-Masri, is angry with the situation, saying: “He shouldn’t be here. He’s in the wrong place.” And also the “Doctor,” according to El-Masri, seems to think he is innocent. His living conditions improve a bit, with a bed instead of a plastic mat and a new carpet. But he continues his hunger strike. On the 37th day, he is force-fed. His captors then promise that he will be released within three weeks, at which point El-Masri starts to eat again. (Meek 1/14/2005)

Major General Antonio M. Taguba out-briefs the findings of his investigation to General David McKiernan. (Saletan 5/5/2004; Jehl 5/10/2004)

At Guantanamo, shortly before their release, Jamal Udeen, Tarek Dergoul, and the Tipton Three are asked to sign a document confessing to having links with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Iqbal remembers: “It was along the lines that I was a member of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, however I have since changed. In other words I had changed my mind since I was detained at Guantanamo Bay. It went on to say that if I was suspected of anything at any time by the United States, I could be picked up and returned to Guantanamo Bay.” He is told that signing the document is a precondition for going back to Britain. “I didn’t really believe him,” Iqbal later says, and so he refused to sign. (Rasul, Iqbal, and Ahmed 7/26/2004 pdf file) Jamal Udeen also has a confession statement presented to him by a British official. “This was given to me first by the Americans and then by a British diplomat who asked if I agreed to sign it. I just said ‘No.’ I would rather have stayed in Guantanamo than sign that paper.” (Prince and Jones 3/12/2004)

British nationals Jamal Udeen, Tarek Dergoul, Ruhal Ahmed, Asif Iqbal, and Shafiq Rasul are released from Guantanamo without charges. Upon landing at the RAF Northolt airfield, all except Udeen are arrested by British police. They are released soon after questioning. (Prince and Jones 3/12/2004)

Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba submits the final version of his report (see February 26, 2004) on the investigation into prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib by MPs. He concludes that military intelligence personnel played a part in the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. But due to the fact that his investigation was limited to the conduct of MPs (see January 19, 2004), he did not investigate military intelligence conduct. Another investigation (see August 25, 2004), however, is launched that will examine military intelligence’s role in the abuses. It will be conducted by Maj. Gen. George R. Fay, the Army’s deputy chief of staff for intelligence. But the scope of this investigation is also limited from the outset, for two reasons. First, as a two-star general, he cannot hold any officer of his own rank or higher accountable. Second, Fay is appointed by Lt. Col. Ricardo S. Sanchez and therfore the scope of investigation is limited to the people under Sanchez’s command. (Hirsh and Barry 6/7/2004) Additionally, Fay may be less inclined to report negatively on military intelligence personnel, since his superior, Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, head of Army Intelligence, has already stated that the abuse at Abu Ghraib was committed by “a group of undisciplined military police” who were acting on their own, and not upon instructions from military intelligence officers. (Weissman 5/14/2004)

In a statement, British former Guantanamo prisoner Tarek Dergoul “condemns the US and [British] governments for allowing these gross breaches of human rights and demands the release of all the other detainees.” His treatment included “botched medical treatment, interrogation at gunpoint, beatings and inhumane conditions.” The statement adds: “Tarek finds it very difficult to talk about these things and his family believe his mental health has been severely affected by the trauma he has suffered.” When confronted with the allegations of Dergoul and Jamal Udeen, a Pentagon spokeswoman describes these as “simply lies.” The same day, Secretary of State Colin Powell says in a television interview that he believes the US treats the detainees at Guantanamo “in a very, very humanitarian way.” And he adds, “Because we are Americans, we don’t abuse people in our care.” (Branigan 3/13/2004)

Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba presents his report (see February 26, 2004) on prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib to his commanders. (Weissman 5/14/2004) The report is “very closely held” among the Army’s senior leadership and the report is only accessible to top officials on a secure computer network. Congress is not informed of the report or its findings. (Bowman 5/6/2004) It is classified as “Secret / No Foreign Dissemination.” Neither the vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Gen. Peter Pace, nor the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld will later say they know why the report was classified when asked at a Pentagon press briefing on May 4. Such a classification may be in violation of US law. Section 1.7 of Executive Order 12958 reads: “In no case shall information be classified in order to… conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error [or to] prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency….” (Secrecy News 5/5/2004)

