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The French colony of Mauritius, which includes the Chagos Archipelago, is ceded to Britain as part of the Treaty of Paris. [Gifford, 5/27/2004]
The USS Lancaster, at the mouth of the Congo river, fires a twenty-one-gun salute in honor of King Leopold’s “Congo Free State.” [Hochschild, 1999, pp. 86-87]
The Wilson administration appoints General John H. Russell as high commissioner and Louis Borno—an admirer of Mussolini—as the new Haitian president. This event follows the dismissal of the previous Haitian president, Sudre Dartiguenave, who had refused to sign an agreement concerning the repayment of debts to the US-owned National City Bank (later to be name Citibank) which controls Haiti’s National Bank and railroad system. [Rogozinski, 1992, pp. 240; Common Dreams, 3/10/2004] Russel and Borno’s period of rule are characterized by infrastructure improvement, growing racial and cultural tensions, increased US control, and—toward the end of their term—increased civil unrest. Under their authority, most of the country’s tax revenue is used to pay debts owed to foreign interests. The two will jointly rule until 1930 when, after a 1929 uprising, Borno is ousted. A short provisional head will be put in place until the National Assembly elects St�nio Vincent in November 1930 as president. [Rogozinski, 1992, pp. 240-241]
US President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs an agreement with Haiti for a US withdrawal the following year. [Rogozinski, 1992, pp. 241]
The Geneva Accords temporarily divide Vietnam in half at the 17th parallel, with Ho Chi Minh’s forces in the north and Bao Dai’s regime in the south. The accords also call for elections to be held in all of Vietnam within two years to reunify the country. [Geneva Accords: Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, 7/29/1954] The US opposes the unifying elections, fearing a likely victory by Ho Chi Minh, and refuses to sign the Geneva accords. “If the scheduled national elections are held in July 1956, and if the Viet Minh does not prejudice its political prospects, the Viet Minh will almost certainly win,L the CIA notes. [Kolko, 1985, pp. 84] And US President Dwight Eisenhower admits, “I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, a possible 80 per cent of the population would have voted for the communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader.” [Eisenhower, 1994, pp. 372]
US President Dwight Eisenhower rejects a Soviet proposal that North and South Vietnam remain permanently divided and join the United Nations as separate states. [Karnow, 1997, pp. 692]
Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah spends much of his time campaigning for the political unity of black Africa. In his 1961 book, I Speak of Freedom, Nkrumah writes of the need for a united black Africa. “Divided we are weak; united, Africa could become one of the greatest forces for good in the world,” he writes. However, other African governments, burdened with their own problems, are reluctant to heed his call. [Nkrumah, 1961; BBC, 11/4/1997; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2004]
Janio da Silva Quadros is elected president of Brazil by a record margin. He mysteriously resigns, reportedly under military pressure. Joao Goulart, the vice-president, succeeds Quadros as president and aims to continue Quadros’ independent foreign policy. He expands the country’s trade with socialist countries and refuses to participate in the embargo against Cuba. [Keen, 1992, pp. 357; Blum, 1995; Fausto, 1999, pp. 263-264] Joao Goulart is no communist. He is described as a “millionaire landowner and a Catholic who wears a medal of the Virgin around his neck.” He receives “a ticker-tape parade in New York City in April, and toasts the US ambassador, ‘To the Yankee Victory!’ after the Cuban Missile Crisis in October.” [Blum, 1995]
US Secretary of State Dean Rusk sends British Foreign Minister Lord Home a letter which includes the following passage: “[W]e do believe that [Dr. Cheddi] Jagan and his American wife are very far to the left indeed and that his accession to power in British Guiana would be a most troublesome setback in this hemisphere. Would you be willing to have this looked into urgently to see whether there is anything which you or we can do to forestall such an eventuality?” The British foreign minister will respond to this letter a week later (see August 18, 1961). [US Department of State, 8/11/1961]
The policies of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem create concern in Washington when Diem’s government intensifies its repression of the Buddhists and clamps down on the press. Also worrisome to his US backers are rumors that he is considering unification with the North. [Herring, 1986, pp. 96; National Security Archives, 11/5/2003] When the Kennedy administration learns that a group of South Vietnamese generals are planning a [second] coup attempt, the decision is made to provide them with support. [National Security Council Staff, 8/28/1963 ; US Department of State, 10/25/1963 ; National Security Council Staff, 10/29/1963 ; US President, 11/1/1963 ; National Security Archives, 11/5/2003] “President Kennedy and his advisers, both individually and collectively, had a considerable role in the coup overall, by giving initial support to Saigon military officers uncertain what the US response might be, by withdrawing US aid from Diem himself, and by publicly pressuring the Saigon government in a way that made clear to South Vietnamese that Diem was isolated from his American ally. In addition, at several of his meetings Kennedy had CIA briefings and led discussions based on the estimated balance between pro- and anti-coup forces in Saigon that leave no doubt the United States had a detailed interest in the outcome of a coup against Ngo Dinh Diem. The CIA also provided $42,000 in immediate support money to the plotters the morning of the coup, carried by Lucien Conein, an act prefigured in administration planning.” [National Security Archives, 11/5/2003]
Sir Bruce Greatbatch, governor of Seychelles, says in a Foreign Office memorandum how the US has made the depopulation of the Chagos Islands “virtually a condition of the agreement.” Describing the islands’ inhabitants, he says, “[T]hese people have little aptitude for anything other than growing coconuts.” They are “unsophisticated and untrainable,” he remarks. [Guardian, 10/2/2004; ZNet, 10/22/2004]
Concerned about the prospects of Soviet expansion in the Indian Ocean, the US government asks Britain to find an uninhabited island where the US can build a naval base. [US Congress, 6/5/1975; Sunday Times (London), 9/21/1975; US Congress, 11/4/1975; BBC, 11/3/2000; Los Angeles Times, 11/4/2000; CBS News, 6/13/2003] In return, the US says it is willing to waive up to $14 million in research and development fees related to Britain’s Polaris missile program. [US Congress, 6/5/1975; US Congress, 11/4/1975; BBC, 11/3/2000; Los Angeles Times, 11/4/2000; CBS News, 6/13/2003] The US puts its sights first on the island of Aldabra, located north of Madagascar. But the island is a breeding ground for rare giant tortoises, whose mating habits would likely be disturbed by military activities. Fearing that ecologists would bring publicity to US activities on the island, the US looks for an alternative. The US decides on Diego Garcia, the largest island of the Chagos Archipelago. It is strategically located in the heart of the Indian Ocean just south of the equator. There is one problem, however. The islands have a population of roughly 1,800 people (who are known as Chagossians, but also referred to as Ilois) who have inhabited the 65-island archipelago for more than 200 years. [Sunday Times (London), 9/21/1975; BBC, 11/3/2000] Most of them are descendants of African slaves (see 1770s) and Indian plantation workers. [BBC, 1/10/2001] To deal with this “population problem,” British politicians, diplomats and civil servants begin a campaign “to maintain the pretense there [are] no permanent inhabitants” on the islands. They fear that if the international community learns about the existence of the population, it will demand that the Chagossians be recognized as a people “whose democratic rights have to be safeguarded.” [BBC, 11/3/2000]
Commenting on the US and Britain’s plan to evict the inhabitants of Diego Garcia so the two countries can establish a military base on the island (see 1963-1965), British Colonial Secretary Anthony Greenwood warns that it must be presented to the United Nations “with a fait accompli.” [BBC, 11/3/2000]
In Washington, D.C., US ambassador to Ghana William P. Mahoney meets with CIA Director John A. McCone and the deputy chief of the CIA’s Africa division [name unknown] to discuss a “Coup d’etat Plot” in Ghana. According to a CIA document summarizing the meeting, Mahoney says that he is uncertain whether the coup, being planned by Acting Police Commissioner Harlley and Generals “Otu” and “Ankrah,” will ever come to pass. Notwithstanding, he adds that he is confident that President Kwame Nkrumah will not make it another year, given his waning popularity and Ghana’s deteriorating economy. “In the interests of further weakening Nkrumah,” Mahoney recommends that the US deny Nkrumah’s forthcoming request for financial assistance, according to the CIA memo. He adds that by refusing the request it would make a “desirable impression on other countries in Africa,” the memo also says. In the event of a coup, Mahoney says a military junta would likely come to power. [Central Intelligence Agency, 3/11/1965; SeeingBlack (.com), 6/7/2002]
In a telegraph to the US Department of State, US ambassador to Ghana William P. Mahoney recounts a meeting he had that morning with President Kwame Nkrumah. He says he told the president that the US government resented the anti-US statements he had made in his March 22 speech (see (3.00pm-3:30pm) March 22, 1965), in which he had laid blame on the US for many of Africa’s problems. “I said I would never have believed that [a] man of his sophistication and refinement would use language like that against my country, and it shock[ed] [me] to hear him do so.” Mahoney says that Nkrumah conceded that the rhetoric in his speech was “loaded and slanted throughout,” but insisted that “he had special purpose in mind.” After Mahoney further criticized Nkrumah’s speech, defending US policy in Africa, he saw that the president was crying. “I looked up and I saw he was crying. With difficulty he said I could not understand [the] ordeal he had been through during [the] last month. [He [r]ecalled that there had been seven attempts on his life…]” In comments listed at the end of his telegraph, Mahoney says that Nkrumah seems “convinced as ever [that the] US is out to get him” and “still suspects US involvement” in the recent assassination attempts. He explains that Nkrumah appears to be a “badly frightened man” whose “emotional resources seem [to] be running out” and predicts that there will be “more hysterical outbursts” from Nkrumah against the US. [US Department of State, 4/2/1965; SeeingBlack (.com), 6/7/2002]
A telegram sent to the UK mission at the United Nations describes how the US and Britain are conspiring to hide the fact that the planned relocation of residents from the island of Diego Garcia will include inhabitants who have lived there for generations. The US intends to establish a military base on the island (see 1963-1965). “We recognize that we are in a difficult position as regards references to people at present on the detached islands,” the telegram says. “We know that a few were born in Diego Garcia and perhaps some of the other islands, and so were their parents before them. We cannot therefore assert that there are no permanent inhabitants, however much this would have been to our advantage. In these circumstances, we think it would be best to avoid all references to permanent inhabitants.” [BBC, 11/3/2000]
A British Foreign Office official writes of “convert[ing] all the existing residents [of the Chagos Islands] into short-term, temporary residents” in order to justify their removal to make room for US naval facilities planned for the island of Diego Garcia (see 1963-1965). [Guardian, 10/2/2004; ZNet, 10/22/2004]
Commenting on the recent coup in Ghana (see February 24, 1966), Robert W. Komer, a special assistant to the president, says in a memo to President Johnson that the overthrow of the Nkrumah government was “another example of a fortuitous windfall.” He gloats over the win noting that “Nkrumah was doing more to undermine our interests than any other black African” and that the “new military regime is almost pathetically pro-Western.” He then goes on to emphasize that the US should “follow through skillfully and consolidate such successes.” He explains: “A few thousand tons of surplus wheat or rice, given now when the new regimes are quite uncertain as to their future relations with us, could have a psychological significance out of all proportion to the cost of the gesture. I am not arguing for lavish gifts to these regimes—indeed, giving them a little only whets their appetites, and enables us to use the prospect of more as leverage.” [National Security Council, 3/12/1966; SeeingBlack (.com), 6/7/2002]
Sir Paul Gore-Booth, a senior official at the Foreign Office, writes to diplomat Dennis Greenhill about the “population problem” on the island of Diego Garcia where the US and Britain want to establish a military base (see 1963-1965). “We must surely be very tough about this,” he says. “The object of the exercise is to get some rocks which will remain ours… There will be no indigenous population except seagulls… The United States Government will require the removal of the entire population of the atoll by July.” In his reply, Greenhill says, “Unfortunately along with the birds go some few Tarzans or Man Fridays whose origins are obscure and who are hopefully being wished on to Mauritius.” [BBC, 11/3/2000; Los Angeles Times, 11/4/2000; National Post, 3/1/2001; CBS News, 6/13/2003; British Royal Courts of Justice, 10/9/2003; Guardian, 10/2/2004; ZNet, 10/22/2004]
Under the heading “Maintaining The Fiction,” an unnamed British official recommends in a memo that Britain reclassify the residents of the Chagos Archipelago as “a floating population.” He also suggests making “up the rules as we go along.” [ZNet, 10/22/2004]
The military government of Ghana meets with the Paris Club of Western governments and forges a debt rescheduling agreement, which defers Ghana’s debt obligations between June 1966 and December 1968 to the period 1971-1979. [West Africa Review, 1999]
Svetlana Stalin, daughter of deceased Soviet leader Josef Stalin, defects to the West. The defection is arranged by the CIA’s station chief in India, David Blee, after Svetlana asks for asylum at the US embassy in Delhi. While officials in Washington are undecided about what to do about her request, Blee puts her on a plane and spirits her out of India to the West. The New York Times will later call this episode “one of Mr. Blee’s biggest early triumphs.” [New York Times, 8/17/2000; Los Angeles Times, 8/18/2000; Guardian, 8/22/2000]
On two separate voyages, plantation workers and residents leave the Chagos Islands on the Mauritius, a ship operated by Rogers & Co., to Port Louis, Mauritius’s capital. Many of the passengers are going to Mauritius only temporarily and intend to return to the island. But when they try to return to the Chagos Islands in 1968, they are refused passage and told they will not be permitted to return to their homes. The islanders are thus left stranded in Mauritius, without resettlement assistance or compensation. [Washington Post, 9/9/1975; BBC, 11/3/2000; Los Angeles Times, 11/4/2000; British Royal Courts of Justice, 10/9/2003] Olivier Bancoult later recounts to the BBC how his 11-member family went to Mauritius in 1968 so that his ill sister could see a doctor. After she died, family members tried to return to the islands, but “were told the land had been given to the Americans for a US military base.” [Los Angeles Times, 11/4/2000] The British also purchase the islands’ copra plantations and shut down their medical facilities. [BBC, 11/3/2000] Ships carrying food and medicine to Diego Garcia are turned back. [CBS News, 6/13/2003] These measures are taken with the knowledge of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and his Conservative successor, Edward Heath. [BBC, 11/3/2000]
Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart writes that “by any stretch of the English language, there was an indigenous population and the Foreign Office knew it.” [ZNet, 10/22/2004]
The US informs Britain that it will proceed with an “austere” communication and other facilities on Diego Garcia, the largest atoll of the Chagos Archipelago. This information is not made public. [British Royal Courts of Justice, 10/9/2003]
British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart notes in a memo to Prime Minister Harold Wilson that Parliament and US Congress were not informed that the US had waived several million dollars worth of fees associated with Britain’s Polaris submarine program (see 1963-1965). The US had agreed to waive the fees in exchange for an agreement that the British would rid Diego Garcia of its indigenous inhabitants so the US could build a military base there. [BBC, 11/3/2000; Los Angeles Times, 11/4/2000; CBS News, 6/13/2003]
British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, Chancellor of the Exchequer Roy Jenkins and Secretary of State for Defense Denis Healey approve plans to completely evacuate the Chagos Islands in order to make way for the construction of a US communications facility on Diego Garcia, the archipelago’s largest island. [British Royal Courts of Justice, 10/9/2003]
In a secret memo to British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart proposes that Britain mislead the UN “by present(ing) any move as a change of employment for contract workers—rather than as a population resettlement.” [ZNet, 10/22/2004] Five days later, Wilson approves the recommendation (see April 26, 1969).
British Prime Minister Harold Wilson approves a recommendation (see April 21, 1969) by Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart to mislead the UN about the population of the Chagos Islands. [ZNet, 10/22/2004]
Socialist Salvador Allende is elected as president, despite extensive CIA efforts (mainly through propaganda) to prevent him from winning (see 1964). He pursues a leftist program, establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba and moving Chile closer to communist countries such as China, North Korea and North Vietnam. He also nationalizes various industries, several of which have significant US business interests. The US responds by continuing support of the opposition and working systematically to weaken Chile’s economy. [US Congress, 12/18/1975, pp. 148-160; Keen, 1992, pp. 332-336; Federation of American Scientists, 9/11/2998]
Three hijacked aircraft at Dawson’s Field in Jordan. [Source: Jordanian National Archive]Terrorists try to simultaneously hijack three airliners heading to the United States from Europe in a series of events that culminate in two of the airliners, along with another plane, being blown up at an airfield in Jordan. The hijackers are members of a group called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) who want to gain the release of Palestinian militants held in Europe and Israel.
Hijackers Carry Hidden Weapons onto the Planes - The series of events begins on September 6, 1970, when the PFLP members board three commercial aircraft at various European airports: Swissair Flight 100 from Zurich, TWA Flight 74 from Frankfurt, and El Al Flight 219 from Amsterdam. All three planes are bound for New York. The terrorists are able to carry concealed guns and grenades onto them.
Pilot Manages to Prevent One Hijacking - The pilot of one of the planes, Flight 219, is alerted to four suspicious passengers—actually the PFLP members—before he takes off and has two of them removed from the plane. However, the other suspicious passengers, Leila Khaled and Patrick Arguello, are allowed to stay on board. Once the plane is airborne, they go to the front of it carrying hand grenades and demand to be let into the cockpit. But, to prevent the hijacking, the pilot puts the plane into a steep dive, thereby throwing the two terrorists off their feet. Arguello is shot dead by an air marshal in the ensuing struggle while Khaled is disarmed and held captive. The plane makes an emergency landing at Heathrow Airport, near London, and Khaled is then arrested by British authorities.
Two Hijacked Planes Land in Jordan - Flight 100 and Flight 74, unlike Flight 219, are easily hijacked and, on the instruction of the hijackers, head to Jordan. They land at Dawson’s Field, a disused airstrip in the desert. Dozens of PFLP members are waiting there to assist the hijackers. The planes’ passengers are held at the airstrip for days. The terrorists demand the release of PFLP prisoners in Israel and Europe, and threaten to kill the hostages if their demands are refused. Meanwhile, reporters and television cameramen assemble around the airstrip, and the events taking place there are broadcast to the world.
Fourth Plane Is Flown to Egypt and Blown Up - Remarkably, one of the PFLP members forced to get off Flight 219 in Amsterdam is able to get on another plane bound for New York, Pan Am Flight 93, with a hand grenade hidden in his groin area. He hijacks the flight once it is airborne and asks to be flown to Dawson’s Field. The pilot tells him the plane is too large to land there and so he instead flies to Cairo, Egypt. [Jewish Journal, 2/23/2006; Wall Street Journal, 2/24/2006; PBS, 2/27/2006; Jerusalem Post, 9/16/2011; Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 8/19/2016] On the way, the plane stops in Beirut, Lebanon, where it is laced with explosives. [9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003 ] After it lands in Cairo, the passengers are able to get off just before it blows up.
Fifth Plane Is Hijacked and Flown to Jordan - On September 9, PFLP sympathizers hijack another plane, BOAC Flight 775 bound from Bombay, India, to Beirut. On their direction, the plane is flown to Dawson’s Field, where it joins Flight 100 and Flight 74. The PFLP thus has three planes and 310 hostages, the majority of them Americans, under its control at the airstrip. The group sets a deadline of September 12 for its demands to be met. On September 11, 200 of the hostages are taken to Amman, the Jordanian capital, for release. However, Jewish passengers and the planes’ flight crews remain as hostages at the airstrip.
Three Planes Are Blown Up but No One Is Killed - On September 12, the PFLP blows up the three planes at Dawson’s Field. Fortunately, no one is on them when it does this, but the dramatic scene is filmed and broadcast around the world. Despite the approach of Jordanian troops, the PFLP members at the airstrip are then able to get away, taking the remaining hostages with them. [Trento and Trento, 2006, pp. 59; Jerusalem Post, 9/16/2011] On September 29, the PFLP will release these hostages. The following day, Khaled, along with six Arab prisoners held in European jails, will be released and flown to Cairo. [Daily Telegraph, 1/1/2001] However, the hijackings will fail to result in the freedom of most of the prisoners whose release the PFLP demanded.
Day of the Hijackings Is the 'Blackest Day in Aviation History' - The series of events will become known as “Black September.” [Jerusalem Post, 9/16/2011] Until 9/11, September 6, 1970, when the first hijackings occur, will be known as “the blackest day in aviation history.” [Jewish Journal, 2/23/2006; PBS, 2/27/2006] The events will lead the international aviation community to finally take coordinated action to prevent hijackings. Additionally, they are “the first major terrorist hijacking attempt that captured the media’s attention,” according to Norman Shanks, the security manager at Heathrow Airport from 1986 to 1991. [New York Times, 3/29/2016]
Hijackings Have Similarities with the 9/11 Attacks - Mary Schiavo, inspector general of the Department of Transportation from 1990 to 1996, will later note the similarities between the Black September hijackings and the events of September 11, 2001, when she criticizes the failure of authorities to prevent the 9/11 attacks. While the events of September 11 were “astonishing in the numbers of casualties and the enormity of the devastation,” she will comment, “the modus operandi of the terrorists” was not new. “Almost 31 years after four planes were hijacked and blown up in an Islamic jihad staged in Jordan, four US planes were hijacked in what Osama bin Laden would call, in congratulatory messages, a jihad,” she will state. “Astonishingly,” she will add, “we heard, even from the FAA and the Department of Transportation, that ‘nothing like this ever happened before.’” [9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003 ]
A British ordinance denies the inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago the legal right to return once they have been evicted from the islands. The British government claims that the measure is necessary in order to ensure “the peace, order and good government of the territory.” [Guardian, 9/1/2000]
The administrator of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), John Rawling Todd, tells the remaining inhabitants of Diego Garcia that Britain intends “to close the island in July.” The islands of Peros Banhos and Salomon will remain open for the time-being. [British Royal Courts of Justice, 10/9/2003]
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announces a planned meeting set for September 22, 1971 to call for a larger share of assets, profits, and management of oil companies operating in its countries. The relevant oil companies refuse its demands. OPEC specifically states in its announcement that it wants to “take immediate steps toward the implementation of the principle participation in the existing oil concessions.” [New York Times, 8/14/1971]
President Nixon officially announces the end of the gold standard system of monetary policy for international exchange of gold deposits in an evening address to the country. Nixon’s move to sever the link between the dollar’s value and gold reserves effectively ends the Breton Woods system of monetary exchange and changes the dollar to a “floating” currency whose value is to be determined largely by market influences. Nixon’s decision results from a run on gold exchanges and rampant speculation in gold markets in Europe, and he changes the US monetary policy after receiving advice from Treasury Secretary John Connally, Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs Paul A. Volcker, and others in a special working group. The dollar becomes a fiat currency, causing a brief international panic before other countries follow suit and also allow their currencies to “float.” [New York Times, 8/16/1971, pp. 1]
Britain permits the US to establish “a limited communications station” on the island of Diego Garcia. [US Congress, 6/5/1975]
The United States prohibits former inhabitants of Diego Garcia from visiting the graves of their ancestors, despite a letter from the British government urging the US to grant them permission. [CNN, 6/18/2003]
When the US military base at Diego Garcia is completed, employment recruiters are instructed not to hire former inhabitants of the Chagos Islands. Benoit Emileien, a former employee of the base, later recalls, “I was given instruction to be careful. They don’t want any kind of claim or demonstration.” Emileien also says discussion of the island’s former inhabitants was taboo. [CNN, 6/18/2003 Sources: Benoit Emileien] Instead, the US hires workers from the Philippines and Mauritius. [Guardian, 12/13/2000]
The US seeks permission from Britain to build a military support facility on the island of Diego Garcia. [US Congress, 6/5/1975]
Britain agrees to a US request (see February 1974) for permission to build a military support facility on the island of Diego Garcia. This replaces an earlier 1972 agreement (see 1972) that permitted the US to establish a “a limited communications station” on the island. [US Congress, 6/5/1975]
US Congress passes a bill allowing the Department of Defense to upgrade the communications facility at Diego Garcia to a “naval support” base. The US will lengthen the island’s runway from 8,000 to 12,000 feet, increase the available petroleum, oils, and lubricants storage, and dredge its harbor, among other improvements. [Sunday Times (London), 9/21/1975]
The Pentagon provides Congress with a “Report on the Resettlement of Inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago.” The 10-page report, drafted in response to congressional inquiries, asserts that prior to the “resettlement” of the inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago, the islands “were sparsely populated, essentially by contract workers and their dependents who bad been brought to the islands to work in coconut plantations.” Pressing its case that the islanders were not permanent inhabitants of the islands, the report claims there was “little evidence of any real sense of a distinct community evolved by the special local environment,” and adds that “any attachment to the locale could be attributed to the easy-going ways of the old plantation company rather than to sentiments regarding the islands themselves.” Without any supporting evidence, the report claims that “it appeared that the transfer of the inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago would be feasible and that the persons then working on the islands would accept employment under suitable conditions elsewhere.” According to the Pentagon, the inhabitants left the island without protest. “We understand from the British that although there was some initial reluctance on the part of the older people to move, all went willingly,” the report says. “No coercion was used and no British or US servicemen were involved.” The Pentagon report concludes: “United States and [British] officials acted in good faith on the basis of information then available to them, with respect to the issue of resettling the people of the Chagos Archipelago.” [US Department of Defense, 10/10/1975]
A congressional subcommittee of the Committee on International Relations holds a hearing on the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the US military facility at Diego Garcia island. The hearing focuses on the forced eviction of the archipelago’s inhabitants (see July 27, 1971-May 26, 1973).
Testimony of George T. Churchill - In his statement to Congress, George T. Churchill, director of International Security Operations at the Department of State, attempts to defend the State Department and Pentagon from accusations that they misled Congress about the inhabitants of Diego Garcia. He asserts that the island’s population had consisted mainly of “contract laborers and their families whose livelihood depended on the coconut plantations and whose ties to the island were tenuous.” Their settlements, he says, “appear to have been something more than work camps but considerably less than free indigenous communities.” Churchill argues that resettlement was necessary because the islanders would not have had work once the plantations were replaced by US military facilities. When it was time to go, he claims, the residents “went willingly.” He also contends that he could find no evidence in government files that there was a “lack of concern for the inhabitants of the Chagos Islands.” He admits that his report is based entirely on US and British sources and that no attempt was made to interview the former inhabitants or request information from the Mauritius government—despite his acknowledgment that on many issues, there “simply wasn’t enough data.” Churchill argues that it was Britain’s responsibility to see to the islanders’ welfare after resettlement and denies that the US has any obligation—moral or legal—to the islanders, even though their eviction had been a condition of the US’ 1966 agreement (see December 30, 1966) with Britain to use the island. [US Congress, 11/4/1975]
Testimony of Commander Gary Sick - Pentagon official Gary Sick addresses accusations that the military has misled Congress about Diego Garcia’s population. In his testimony he cites instances where passing references were made about the islands’ population, including a 1964 Washington Post article mentioning the possibility that an “indigenous population” might exist on the island; a 1969-1979 Pentagon spending proposal which referred to the islanders as “rotating contract personnel engaged in harvesting copra”; and a 1970 congressional hearing in which it was stated that the “British [had] gone a little farther about removing the population from there now.” [US Congress, 11/4/1975]
On a trip to New York, Pakistani dictator Muhammad Zia ul-Haq meets with former US President Richard Nixon. The meeting is to discuss the Soviet-Afghan War, but Pakistan’s nuclear program also comes up. General Khalid Mahmud Arif, who accompanies Zia, will later say that Nixon makes it clear he is in favor of Pakistan gaining nuclear weapons capability. Nixon does not say that he is acting for Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan, but, according to authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clarke, “his comments signal […] the way ahead,” as the future Reagan administration will enable Pakistan to continue work on its nuclear weapons program without being sanctioned. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 76]
Congressman Jonathan Bingham (D-NY) says that Pakistan’s nuclear policy represents a “clear and present danger to the US and indeed Western security interests in the Persian Gulf and South Asia.” Bingham, chairman of the House International Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee, is part of a group of congressmen who oppose a plan by the Reagan administration to turn a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program in return for support against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Another of the group is former astronaut and current Senator John Glenn (D-OH). One of Glenn’s aides, Len Weiss, will later describe the feeling in Congress at this time: “Afghanistan had a huge effect on the Hill, becoming a marker of patriotism. There were only two choices. You were against the Soviets and therefore for Pakistan. Or you were against Pakistan and somehow for the Soviets. Nobody thought to tell us that we could be against Pakistan’s bomb and against the Soviets too. That required too much work for the Reagan people. They were lazy and short-sighted.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 80, 475]
Pakistan Foreign Minister Agha Shahi and General Khalid Arif visit Washington to discuss the new Reagan administration’s plans for the Soviet-Afghan War. The new administration is aware that Pakistani support is crucial if it wants to keep up US aid to anti-communist fighters in Afghanistan. However, the Pakistanis impose a number of conditions on their participation, one of which is that the US does not complain about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development program. According to former State Department official Dennis Kux, Shahi and Arif tell US Secretary of State Alexander Haig that Pakistan will not compromise on its nuclear program. Haig replies that if Pakistan conducts a nuclear test, this will cause trouble in Congress and “make it difficult to cooperate with Pakistan in the way that the Reagan administration hoped.” However, if Pakistan does not perform a test, the nuclear program “need not become a centerpiece of the US-Pakistani relationship.” State Department South Asia specialist James Coon will comment that there is “a tacit understanding that the Reagan administration could live with Pakistan’s nuclear program as long as Islamabad did not explode a bomb.” [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 118, 248] Over the next few months, Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance James Buckley and other US officials travel back and forth between Washington and Pakistan, in the words of authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, “refining the back-channel deal on the Pakistan nuclear program,” and reassuring the Pakistanis that the Reagan administration will allow their work on the bomb to continue. On one occasion, Arif meets Buckley and they discuss the sale of F-16 fighters to Pakistan. Arif then raises the nuclear issue, but, Arif will later say, “The Americans suggested there was no need to talk about Pakistan’s [nuclear] program any more.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 88-89]
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee votes 10-7 to approve a six-year waiver requested by the Reagan administration allowing it to provide aid to Pakistan. The waiver is required because foreign aid for Pakistan was cut off in 1979 in response to revelations that it had acquired unsafeguarded uranium enrichment technology. The Reagan administration wants to provide aid to Pakistan to get it to assist anti-Soviet fighters in Afghanistan. An increased aid package will be approved in December (see December 1981). [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 118-119; Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 85]
In response to information it has received about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program (see June 2, 1981), Israel begins planning a pre-emptive strike against one of Pakistan’s main nuclear facilities. The complex to be targeted is in Kahuta, near Islamabad, and houses Pakistan’s uranium enrichment centrifuges. However, the plan is not implemented due to US pressure, applied due to friendly US relations with Pakistan and Pakistani co-operation on anti-Soviet efforts in Afghanistan. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 86]
Israel’s permanent representative to the UN, Yehuda Blum, tells the UN General Assembly that “there is abundant evidence indicating that [Pakistan] is producing nuclear weapons.” He adds that “at the Engineering Research Labs… Pakistan is secretly constructing a plant for the production of weapons-grade enriched uranium by centrifuges” based on a technology “stolen from the URENCO plant in the Netherlands.” He also says that Pakistan has established front companies in 14 countries to acquire components, and that Pakistan is close to building a cascade of at least 1,000 centrifuges. In addition, the Pakistanis intend to build more than 10,000 of them, “which in turn could produce about 150 kg of enriched uranium a year, sufficient for seven nuclear explosive devices every year.” Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will write that this information is “what the US had known for several years but had chosen not to share with the rest of the world.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 85-86]
The US State Department writes a cable to Israel to allay Israeli fears about Pakistan’s nuclear program (see June 2, 1981). However, the communication contains information the US must know to be untrue. The cable says, “We believe that the Pakistanis have so far been unable to make their centrifuge machines work and that they have not yet produced any significant quantities of enriched uranium.” Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will say this is a “blatant lie,” as the US knows the opposite is true. The cable concludes, “Even if the Pakistanis do manage to eventually overcome their problems in the enrichment area, it would likely take them a few years of successful operations to produce sufficient fissile material to fabricate a single device.” It also estimates that it will take Pakistan another decade before it has a suitable missile system to go with warheads. Levy and Scott-Clark will add, “Not only was the US misrepresenting the available intelligence, but it was also ignoring several articles published by Khan himself in Western nuclear gazettes in which he had explicitly laid out the hurdles his centrifuge construction program had overcome.” Moshe Ya’alon, later head of Israeli military intelligence, will say that the Israelis are stunned by this response. “The US was glib on Pakistan,” he will add. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 85-86]
US President Ronald Reagan says at a press conference, “We are opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and do everything in our power to prevent it.” However, Reagan is aware of Pakistan’s nuclear program and is doing nothing to prevent it. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 88, 90-91, 47]
Reagan administration official James Buckley. [Source: Biographical Directory of the US Congress]James Buckley, an undersecretary for security in the Reagan administration, tells the House Foreign Affairs Committee that Pakistan is unlikely to progress with its nuclear weapons program if it receives US aid. He will repeat the argument in the New York Times three months later: “In place of the ineffective sanctions on Pakistan’s nuclear program imposed by past administrations, we hope to address through conventional means the sources of insecurity that prompt a nation like Pakistan to seek a nuclear capability in the first place.” Len Weiss, an aide to anti-proliferation Senator John Glenn, will later comment, “It seemed highly unconventional to reward a country bent on becoming nuclear with extra funding and jets.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 82, 88]
The US Senate approves an aid package for Pakistan worth $3.2 billion. This makes Pakistan the third largest recipient of US assistance after Israel and Egypt, and is in response to Pakistani support for the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan. The aid is granted despite the fact that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons program, as Congress is assured that the aid is conditional on Pakistan stopping this program (see September 1981). However, Pakistan does not do so and informs the Reagan administration of this (see Mid-December 1981). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 89] Due to an amendment introduced by Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-NY), aid for any country that detonates a nuclear device will be cut off. Author Dennis Kux will note that this makes “the ‘tacit’ understanding about Pakistan’s not testing (see April 1981)… a legal requirement for US aid.” [Armstrong and Trento, 2007, pp. 118-119]
Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi meets US Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance James Buckley in Islamabad, Pakistan, following a large grant of US aid to Pakistan (see December 1981). The aid is theoretically conditional on Pakistan stopping its nuclear weapons program, but, according to Agha Shahi: “I mentioned the nuclear caveats and emphasized that if we had a bomb and wanted to test it there was nothing the US could do. Buckley shrugged his shoulders and said, ‘I understand. Yes, we know.’” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 89]
US Army intelligence manuals provided to Latin American military officers attending the US Army’s “School of the Americas” advocate executions, torture, blackmail and other forms of coercion against insurgents and sanctions the use of “fear, payment of bounties for enemy dead, beatings, false imprisonment, executions and the use of truth serum” to recruit and control informants. [Washington Post, 9/21/1996]
Pakistani officials decide to try to sell the nuclear weapons technology and expertise they have acquired in the last decade to other countries. The decision is taken because the Pakistanis’ nuclear weapons project is extremely expensive and they realize that the US money and goodwill that is keeping it alive is finite. Former Pakistani foreign minister Agha Shahi will say: “[Pakistani President Muhammad] Zia [ul-Haq] began to see the truth in something I had long argued. We were now deep inside the US pocket. Pakistan needed to win independence so as not to suffer when the inevitable happened and the US dropped us. Pakistan needed to broker new alliances and develop a revenue stream that was dependable and outside the scope of the US-run Afghan war.” Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will write: “KRL [Khan Research Laboratories] was Pakistan’s money pit, costing hundreds of millions of dollars to maintain, but it was also potentially a cash cow, [A. Q.] Khan’s advances in the field of uranium enrichment being unique and extremely valuable. Out of the handful of countries that had mastered enrichment technology, including China, France, Pakistan, the US, and the Soviet Union, only China and Pakistan were free to share it, having refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).… This technology was worth millions if Pakistan was able to sell it.” Therefore Zia and senior cabinet members begin a series of “highly secretive meetings to explore trading KRL’s skills and assets.” The urgency of this project increases further after the Soviet Union decides to end the Afghan war in 1986 (see November 1986-November 1987). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 132-133]
A delegation from Pakistan’s foreign ministry holds its first talks about possibly selling the nuclear technology and know-how it has acquired with representatives of the Iranian, Syrian, and Libyan governments. The talks, ostensibly about the wider topic of strategic co-operation, follow on from a conscious decision by Pakistani leaders to sell what they have (see (Early 1985)).
No Qualms - Although it is possible the US would be angry if it finds out, and could cut off significant aid to Pakistan, according to authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, “no one at Army House in Rawalpindi perceived it as immoral or considered the risk too large to take.” General Khalid Mahmud Arif will say: “Having seen the US so flexible in the past, everyone doubted that it would sanction us at all. Also, few of us held the NPT [Nuclear Proliferation Treaty] in high regard. We referred to it as a monopoly, to service the West’s interests. There were so many countries that had been allowed to arm and proliferate—Israel, South Africa, Argentina—countries that slotted into the US’s foreign policy requirements and were allowed to do as they please.”
Shia Iran Not a Problem - Although the Pakistanis want to sell the bomb to other Muslim countries, Pakistani leader General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, a hardline Sunni, is wary of sharing it with Shia Iran. However, according to Levy and Scott-Clark, because Iran is currently at war with Iraq and threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan, it is not perceived as such a threat at this time: “The Shias were a contained and localized minority, the underdogs to the US-backed Sunni elite of Islamabad, Amman, Cairo, and Riyadh. No one contemplated a time when that Sunni strength and wealth would be threatened by war in Iraq and a Shi’ite awakening with its epicentre in Iran.” Nevertheless, Pakistan will not sell completed nuclear weapons to Iran, only technology for enriching uranium. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 133-134]
US aid to Pakistan reaches $4 billion in this year. This large amount of aid is being provided in connection with, and in addition to, US support for the anti-Soviet mujaheddin in Afghanistan, who are based in Pakistan (see May 1979). [Raw Story, 4/30/2007]
Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto refuses to visit North Korea during her first term in office. Bhutto will later say that she is pressured to go by her party, the Pakistan People’s Party, and there may be some link to co-operation on the two countries’ nuclear programs (see Late 1980s). Bhutto resists the pressure for fear it will generate adverse publicity in Western countries. However, Bhutto will go to North Korea in her second term in order to facilitate nuclear proliferation (see December 29, 1993 and Shortly After). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 244]
US Ambassador to Indonesia Paul Wolfowitz leaves his position after a three-year tenure. At a farewell speech in the Indonesian capital of Jakarta, Wolfowitz says, “If greater openness is a key to economic success, I believe there is increasingly a need for openness in the political sphere as well.” The Washington Post will comment that this remark is “in line with the US envoy’s quiet pursuit of political and economic reforms in Indonesia,” but “stunned some members of [Indonesian President] Suharto’s inner circle,” as it “could have landed domestic critics in prison.” [Washington Post, 3/28/2005]
Pakistan sends a Stinger missile to North Korea. Pakistan obtained the Stinger from the US, which provided them to Pakistani-backed rebels during the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s (see September 1986). The missile is partly intended as a gift for the North Koreans—an incentive for the revival of co-operation between the two countries, which has been stalled for some time (see Late 1980s). In addition, the Stingers held by Pakistan are becoming useless, because their batteries are failing, and the Pakistanis hope that the North Koreans will be able to help them reverse engineer the batteries. The mission to North Korea is undertaken by ISI Director Javed Nasir at the behest of Pakistani army chief Mirza Aslam Beg and nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, who will later become closely involved in co-operation with the North Koreans. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 220]
Shortly before the US House Judiciary Committee interviews two Canadian officials who have said Canada has the allegedly stolen PROMIS software (see November 1990 and January 1991), the Canadian government contacts the committee and imposes a further condition on the interviews. The Canadians had already insisted the officials be accompanied by minders (see Shortly After February 26, 1991), but now says that, in addition, they will only answer questions specifically related to the software. They will not answer questions about any allegations that four software programs that may have been acquired by the Canadian government may be derivates of the PROMIS software. If the committee wants information about such alleged derivatives, it will have to submit a written request. [US Congress, 9/10/1992]
Two Canadian officials who had previously said that the Canadian government was using Inslaw’s PROMIS software now tell the US House Judiciary Committee that it is not. In an interview with the committee, officials Denis LaChance and Marc Valois of the Canadian Department of Communications say that they had incorrectly identified software used by the Canadians as being Inslaw’s PROMIS (see November 1990 and January 1991), whereas in fact it was actually project management software from a company called the Strategic Software Planning Corporation that is also called PROMIS. Despite an objection by the Canadians to them being asked about PROMIS derivatives in Canada (see Before March 22, 1991), the two officials also say they do not use or know of a derivative of Inslaw’s PROMIS in Canada. The president of the Strategic Software Planning Corporation will later acknowledge in a sworn statement to committee investigators that his company had sold a few copies of his firm’s PROMIS software to the Canadian government in May 1986. [US Congress, 9/10/1992]
The US imposes sanctions on two Chinese companies for their part in nuclear proliferation activities. The sanctions are the product of work by Gordon Oehler, the US national intelligence officer for weapons of mass destruction. Oehler has been tracking missile deals between China and Pakistan for two years (see 1989) and finds out about the companies’ involvement in a shipment to Pakistan of a “training M-11 ballistic missile.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 257]
Canada’s ambassador to the US, Derek Burney, writes to the House Judiciary Committee saying that neither the Canadian Royal Mounted Police nor the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) have the PROMIS software developed by Inslaw or derivatives thereof. The statement is in response to an October letter from the committee, which is investigating the alleged theft from Inslaw of a version of the software and its subsequent passage to Canada. According to Burney, both the Mounties and the CSIS told him that not only do they not use Inslaw’s PROMIS or any software believed to be a derivative of it, but that they do not use any case management software at all. The committee will comment: “The ambassador’s conclusory statement did not provide an offer or an opportunity for further verification of the allegations received concerning the government of Canada. Without direct access to [the Mounties], CSIS, and other Canadian officials, the committee has been effectively thwarted in its attempt to support or reject the contention that Inslaw software was transferred to the Canadian government.” [US Congress, 9/10/1992]
China signs the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (see July 1, 1968). At the same time, it signs the Missile Technology Control Regime, a multinational agreement aimed at restricting missile sales. One result is that the US waives sanctions imposed on two Chinese companies the previous year for shipping a nuclear-capable missile to Pakistan (see June 1991). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 257, 511] However, China will make another missile shipment to Pakistan a few weeks later (see (April 1992)).
Nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan discusses purchasing No-dong missiles with North Korea’s foreign minister, Kim Yong-nam, who is visiting Pakistan. Khan wants the missiles because he is competing with another Pakistani organization, the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), in missile design, and is losing the competition. The PAEC started designing nuclear-capable missiles before Khan, and can produce missiles with a longer range. The No-dong missiles would enable Khan to leapfrog the PAEC, as they are long-range ballistic missiles that would be able to strike deep inside India. Khan says that Pakistan could purchase the missiles, or the two countries could negotiate an agreement under which Pakistan would give North Korea nuclear weapons technology in exchange for the missiles. An agreement will eventually be reached (see December 29, 1993 and Shortly After). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 244-245]
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) accuses North Korea of violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which the country signed eight years ago (see December 12, 1985). Inspectors believe that the North Koreans are misrepresenting their nuclear program, and building secret sites in remote mountain areas. North Korea admits that it has reprocessed some plutonium, but says it was less than 100 grams and had come from damaged spent fuel rods. The inspectors disagree, citing evidence that North Korea had reprocessed on at least three occasions, in 1989, 1990, and 1991. North Korea announces it intends to withdraw from the treaty, but the withdrawal itself is suspended while negotiations take place. A compromise solution is reached where North Korea will enable inspections of current facilities, provided investigations of its historic research activities cease. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 247]
North Korea test fires a long-range No-dong missile, and the test is attended by a Pakistani delegation, including nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan and one of his associates, Brigadier Sajawal Khan Malik. Khan and the North Koreans have been discussing the conditions under which Pakistan might acquire the missiles for some time (see August 1992). The missile is said to have a range of 800 miles and to be able to carry a payload weighing 1000 kg. Although the missile is not yet able to carry a nuclear warhead, Khan believes adapting it to do so will not be a problem. Khan will eventually conclude a deal for the missiles through Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (see December 29, 1993 and Shortly After). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 245]
Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto agrees to visit North Korea at the request of nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan. Khan asked Bhutto to go because he wanted more powerful missiles to carry nuclear weapons he has designed “into the depths of India.” Bhutto will later say she was shielded from Pakistan’s nuclear program and did not know about Pakistan’s missile capability until Khan told her. She will later describe her reply to Khan’s request: “I wanted it to be known that I would not stand in the military’s way, and when Khan told me that only a country like North Korea could provide the kind of intercontinental missiles we needed, I thought there was no harm in it. But I did tell him I would not give him the money to develop these missiles. I believed in parity. India had not escalated by creating such missiles, I thought, so Pakistan would not do so either.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 244]
Husein Haqqani, an aide to Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, tells her that a planned trip to North Korea at the request of nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan to facilitate nuclear co-operation between the two countries (see December 29, 1993 and Shortly After) is a bad idea and she should not go. Haqqani will later say: “North Korea was an outlaw state, with few morals or qualms about trading in anything illicit and it was at loggerheads with the US. I told her the military and Khan were trying to trick her and that we should not be doing arms deals with [North Korea]. But she ignored me and asked me to accompany her. I cried off. I let a colleague go in my place. I let him think I was giving him a chance when I was actually watching my own back. All I kept thinking was, what happens many years down the line when this trip to North Korea is gone over? Such a thing could ruin a career. There was this bad smell about it.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 245]
Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visits North Korea after being asked to do so by nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan to help co-operation between the two countries on nuclear weapons and delivery systems (see Shortly Before December 29, 1993 and Shortly Before December 29, 1993).
Speech - At a formal dinner with North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung, Bhutto says: “Nuclear non-proliferation should not be used as a pretext for preventing states from exercising fully their right to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes geared to their economic and social development.” She adds: “Pakistan is committed to nuclear non-proliferation both at the global and regional level. It is not fair to cast doubts on Pakistan’s interests and to subject Pakistan to discriminatory treatment.”
Deal - Bhutto then asks Kim for blueprints for missiles that can deliver Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in a potential strike on India. Kim is surprised, but Bhutto emphasizes that “We need those missiles.” Kim agrees and proposes setting up technical teams, giving her information on computer discs to take home with her the next day.
Something More? - However, Bhutto will later remark: “They gave me a bag of materials. Kim said the teams each side selected would do the deal, whatever the deal was to be. I really had little idea of what they were discussing. I did wonder, though. Was it only missiles? They said it was to be a cash deal.” Bhutto will also say that General Khawaja Ziauddin, a close associate of Khan, was in charge of the deal for the Pakistanis.
Framed? - When Bhutto returns to Pakistan, she meets with one of her aides, Husein Haqqani, and shows him the bag of materials. Haqqani will later comment: “They could have been anything. It horrified me and I said so. She sensed then that the military had framed her. Her fingerprints were all over whatever their plan was for North Korea.” Bhutto gives the bag to Ziauddin, but will later say: “As far as I knew, the deal involved buying No-dong missiles for cash. But when I requested more information, the military clammed up.” After this trip, Bhutto is apparently not closely involved in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and is even unable to obtain information about its budget. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 247-249]
US and UN military forces enter Haiti and restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the presidency. [Turck, 2/24/2004] US conservatives, such as Senator Jesse Helms, are against the intervention and criticize President Bill Clinton for engaging in unnecessary “nation building” in Haiti. Helms falsely makes the claim on the Senate floor that Aristide is “psychotic,” based on a CIA document later revealed to be a forgery. [Newsday, 3/1/2004; Taipei Times, 3/1/2004; Observer, 3/2/2004]
’Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft,’ by Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice. [Source: Harvard University Press]Future National Security Adviser and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Philip Zelikow, who, as executive director of the 9/11 Commission, will investigate her performance in the run-up to 9/11, co-author a book about the implications of German reunification. The two had worked together on the National Security Council in the 1980s and early 90s, but are both now working at universities. Zelikow is a professor at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and Rice is the provost at Stanford. The book, entitled Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft, is mostly written by Zelikow, who is, in author Philip Shenon’s words, “pleased to share credit with such an obvious up-and-comer as Rice.” [Shenon, 2008, pp. 40-41]
Diplomats at the US embassy in Egypt are not informed of the CIA’s rendition program. At this time the program is primarily aimed at locating enemies of the Egyptian regime and bringing them back to Egypt, where they are tortured (see Summer 1995 and Before Summer 1995). The only exception to this is US ambassador to Egypt Edward Walker, who is read into the CIA program although he is actually a State Department employee. One of the diplomats’ jobs is to report on Egypt’s extremely poor human rights record, including its torture methods. Walker will later comment, “It wasn’t a question of mincing words… I think the human rights reports were correct.” He will add that there are Chinese walls at the embassy to keep the CIA program secret from the diplomats: “The walls were huge and they only come together at the ambassador level… [The diplomats working on human rights] might have been a little upset if they knew what was going on.” [Grey, 2007, pp. 126]
The US Senate votes to lift some sanctions that were imposed on Pakistan due to its nuclear weapons program (see August 1985 and October 1990). The measure does not allow the US to sell Pakistan embargoed F-16 fighters, but, according to authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, only leads to “a few million dollars being dispatched to a handful of Pakistan-based charities.” The amendment was proposed by Hank Brown (R-CO), chairman of a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The measure is opposed by John Glenn and other like-minded senators strongly against nuclear proliferation, but passes by one vote. Levy and Scott-Clark will comment, “It [the measure] was not a remedy and did nothing to bolster the fragile [Pakistani] democracy that had gone 10 rounds in the ring with the military and its ISI.” [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 265, 513]
Haiti’s government and lawyers for Alerte Belance, a Haitian woman who was assaulted by FRAPH forces during the coup period (see October 31, 1991), seek the FRAPH documents (see (Late October 1994)) from the US. But the US Defense Department refuses to provide them, saying the papers are classified and must first be reviewed before being released. The Haitian government wants to use the documents as evidence in the prosecution of FRAPH members and Belance’s attorneys have subpoenaed them for use as evidence in a lawsuit against FRAPH member Emmanuel Constant who is living openly in the USA, and who has admitted being a paid CIA asset during the FRAPH’s period of military rule in Haiti (see October 14, 1993). Belance’s lawyers say the documents could contain important information about FRAPH’s financing, their weapons, and the crimes they are accused of having committed. In October 1996, the US sends documents to Port-au-Prince, but the Haitian government refuses them on grounds that they are incomplete. [Inter Press Service, 10/10/1995; Amnesty International, 2/7/1996; Amnesty International, 2/7/1996]
US Vice President Al Gore visits Haiti on the one-year anniversary of Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s return to power. During his visit, he meets with President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and stresses the need for his government to comply with the structural reforms which he had agreed to implement in August 1994 (see August 1994). “We discussed the need for continuing international assistance to meet the developmental requirements of Haiti and the steps the government of Haiti and its people need to take in order to ensure the continued flow of these funds,” Gore recounts during a brief press conference. Earlier in the month, Aristide’s government refused to sign a letter of intent assuring the US, IMF, and other donors that the country would follow though with the mandated reforms (see Early October 1995). [Inter Press Service, 10/16/1995; Multinational Monitor, 11/2004]
On a visit to Iran, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto quietly asks Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani about possible nuclear weapons transactions between their two countries. The question is prompted by rumors Bhutto has heard about some kind of nuclear weapons deals between them, and is put to Rafsanjani at a meeting with Bhutto and Pakistani President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari. Bhutto will later say: “I asked Rafsanjani: ‘Is there something going on? Is there a nuclear exchange?’ Rafsanjani looked surprised. He said he suspected it too but he said he knew nothing.” Bhutto will add that she later learns the Revolutionary Guard is the organization responsible for the deal in Iran, indicating Rafsanjani’s profession of ignorance may be genuine. The timing of this meeting is not entirely clear, as Bhutto visits Iran twice around this time, in December 1993 and November 1995. However, she is known to meet with Rafsanjani on November 7 during her second visit. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 255, 511]
At some point in the mid-to-late 1990s, French authorities ask their counterparts in Britain to ban the militant newsletter Al Ansar, which is published in Britain by supporters of the radical Algerian organization Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA). Authors Sean O’Neill and Daniel McGrory will describe the newsletter: “This was handed out at mosques, youth clubs, and restaurants popular with young Arabs. It eulogized atrocities carried out by mujaheddin in Algeria, recounting graphic details of their operations, and described in deliberately provocative language an attack on a packed passenger train and the hijacking of a French airliner in December 1994 which was intended to be flown into the Eiffel Tower.” They add that its past editors “read like a who’s who of Islamist extremists,” including Abu Hamza al-Masri, an informer for the British authorities (see Early 1997 and Before October 1997), Abu Qatada, another British informer (see June 1996-February 1997), and Rachid Ramda, the mastermind of a series of attacks in France who operated from Britain (see 1994 and July-October 1995). The newsletter is also linked to Osama bin Laden (see 1994 and January 5, 1996). However, British authorities say that the newsletter cannot be banned. [O'Neill and McGrory, 2006, pp. 112-113]
The US begins to send Pakistan a series of demarches complaining about its nuclear proliferation activities. The sending of the demarches follows the receipt of intelligence about nuclear deals between Pakistan and North Korea. North Korea’s plutonium program is in abeyance at this time, but it has begun a uranium enrichment project and the US is aware of this. However, according to State Department official Robert Einhorn, Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan is never mentioned in the demarches, at the CIA’s request. The CIA wants Khan’s proliferation network to continue to run and is worried that mentioning him in them would tip him off to what the CIA knows. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 280]
Mohamed al-Owhali, one of the bombers of the US embassy in Nairobi, Kenya (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998), is rendered from Kenya to the US. Al-Owhali was arrested in Nairobi after the bombing and gave up information to local authorities and the FBI about it (see August 4-25, 1998 and August 22-25 1998). He will be tried in the US and sentenced to life in prison (see October 21, 2001). [Grey, 2007, pp. 129, 246]
According to a consular officer later interviewed by the 9/11 Commission, at this time the US Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, begins interviewing “a majority” of male Saudi US visa applicants between the ages of 16 and 40. The officer will say that this is because the consulate is aware of Osama bin Laden, knows he is dangerous, and is concerned about the possibility that Saudi visa applicants might intend to go to the US to participate in terrorist attacks. Al-Qaeda has recently attacked two US embassies in East Africa (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). Although some US officials in Saudi Arabia around this time will later say that they were unaware Saudis could be security threats, the official will call this position “absurd” and “patently ridiculous.” The official will also define how they looked for potential extremists: Saudi applicants who had long beards, a short robe, or other indicators of fundamentalism, and fundamentalist Muslim clerics who want a visa to chant the Koran in a US mosque around the time of Ramadan receive greater scrutiny. In addition, even an applicant who does not look like an extremist but is from a location known to have produced extremists, such as Qassim Province, “and he doesn’t have a good explanation, and he wants to go to the US for an extended stay, that person didn’t get a visa.” These applicants are denied visas under section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which is for use against applicants who are suspected of wanting to immigrate. One of this officer’s colleagues will confirm the interview policy at this time, saying they interview 100 percent of Saudi citizens who are first-time student visa applicants, 80 percent of all students, and five percent of all other Saudi applicants. [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 124-125 ] Around fall 2000 this policy of aggressively interviewing Saudi visa applicants will apparently be scaled back (see Early Fall 2000) by Shayna Steinger, a consular officer who will go on to issue 12 visas to the 9/11 hijackers (see July 1, 2000).
Senior Taliban spokesman Mullah Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil meets diplomats from the US embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, to examine new ways of resolving the problem of Osama bin Laden’s presence in Afghanistan after judicial proceedings against him collapse there (see (October 25-November 20, 1998)). Ahmed expresses his opinion that Taliban leaders are caught between “a rock and a hard place” since, if they expel bin Laden without cause they will have internal problems and, if they do not, they will have external ones due to the US. Ahmed suggests that the Saudis have a key to the solution. Afghan and Saudi religious scholars could convene a joint meeting and issue a ruling that bin Laden had acted illegally, for example by holding a news conference when he was under a communication ban. He could then be expelled without this causing internal unrest in Afghanistan and the problem would be resolved “in minutes, not hours.” The US would be happy if bin Laden were expelled to Saudi Arabia or Egypt, but the Saudis apparently do not favor a joint meeting and the proposal is not acted upon. [US Department of State, 11/28/1998 ]
US President Bill Clinton and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reach an agreement on co-operation between their countries. According to a deal offered by Clinton, the US will refund Pakistan most of the $470 million it owes for a group of F-16 fighters ordered and paid for by Pakistan but never delivered (see August-September 1989). In return, Clinton asks Sharif to close down Pakistani nuclear proliferator A. Q. Khan and his operations, as well as training camps for radical Islamists in Afghanistan that are supported by Pakistan. However, Sharif does not fulfill his end of the bargain, and the Pakistani government continues to support both Khan and the training camps. According to authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Sharif thinks he can get away with the inaction because of Clinton’s preoccupation with the Monica Lewinsky sex scandal and the US’s generally permissive attitude to Pakistani nuclear weapons. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 286]
The CIA appoints Rob Richer as chief of its station in Amman, Jordan. Richer develops what Harper’s journalist Ken Silverstein will call an “extraordinarily close relationship” with Jordan’s King Abdullah. According to Silverstein, the king always remains on good terms with the CIA, which is his principal point of contact with the US in preference to the US ambassador. [Harper's, 9/12/2006]
East Timorese head for the polls and vote overwhelmingly (78.5 percent) for independence. Turnout is estimated at 99 percent, despite there having been intense intimidation from Indonesian troops to discourage voting. Angered by the vote, the Indonesian military-backed, anti-independence militias launch a terror campaign across East Timor, creating approximately 200,000 to 300,000 refugees. The UN evacuates, leaving the East Timorese at the mercy of the Indonesian forces. [John Pilger, 1994; BBC, 9/4/1999; BBC, 11/5/1999; BBC, 11/26/2005]
The US deports Hani El-Sayegh, a Saudi National who is a suspect in the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing (see June 25, 1996), back to Saudi Arabia. [Grey, 2007, pp. 247] The deportation is approved by a US judge. [Washington Post, 10/29/2000]
History - In 1996, el-Sayegh, who had been living in Iran, moved to Kuwait. He later went to Canada, where he cut a deal with American officials that called for him to plead guilty in an unrelated plot against Americans in Saudi Arabia that was never carried out. In 1997, Canada expelled el-Sayegh for suspected terrorist activity. Attorney General Janet Reno allowed him into the United States solely for prosecution under the pact. But after arriving, he said he had not understood the accord, knew nothing about the Khobar attack, and was out of Saudi Arabia when the bombing occurred. Despite this, the Saudis suspected him of being present at the bombing and his brother was held in connection with it, and allegedly tortured in a Saudi jail. [New York Times, 10/12/1999]
Agreement - The deportation follows an agreement between FBI Director Louis Freeh and Prince Naif, Saudi Arabia’s interior minister. Under the agreement, el-Sayagh is returned to Saudi Arabia, and, according to officials familiar with the arrangement, FBI agents will be allowed to watch his interrogation through a one-way mirror and submit questions to his Saudi inquisitors. Washington Post journalist David Vine will comment, “Such practices are sharply at odds with Freeh’s oft-stated message about the FBI’s need to respect human dignity and the tenets of democracy while fighting crime.” Although FBI officials will say a year later they have not seen any indication that el-Sayegh has been tortured, Vine will add, “But agents say privately that when entering a foreign culture to do police work they do not have control over how prisoners are treated and must tread lightly.” [Washington Post, 10/29/2000]
Khobar Towers Attack Could Have Been Prosecuted in US - The Khobar Towers attacks may have been in Saudi Arabia, but were against US nationals, so suspects can be prosecuted in the US. Tony Karon of Time magazine will express surprise at the deportation: “Run that one by again: The United States doesn’t want to try a man suspected of a bomb attack that killed Americans—and they’re sending him home?!” However, the Justice Department apparently thinks there is not enough evidence to try him in the US, and, according to Time correspondent William Dowell, “Clearly, there’s a lower standard of proof in Saudi courts,” so, “It may be easier for Washington if the Saudis handle the trial—and the execution, which would likely follow.”
Possible Geopolitical Motive - According to Karon, an alternative explanation is that geopolitics may be behind the decision: “Sending el-Sayegh… back to Saudi Arabia could solve another touchy problem for Washington.” This is because President Clinton said the US would retaliate against any government that was involved in the attacks, and an Iranian hand is suspected in the bombing. However, according to Time Middle East bureau chief Scott Macleod: “the attack occurred before the election of President Khatami, who has clearly demonstrated a commitment to end state terrorism and normalize Iran’s relations with the rest of the world. Given Washington’s desire to strengthen his reformist government against its hard-line opponents, the US would be unlikely to take military action against Iran unless there were fresh acts of terrorism.” [Time, 10/5/1999]
Political groups opposed to the party of Jean-Bertrand Aristide form the Democratic Convergence, a coalition made up of roughly 200 groups, which is headed by former Port-au-Prince mayor Evans Paul, a previous Aristide supporter and leader of the Convention for Democratic Unity. [Boston Globe, 2/14/2004; Turck, 2/24/2004] The Convergence is a product of the USAID program, “Democracy Enhancement,” the purpose of which is to “fund those sectors of the Haitian political spectrum where opposition to the Aristide government could be encouraged.” Financial support for the Convergence comes from the International Republican Institute (IRI), which is associated with the US government-funded National Endowment for Democracy. The IRI receives about $3 million annually from Congress, as well as millions more from private Haitian and US interests. The organization’s board includes a number of “current or former Republican Party officials, Republican officeholders, or members of Republican administrations.” The IRI’s activities in Haiti are not completely understood and Roger Noriega, the US permanent representative to the Organization of American States, has always refused to elaborate on the organization’s work in Haiti. [Z Magazine, 7/1994; Boston Globe, 2/14/2004; Turck, 2/24/2004; Interhemispheric Resource Center, 2/27/2004; CounterPunch, 3/1/2004]
Eric Newsom, assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, sends a letter to Richard Wilkinson, the director for the Americas at Britain’s Foreign Office, urging the British government to prohibit former inhabitants of the Chagos Islands from returning to any of the islands in the 65-island archipelago. The former inhabitants want to resettle two islands, Salomons and Peros Banhos, which are located about 140 miles from Diego Garcia where a major US military base is located. The letter claims that allowing the islands’ former residents to resettle their homelands “would significantly degrade the strategic importance of a vital military asset unique in the region.” He explains: “If a resident population were established on the Chagos Archipelago, that could well imperil Diego Garcia’s present advantage as a base from which it is possible to conduct sensitive military operations that are important for the security of both our governments but that, for reasons of security, cannot be staged from bases near population centers…. Settlements on the outer islands would also immediately raise the alarming prospect of the introduction of surveillance, monitoring and electronic jamming devices that have the potential to disrupt, compromise or place at risk vital military operations.” He also informs Wilkinson of US plans to expand the base. “In carrying out our defense and security responsibilities in the Arabian Gulf, the Middle East, south Asia and east Africa, Diego Garcia represents for us an all but indispensable platform. For this reason, in addition to extensive naval requirements, the USG is seeking the permission of your government to develop the island as a forward operating location for expeditionary air force operations—one of only four such locations worldwide,” the letter goes on to say. [Guardian, 9/1/2000]
Two consular officers at the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Shayna Steinger and David El Hinn, argue over the eligibility of Saudi citizens for US visas. The consulate had instituted a policy of aggressively interviewing young Saudi males in the wake of the 1998 East African embassy bombings due to terrorism concerns (see (Late August-September 1998)). When El Hinn arrives in Jeddah in August 2000, the consulate is still interviewing a significant percentage of Saudi visa applicants and all first-time students. El Hinn will say that officers are suspicious of Saudi citizens who are from locations where they know extremists live and who have only a vague notion of where they are headed in the United States. In addition, officers at the consulate think that, because of trouble in the Saudi economy, Saudis perhaps should not be getting visas almost automatically. Therefore, El Hinn denies a significant percentage of Saudi visa applicants as well as third-country applicants. Steinger, who works full-time on visas and deals with most of the Saudi applicants, takes a different approach and issues visas to almost all the Saudis who apply for one. Despite the obvious terrorism concerns that had previously been known to US officials in Jeddah, Steinger will say that she is “never really afraid of Saudis” and never makes the connection between the known presence of al-Qaeda members in Saudi Arabia and the possibility that the Saudis applying for visas are terrorists. Steinger believes that El Hinn is denying Saudis visas for what she will call “the wrong reasons,” and the two clash over this. El Hinn is even rebuked by the consul general in Riyadh for his high refusal rate. Nevertheless, El Hinn does not change his practices. Steinger issues 12 visas to the future 9/11 hijackers (see July 1, 2000). [Office of the Inspector General (US Department of State), 1/23/2003; Office of the Inspector General (US Department of State), 1/30/2003; 9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 125-126 ]
After a British court rules that the former inhabitants of the Chagos Islands have a right to return home (see November 3, 2000), the US, which is leasing the archipelago’s largest island, Diego Garcia, says it will not allow the islanders to return to Diego Garcia and will not allow them to use the island’s airstrip. The cost of building an airstrip on one of the other islands would likely cost more than $100 million. Without access to an airfield, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the islanders to resettle any of the islands. [Guardian, 12/13/2000]
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