A manager at Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, agrees that the agency can release an innocent German citizen named Khalid el-Masri who has been imprisoned in one of the CIA’s black sites for about two months (see December 31, 2003-January 23, 2004 and January 23 - March 2004). The CIA has known el-Masri is innocent for some time, but has not yet got around to releasing him (see (February 2004)). However, the manager, Alfreda Frances Bikowsky, makes his release conditional on the German intelligence services promising to follow him once he is free. She is told that as el-Masri is not a terrorist, but innocent, he cannot be put on a watch list, followed, or monitored when making phone calls. Therefore, she is reluctant to let him go and he remains in prison in Afghanistan. (Mayer 2008, pp. 285)

David Hackworth.David Hackworth. [Source: Public domain via Flickr]Staff Sgt. Ivan Frederick’s uncle William Lawson sends an e-mail about the abuses and their documentation to the website of retired Col. David Hackworth, stating: “We have contacted the Red Cross, Congress both parties [sic], Bill O’Reilly [a Fox News Channel host] and many others. Nobody wants to touch this.” Within minutes, an associate of Hackworth calls him over the phone. Hackworth, who is described by the New York Times as “a muckraker who was always willing to take on the military establishment,” then puts Lawson in touch with the producers of the CBS news program “60 Minutes II,” who will eventually air the story on Abu Ghraib. Lawson’s efforts to publicize the abuses are motivated by his fear, and that of his brother-in-law, Frederick’s father, that Frederick will take the fall for what they believe involves higher ranking officers and officials. Seventeen members of Congress, however, ignored Lawson’s plea before he contacted Hackworth. “The Army had the opportunity for this not to come out…, but the Army decided to prosecute those six GI’s because they thought me and my family were a bunch of poor, dirt people who could not do anything about it. But unfortunately, that was not the case.” (Dao and Lichtblau 5/8/2004)

Four months after his arrest, Saddam Salah al-Rawi is finally informed of his charges. “Some soldiers gave me a paper in Arabic with my charges: ‘suspected member of a terrorist group.’ The paper said some other things about the Geneva Conventions. They told me to sign it. I wrote on it that I just wanted to know my charges so I could defend myself. Then I signed it.” (CPTnet 5/12/2004)

A report by the inspector general of the US Army’s Combined/Joint Task Force 180 in Bagram, Afghanistan, finds numerous problems with detainee treatment at Bagram and other facilities. The problems include a lack of training and oversight on acceptable interrogation techniques (see July 2002). According to the report, “Army doctrine simply does not exist” at the base, and detainees are not afforded “with the privileges associated with enemy or prisoner of war status” or the Geneva Conventions. The memoranda will be released to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in 2006 (see January 12, 2006). (American Civil Liberties Union 1/12/2006)

Saddam Salah al-Rawi is released. An apology is made, some clothes given, and $10 paid. The money that was taken from him (see December 2-3, 2003), is never returned. (CPTnet 5/12/2004) Then one of the soldiers steps up to him with a warning, saying, “You were inside the prison and you saw some good things and some bad things. Forget the bad things and remember only the good.” (McCarthy 5/13/2004)

News of the commotion surrounding the Abu Ghraib scandal apparently does not reach prisoners at the Hard Site. Huda al-Azzawi says she heard about the scandal only after her release in July 2004. “Retrospectively, I realize that after the scandal broke, our situation improved,” she later recalls. (Hennion 10/12/2004) She is now allowed to exercise in the yard outside for 10 minutes a day. She is given a bed, and assigned a new female guard, “Mrs. Palmer,” who tries to learn Arabic. Later, as hundreds of detainees are released, Al-Azzawi and her sister are moved from their cells to a tent. Three US generals will come to interview her in an apparent investigation of the death of her brother Ayad (see December 24, 2003). But according to her, no apology is offered. (Harding 9/20/2004)

Page 4 of 7 (670 events)
previous | 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 | next

Creative Commons License Except where otherwise noted, the textual content of each timeline is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike